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BRIDGING JURISDICTIONAL DIVIDES 
 




Ontario, eight Great Lakes states, U.S. tribes, federal agencies in Canada and the United 
States, and the binational Great Lakes Fishery Commission all have a role in Great Lakes fishery 
management, with the non-federal governments retaining primary management authority.  This 
dissertation is about how and why independent (yet interdependent) fishery managers work 
collectively through A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, a non-
binding agreement. This research focuses on what the Joint Strategic Plan means to those who 
participate in the process and relies primarily on semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation to address the central questions:  Why do fishery managers take collective action in 
Great Lakes fishery management?  What do fishery managers hope to achieve when they 
participate in the Joint Strategic Plan?   
 
 The data reveal four facets of Great Lakes fishery management that help explain how and 
why collective action occurs.  First, the history of Great Lakes fishery management illustrates that 
the non-federal governments have a strong sense of jurisdictional independence, which has made 
them sensitive to usurpation of their authority and thus somewhat reluctant to cooperate with each 
other.  Second, fishery managers are part of an “epistemic community,” a group of like-minded 
professionals, and the Joint Strategic Plan gently coerces this community into working together 
and substantially rewards them for doing so.  Third, despite long-standing tensions between the 
federal and non-federal governments, the non-federal members generally trust their federal 
counterparts and work with them synergistically.  Finally, members reject the idea of a binding 
agreement because it would be inconsistent with Great Lakes fishery governance and because 
they feel they can achieve their goals through a non-binding agreement.  These conclusions are 
applied to a case study—a dispute over walleye harvest in Lake Erie in 2004—as a way to 
illustrate how members believe the plan serves their needs even in stressful situations.  This 
dissertation concludes by identifying four overarching themes related to fishery governance 
through the plan—jurisdictional independence, shared strategies and plans, science, and personal 







In the heart of North America lie the five Great Lakes—Superior, Huron, Michigan, Erie, 
and Ontario—and to many, fish are the most alluring feature of these magnificent bodies of 
water.  People love fish.  People love to fish.  Fish are the central thread in the lakes’ fabric.  
Commercial fishing supports jobs; recreational fishing melts away life’s tensions.  Tribal fishing 
is a right in many areas and is the backbone of native communities.  Fish mean a clean 
environment.  The lakes are home to a rich variety of species such as lake trout, walleye, yellow 
perch, sturgeon, American eel, whitefish, salmon, burbot, bass, and bluegill.  Together, the 
commercial, sport, and tribal fisheries bring $4 billion in economic return to the region annually 
(Talhelm 1988).  Canada and the United States have shared the lakes’ fisheries since the region’s 
boundaries were settled after the American Revolution, and because the fish are so important to 
people and the environment, government agencies go to great lengths to manage the resource.  
People in both countries expect fish to be abundant, accessible, and available for future 
generations. 
 Fish are in demand and like any natural resource that is limited yet important to many, 
the Great Lakes fishery is stressed.  As human populations grew with the advent of European 
colonization, and as fishing gear improved, people overfished and fish stocks suffered collapse 
(Bogue 2000).  Habitat loss, invasive species, and water quality degradation also took their toll on 
the resource.  Lake trout, for example, a key native species, suffered overfishing and predation by 
the non-native sea lamprey such that the fishery was closed in 1962; other species, such as several 
types of cisco (a kind of whitefish) were extirpated or driven to extinction due to overfishing, sea 
lamprey predation, habitat loss, and other factors.  Many other fish stocks suffered boom and bust 
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fluctuations.  Since the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1957 (to allow ocean-going 
vessels access to the Great Lakes), an invasive species influx has altered permanently the food 
web, causing considerable harm.  Today, forces like invasive species and habitat loss threaten the 
fishery’s future.   
While all fishers must be resource stewards, government agencies are directly responsible 
for managing the fishery.  Governments strive to ensure benefits for today’s fishers while 
protecting the resource for future use.  As such, federal, provincial, state, and tribal governments 
maintain professional fisheries ministries, bureaus, divisions, or departments and staff them with 
highly trained fishery managers.  The managers are biologists who work with animals to 
understand species interactions, fish behavior, food web fluctuations, and how countless other 
variables affect fish.  They are also diplomats, working with other fishery managers, politicians, 
and the public to balance myriad needs and desires including those of commercial, recreational, 
and tribal fishers; elected officials; and environmental preservationists (Krueger and Decker 
1999).  Managers are expected to master the impossible:  putting all of the biological and political 
pieces together to understand how the elements interact as an ecosystem.  They make and 
implement policies, plan strategies with neighboring jurisdictions, feel political pressures, and are 
the face of government to the public.  Fishery managers make the process work.   
Krueger and Decker (1999, p. 31-32) point out that “the institutional complexity 
surrounding fisheries management increases when natural resources are shared along state or 
provincial boundaries or between countries.”  The Great Lakes region has such institutional 
complexity.  Two nations, eight states, one province, and several U.S. tribes border the Great 
Lakes and each of these jurisdictions, along with the bi-national Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission, has some role in fishery management.  No central authority exists to oversee fishery 
management or to impose regulations.  Instead, management authority is dispersed and rests 
primarily with the non-federal governments—the states, the province, and the tribes.  Because the 
fishery managers from each jurisdiction are accountable to their own government, they are drawn 
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inherently toward acting parochially; working for the narrow interests of or exclusively within the 
boundaries of their particular jurisdiction. 
The human-conceived jurisdictional boundaries are not congruent with biological 
realities, as Great Lakes fish do not observe political borders.  However, just as boundary lines 
carve up the natural ecosystem and invite parochialism, the interconnected fishery unites the 
jurisdictions and makes multilateral interactions all but inevitable.  To help manage within this 
political complexity, the fishery management jurisdictions adhere to a voluntary, consensus-based 
framework known as A Joint Strategic Plan For Management of Great Lakes Fisheries.  The plan 
calls for participants to meet regularly through “lake committees” and “technical committees,” to 
identify and articulate their shared fishery objectives, to share information and data, to develop 
and implement shared plans and objectives, and to fulfill policies in which the jurisdictions hold 
in common.  This cooperative approach to Great Lakes fisheries is referred to as “collective 
action” throughout this dissertation.  The plan is by and for the non-federal managers.  The 
Province of Ontario, each Great Lakes state, and two U.S. intertribal organizations are signatory 
to the plan.  Canadian and U.S. federal agencies have also signed the plan, pledging to work 
within its structures, and the binational Great Lakes Fishery Commission facilitates the plan’s 
implementation.  While the plan does not replace any jurisdiction’s management authority, it is 
intended to improve overall fisheries governance on the Great Lakes by being the way for 
managers to keep communication channels open, to share information, to know one another, and 
to work together to better harmonize the many jurisdictions’ policies.  Figure 6-1 (page 238) 
provides a conceptual diagram of Great Lakes fishery management with an emphasis on A Joint 
Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries. 
This dissertation is about how and why independent (yet interdependent) fishery 
managers cooperate in the biologically and politically complex Great Lakes setting.  It asks Why 
do fishery managers take collective action in Great Lakes fishery management and what do 
fishery managers hope to achieve when they participate in A Joint Strategic Plan for 
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Management of Great Lakes Fisheries?  To address these questions, the dissertation focuses on 
the fishery managers—on their attitudes and behavior—because the members themselves created 
the process and maintain it only so long as it is useful to them.  Understanding Great Lakes 
fishery governance and how and why it functions, therefore, is predicated on understanding the 
fishery managers’ perspectives.  As such, this research draws from 62 semi-structured 
interviews—conduced between February 2004 and April 2005—with Joint Strategic Plan 
participants.  This dissertation’s conclusions are based mainly on the interviews, though it also 
uses other sources of qualitative data including participant observation, case study analysis, and 
document analysis.  Appendix A contains a detailed description of this dissertation’s 
methodologies and methods and Appendix B lists participants in and the questions posed during 
the semi-structured interviews. 
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
 
 Cooperation in Great Lakes fishery management and how and why it occurs are the 
central themes of this dissertation.  Chapter 1 begins by presenting a history of jurisdictional 
authority in Great Lakes fishery management to illustrate that the region’s fishery governance 
regime rests with independent, non-federal governments, which has created a parochial culture.  It 
asks:  What were the forces that thwarted cooperation over shared Great Lakes fisheries and 
what caused the independent jurisdictions to overcome those forces?  Chapter 1 argues that 
parochialism stymied repeated attempts among the jurisdictions to work together from at least the 
mid-1800s through the 1940s.  Cooperation began to emerge after the sea lamprey crisis of the 
mid-twentieth century prompted the formation of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission to address 
the problem and to help coordinate fisheries issues.  Regular information-exchange began in the 
mid-1960s with the formation of permanent lake committees.  Interactions became more strategic 
and formal beginning in the late 1970s during an era of environmentalism and while the non-
federal jurisdictions were under the threat of federal preemption, culminating in the 1981 Joint 
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Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, a plan that still drives the management 
regime.  Chapter 1 establishes that the Joint Strategic Plan is the region’s response to political 
incoherence, sovereignty, sentiments of independence, and jealously guarded authorities.  Crisis 
(the sea lamprey and, later, the threat of federal intrusion) and leadership (the commission as a 
facilitator) led to the development of a cooperative regime.  The Joint Strategic Plan reflects the 
history of Great Lakes fishery management and is structured to respect independence and 
authority while maximizing opportunities for collective action.  Chapter 1 relies on minutes, 
transcripts, and other archival documents; legal sources; interviews; and other historical literature 
to produce a history of the development of cooperation, through the Joint Strategic Plan, in the 
Great Lakes region. 
The theoretical implications of this history of cooperation raise questions about collective 
action and why it occurs; about the relationship between the federal and non-federal governments 
in Great Lakes fishery management; and about the rationale, strengths, and weaknesses of a non-
binding agreement for Great Lakes fishery governance.  These themes are developed in the body 
of the dissertation.   
Chapter 2 looks at the behavior of the individual fishery managers and asks:  How can 
multijurisdictional institutions help independent jurisdictions steer conflict toward cooperation 
rather than competition? How do fishery managers on the Great Lakes organize in a way that 
minimizes the clash between parochialism and collective action and why do fishery managers—
who are accountable only to their own jurisdiction—expend time, energy and resources to 
coordinate fisheries policies?  While the chapter begins with a brief discussion about the 
tendency toward selfishness (in the context of Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons”), it 
centers more on collective action rather than on dealing with allocation of (competition over) 
shared resources.  The literature most relevant to this chapter concerns relationships, rewards, and 
coercion and how they relate to collective action among individuals.  The chapter argues that 
conflict is inevitable over a shared natural resource and that the important issue is whether 
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conflict leads to competition or collective action.  The Joint Strategic Plan is designed to help the 
participants see collective action, not competition, as in their self-interest and, as such, 
established formal processes for regular interactions and relationship building.  The Joint 
Strategic Plan nurtures collective action by relying on the existence and strength of an epistemic 
community, an elite group of like-minded professionals.  The Joint Strategic Plan process gently 
coerces members to adhere to the norms of the community.  Moreover, the process rewards 
participants because interactions with trusted peers are enjoyable, because appropriate ecosystem 
management is professionally and personally pleasing, and because scientifically and politically 
defensible policies create fewer implementation problems in the home jurisdiction. 
Although the non-federal jurisdictions retain primary management authority over Great 
Lakes fisheries, the Canadian and U.S. federal governments and the binational Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission participate actively in the Joint Strategic Plan regime, thus illustrating that 
the relationship among officials from different levels of government is a key feature of Great 
Lakes fishery management.  Political scientist Denise Scheberle (2004) presents a model of 
environmental federalism that characterizes relationships between levels of government as they 
implement environmental policies.  Using her model as a backdrop, Chapter 3 asks: Can an 
institution in a non-federally-dominant region ease inherent federalism tensions?  How do the 
states, the U.S. tribes, and the Province of Ontario work together and with the federal 
governments to identify and implement shared fishery policies?   The chapter argues that U.S. 
non-federal managers are at once suspicious of federal involvement and appreciative of it.  (These 
sentiments were rarely evident among Canadian participants.)  Participants believe the U.S. 
federal agencies involved in Great Lakes fisheries wish to expand their authority at the expense of 
the non-federal governments.  However, members believe the plan helps ease federalism tensions 
and facilitates synergy among levels of government.  As such, the non-federal participants 
generally trust their federal colleagues and rely on federal resources and leadership.  Participants 
also believe the commission’s involvement in the Joint Strategic Plan is appropriate so long as the 
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commission remains neutral and committed to the process and does not attempt to overstep its 
limited authority.  This chapter extends Scheberle’s analysis to a situation—Great Lakes fishery 
management—where the federal government is involved yet not dominant and concludes that 
because of trust among officials and an active process to work together, the federal-non-federal 
governments engage in what Scheberle describes as a “pulling together and synergistic” 
relationship, a highly desirable state.   
Multijurisdictional agreements are usually designed to prompt or compel certain behavior 
among the signatory members.  Agreements come in many forms and in varying degrees of 
strength.  Some are binding and some are not.  Chapter 4 asks Under what circumstances are 
non-binding agreements preferable to binding agreements?  Why do Joint Strategic Plan 
members prefer a non-binding agreement and how do participants use the agreement to enhance 
the likelihood that policies developed under it will be implemented?  Literature related to 
sovereignty, institutions, agreements, and implementation are reviewed to understand the 
strengths, weaknesses, and application of binding and non-binding agreements.  The Great Lakes 
fishery regime is then considered in the context of this literature to identify and discuss the 
conditions on the Great Lakes that warrant a non-binding agreement and to extend the literature 
to this regime.  This chapter argues that a non-binding fisheries agreement is most appropriate for 
the Great Lakes region because members must preserve jurisdictional autonomy, policies must be 
flexible, and members wish to work together to promote ambitious policies rather than to 
constrain behavior.  As such, the members believe that the types of policies that emerge from a 
non-binding agreement are more valuable than those that would come from a binding agreement.  
Participants also prefer a non-binding agreement like the plan because it contains meaningful 
mechanisms to enhance the chances of implementation, negating the need for an intrusive binding 
agreement. 
Chapter 5 consists of a single case study—walleye management in Lake Erie—that 
looks at a situation that tested the plan’s ability to manage conflict in a non-binding fashion.    
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Walleye management can be contentious on Lake Erie because the species is valuable 
economically to both Canada and the U.S. and because harvest methods vary markedly between 
the two nations—the Canadians harvest walleye commercially and the Americans recreationally.  
Unlike the other lake committees, the Lake Erie Committee uses the Joint Strategic Plan process 
to establish walleye harvest quotas, known as total allowable catch (TAC).  Most of the time, the 
Lake Erie Committee can agree on and adhere to a TAC.  However, the committee failed to 
maintain consensus on the 2004 TAC after consensus was achieved and announced.  The 
committee could not resolve the dispute on its own and, in late 2003, invoked the Joint Strategic 
Plan’s dispute provisions, a rare occurrence.  This chapter asks: What is the mechanism for 
dealing with conflict when there are no binding enforcement provisions?  How did the 
participants understand the walleye dispute as it occurred?  How did the non-binding plan help 
the committee members resolve their dispute?  This chapter argues that the concept of consensus, 
the existence of an epistemic community of scientists, and other factors are critical to building the 
trusting relationships necessary to make the TAC process function.  Moreover, the plan, though 
mostly designed to facilitate non-distributional policies, nevertheless can address distributional 
issues like TACs, despite being non-binding.  Members believe the plan’s dispute resolution 
mechanisms can help them address serious contention. This chapter relies on interview data and 
draws upon Lake Erie Committee documents, minutes, and reports to create a new source for 
understanding TAC-setting processes as they apply to the operations of lake committees. 
Together, these chapters present an emergent picture of Great Lakes fishery governance 
under the Joint Strategic Plan, which is outlined in Chapter 6.  Today’s Great Lakes fishery 
management regime is a direct product of the region’s history and the jurisdictional realities that 
resulted in primary management authority resting with the non-federal governments.  The non-
federal jurisdictions have a deep culture of independence, and the general unwillingness to 
cooperate or to cede authority contributed to poor, uncoordinated management despite the 
interconnected nature of the ecosystem.  Crisis and leadership prompted the jurisdictions to 
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establish permanent mechanisms for cooperation.  This chapter concludes that diffuse political 
authority, non-federal autonomy, a strong interest in interdependence, the threat of federal 
preemption, the existence of an acceptable third party to facilitate cooperation, and a mutual 
interest in strategic planning are the conditions that led to the development of the plan and explain 
why the plan is the way it is.  Respecting jurisdictional autonomy, reliance on shared strategies 
and goals, basing decisions on science, and developing strong relationships among the 
participants are the plan’s key design elements, and the impact of these elements on the plan’s 
durability and replicability are discussed. 
This research will demonstrate that the Great Lakes fishery management regime is 
remarkable not just because the members respect each others’ authority, but also because they see 
political independence as a strength—as a way to leverage resources and take collective action.  
The regime is remarkable not just because it keeps the federal governments at bay in a non-
federally driven situation, but also because it helps the federal and non-federal governments draw 
upon each others’ capabilities to develop and implement meaningful, strategic management 
activities.  The regime is remarkable not just because it is rooted in a non-binding agreement, but 
also because the plan’s voluntary strategies enhance the likelihood that the members will 
implement it without needing an overbearing “stick” to enforce.  Great Lakes fishery 
management is science-based and cooperative, not naïve or provincial.  Joint Strategic Plan 
meetings are dynamic and cutting edge, not routine or banal.  Participants today operate in a 
culture of cooperation that was missing for much of the region’s history.  This dissertation is 
about the fishery managers-diplomats and how they have self-organized into a collegial, strategic, 






TRANSCENDING DIFFUSE POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
 




Jurisdictional authority over Great Lakes fishery management rests with independent, 
non-federal governments—the Province of Ontario, the eight Great Lakes states, and U.S. 
tribes.  This independence undermined repeated attempts by the jurisdictions from at least 
the mid-1800s to the 1940s to coordinate their disparate fishery management activities.  
Cooperation began to emerge after the sea lamprey invasion reached crisis stage by the 
1940s and thus forced collective action, after the non-regulatory Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission was formed in the 1950s and served as a focal point for discussions, and 
after the commission created lake committees in the 1960s.  The threat of federal 
intrusion into non-federal management, the commission’s continuing leadership, and the 
spirit of an era of environmentalism in the 1970s prompted the jurisdictions to formalize 
their interactions by developing A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes 
Fisheries in 1981.  With a history of parochialism as a backdrop, chapter 1 discusses how 
and why a cooperative regime emerged and argues that today’s fishery management 
process is rooted in political fragmentation, sovereignty, sentiments of independence, and 
jealously guarded authorities.  Cooperation was prompted by crisis and leadership and the 
structure and goals of the Joint Strategic Plan reflect the history of Great Lakes fishery 




 In the late 1700s and early 1800s, during the period of European colonization, the Great 
Lakes region was a key battleground for control of North America.  World powers fought each 
other, colonists, and native peoples for the right to control the region and out of these conflicts 
emerged political boundaries that eventually defined the domains of Canada, the United States, 
eight U.S. states, several tribes, and the Province of Ontario.  This patchwork of boundaries 
carved up the region politically, and many of today’s borders reflect events and decisions of more 
than 200 years ago.  Each of the non-federal jurisdictions would retain, attain, or affirm its right 
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to control the fisheries in its waters, yet because the waters are interconnected, such political 
diffusion would lead to major problems when jurisdictional management philosophies differed 
and when resources became scarce.  Indeed, the multitude of independent governments, each with 
its own philosophies and constituent pressures, led to inconsistent, ineffective, and injurious 
fishery practices, reflecting a long history of parochialism and uncooperative behavior. 
The region’s history helps explain the emergence of institutional arrangements to help 
manage the shared Great Lakes fishery, culminating in the 1981 Joint Strategic Plan for 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries.  This chapter asks:  What were the forces that thwarted 
cooperation over shared Great Lakes fisheries and what caused the independent jurisdictions to 
overcome those forces?  What regime did the jurisdictions establish to help them reach their 
shared goals?  As this chapter will argue, the existence of many non-federal jurisdictions, 
coupled with strong management authority at the non-federal level and opposition to overarching 
management institutions, contributed to decades of uncoordinated management of the shared 
Great Lakes fishery.  This diffuse authority created intense jurisdictional independence and left 
the region’s governments ill-equipped to respond to some of the biggest challenges the basin 
faced, particularly as the lakes became more polluted and as the fishery declined.  Despite their 
best efforts at multijurisdictional conferences, binational boards of inquiry, interstate agreements, 
and even treaties, the jurisdictions were unable (and mostly unwilling) to harmonize their fishery 
regulations and install some degree of coordinated management.   
As is often the case with environmental management, crises prompted action, and the 
invasive sea lamprey, which ravaged the fishery at a basinwide level starting around the 1920s, 
proved to be the major catalyst for the establishment of an overarching institution, the Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission.  Being the only cross-cutting fishery body on the lakes, the 
commission was to assume some level of leadership in coordinating multijurisdictional action.  
This commission was granted little in the way of direct management authority and, as such, was 
perceived as relatively neutral (i.e., unable to intrude upon non-federal management authority).  
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This neutrality was essential in convincing the jurisdictions that they could both cooperate 
through the commission’s structures and retain their independence.   
The commission formed lake committees in the 1960s to help the jurisdictions meet on a 
regular basis.  With these lake committees, the jurisdictions grew comfortable with information 
sharing.  In the 1970s, another crisis in the non-federal jurisdictions’ eyes—the potential 
strengthening of outside authorities—prompted a shift from information sharing to strategic 
planning through a more-structured arrangement, A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of 
Great Lakes Fisheries. As in the 1960s, the jurisdictions would acknowledge that some 
overarching entity—again, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission—would be critical to helping 
them achieve their shared goals.  Thus, in the two major instances when the jurisdictions became 
organized—in the 1960s and in the early 1980s—agencies acknowledged that cooperation would 
not come automatically; that an appropriate institution was needed to keep them committed to 
working together.  The Joint Strategic Plan, by being a non-binding, strategic agreement, reflects 
the region’s history and institutional realities.  The plan is formulated to suit the Great Lakes 
region’s needs and unique conditions. 
The Joint Strategic Plan emerged after a slow but continuous development of a culture of 
cooperation.  This chapter traces the roots of federal, state, provincial, and tribal fishery 
management authorities and presents a history of cooperation in Great Lakes fishery 
management, dividing management into four eras of progressively improving cooperation, 
culminating in the still-in-effect Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries.  
The chapter concludes by presenting the details of the Joint Strategic Plan, describing the 
functions of the cooperative regime, and presenting the theoretical lessons from this history.  This 
chapter relies on semi-structured interviews with Joint Strategic Plan participants (see Appendix 
A) to understand the history of Great Lakes fishery governance, the motivations for the 
development of the Joint Strategic Plan, and the substance of the plan.  This chapter also uses 
primary documents (minutes and reports starting in the 1940s) and literature to understand 
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cooperation and the emergence of cooperative structures.  Finally, this chapter uses legal 
documents (such as laws and treaties), and literature to understand the management authorities of 
each type of jurisdiction. 
 
AUTHORITY DISPERSED:  FEDERAL, STATE, PROVINCIAL, TRIBAL, AND 
BINATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OVER THE GREAT LAKES FISHERY 
 
Following the American Revolution, the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain 
affirmed the boundary between Canada (then a British Territory) and the United States.  As the 
treaty stipulated, the international boundary was to run through the center of the Great Lakes: 
It is hereby agreed and declared, that the following are, and shall be their boundaries . . . 
a line due west  . . . into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the 
communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie, through the middle of said 
lake until it arrives at the water communication between that lake and Lake Huron; 
thence along the middle of said water communication into Lake Huron; thence through 
the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior; 
thence through Lake Superior northward of the Isles Royal and Phelipeaux, to the Long 
Lake . . . .  (Anonymous 1783) 
 
At the time of the treaty (as now), it was well-accepted that when two nations border an inland 
lake, both countries would be entitled to their share of the natural resources (Piper 1967).  
Subsequent to the Treaty of Peace, the U.S. Northwest Ordinance of 1787 allowed for up to five 
new states to be added to the Great Lakes region as westward expansion occurred, in addition to 
the three states already established (five states were in fact added) (Bogue 2000).  While the 
young American government and the European powers agreed to the region’s boundaries, native 
peoples were displaced (Ferguson 1979), only to have their sovereignty recognized later through 
treaties (Busiahn 1985; Flanagan 2000).   
As a result of the boundary decisions during the late 1700s and early 1800s, two nations, 
eight states, the Province of Ontario, and several tribes border the lakes (figure 1-1).  Through 
enumerated powers, ownership rights, court cases, precedent, and legislation, each of the non-
federal jurisdictions would retain and attain the authority to manage its section of the resource, 
though with some federal involvement as well.  These authorities are generally understood and 
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accepted, though they are not always exclusive.  That is, the areas of authority do not always have 
concrete edges, though the non-federal authority is largely supreme to the federal authority in 
Great Lakes fishery management.  The following sections provide an overview of the various 
authorities and how they were derived. 
  
Canadian federal, provincial, and Aboriginal authorities:  awkward, ambiguous 
arrangements 
 
The Canadian federal and provincial authorities over Great Lakes fisheries are deeply 
intertwined, with an added involvement of the Aboriginal First Nations.  While Ontario takes the 
lead in Great Lakes fishery management, the relationship is complex, as the federal government 
Figure 1-1:  The Great Lakes political jurisdictions within the lakes system.  (Headquarters for the 
Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission (GLIFWC) and the Chippewa-Ottawa Resource 
Authority (CORA) shown.) 
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retains, but delegates, authority to the province (Harrison 1996).  Article VI, § 91 of the British 
North America Act (BNA) of 1867 (the Canadian Constitution) lists freshwater fisheries 
management and conservation—which includes Great Lakes fisheries—as a federal power 
(Ollivier 1962).  It also grants the federal government authority to protect fish habitat, including 
water quality.  The federal government exercises this authority through its Fisheries Act 
(Dochoda 1999; Government of Canada 2004; Harrison 1996).  This act authorizes the federal 
government to conduct law enforcement (§ 5), issue fishing licenses in unlicensed areas (§ 7), 
construct fishways around obstructions (§ 20), protect fish habitat (§ 35), and promulgate fishery 
regulations, including regulations governing conservation, harvest quantity, harvest methods, fish 
marketing, licensing, and inter-provincial commerce (Government of Canada 2004; Lamb and 
Lybecker 1999; Rideout and Ritter 2002).   
Although the BNA grants the federal government considerable power over freshwater 
fisheries management, Ontario’s role in Great Lakes management is far more substantial.  Much 
of Ontario’s authority derives from the fact that the provinces own the natural resources within 
their boundaries (Bogue 2000; Gibson 1973; Harrison 1996), including the fish.  BNA Article 
VIII, §§ 109 and 117 grants to the provinces ownership of (and the rights to royalties from) “all 
lands, mines, [and] minerals” (Ollivier 1962; Thompson 1974).  Article VI, § 92 enumerates 
provincial powers, giving them the right to legislate property issues and manage provincial lands.  
Provinces are also given meaningful powers to raise revenues and manage commerce (Thompson 
1974; Vaughan 2003).  These BNA sections, along with two court cases—Dixon v. Snetsinger 
(Dixon v. Snetsinger 1873) and R. v. Moss (R.v. Moss 1896)—affirmed that the provinces—not 
the federal government—own the lake beds.  With lake bed ownership comes ownership of the 
waters that flow above them and the fish that inhabit those waters (Piper 1967).   
Property ownership also includes the ability to grant access to the property and to benefit 
from royalties (Bogue 2000; Harrison 1996; Thompson 1974).  By owning the lake bed, Ontario 
has the power to grant people the right to fish.  It took Ontario some time to establish those rights 
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and authorities.  Prior to the late 1800s, the federal government exerted strong management 
authority over inland fisheries by virtue of its enumerated powers under BNA § 91.  The first 
major court case addressing provincial management rights, The Queen v. Robertson (R. v. 
Robertson 1882) established that managing non-tidal waters (including the Great Lakes) was the 
purview of the owner (Thompson 1974), in this case, the province.  In the Fisheries Reference of 
1898, Ontario challenged the federal government’s authority to issue fishing licenses, claiming it 
was a breach of the province’s ownership rights, as established by the BNA.  The court concluded 
that fish appropriation fell under the province’s property rights, not the federal government’s 
enumerated authority to manage the fishery (A.G. (Canada) v. A.G. (Ontario) 1898).  Other court 
cases asserted that while the federal government could constrain provincial actions through its 
conservation powers, in doing so, the federal government had to demonstrate that the action did 
not infringe upon provincial property rights (Thompson 1974). 
As time went by, the practical implications of court decisions and agreements between 
levels of government was such that the provinces would determine who could fish, how they 
could fish, and how much they would pay to fish while the federal government would implement 
policies to conserve and protect the resource, to prevent fisheries loss, to conduct law 
enforcement, and to protect habitat (Thompson 1974).  Jurisdictional overlap remains large 
(Gibson 1973) and authorities are not always exclusive.  To complicate the matter, the 
governments distinguish between commercial and recreational fishing in how regulation occurs.  
A fish caught commercially is considered property and, therefore, is regulated by the province 
(Brown et al. 1999), thereby giving the province leeway to expeditiously install commercial 
regulations.  Recreational fishing, on the other hand, is considered both a property matter (i.e., 
granting access to the fishery) and a conservation matter (the tools for regulating recreational 
fishing—bags limits—are considered conservation tools).  Conservation is a federal responsibility 
while granting access is provincial. Thus, both levels of government are involved in recreational 
regulations (Rideout and Ritter 2002).   
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Enumerated powers and ownership, thus, justify both federal and provincial authority 
over the Great Lakes fishery.  To make this awkward situation workable, Ontario and the federal 
government agree that Ontario shall establish the fishery regulations and then refer the 
regulations to the federal government for assent.  The federal government incorporates those 
regulations into the federal Fisheries Act and Ontario then implements the act (Dochoda 1999; 
Lamb and Lybecker 1999).  This arrangement, while complex, has been largely amenable to both 
sides and allows for the two levels of government to operate under the unique situation that the 
BNA and court cases created (Gibson 1973). 
 Just as the federal-provincial relationship is complex, so is the relationship between 
those governments and tribal First Nations, particularly as they relate to the First Nations’ 
authority to manage fisheries.  Courts have ruled that provincial and federal regulations do not 
inherently deny tribal access to fish, thus limiting the direct role Canadian tribes can play in 
fisheries management.  Indian lands of British North America were sold to Britain starting in 
1764 through a series of treaties or agreements with the Aboriginal peoples (Surtees 1986).  The 
Robinson Treaties of 1850 guaranteed the tribes “full and free privilege . . . to fish in the waters 
[now ceded by them] as they have heretofore been in the habit of doing” (Duhamel 1964a; 
Duhamel 1964b; Surtees 1986).  The Robinson Treaties were followed by a series of eleven 
numbered treaties (entitled Treaty 1, Treaty 2, etc.) that facilitated the sale of large parcels of land 
throughout Canada to the Crown (Cloutier 1957a; Cloutier 1957b; Duhamel 1966; Flanagan 
2000).  Most of those treaties also included fishing and hunting rights, though, as in Treaty 3, 
they also included the caveat that the rights would be “subject to such regulations as may from 
time to time be made by Her Government of Her Dominion of Canada” (Duhamel 1966).   
 Despite these treaties, Canadian federal and provincial powers limit the Aboriginal 
authority to exercise their fishing rights.  The 1990 case R. v. Sparrow (R. v. Sparrow 1990) 
was a major ruling that clarified the meaning of § 35 (1) of the Constitution Act of 1982, which 
explicitly recognized and affirmed Aboriginal treaty rights.  The Sparrow decision held  
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that fishing regulations were established to manage fisheries, not to limit Aboriginal rights, and 
that federal regulatory authorities to manage fisheries were valid.  The court added, “there is 
nothing in the Fisheries Act or its detailed regulations that demonstrates a clear and plain 
intention to extinguish the Indian aboriginal right to fish.”  The evolution of First Nations’ policy 
does not mean the tribes are powerless to influence management.  The Sparrow  decision did 
remind government of its responsibility to protect Aboriginal fishing rights.  To protect the rights, 
government must ask whether the regulations are reasonable, do not impose undue hardship, or 
do not infringe on Aboriginal rights in a major way.  Government must also consult with 
Aboriginal peoples if there is to be a chance their fishing rights would be violated.   
 As often happens in Canada, agreements facilitate policy execution.  In the case of 
relations with First Nations, Ontario negotiates fishery management agreements, like an 
agreement between the province and the Saugeen Ojibway governing commercial fishing around 
the Bruce Peninsula of Lake Huron.  Under this agreement, the First Nations are responsible for 
monitoring commercial harvest and the tribal and provincial biologists agree to share data and 
make joint recommendations on harvest quotas (Payne 2005).  In addition to agreements, First 
Nations—individually and collectively—implement fishery biology and monitoring programs. 
 
U.S. federal, state, and tribal responsibilities:  acting pursuant to enumerated authorities 
 
 As in Canada, the U.S. federal, state, and tribal authorities are intertwined, though the 
lines of responsibility are somewhat clearer than in Canada.  The states and tribes, like the 
Province of Ontario, retain primary management authority over their fishery resources, though the 
federal government does have significant—albeit mostly unused—powers to influence fishery 
management.  While ownership and enumerated powers define authority in Canada, in the United 
States, courts first couched, then abandoned, authority based on ownership and instead derived 
authority mostly from enumerated powers. 
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Throughout the United States, including in the Great Lakes basin, the states and tribes 
have well established authority to manage fish and wildlife, especially the animals that remain 
entirely within their boundaries.  One basis for state management authority is simply how the 
borders were set in the Great Lakes region.  A common principle when dividing territory is that 
inland lakes are treated differently from oceans.  While the international border runs through the 
middle of four of the five Great Lakes (all but Lake Michigan), state boundaries extend to the 
international border (Bogue 2000; Piper 1967), thus no international waters exist in the basin 
(Piper 1967).  Great Lakes boundaries stand in contrast to oceanic coastal areas where state 
jurisdiction ends three miles from the state’s shores.  The fact that state boundaries extend to the 
international border allowed states to deny the existence of federal waters and assert the authority 
over Great Lakes’ lake beds, waters, and the fish of those waters (Piper 1967). 
Early court decisions ruled that states owned the fish and game.  The 1845 Supreme 
Court case Pollard v. Hagan affirmed state ownership of waters and lake beds by stressing that 
such ownership was a time-tested tenet of law; a right that preceded the Constitution (Dochoda 
1999; Howard [1845] 1901; Killian and Beck 1987; Piper 1967).  Subsequent cases—particularly 
the 1877 case McCready v. Virginia and the 1896 case Geer v. Connecticut—upheld state 
ownership, though Geer, as discussed below, would be overturned (Davis 1896; Killian and Beck 
1987; Otto [1877] 1901). 
 State ownership of lake beds helped to establish non-federal authority to manage 
fisheries, but during the twentieth century, courts shifted from basing natural resource cases on 
ownership to basing cases on enumerated powers (Zorn 2005).  Consequently, while states 
maintained their management authority, the federal government asserted its constitutional powers 
to play a role in hitherto exclusive state fishery affairs.  In the 1920 case Missouri v. Holland  
(Knaebel 1920), the Supreme Court upheld a treaty—the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (USGPO 
1918)—allowing federal management of migratory birds despite Missouri’s argument that the 
state owned the wildlife.  The court ruled that since the Constitution granted the federal 
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government treaty-making authority, the federal power could supersede the state authority 
(Holmes 1920; Killian and Beck 1987; Knaebel 1920; Moore 1965; Willoughby 1979; Zorn 
2005).  The Missouri case did not deny the fundamental right of states to manage resources, 
rather, it said that there may be times when the national interest is more important than a state 
interest, thus allowing federal involvement (Willoughby 1979).  In 1948, in the Supreme Court 
case Toomer v. Witsell (Wyatt 1948), the court further backed away from earlier ownership 
decisions, referring to state ownership as “fiction” (Killian and Beck 1987) and the 1979 case 
Hughes v. Oklahoma (Lind [1979] 1981) essentially ended the state ownership issue, specifically 
overturning Geer.  In Hughes, the court stated that assertions of ownership could not prevent the 
federal government from exerting its powers, in this case, commerce powers (Killian and Beck 
1987; Zorn 2005).  
Clearly, while state management authority was not revoked, the state claim of exclusive 
authority based on ownership would not stand if the federal government chose to exercise its 
powers.  The Clean Water Act (USGPO 1972), the Endangered Species Act (USGPO 1973), the 
Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES [1973] 1979), and other 
new laws of the 1970s, for example, set the stage for federal involvement in environmental 
matters previously left up to the states.  These acts, plus pre-1970s federal fisheries legislation 
like the Federal Aid in Sportfish Restoration Act of 1950 (USGPO 1950) and the Anadromous 
Fish Conservation Act of 1965 (USGPO 1965), provide the federal government with mechanisms 
to involve itself in Great Lakes fisheries and to restrict state actions.  However, even with these 
federal laws, federal involvement in state fishery matters is far from inherent and certainly not 
absolute or exclusive.  Important to the non-federal jurisdictions is the fact that the Constitution 
does not directly grant the federal government the power to manage fisheries.  The Tenth 
Amendment grants authorities not expressly vested in the federal government to the states.  
Authority over fish, wildlife, and natural resources is not an express power given to the federal 
government and, therefore, it is retained by the states.  While many natural resource issues are 
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multi-state matters, and while the courts have ruled that strong federal powers—such as 
regulating commerce, protecting habitat, managing navigation and entering into treaties—could 
overrule state authorities (Zimmerman 2005), state authority to manage its natural resources, in 
the Great Lakes region has nevertheless remained relatively intact. 
U.S. tribal authority is also relatively strong and has grown during the previous three 
decades.  Tribes, being sovereign, hold authority to manage the fisheries of their waters.  The 
tribal role in Great Lakes fishery management is far more developed in the United States than in 
Canada and, as such, tribes in some areas have a management role similar to the states.  Tribal 
authority, in its most basic form, is rooted in the 1832 Supreme Court decision Worcester v. 
Georgia (Peters [1832] 1901), where the court affirmed that an Indian tribe is a political power 
with authority of self-governance and the ability to execute a broad range of responsibilities 
including taxation and tribal property management (Cohen 1988). 
Until 1871, the U.S. federal government addressed Indian issues through treaties with 
individual tribes.  These treaties are the foundation for tribal fishing rights and some management 
authority.  Authority exists in two main areas:  on-reservation and off-reservation.   The U.S. 
Department of Interior in 19361 affirmed that on-reservation authority was consistent with the 
tribes’ broad rights of self-governance (Cohen 1988).  Tribes can maintain exclusive fishing 
rights on-reservation; other fishing laws (e.g., state laws) are generally not applicable (Busiahn 
1985).  On off-reservation lands (known as “ceded” or “sold” lands, which include adjacent 
waters), tribal fishing rights are usually found in the treaties covering the transfer of the ceded 
lands.  In waters adjacent to ceded lands, tribes can regulate their members, though other non-
Native fishers have access to the waters as well and are subject to state regulations.  Several 
treaties between the U.S. federal government and the various tribes affirm tribal fishing rights in 
Great Lakes’ waters and provide a foundation for tribal management.  In the Treaty of March 28, 
                                                 
 
1 Op. Acting Sol. I.D., M. 28107, June 30, 1936 (Cohen, 1988, fn 174, p. 285). 
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1936, with the Ottawas and Chippewas, for instance, the tribes ceded portions of the northern 
lower peninsula and eastern upper peninsula of Michigan (including waters of lakes Michigan, 
Huron, and Superior) to the United States, while retaining the right to hunt and fish on the ceded 
lands (including the waters of adjacent Great Lakes) (Anonymous 1873).  A treaty of 1842 with 
the Chippewa Indians included a similar cession of Lake Superior waters in Wisconsin (GLIFWC 
2006; Kappler [1904] 2006; Mattes et al. 2005). 
With the tribal rights to fish on and off reservation in the Great Lakes region affirmed, 
tribal management authority evolved through a series of court cases and agreements with state 
governments.  From the time of the Indian treaties of the 1800s to around the 1960s, Native 
American fishers did little to assert their management rights in ceded waters.  During this period, 
Native fishers purchased fishing licenses from the states and conformed to state harvest 
regulations (Chiarappa and Szylvian 2003).  In the 1960s and 1970s, the tribes revisited the still-
valid treaties and began to assert their rights.  In Michigan, the cases People v. Jondreau 
(Michigan Supreme Court 1971) in 1971 and People v. LeBlanc (Michigan Supreme Court 1976) 
in 1976, and the Voight case in Wisconsin (United States Court of Appeals 1983) re-affirmed 
Indian rights to fish in ceded waters without a state license (Chiarappa and Szylvian 2003; Zorn 
2003).  After these cases, tribal authority to issue licenses to their members would be protected 
and tribes would have the ability to block state regulations in the ceded waters should tribes 
demonstrate the ability to regulate their members effectively and uphold the state’s conservation 
goals (Busiahn 1985; Schlender (undated); Zorn 1989).  The landmark 1979 case U.S. v. 
Michigan (United States District Court 1979) re-affirmed tribal activities in ceded waters, noted 
that the state does not have exclusive management authority in the ceded waters, and said that 
state regulations over tribal fishing would be invalid. 
 While each of the individual tribes that signed treaties with the U.S. federal government 
retain the rights stated in the treaties, the tribes formed two inter-tribal organizations in the United 
States to consolidate tribal expertise.  These two organizations—the Chippewa-Ottawa Resource 
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Authority (CORA, formerly the Chippewa-Ottawa Treaty Fishery Management Authority), 
headquartered in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, and the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife 
Commission (GLIFWC), headquartered in Odanah, Wisconsin—exercise powers delegated to 
them by their individual tribal members.  These organizations support biologists, law enforcement 
officers, policy-makers, and public information officers who develop the fisheries policies for off-
reservation waters on behalf of the component tribes. 
Tribal authority overlaps in many respects with state authority, as both states and tribes 
regulate harvest, conduct assessment activities, enforce regulations, and undertake many similar 
day-to-day activities in the same waters.  That is, both states and tribes regulate fisheries, just not 
exclusively.  In ceded waters, state management authority is limited to what is necessary to 
conserve the resource; tribal regulations (for instance, tribal licenses) may supersede state 
regulations if the tribes have an effective system of self-governance that supports resource 
conservation.  To work through this potentially difficult and confusing situation, the states and the 
tribes together develop and adhere to fishery agreements.  In the waters covered under the Treaty 
of 1836, a “Consent Decree” (an agreement between tribes, Michigan, and the federal 
government mandated by the U.S. v. Michigan decision), outlines where, when, and for what 
species tribal fishers can fish; who licenses fishers; how top species shall be managed; and how 
enforcement shall be coordinated (United States District Court 2000).  The consent decree 
requires periodic re-negotiation among the State of Michigan, the relevant tribes, and the federal 
government, under the oversight of a judge.   In other ceded waters of the Great Lakes (which are 
only in Lake Superior), further agreements (such as court orders for tribal consensus on state 
management decisions and comprehensive protocols for state and tribal committees) define tribal, 
state, and federal management spheres (Zorn 2003).  
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Based on history, court decisions, and the Constitution, state and tribal authorities are 
generally delineated.  The states and the tribes: 
• Establish and enforce harvest regulations; 
• Issue fishing licenses; 
• Stock recreational fish (primarily states though some tribes as well); 
• Undertake various fishery rehabilitation initiatives; 
• Carry out assessment activities; 
• Undertake measures to protect habitat; and 
• Protect against invasive species. 
 
The federal government: 
• Conducts scientific assessments and collects fisheries data; 
• Implements treaties; 
• Regulates endangered species; 
• Assists with restoration of native species; 
• Mediates multi-state disputes; 
• Controls the interstate transportation of harmful species; 
• Protects against invasive species; and 
• Maintains tribal trust responsibilities. 
 
Binational coordination:  The Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
 
The federal, provincial, state, and tribal authorities are today fairly clear and established, 
and a bi-national fishery institution—the Great Lakes Fishery Commission—also exists on the 
Great Lakes to assist in fishery management, though as the next section will illustrate, the 
formation of this institution was hard-fought.  For many decades, cross-border cooperation was 
irregular, and while many people strongly believed an overarching institution for Great Lakes 
fishery management would help make the many disparate management policies more uniform, 
the U.S. states were reluctant to surrender any of their authority to a bi-national institution 
(Fetterolf 1980).  The destructive sea lamprey in the mid-twentieth century, and the need to 
control the predator basinwide, ultimately convinced the jurisdictions that a binational institution 
was warranted.  Sea lampreys invaded the Great Lakes through shipping canals and quickly 
spread throughout the system. Sea lampreys attach to fish with a suction cup mouth ringed with 
 
 25
sharp teeth and feed on the fish’s blood and body fluids.  Sea lampreys decimated the Great Lakes 
fishery and significantly reduced the commercial harvest.  By the late 1940s, harvest of lake trout, 
a keystone species, had fallen by 99% from the average catch of the 1930s (Fetterolf 1980).  
The sea lamprey crisis was severe and the federal and non-federal governments alike, 
under pressure to fix the problem, realized that only a coordinated approach would be effective.  
While the states, the province, and the federal governments had relatively defined authorities in 
the basin, a response to sea lampreys would not be effective if it were simply left up to each 
jurisdiction to operate within its waters; sea lampreys were an international problem (Smith and 
Elliott 1952).  The Canadian and U.S. Federal governments decided to address the sea lamprey 
problem through a treaty.  The treaty—the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries (U.S. 
Department of State)—was signed September 10, 1954 by the two nations and created the Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission.2  Not wanting to upset the defined state, provincial, and federal 
authorities, the governments gave the commission limited responsibilities.  The treaty expressly 
prohibited the commission from encroaching on other jurisdictions’ authorities, stating the 
convention “does not change the established rights and jurisdiction over the fishery held by the 
                                                 
 
2 The Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, which created the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, did not 
affect or amend the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which created the International Joint Commission, 
the other bi-national treaty organization on the Great Lakes.  The International Joint Commission remained 
responsible for water levels and, particularly since the 1970s, water quality. 




riparian states, the federal government of Canada, and the Province of Ontario” (U.S. Department 
of State).  The treaty did give the commission powers to: 
1. formulate a research program “designed to determine the need for measures to make possible the 
maximum sustained productivity of any stock of fish in the Convention Area;” 
2. coordinate the implementation of the research program, or to carry out research; 
3. make recommendations to the governments based on the research findings; 
4. develop and implement a sea lamprey management program; and 
5. publish scientific studies. 
 
These duties reflect the strongest duties the non-federal jurisdictions were willing to accept and 
are a compromise based on lessons learned from previous attempts to establish a binational 
commission for Great Lakes fisheries.  The duties are mostly related to improving biological 
understanding (research duties) and implementing programs that the non-federal governments did 
not have the capacity to address (sea lamprey control). 
The commission consists of four members from each country plus one alternate from the 
United States.  The Canadian commissioners are appointed directly by Privy Council; the U.S. 
commissioners are appointed by the President and do not require Senate confirmation.  The treaty 
allows the commission to operate independently of any federal, provincial, state, or tribal agency 
and, in fact, the commissioners actively manage the program and are accountable to the Privy 
Council and the President for their performance.  Despite this independence, the convention does 
urge (though does not mandate) the commissioners to use existing government agencies in the 
discharge of its duties.  As such, the commission contracts its on-the-ground sea lamprey control 
program to Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  The 
commission also works in cooperation with the U.S. Geological Survey for sea lamprey research 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the design and construction of physical sea lamprey 
control structures, such as barriers and traps.  The commission works closely with the provincial, 
state, and tribal governments to ensure that its program is consistent with their objectives and 
respective of their fishery protocols.  By having limited authority, the commission did not alter 
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the spheres of authority for fishery management in the Great Lakes basin nor did it centralize 
regulatory responsibilities in an overarching agency. 
Table 1-1 lists detailed responsibilities of the basin’s primary fishery agencies and figure 
1-3 illustrates the authority of each type of Great Lakes jurisdiction. 
 
DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ROLE IN GREAT LAKES FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
Binational 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
• Formulate and conduct sea lamprey control (in partnership with Canadian and U.S. federal 
agencies) 
• Coordinate fisheries research 
• Publish research 
• Support budget initiatives 
• Make recommendations to governments about fish stocks of common concern 
• Facilitate A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries at the request of 
non-federal jurisdictions 
• Participate in the technical committees 
Canada—Federal 
• Trust responsibility for tribal First Nations 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
• Serve on the technical committees  
• Conduct sea lamprey control, under the direction of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
• Restore habitat 
• Permit habitat alteration 
• Conserve fisheries (in cooperation with Ontario) 
• Conduct fisheries research 
• Conduct invasive species research and policy 
• Contribute to the development of fish community objectives, state-of-the-lake reports, and 
other plans. 
• Conduct law enforcement 
Department of Foreign Affairs Support bi-national initiatives, primarily the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries. 
Canada—Provincial 
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources 
• Serve on the lake committees and technical committees 
• Establish commercial harvest regulations 
• Implement the federal Fisheries Act 
• Issue fishing licenses 
• Permit private stocking of recreational fish 
• Undertake native species restoration 
• Carry out assessment activities 
• Conduct law enforcement 
Canada—First Nations 
Individual tribes 
• Establish regulations on-reservation, so long as they do not contradict the Indian Act 
• Negotiate suitable fishing regulations with the Province of Ontario 
• Conduct fisheries assessment and monitoring 
United States—Federal  
• Trust responsibility for tribes 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(Department of Defense) 
• Contribute to technical committees 
• Construct physical structures to control sea lampreys, under direction of the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission 
• Restore fish habitat through the Great Lakes Fishery and Ecosystem Restoration Program, 
in partnership with the states and tribes 
• Conduct environmental restoration and mitigation 
U.S. Department of State • Support bi-national initiatives, primarily the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries 
• Assist in brokering law enforcement agreements 
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DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ROLE IN GREAT LAKES FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(Department of Interior) 
• Serve on the technical committees 
• Conduct sea lamprey control, under the direction of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission  
• Restore native species, in cooperation with the states and tribes 
• Fund fishery projects through the Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act 
• Conduct invasive species research and policy. 
• Contribute to the development of fish community objectives, state-of-the-lake reports, and 
other plans 
• Conduct law enforcement 
U.S. Geological Survey 
• Serve on the technical committees  
• Carry out forage-base assessment 
• Conduct sea lamprey research, under the direction of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
• Conduct fishery research 
• Contribute to the development of fish community objectives, state-of-the-lake reports, and 
other plans 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (Great Lakes 
Environmental Research Laboratory—
Department of Commerce) 
• Contribute to technical committees 
• Conduct fishery research (particularly on the dynamics of the food web) 
• Carry out invasive species research 
• Contribute to the development of fish community objectives, state-of-the-lake reports, and 
other plans 
United States—States 
Departments of natural 
resources/environmental quality for the 
states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin 
• Serve on the lake committees and technical committees 
• Establish harvest regulations 
• Issue fishing licenses 
• Stock recreational fish 
• Undertake native species restoration (including the rearing, stocking, and regulation of 
harvest of native fish) 
• Carry out assessment activities 
• Protect and restore habitat 
• Conduct law enforcement 
United States—Tribal 
Individual tribes, and operating 
collectively through the Chippewa-
Ottawa Resource Authority and the 
Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife 
Commission 
• Serve on the lake committees and technical committees  
• Manage on-reservation fisheries 
• Issue tribal fishing licenses in ceded (off-reservation) waters under treaties with the U.S. 
Federal Government and pursuant to agreements with states 
• Conduct biological assessments 
• Manage invasive species (in cooperation with other the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
for sea lamprey and other agencies) 
• Conduct law enforcement 
• Undertake fisheries research 
• Restore native species 
Table 1-1:  Binational, federal, provincial, state, and tribal fishery management authority, by 








POLITICAL INCOHERENCE AND DECLINE OF THE FISHERY 
 
The diffusion of fishery management authority among many jurisdictions in the Great 
Lakes basin created an air of sovereignty and independence that for more than a century inhibited 
a basinwide approach to fishery management.  Indeed, with the many independent jurisdictions, 
each with its own authority and political will, the history of Great Lakes fishery management is a 
history of parochialism, unilateral action, false starts at cooperation, good intentions, failed 
agreements, and frustration.  Also, as human use of the Great Lakes’ resources intensified, the 
jurisdictions found themselves ill-equipped or unwilling to manage the fishery cooperatively.   
The Great Lakes region is endowed with abundant water resources, making it an historic 
center for settlement, growth, and manufacturing (Beeton et al. 1999; Dempsey 2001; Ray et al. 
1991).  Along with economic growth and prosperity came damage to the Great Lakes’ 
environment:  forests were logged, wetlands were drained, prairies were turned into farmland, 
urban areas grew.  Prior to European settlement, native peoples were the primary exploiters; non-
native peoples fished the lakes since they settled the region (Regier 1999).  Important species 
such as lake trout, whitefish, burbot, chubs, walleye, and yellow perch, dominated commercial 
and tribal fishing.  (Appendix C includes a list of the key species of each Great Lake.)  Serious 
exploitation began in the 1840s (Bogue 2000) and by 1872, when the federal governments 
completed the first long-term report on commercial fishing, the fishery was already stressed and 
in decline (Bogue 2000).  As boats, gear, and technology improved, the amount of fish harvested 
increased. By the late 1800s, commercial fishermen were observing—and contributing to—major 
declines in catch, a sign of overexploitation (Dempsey 2001).  “Between 1850 and 1893, 
commercial fishing on the Great Lakes evolved into a wasteful, exploitative . . .  industry” which 
was more “profit-oriented” and “market-driven” than driven by conservation or sustainability 
(Bogue 2000, p. 42).  Pollution, invasive species, and habitat impairment (including physical 
destruction of streams particularly associated with sawmill and lumbering operations) also 
contributed to the decline of fish populations (Dempsey 2001). 
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 The fishery continued to deteriorate into the twentieth century.  The commercial lake 
trout catch peaked around the turn of the century, but by the late 1940s, had fallen by 99% from 
the average catch of the 1930s (Fetterolf 1980).  The commercial lake trout fishery was closed in 
1962 (Baldwin et al. 1979; Pycha and King 1975).  Over-exploitation and sea lamprey predation 
were the primary causes for the collapse of the lake trout fishery.  Several other native species 
declined significantly or were extirpated from Lakes Michigan, Huron, Erie, and Ontario (Lake 
Superior has not lost a species), including ciscoes (whitefish), blue pike, sturgeon, and Atlantic 
salmon (Cudmore 1999).  Overharvest, changes in the food web’s composition (caused by 
invasive species), pollution, and habitat loss all contributed to the decline of the Great Lakes 
fishery (Eshenroder 1987; Hansen 1999; Hile et al. 1950; Jensen 1978; Krueger and Ebener 2004; 
Zint et al. 1995).   
 The large number of government authorities, each with an independent right to manage 
its fisheries, resulted in incoherent policies.  Said historian Margaret Beattie Bogue (2000, p. 
332):   
The divided jurisdiction over the fisheries of the Great Lakes led to almost 
insurmountable obstacles to conservation efforts.  While partition does not always mean 
stalemate, in this case the division of the waters hamstrung the state or provincial and 
national efforts to control the exploitation of the fish resource, a constraint recognized as 
increasingly important beginning in the 1870s as parts of the whole failed effort to find 
ways to control aggressive overfishing. 
 
Bogue’s history of Great Lakes fishing from 1833 to 1933, and data reports from the fishery 
assessments at the time, indeed describe an era of rapidly depleting fish stocks caused by over-
exploitation and a lack of political will to regulate (Bogue 2000; Cobb 1916; Hinrichs 1913; Joslyn 
1905; Willoughby 1979).  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, each jurisdiction dealt 
with its own political mix of legislators and special interests, a mix that usually thwarted fishery 
regulation (Bogue 2000; Willoughby 1979).  The U.S. jurisdictions tended to favor fisheries 
propagation (stocking) to bolster the fish stocks instead of imposing regulations on commercial 
fishing (Bogue 2000).  The Canadians tended to support regulations and enforcement and were 
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aggressive in undertaking measures to conserve the fishery resources by appointing fishery 
officers, establishing a system of licensing, closing fishing seasons when necessary, regulating 
fishing gear, protecting fish habitat, and specifying size limits.   
 Some level of recovery, prosperity, and ecosystem integrity has emerged since the 1950s, 
primarily after sea lamprey control began.  Commercial fishing has held steady in Canada and 
decreased in the U.S. between the 1930s and the 1970s (Brown et al. 1999), while sportfishing 
has boomed, starting in the 1960s.  Management practices, such as commercial harvest limits, the 
introduction of new species of sport fish (e.g., Pacific salmon, steelhead trout), enhanced 
investments in harbors and boat-access ramps, and sea lamprey control, contributed to a surge in 
new sport anglers (Bence and Smith 1999; Regier 1999; Tanner and Tody 2002).  The combined 
recreational, tribal, and commercial fishery is worth up to $4 billion annually to the people of 
Canada and the United States (Talhelm 1988), though these economic benefits still depend on 
careful, intense, and often costly management actions to propagate the fishery and protect it from 
sea lampreys.  This degree of recovery and the relative stability occurred because of federal and 
non-federal support for fisheries departments and concerted efforts to rehabilitate stressed 
fisheries.  These efforts would have been difficult or impossible without cooperation among the 
various authorities, as no single government had the authority or the resources to affect lakewide 
or basinwide change.  As the next section will argue, cooperation was slow to evolve, but it did 
develop, propelled by crisis and leadership. 
 




The wide assortment of approaches to fishery management, and lenient enforcement of 
what few regulations there were, did little to conserve the fishery or to build trust among the 
people who fished the lakes.  The situation bred resentment among the Canadian commercial 
fishers, who did not like the fact that they were regulated while the Americans were not, and a 
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feeling of futility among the fishery managers, as hard-won regulations in each jurisdiction were 
rarely reciprocated (Kuchenberg and Legault 1978).  The frustration over political incoherence 
and the resulting fishery decay prompted repeated attempts to coordinate policies and repeated 
calls for federal or binational preemption over non-federal authority.  The non-federal 
governments and industry resisted any regulations or loss of authority and instead tried time and 
again to work together to harmonize their activities voluntarily.  However, in the absence of any 
overarching authority to compel or nurture cooperation, the interest in protecting independence 
proved to be more powerful than taking collective action. 
Efforts to bridge jurisdictional divides in fishery governance3 fall into four broad eras:  
(1) 1883 to 1942, characterized by improvised conferences, a lack of governance institutions, and 
failed attempts at agreement; (2) 1943 to 1963, characterized by the emergence of cooperative 
committees and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission; (3) 1964 to 1980, characterized by the 
maturation of lake committees as a way to share information; and (4) 1981 to the present, 
characterized by strategic cooperation through A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great 
Lakes Fisheries.  Progressing through these eras, the jurisdictions went from relying on ad hoc, 
politically insincere conferences to adopting strategic plans that institutionalized interactions, 
retained individual jurisdictional authorities, and created a culture of cooperation that grew over 
time.  Along the way, the jurisdictions considered—and rejected—calls to approve sweeping 
treaties and binding agreements.  Table 1-2 (page 66) lists the many conferences and outcomes 
that characterize the four eras, and figure 1-3 (page 69) illustrates the evolution of cooperative 
committees and agreements from the 1880s to the present. 
The discussion of these four eras will show several key theoretical issues surrounding 
multijurisdictional governance.  First, when many jurisdictions each have independent 
                                                 
 
3 The governments of Canada and the United States successfully bridged divides in water quantity and 
(particularly since the 1970s) water quality governance through the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 
which created the International Joint Commission, a sister agency to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission. 
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management authority over the same resource, some force, whether it be a crisis, an institution, or 
a paradigm shift in management philosophy (or a combination of these factors), helps prompt 
cooperation.  Second, jurisdictions cooperate and retain their independence when a perceived 
neutral authority (e.g., the Great Lakes Fishery Commission) guides the process and respects 
authorities.  Third, the regime to guide cooperation on the Great Lakes (the Joint Strategic Plan) 
is self-organizing, represents jurisdictional independence, and reflects the history and 
jurisdictional realities of the Great Lakes region.   
 
1883 to 1942:  Improvised conferences, false starts, and attempts at agreement 
   
 Beginning in 1883 and continuing at a regular pace for nearly 60 years, the jurisdictions 
convened no fewer than 27 international and interstate conferences, and the federal governments 
signed one international treaty, in an attempt to create a permanent mechanism for cooperative 
Great Lakes fishery management.  During this era, the jurisdictions individually devoted ever-
increasing resources to fishery management, they improved science, and they refined their fishery 
management techniques (Nielsen 1999).  However, they rarely cooperated with each other.  
While the states and the province arranged meetings from time to time to share ideas and to try to 
coordinate their policies, their interest in cooperation did not last far beyond meeting-
adjournment.  As such, the federal governments, academicians, and, at times, the non-federal 
jurisdictions themselves repeatedly called for a strong, regulatory authority on the Great Lakes.  
Governments failed to create such an authority for three main reasons:  the states were unwilling 
to cede management authority to the federal governments or to a binational institution (Fetterolf 
1980); the federal governments were unwilling to allow states to enter into binding agreements 
with foreign governments (Dochoda 1999; Zimmerman and Wendell 1951); and non-federal 
fishery managers were unable or unwilling to persuade their legislatures to implement the 
recommendations of the many conferences and meetings (Gallagher et al. 1942).  This suggests 
that in the absence of a force or a motivation to cooperate, governments with independent 
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authority will remain interested in protecting their authority, even when cooperation might be 
beneficial to all parties. 
 The first official statement stressing the need for cooperative fishery management came 
from the State of Michigan in 1875 when the state observed that uniform laws governing the 
fishery would be desirable.  In 1879, Michigan called for a federal commission to help the states 
coordinate their policies (Gallagher et al. 1942), and while such a commission would not be 
established until 1892, the states did begin a series of multilateral fisheries meetings and 
conferences, starting in 1883, to share information, promote fish hatcheries, develop 
recommendations, and attempt to make uniform the disparate regulations.  These meetings were 
mostly ad hoc and informal and except for small bits of action in one or two legislatures, nothing 
much came of recommendations from the meetings (Bogue 2000; Gallagher et al. 1942; U.S. 
Congress 1937). 
 One of the main barriers to harmonizing non-federal regulations was the disparate 
philosophies and policies for Great Lakes fisheries throughout the basin.  Governments rarely 
licensed commercial fishers in U.S. waters and state regulations were piecemeal.  Political 
pressures were such that state regulations lasted hardly more than a few years anyway, making 
effective fishery management all the more difficult.  Establishing uniform regulations across the 
states would be near-impossible, considering individual states could not even establish effective 
and lasting regulations for their own waters.  Furthermore, states that did not wish to acquiesce to 
other states’ regulations had a habit of agreeing to shared regulations and then abandoning them 
(and, of course, casting appropriate blame) when another jurisdiction could not live up to its end 
of the agreement (Willoughby 1979). 
While the states and the province were trying (and failing) to coordinate their activities 
through ad hoc meetings, the idea of federal preemption proceeded down a parallel track.  The 
Canadian and U.S. federal governments retained strong treaty-making powers, powers which 
could take priority over state and provincial authorities (Willoughby 1979).  Also, the federal 
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governments, by virtue of their authority to manage interjurisdictional issues and regulate 
commerce, felt they could leverage authority away from the non-federal entities.  Spurred on by 
academicians and others who observed inadequate state regulations, the federal governments 
attempted to create agreements and institutions that would heighten overarching control at the 
expense of the non-federal governments.  In 1892, a joint commission to investigate water issues 
observed the lack of uniform regulations and recommended a permanent international body.  This 
recommendation was not widely appreciated, as it would have intruded upon state management 
authority (Bogue 2000).  Five years later, in 1897, another international commission, looking at 
border issues, recommended a binational treaty—the Inland Fisheries Treaty of 1908—for the 
Great Lakes fishery and a permanent commission to promulgate regulations.  Such a treaty was 
offered in 1908 but withdrawn in 1914 after the non-federal governments opposed it vehemently 
as a usurpation of their management authority (Fetterolf 1980; Piper 1967).4   
                                                 
 
4 About this time, in 1909, Canada and the United States successfully ratified the Boundary Waters Treaty 
of 1909, a major agreement that, among other things, created the International Joint Commission, a 
governance body to implement the treaty.  The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which is still in effect, 
focused on water management along the entire Canadian/U.S. border, considering the heavy use of water 
for navigation, industry, power, and agriculture (Bogue 2000).  Water problems—both quality and 
quantity—were growing in importance to the two nations around the turn of the twentieth century; the 
focus on water tended to relate to human health and use rather than to fish health, thus there were few overt 
discussions connecting fisheries and water issues during this period. 
The question arises as to why Canada and the United States did not simply combine the two 
treaties, given the major interest from both governments at the time in establishing joint agreements about 
both water and fisheries.  The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the proposed Inland Fisheries Treaty of 
1908 were likely kept separate for several reasons.  First, the scope of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 
was much larger than the Great Lakes, as the treaty covered the entire Canadian/U.S. border.  Agreements 
about the Great Lakes fishery would have been out of place in the larger Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.  
Second, the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 likely focused entirely on powers explicitly granted to the 
federal governments through their constitutions.  At the time—as today—navigation and regulating water 
levels was a clear federal responsibility while fisheries were—as today—in the domain of the non-federal 
governments.  Thus, it would have been difficult to marry the two ideas easily and still maintain the support 
needed for the approval of a combined treaty.  Third, the governments then—as is often the case today—
likely simply kept the issues separate, not fully cognizant of the connection between water quantity, water 
quality, and fisheries.  Governments often compartmentalize laws and institutions and set them up to 
address specific issues (Holling 1995), and the interest in keeping fisheries and water separate should not 
be surprising.  .   
Historian Margaret Beattie Bogue (2000), in her book Fishing the Great Lakes, provides a 
discussion about the debates leading to the proposed Inland Fisheries Treaty of 1908 and a brief discussion 
about the forces that prompted the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.  She offers little indication that the 
governments considered merging the two treaties or even that either treaty was discussed within the context 
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This era of little to no cooperation persisted because many independent jurisdictions—
each with its own suite of politics, constituents, needs, and philosophies for management—were 
responsible for managing their portion of the resource and had little incentive to give up 
authority.  With no overarching authority to force or persuade the jurisdictions to cooperate, each 
proceeded to manage in its own way for decades.  Revealingly, governments at all levels 
recognized the need for cooperation: time and again they attempted to meet together, harmonize 
regulations, and move in a unified direction.  However, each time, the jurisdictions’ independent 
will to manage their own waters, to appease their own constituents, and to ignore the wishes of 
other jurisdictions overrode the perhaps good intentions to coordinate actions.  Since neither 
whole-scale crisis nor overarching authority existed during this era to encourage collective 
behavior, the jurisdictions had no compelling incentive to cooperate and, thus, continued on a 
course of parochialism.   
 
1943-1963:  Crisis and leadership—Cooperation takes root 
 
Crisis and the emergence of a coordinating institution helped bring an end to the era-of-
no-cooperation.  A commitment to information-sharing and cooperative action would emerge 
from this era because the jurisdictions would come to realize that they had no choice but to work 
together; fishery problems grew too severe for them to manage their waters independently and 
still expect fish to be available.  Cooperation emerged in the 1940s because of the need to address 
the sea lamprey on a basinwide level and the need to share information and resources to restore 
the fishery ravaged by the sea lamprey and other problems.  This emergence of cooperation 
received a boost in 1956 with the formation of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission as an entity 
the jurisdictions could turn to to help them maintain ongoing interactions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
of the other.  Future research into the origins of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, whether fisheries 
were discussed within that treaty’s context, and whether any discussion occurred about merging the 
proposed Inland Fisheries Treaty of 1908 and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 would likely yield more 
definite answers about why the two treaties followed separate paths. 
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By the mid-1940s, the managers were coming to realize that a lack of uniform regulations 
was the least of their problems.  The fishery was being systematically destroyed not only by 
overfishing and habitat loss, but also by an insidious predator, the sea lamprey, an invader from 
the Atlantic Ocean.  By the mid-1940s, sea lampreys were abundant in the system and were 
playing havoc on the fisheries.  Sea lampreys regularly migrated across political boundaries 
(Smith and Elliott 1952) and the fishery’s future depended on a unified, concerted effort to 
control the pest.  Governments were in a race against time to come up with a way to manage the 
lamprey and restore the lake trout and other species, lest the fishery and environment be 
decimated. 
Yet another interstate conference, held in Madison, Wisconsin, in 1943, recommended 
the creation of institutions—in this case, two ad hoc committees, the Lake Trout Committee and 
the Sea Lamprey Committee—to address the basin’s major problems.  Unlike previous 
recommendations, however, these committees would actually be formed (in 1946 and 1949 
respectively) and would persist (Anonymous 1946).  These two committees comprised 
representatives from the Great Lakes states, the Province of Ontario, and the federal governments.  
The primary intent of the committees was information sharing, particularly as agencies responded 
to the lake trout and sea lamprey problems.  During the 1949 Lake Trout Committee meeting, for 
instance, participants discussed a lake trout stocking schedule and protocols for individual efforts 
to mark stocked fish5 (Anonymous 1949).  The participants also used the meeting to keep each 
other abreast of their particular agency’s activities.  Ultimately, the lake trout and sea lamprey 
committees would merge into the Great Lakes Fishery Committee (and later, morph into the 
Upper Great Lakes Fishery Committee, as the lower lakes did not have as large a stake in the 
issue).  Although attendance at these meetings was sporadic and although they focused on the 
                                                 
 
5 When fish are stocked into lakes, managers often mark the fish by clipping a fin so that the hatchery 




upper Great Lakes where the sea lamprey and lake trout problems were most pronounced, these 
committees were the first multijurisdictional committees to meet regularly.  Cooperation, 
however limited in subject and scope, had begun. 
In addition to the Great Lakes Fishery Committee, agencies in 1951 formed a binational 
ad hoc committee on Lake Erie—called the Lake Erie Fish Management Committee.  This 
committee was intended to help participants discuss the “essentials” of Lake Erie fishery 
management, including the role of regulations, marketing, harvesting, hatcheries, and research 
(Anonymous 1952; GLFC 1951).  (An ad hoc Lake Ontario Committee, consisting of 
representatives from New York and Ontario, also existed around that time, but no minutes from 
those meetings were retained.)  While the agencies intended the Lake Erie Fish Management 
Committee to be temporary until the federal governments formed a treaty organization to regulate 
(GLFC 1956), no treaty organization was formed.  By 1955, the Lake Erie Fish Management 
Committee became formalized and government participation grew significantly.  Later, the 
meetings would include the public (GLFC 1955).  This committee was the early progenitor of the 
lake committees, formed by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission in the 1960s. 
Just as these new committees were in their formative stages, the Canadian and U.S. 
federal governments waged one last-ditch effort to create an overarching regulatory institution for 
the Great Lakes fishery.  In 1946, the two governments signed a treaty to create a binational 
commission with the power to prepare sweeping Great Lakes fishery regulations, though the 
regulations would be enforced by the non-federal governments (Bogue 2000; Piper 1967; Truman 
1946).  Like the proposed Inland Fisheries Treaty of 1908, states opposed this treaty strongly 
because the commission it created would usurp their management authority.  “As a result 
[President Truman] withdrew the treaty from the Senate and did not ratify it” (Piper 1967, p. 44).  
This would be the last attempt to create a bi-national, regulatory body on the Great Lakes.  
While the need to promulgate common fishery regulations was lessened with the 
emergence of the sea lamprey and lake trout committees, the sea lamprey invasion stressed the 
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need for strong Canadian and U.S. federal action, as the non-federal governments were unable 
(and still uncoordinated enough) to manage the problem.  Thus, despite the fact that the Lake 
Trout, Sea Lamprey, and Lake Erie Committees continued to function, the idea of a binational 
treaty for the Great Lakes did not go away, though the failed treaties of 1908 and 1946 convinced 
governments that any binational agreement could not be regulatory or preemptive of non-federal 
management rights.  Officials believed the federal governments should establish an institution 
with the authority to manage sea lampreys and (probably more importantly to the non-federal 
jurisdictions) provide the funds to carry out the program.  This authority needed to be clear and 
distinct from the other management authorities and it needed to be binational.  Consequently, the 
governments in 1954 successfully negotiated and ratified the Convention on Great Lakes 
Fisheries, which created the Great Lakes Fishery Commission in 1956.  This new binational 
institution’s authority did not approach the regulatory powers granted in the preceding un-ratified 
treaties (U.S. Department of State).  Non-federal entities widely supported this convention 
because the commission would manage a common pest, a pest that the non-federal governments 
had neither the funds nor the means to address.  Beyond its sea lamprey management authority, 
the commission could not compel a jurisdiction to do anything, though the convention did 
envision the possibility of the commission playing a coordinating role saying “[t]he commission 
may seek to establish and maintain working arrangements with public or private organizations for 
the purpose of furthering the objectives of this convention” (U.S. Department of State).  This 
provision allowed the commission to softly lead coordinated actions, to form permanent 
multijurisdictional committees, and later to justify the commission’s role in facilitating A Joint 
Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries at the request of the non-federal 
jurisdictions. The formation of the commission essentially ended the debate about whether there 
would be an authoritative body on the lakes to promulgate regulations or exert centralized 
authority over the non-federal entities.  No such body would be created.  Instead, the approach 
would focus on voluntary, on-going cooperation. 
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 For the remainder of the 1950s and through the first half of the 1960s, the Great Lakes 
Fishery Committee and the Lake Erie Fish Management Committee blossomed.  Attendance grew 
and the meetings became more encompassing.  Participants produced written and oral reports 
about agency activities, and they used the meetings to learn what the other jurisdictions were 
doing, what regulations they were promulgating, and what research they were conducting.  While 
participants did not initially use this process to develop shared management plans, they did use 
the process as a way to interact regularly and share information.  (For examples of agendas see 
GLFC 1958a; GLFC 1958b; GLFC 1959.)  These committees were persistent and put an end to 
the many failed attempts at regular meetings among the management jurisdictions.  The sea 
lamprey crisis helped jolt the jurisdictions into thinking beyond their borders and helped create a 
commission with the authority to deal with the problem on a basinwide level.  The commission, 
in its enabling treaty, was also encouraged to do what it could to bring the jurisdictions together 
to share information and coordinate their activities.  Clearly, the committees were becoming more 
 
Figure 1-4:  Negotiators of the 1954 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries.  
Photo:  Great Lakes Fishery Commission. 
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useful to the individual management agencies who participated in the process, with research and 
information needed to aid management as a key focus.  With the commission given the go-ahead 
to bring the agencies together, regular cooperation among the jurisdictions was becoming 
common. 
  
1964-1978:  Interactions become routine—The era of lake committees 
 
  Although the new Great Lakes Fishery Commission was not established to harmonize 
regulations, the commission quickly became the focal point for cooperation and scientific 
exchange, as it was the only basinwide, binational fisheries body on the Great Lakes.  The 
commission’s stature would prove to be important, as the commission, by 1964, realized that the 
goodwill of the agencies to meet was not enough to maintain cooperative relations.  Cooperation 
needed to be structured and managers needed to expect some business to take place through a 
committee process.  The commission thus formed permanent lake committees in 1964 and, in 
doing so, made interactions expected and on-going.  It took leadership—not a compelling stick—
to encourage the jurisdictions to work together. 
 While the Great Lakes Fishery Committee and the Lake Erie Management Committee 
continued to meet, they were still limited to particular areas of the basin and focused on a 
relatively narrow suite of issues.  Indeed, the upper Great Lakes had a committee just for lake 
trout and sea lamprey (important issues, but not comprehensive) and the lower lakes had a 
committee just for Lake Erie.6  Specific committees for the other lakes did not exist.  Moreover, 
the committees lacked formal sanction from the management jurisdictions and instead were, in 
the words of Dr. Ferguson, an official from the Province of Ontario in 1962, “an amorphous 
group of research and management people with no official status as representatives” (GLFC 
1962, p. 13-14).  As meetings became more routine and scientific, high-level administrators 
                                                 
 
6 Lake Ontario had a committee as well in the early 1950s, but it is unclear how regularly that committee 
met, as no minutes are known to exist. 
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stopped attending (GLFC 1963).  This lack of status did not bode well for cooperation, and some 
questioned whether senior officials would continue to take the cooperation seriously in the 
absence of committee charters.  For instance, Norman Baldwin, chair of the Lake Erie Fishery 
Management Committee (and also executive secretary of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission), 
wondered out loud during the 1963 committee meeting whether the committees were continuing 
to serve a useful function considering the senior administrators’ waning interest (GLFC 1963). 
The following year, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission sensed the committees were 
losing momentum and concluded they needed to be formalized if they were to survive and serve a 
useful purpose.  As such, the commission established committees for each lake “to strengthen the 
work of the States and Province in administering the fishery and to further the objectives of the 
Commission” (GLFC 1964, p. 7-8).  According to the commission’s internal rules, “each 
committee shall consist of a senior staff member from each agency administering the fishery, 
assisted by experts and advisors from all agencies concerned” (GLFC 1965a, p. 11).  Although 
the lake committees would comprise state and provincial fishery managers, they were, at the 
outset, established to advise the commission and help it discharge its research and advisory 
mandates.7  The commission stressed that the existence of the committees would “in no way 
infringe on the responsibilities of the other agencies [i.e., the province and the states] concerned 
with the fishery” (GLFC 1964, p. 8). 
The lake committees met for the first time in 1965 and, according to the meeting 
summaries (GLFC 1965a), were established to: 
• provide a forum for agencies to coordinate their management programs; 
• serve as means for agencies to keep each other informed of changes in regulations and about each 
others’ management practices; 
• help the agencies explore uniformity in regulations, where appropriate; 
• assemble a group of fishery experts who could assist the fishery commission in the execution of its 
program; 
                                                 
 
7 One interviewee for this research pointed out that this was the commission’s way of saying it did not have 
the resources to do its job and, thus, needed to tap into state and provincial expertise. 
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• serve as a way for the commission to communicate its program and needs to the management 
agencies; and 
• be a place to consider matters referred to the committee.  (See appendix V of 1965a for descriptions 
of each lake committee's charge.) 
 
Commission executive secretary Norman Baldwin explained to the new lake committee 
members that the commission was responsible for formulating and leading Great Lakes fishery 
research and making recommendations on measures to improve the shared fish stocks.  As such, 
the committees would help bring the commission “in closer touch” with the resource and with 
agency management activities (GLFC 1965b).  While this suggests that the lake committees were 
originally established to serve the commission, Baldwin also added that the lake committees 
should feel free to use the process to deal with any matter it chose (GLFC 1965b). 
During the ensuing decade after the lake committees were formed, the committees 
focused less on being advisory bodies to the commission and more on being forums for 
information exchange and reporting among the state and provincial jurisdictions.  The Lake 
Superior Committee agenda for 1968, for example, illustrates the types of things members 
discussed during a typical lake committee meeting: 
I. Agency reports about the status of fish populations 
a. Sea lamprey 
b. Lake trout 
c. Salmon 
d. Lake herring 
e. Whitefish, rainbow trout, walleye, alewives, chubs, etc. 
 
II. Jurisdictional reports on current management measures 
a. Sea lamprey 
b. Commercial fishing regulations 
c. Sport fishery 
d. Planting (stocking) schedules 
 
III. Agency monitoring of fish stocks and research 
 
This agenda is nearly identical to the agendas of the other lake committees; the format changed 
little throughout the rest of the 1960s and the 1970s.   
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   During interviews (described in Appendix A) with many early lake committee members, 
several recall the meetings being mostly a mechanism for information exchange and not so much 
a process capable of handling crises, developing shared policies, or advancing science on the 
Great Lakes, though they often used the process to come to agreement on how hatchery-reared 
fish would be allocated.  The meetings were useful as a way to share information but beyond that 
they inspired little strategic action.  The committees were not used, for example, as a means to 
develop uniform regulations, were not used to develop shared fishery objectives for management, 
or were not used to develop and seek consensus about implementation of operational fishery 
management plans.  The lake committees lacked scientific work groups or focused 
subcommittees and, if anything, the lake committees of this era slipped into a simple routine of 
agency reporting.  Said one lake committee member from this era, describing the meetings, “You 
give your report at the meeting, you sit down, [you think] ‘aw Jesus, when is this thing going to 
end?’”  Said another participant, the early lake committees were so focused on jurisdictional 
reports that they were “very turf oriented.” Although the meetings were not entirely strategic, 
they were still vastly different from the region’s parochial history as they served to encourage the 
jurisdictions to interact and helped the managers expect not only to get information from 
colleagues but also to give information.  The main contribution of the early lake committees, thus, 
was to create an ongoing process of interactions among like-minded professionals and to begin 
the development of a culture of cooperation in the region. 
 
1978-Present:  A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries  
 
 Great Lakes fishery management, and the process to facilitate cooperation among many 
jurisdictions, began to change in the mid to late 1970s when the “ecosystem approach to 
management” became popular.  While managers likely had no unifying concept of what 
ecosystem management entailed, generally, such an approach recognized the need to manage 
fisheries across boundaries and to take more than the fish (e.g., habitat, water quality, prey 
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organisms, etc.) into account when considering management initiatives.  The 1970s was an era of 
environmentalism in Canada and the United States and officials at all levels of government were 
motivated to take action to protect and restore the Great Lakes.  At the same time, this was also 
an era of new exertion of federal authority, as intense public concern over the environment 
prompted a suite of new federal laws in the United States and Canada to respond to some of the 
most far-reaching problems the nations faced (Hoberg 1997; Kraft and Vig 2006; Mazmanian and 
Kraft 1999).  The possibility of increased federal activities on the Great Lakes, and a strong 
interest among the jurisdictions in planning their initiatives more purposefully, prompted the 
jurisdictions to move from information sharing to strategic thinking, lest their management 
authority be weakened by other levels of government.  The spirit of this era, the coming-of-age of 
the ecosystem approach to management, and a non-federal interest in taking steps to protect their 
authority through more-coordinated management, helped prompt the fishery management 
agencies and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission to together develop A Joint Strategic Plan for 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries in 1981. 
Past and current lake committee participants have many opinions about why the Joint 
Strategic Plan emerged out of the 1970s, though they generally framed their responses within the 
context of three main reasons:  (1) a lack of strategic planning led some to believe the fishery 
agencies were not doing enough to proactively manage the fishery; (2) agencies were concerned 
about federal intrusion into Great Lakes management, particularly with the passage of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (USGPO 1976), U.S. legislation 
establishing federally dominant fishery management councils; and (3) the Great Lakes Basin 
Commission8 (now defunct) needed to develop a fishery management plan and asked the non-
federal governments to undertake the task.  These three reasons threatened somewhat the 
jurisdictions’ exclusive domain over Great Lakes fisheries and helped spur a move toward more 
                                                 
 
8 Not to be confused with the still-active Great Lakes Commission, an interstate compact established by the 
Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1956. 
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strategic interactions.  In essence, the Joint Strategic Plan emerged out of the 1970s as a way to 
preserve non-federal management authority, to shift into a new environmental paradigm, and to 
leverage federal and non-federal resources.  Like the solidification of cooperation in previous 
eras, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission would provide the leadership to help the agencies 
establish a more-refined governance regime.  These three reasons were complementary and, 
together, help explain why and how the cooperative regime progressed in the late 1970s. 
 
Emergence of Strategic Planning 
 
The first main catalyst for the Joint Strategic Plan was the emergence of planning as an 
important element of natural resource management.  “Planning,” says Crowe (1983, p. 1-2), “is 
an integrated system for management that includes all activities leading to the development and 
implementation of goals, programs, objectives, operational strategies, and progress evaluation.”  
Strategic planning is not a particular project or initiative per se, rather, it is a “way of doing 
business;  . . . a system for decision-making.”  Fishery managers who were active in the lake 
committee process in the 1970s recall that, consistent with the environmental movement 
prevalent in that era, strategic planning within their own agency was in vogue.  One senior 
manager remembers that in the 1970s, it became standard practice to develop a management plan 
to respond to the “issue de jour.”  The State of New York, for instance, produced management 
plans for all of its major management areas in the 1970s and Ontario produced the Strategic Plan 
for Ontario Fisheries (SPOF) (Anonymous 1976) in 1976.  These strategic plans were a way for 
jurisdictions to identify fishery problems and to outline how they would manage them.  However, 
while strategic planning was taking place throughout the basin, the plans were often oriented 
toward the particular jurisdiction’s authority, or on particular fish species, not so much on the 
lake or the basin as a whole.  Indeed, prior to the Joint Strategic Plan, each agency had its own 
strategic plans, its own goals, and its own means and timeline to achieve those goals.  The pre-
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Joint Strategic Plan lake committee process, while a forum for information exchange, still did not 
serve as a catalyst for interagency strategic action (GLFC 1981c). 
Strategic fisheries planning on a basinwide level, many believed, would be beneficial to 
the Great Lakes community.  First and foremost, strategic planning would communicate the goals 
and needs for the fishery.  To get agency, legislative, or public support for an initiative, it would 
be essential to ground that initiative in a clear plan.  Perhaps more importantly, a strategic 
fisheries plan would be necessary if fisheries management were to keep pace with the broader 
environmental movement that was growing more sophisticated in other areas, such as water 
quality.  It was during this era, for instance, that Canada and the United States negotiated and 
began implementing the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, a major binational initiative—led 
by the federal governments—to address some of the most pressing pollution issues.  Bill Pearce, 
Director of Marine Resources for the State of New York, in a 1981 speech about how he saw the 
fishery community vis-à-vis other interests, captures how fishery managers needed to adjust: 
Our interests (fisheries) are competing with some real heavies.  I have an image of a 
board room in which the principles are sitting around the table in their dark blue three 
piece suits, with ties and white shirts and shiny black shoes.  Naturally, they're smoking 
big stogies.  They represent, among others, shipping, heavy industry, municipal 
government, and utilities.  On the edge of the crowd is barefoot Huck Finn.  That's us.  
Maybe I should say, ‘That's been us,’ because we’re beginning to have an impact.  If we 
want to achieve our rightful position we must organize ourselves in such a manner so that 
we can become increasingly effective.  To do this, we, fishery interests, must pull 
together and be certain that others consider fishery interests as equals when decisions are 
made which might affect out interests. [Emphasis in original.] (GLFC 1981c) 
 
An Ontario official, who was interviewed for this research, put it another way:   
[The late 1970s] was the time when concerns for the Great Lakes other than strictly water 
quality . . . were injected into the [Great Lakes Water Quality] agreement. It became 
obvious to some people that if fisheries was going to have an equal voice at the table then 
we bloody well better have a strategy for the Great Lakes.  
 
Added another Ontario official, 
Not only were they able to develop a strategic plan [SPOF] that everybody in the 
province followed and adhered to and so all the fisheries people were working in the 
same direction, but it was a very successful plan, not only for coordinating activities but 
for generating revenue. And so everyone was thrilled with the strategic plan. And the 
need for the strategic plan as successful as it had been within Ontario and I think the Joint 




Concern about Federal Intrusion 
 
The second main catalyst for the Joint Strategic Plan was concern about U.S. federal 
intrusion into non-federal management.  Participants believed that if the Great Lakes jurisdictions 
did not create a process for cooperative management, the U.S. federal government would impose 
one through the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (USGPO 1976).  
The act, signed in 1976 by President Gerald Ford, established a formal process for the federal 
government and the states to govern fishery management activities in federal waters (i.e., from 
three miles to 200 miles from the coast).  The federal National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) would lead the councils (Pacific Fishery Management Council 2005; 
USGPO 1976) but because oceanic states have control over their fisheries to the three-mile limit, 
the act would provide for state involvement.  Under this act, regional councils (made up of federal 
and state managers, stakeholders, and other interested parties), were established to prepare and 
present fishery management plans to NOAA, conduct public hearings on the plans, submit 
periodic reports to NOAA, review fishery harvest policies, and review state and federal actions 
affecting the fisheries (Furlong 2002; USGPO 1976).  NOAA would implement the plans and the 
U.S. Coast Guard would enforce them.  Regional councils were set up in the expected places—
the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts—where federal and state governments needed to cooperate 
to manage the fishery.   
About the same time President Ford signed the Magnuson Act, the Comptroller General 
of the United States concluded in a major report (GAO 1976, p. i) that “Congress should consider 
giving the Secretary of Commerce [the head of NOAA] statutory authority to impose 
management measures on U.S. fisheries when states fail to do so.”   Additionally, the 1970s was 
an era of federal muscle-flexing in environmental programs, with the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency and NOAA, and with passage of the Clean Water Act (USGPO 
1972), the Engendered Species Act (USGPO 1973), the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
(IJC [1972] [1978] 1987), and the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species 
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(CITES [1973] 1979), among other acts.  With the passage of these measures, the federal 
government was stating its intent to be a player in the environmental.  The regional fishery 
councils (under federal leadership), a heavy-handed recommendation from the Comptroller 
General, and major new federal authorities suggested the possibility of a new era of federal 
dominance over fisheries and environment. 
 Applying the Magnuson Act to the Great Lakes would have been a major change in Great 
Lakes fisheries governance, as there are no federal waters in the Great Lakes and federally 
dominated regional councils would have pervade state management.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the non-federal fishery managers of the Great Lakes region were quite concerned 
about the possibility of a Regional Council being thrust upon them.  (In fact, NOAA did propose 
a regional council for the Great Lakes (Dochoda 1999).)  Some long-serving fishery managers 
recall being distressed by the possibility of a Great Lakes regional council under the Magnuson 
Act.  One fishery manager, when asked why the Joint Strategic Plan was developed when it was, 
replied:   
I know quite precisely. This was shortly after the Magnuson Act. . .  There was an effort 
motivated by [NOAA] . . . to extend the Magnuson Act to the Great Lakes, and to create a 
council and engage [NOAA] here.  And the states responded to that as a challenge to 
their jurisdiction. And that led to discussions about how we could address whatever 
institutional weaknesses there were that might lead to the Magnuson Act being extended 
to the Great Lakes. That is what started the [Joint Strategic Plan] exercise. 
 
Other non-federal managers involved in Great Lakes fisheries in the late 1970s agree and point 
out that a Great Lakes regional council would have upset unnecessarily the federal-non-federal 
relationship in the basin in favor of the federal government, as it would have invited federal 
management in an unprecedented and (in light of the absence of federal waters) an unwarranted 
way.  The solution, many realized, was to create a regime to coordinate the jurisdictions’ 
activities in the spirit of the Magnuson Act, but in a way that was suited to the Great Lakes 
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region.  With a basinwide strategic plan, the states reasoned, the federal government would have 
no pretense to usurp non-federal authority in the Great Lakes basin.9 
 
Great Lakes Basin Commission Request 
 
The third main catalyst for the Joint Strategic Plan was a direct request by the Great 
Lakes Basin Commission to develop a fisheries management plan.  In 1967, President Lyndon 
Johnson created several river basin commissions, including the Great Lakes Basin Commission, 
to investigate matters relating to the environmental health of U.S. waters.  The basin commission 
was a consortium of state and federal agencies (GLFC 1977c) though was authorized and led by 
the federal government.  The basin commission played a key role in the development of the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement and integrated many issue areas including fisheries, wildlife, 
toxic pollution, and navigation.  In the early 1970s, the basin commission began producing 
approximately twenty framework studies about these and other issues as background for a 
comprehensive, forty-year management plan for the Great Lakes.   
In 1977, Carlos Fetterolf, then Great Lakes Fishery Commission executive secretary, 
reported that the basin commission asked the fishery commission to help develop the fishery 
portion of its comprehensive management plan (GLFC 1977c), suggesting that the plan include: 
management objectives for the Great Lakes fishery, an examination and clarification of the 
basin’s environmental problems, an action plan for the management of Great Lakes fishes, and a 
coordination of state fishery plans with state coastal programs (GLFC 1977b).  One major 
problem with the basin commission’s proposal, however, was that it would have been a major 
undertaking; it would have entailed the development not only of fishery objectives, but an action 
plan to fulfill those objectives.  Such an exercise, while recognized throughout the basin as 
                                                 
 
9 At the invitation of the non-federal jurisdictions and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, NOAA 
participated in the development of the Joint Strategic Plan and signed the plan in 1981.  By involving 
NOAA in the process from the earliest stages, the jurisdictions were able to secure acceptance from the 
U.S. federal government for the Great Lakes fishery management regime under the Joint Strategic Plan 
instead of under a regional council. 
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beneficial, was, nonetheless, being thrust upon the management agencies when, in fact, few 
operational plans existed, let alone a basinwide one.  Moreover, members of the fishery 
commission expressed worry that the basin commission’s approach would be inconsistent with 
the spirit of the lake committee regime because it would not involve Ontario (GLFC 1977a). 
Meanwhile, sensing the opportunity to play a leading role in the development of a Great 
Lakes fishery management plan, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, operating through Robert 
Herbst, the Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks and a member of the fishery 
commission, submitted its own ideas for how to develop the basin commission’s fishery plan.  
The service proposed to have its Ann Arbor laboratory develop a plan, which would include a 
complete description of the fishery, an assessment of the fishery’s condition and probable future, 
and recommendations for management actions (GLFC 1978a).  The proposal was for an 
operational plan for the Great Lakes and having the service develop such a plan would have had 
the federal government do what had been proposed and resisted for much of the twentieth 
century:  to coordinate Great Lakes fisheries management.  Fetterolf realized immediately that “to 
accept the Herbst proposal  . . . would amount to rejection of the [lake committee] initiative and 
enthusiasm for a binational approach . . . .” (GLFC 1978a).    
State and provincial partners saw the basin commission’s request as doable so long as the 
basin commission or the service did not develop it, as they believed the proposed plan was too 
broad and they did not want an “outside agency” meddling in their affairs.  The lake committees, 
in a letter to the fishery commission, consequently expressed support for the development of a 
strategic fishery management plan (GLFC 1978a) and asked the fishery commission to develop 
the plan.  Their hope was to establish a process for strategic interactions (e.g., Crowe 1983) rather 
than a point-in-time operational document.  In the letter to the commission, the agencies stated 
that they “sincerely believe the Great Lakes Fisheries [sic] Commission has the best resources for 
coordination and development of this plan.  Past experience demonstrates the ability of the states 
and province to attack and resolve significant management problems through the Lake 
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Committees” (GLFC 1978a, p. 203).  The Great Lakes Fishery Commission accepted the request 
and both the Great Lakes Basin Commission and Mr. Herbst expressed in writing their pleasure 
over the fishery commission and the lake committees assuming the development of a strategic 
fishery management plan (GLFC 1978a; GLFC 1978b). 
Work on a strategic Great Lakes fisheries management plan10 (ultimately entitled A Joint 
Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries) began in earnest in the fall of 1978.  
Plan-framers decided early that senior officials from the state and provincial management 
agencies needed to develop and approve the plan, as support for the process and the product 
needed to be from the highest levels (GLFC 1978c; GLFC 1981a).  It was not lost on the people 
who worked on the plan that the fishery managers would be assuming greater responsibilities 
once the plan was put into force.  Managers needed to know that their jurisdiction’s senior 
officials held a cooperative process in high regard, and the only way to ensure such legitimacy 
was to have the senior administrators themselves lead the process.  The plan-drafters labored 
throughout 1979, completed the plan in fall of 1980, and presented it to the individual 
management agencies for their sanction. 
 
THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN:  SUBSTANCE AND EVOLUTION 
 
The development of the Joint Strategic Plan came about because the management 
agencies sensed a federal threat to their authority through the sweeping Magnuson Act, because 
they sensed the need for fisheries to be more prominent in the broader realm of environmental 
management, and because they sensed that a fishery management plan would be developed by 
                                                 
 
10 The Great Lakes Basin Commission referred to the yet-to-be-produced plan as the “Great Lakes Fishery 
Management Plan.”  The agencies added the word “strategic” to the beginning of that working title and 
abbreviated it SGLFMP.  Although the final plan was always entitled A Joint Strategic Plan for 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, the abbreviation for the working title—SGLFMP—lingered for 
decades.  Even today, in 2007, it is not uncommon for lake committee members and others to refer to the 
plan as “SGLFMP” (and actually pronounce it as “see-guhl-fump”), a habit that makes the current Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission executive secretary, Dr. Chris Goddard, bristle conspicuously.  Through his 




other entities (like the basin commission or the Fish and Wildlife Service) if they failed to act.  
The non-federal governments enjoyed unchallenged authority over their fisheries until the 
broader environmental movement of the 1970’s forced them to re-think how they cooperated.  
Like the formation of the lake committees in the 1960s, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
would serve as the neutral force to organize the effort, provide binational legitimacy, and ensure 
the process moved forward.  In light of the other forces at the time—the environmental 
movement, enhanced federal involvement, the Great Lakes Basin Commission, the need for 
strategic planning—it is probable that if the non-federal agencies did not better organize, some 
other entity would intrude on their management responsibilities. 
 Four main sections comprise the plan:  (1) a goal statement, (2) a list of issues 
surrounding the Great Lakes fishery, (3) broad strategies for making the plan work, and (4) 
specific strategic procedures for the agencies to fulfill the agreement.  Each element is described 
below.  Appendix C provides details on each of the plan’s main sections. 
1.  Goal Statement:  Early in the drafting process, the drafters found “no irreconcilable 
differences” among the management agencies in their goals for the fishery, demonstrating that the 
agencies could move in a shared direction (GLFC 1979).  (It would have been a major problem if 
they had discovered that some jurisdictions, say, were absolutely opposed to hatchery propagation 
of fish while the others were not.)  This goal statement, included in the Joint Strategic Plan, noted 
the purpose of agency programs was: 
To secure fish communities, based on foundations of stable self-sustaining stocks, 
supplemented by judicious plantings of hatchery-reared fish, and provide from these 
communities an optimum contribution of fish, fishing opportunities and associated 
benefits to meet needs identified by society for:  wholesome food, recreation, 




The plan, thus, would stress that agencies should strive to have self-propagating fish support the 
fishery, but in the absence of natural reproduction, that they would stock fish.11  The agencies 
affirmed that their management programs would be aimed at providing the maximum benefits to 
a wide variety of stakeholders. 
2. Issues:  In preparing the plan’s list of issues, drafters, through a fixed-form survey 
with open-ended questions, polled the management agencies to learn which issues affected the 
achievement of their goals.  The questionnaire looked at a number of issues including (among 
other things) the institutional framework, decision-making processes, enforcement philosophies, 
availability of scientific information, water use conflicts, fishery allocation, and fishery resource 
stresses (GLFC 1979).  With a large amount of quantitative and qualitative data in-hand, the 
drafters settled on a list of shared issues—issues that management agencies acknowledged they 
should address individually and collectively through the plan.  Those issues are lost fishing 
opportunities, fish community instability of (caused by sea lamprey, overharvest, exotic species, 
etc.), inadequate environmental quality (land use, water use, air deposition), competition among 
users (sport, commercial, tribal fishing), and access to the resource (GLFC 1981a). 
3.  Underlying, broad strategies of the plan:  With a common goal statement and a list 
of fishery issues that needed attention, the plan-drafters then identified four strategies the plan 
                                                 
 
11 Several participants in this research pointed out that this goal statement reveals a contradiction inherent 
in Great Lakes fishery management, then and now.  “Stable, self sustaining stocks” refers primarily to self-
sustaining stocks of native fish like lake trout and ciscoes, fish species that were severely depleted and of 
which there was little hope of immediate recovery.  “Judicious plantings of hatchery-reared fish,” while 
certainly relevant to fish stocked to restore the native fish communities, refers mainly to hatchery 
propagation of exotic salmonids like steelhead trout and Pacific salmon.  These stocked salmonids are the 
mainstay of the fishery in the absence of significant natural reproduction.  This goal statement perhaps 
downplays major disagreement between the State of Michigan, which based its management on stocked 
fish, and some of the other jurisdictions, like Ontario, which focused on natural fish populations.  In this 
compromise goal statement, the agencies stated that their practice of artificially propagating the fishery 
would continue while they sought native species rehabilitation.  Henry Regier, an academician who has for 
decades been involved in fishery management, recently observed that while the plan contains sentiments 
that strive for the ecosystem approach to the management of whole fish communities, it also serves as “an 
endorsement of hatchery-reared exotic salmonids. . . . Perhaps [this] implies a contradiction that has been 
endemic to the [Joint Strategic Plan] all along?  I can’t tell which side is winning now, a quarter century 
later” (Regier, 2005). 
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• Information Sharing and 
• Ecosystem Management. 
 
Consensus:   The Joint Strategic Plan is rooted in action by consensus.  Consensus, says 
the plan, is general agreement, the collective opinion, and the judgment arrived at by most of 
those concerned.  Consensus occurs after all points of view have been heard and when no 
participant objects to the opinion (GLFC 1997a).  Joint Strategic Plan participants generally have 
a shared understanding of consensus.  They recognize that it does not mean unanimity or that 
everyone is completely happy with the outcome.  Rather, in the words of a Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission participant, “consensus to me means everybody agrees or chooses not to disagree.”  
Agencies agree to reach consensus on management practices before they implement major 
initiatives.  Agencies also agree that any change in fishery management practice that affects other 
jurisdictions must be agreed to by the other jurisdictions.  To help achieve consensus on 
management actions, agencies together have identified shared fish community objectives (e.g., 
Ryan et al. 2003) and, often, developed operational plans (e.g., Hansen 1996). 
This definition of consensus is a direct reflection of the jurisdictional realities in Great 
Lakes fishery management and, probably more than any other element of the plan, captures the 
essence of how cooperation would occur under the plan.  Even after the heightened federal 
involvement in the environment of the 1970s and beyond, Great Lakes fishery management 
remained rooted in the fact that independent jurisdictions, at the non-federal level, are the primary 
fishery managers.  Although the Great Lakes Fishery Commission facilitates cooperation among 
these independent actors, the plan was never intended to change the fact that each jurisdiction 
would remain in control of its waters.  In other words, the plan would not force the jurisdictions 
to do something they did not want to do (this is discussed in chapter 4).  Instead, the plan would 
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help produce emergent commonalities and strategic goals.  The plan’s definition of consensus, 
thus, emerged out of the jurisdictions’ history of information sharing, coming together as equals, 
coming together voluntarily, and preserving their autonomy.  Consensus reflects the interest in 
developing an emergent culture of cooperation rather than creating a movement toward coercive 
action.   In the rare instance where consensus cannot be achieved, the Joint Strategic Plan 
contains provisions for conflict resolution through the Great Lakes Fishery Commission or a third 
party. 
Accountability:  The second broad strategy is accountability.  Agencies have the right to 
manage their own fisheries, and some degree of accountability serves to encourage agencies to 
adhere to the shared objectives and plans they develop through the process.  The plan indeed 
depends on each agency taking steps to implement the shared decisions.  Because the plan is non-
binding, it relies on “soft” accountability procedures (as opposed to “hard” procedures like law 
enforcement or sanctions) to encourage implementation.  To promote accountability, the plan 
calls for the production of a decision record—primarily meeting minutes and published 
documents—to make it clear to the public and to other personnel in the home jurisdiction what 
the agencies agreed to and how they plan to fulfill their agreements.  The Joint Strategic Plan also 
calls upon each agency to submit periodic reports about their activities on each lake and to 
provide each other with regular reports on progress toward reaching shared objectives.  These 
accountability measures recognize agency independence while still acknowledging that being a 
part of the plan requires a commitment to each other to implement what is agreed to.  Regular 
public reports and a decision record serve to keep activities transparent. 
Information Sharing:  The third broad strategy is information sharing.  All agencies 
need solid information to properly manage the fisheries.  Information sharing is a key element of 
cooperation because it helps agencies make consistent decisions, it makes the decisions more 
sound, and it is economical because agencies can leverage resources.  Information sharing also 
levels the playing field, as it prevents data hoarding, a practice that is known to happen with 
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valuable products like scientific data.  Information sharing has been difficult at times because the 
jurisdictions generate data in a variety of  formats.  To maximize information sharing, the plan 
calls for agencies to together develop and implement standards for recording and maintaining 
fishery management and assessment data.  The plan envisions the agencies coming to consensus 
on the data needed to develop and achieve their shared goals, developing plans for who is to 
collect the data, and seeking ways in which the agencies can collect their data together.  The plan 
also calls for agencies and the commission to publish information and make it available through 
convenient means. 
Ecosystem Management:  The final broad strategy outlined in the plan is ecosystem 
management.  A guiding principle on the Great Lakes is that managers must consider the Great 
Lakes as systems of interacting biotic and abiotic variables.  This means that fishery managers 
need to look beyond fishery management or single species and instead consider and respond to all 
issues that affect the Great Lakes.  In particular, the plan calls for fishery agencies to integrate 
their fish community objectives and plans with environmental objectives and with plans 
developed through other processes.  For example, the Canadian/U.S. Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement identifies “Areas of Concern” in the Great Lakes basin that have suffered significant 
environmental degradation.  Each area is to have a “Remedial Action Plan” that defines how the 
area is to be restored.  The plans are intended to take into account “the interrelationships between 
land, air, water, and all living things, including humans, and involving all stakeholder groups in 
comprehensive management” (Hartig 1997, p. 437).  The Joint Strategic Plan calls upon fishery 
managers to work with environmental officials involved in activities like Remedial Action Plans 
to integrate fishery needs and objectives with environmental needs and objectives.12 
                                                 
 
12 While the Joint Strategic Plan envisions linkages between fish community objectives and RAPs and 
LAMPs, several participants in this research noted that achieving such linkages has been difficult.  The 
1997 revision of the plan called upon the agencies to redouble their efforts to better articulate 




4.  Specific strategic procedures for implementing the plan:  The final section of the 
plan lists specific procedures to put the plan into action.  First and foremost, the plan identified 
the already-existing lake committees (which the commission established in 1964) as the 
mechanism for implementing the plan.  The plan tasked the participants with developing shared 
fish community objectives, identifying environmental issues that may impede the achievement of 
those objectives, developing plans to achieve the objectives, using the lake committees as the 
forum for information sharing (particularly as a place to report substantive changes in practice), 
and facilitating consensus.  The plan also directed the participants to make annual progress 
reports and to present recommendations to the appropriate agencies.  Finally, the plan called for 
members to develop data collection protocols and to share their own agency’s data. 
 The Great Lakes Fishery Commission signed a resolution pledging its intent to provide 
on-going support for its lake committee process, though the lake committee focus would shift 
Figure 1-5:  Wisconsin DNR Secretary C.D. "Buzz" Besadny (left), signs the Joint Strategic Plan for 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, 1981.  Great Lakes Fishery Commission Executive Secretary 
Carlos Fetterolf witnesses.  Photo:  Great Lakes Fishery Commission. 
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from being committees designed to advise the commission to committees designed to 
operationalize the Joint Strategic Plan.  The plan itself envisioned the commission as being the 
neutral third party to facilitate the process and to mediate disputes.  The commission was quite 
aware of the fact that it did not have management authority in the same vein as the state and 
provincial agencies.  Commissioner Henry Regier, for instance, during the 1981 annual meeting 
(the meeting where the plan was signed), observed that  
although the lake committees advise the commission, the individual members are not 
compelled to tailor their management decisions, except voluntarily, to suit any outside 
entity, including the commission. . . When a problem occurs the GLFC can provide a 
forum for its discussion and resolution, or, as required, a recommended judgment (GLFC 
1981b, p. 11). 
 
 Overall, then, the Joint Strategic Plan made many changes to the Great Lakes fishery 
management regime: 
• Although the lake committees would still be under the Great Lakes Fishery Commission’s 
umbrella, the plan served to associate the committees with the management agencies. 
• The lake committees would become the mechanisms under which the management agencies 
would implement the plan. 
• The management agencies agreed to develop fish community objectives for each of the 
lakes, and the operational plans to achieve those objectives. 
• The agencies agreed to keep the others informed of any significant changes in policy that 
might affect other jurisdictions. 
• Any group decision would be reached by consensus. 
• The Great Lakes Fishery Commission agreed to serve as a neutral third party to mediate 
disputes. 
• The management agencies pledged to submit annual reports to the lake committees. 
• The agencies agreed to coordinate their data collection and dissemination. 
 
Although the lake committees facilitated information sharing prior to the plan, the Joint Strategic 
Plan formalized the relationships among the fishery managers.  From the fishery managers’ 
personal perspective, thus, the plan: 
• Introduced, renewed, and formalized a new set of relationships; 
• Asked each member, as he or she participated in the development of shared objectives, to 
produce something larger than they had before; 
• Asked the participants to formalize relationships with people from other jurisdictions, many 
with different sensitivities; and 





The plan has changed little in overall focus and function since 1981, though agencies 
have created technical subcommittees, have added additional signatories, and have completed one 
major review and revision (in 1997). 
 
The emergence of technical committees 
 
Technical committees consist of field-level professionals who undertake such tasks as 
deciding on data needs, gathering data, interpreting data, and providing advice to the lake 
committees.  While the Joint Strategic Plan does not mandate the formation of technical 
committees, it did allow the lake committees to establish subcommittees.  The Lake Erie 
Committee Technical Committee existed prior to the Joint Strategic Plan,13 and each lake 
committee formed a technical committee as-needed after the plan was signed in 1981.  The Lake 
Ontario Technical Committee operates less formally than the technical committees on the other 
lakes.14  Similar to technical committees are “task groups,” which are more-specific versions of 
technical committees.  The number of task groups on each lake varies according to need and 
specific issues on the lake.  For example, the Lake Erie Committee has established permanent 
walleye, yellow perch, forage, and coldwater task groups.  Technical committees (and task 
groups) meet regularly and report to the lake committees.  Unlike the lake committees, whose 
members represent agencies with management authority, technical committees and task groups 
include as members federal officials and, by invitation, outside experts, such as academicians.  
                                                 
 
13 The Lake Erie Technical Committee was formed in the mid-1970s to assist in the interjurisdictional 
management of walleye (see chapter 5). 
14 Lake Ontario’s technical committee is less-formal than those on the other lakes because only two 
jurisdictions—Ontario and New York—manage the lake and because staff at all levels interact across the 
border on a continual basis.  Said one senior manager from New York, illustrating the on-going 
interactions, “people in the Great Lakes tend to have more interactions with colleagues in other states and 
Ontario who are working on the Great Lakes than they do with colleagues within the same agency working 
on other bodies of fresh water.”  Said another New Yorker on Lake Ontario, “Because we are just dealing 
with two agencies, for all intents and purposes, the lake Ontario Technical Committee is everything.   Or 
you know if you were to say we want the lake Ontario technical committee to have a lake trout task group 
and prey fish task group and a warm water fish task group, a walleye, a yellow perch, task group, it would 
be the same people every time, [including the lake committee members].” 
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Entities that have relevant data to share and that have suitable biological expertise are usually 
invited to participate in the technical committees. 
 
The first new members: U.S. tribal participation in the Joint Strategic Plan 
 
About the time the plan was signed in 1981, the courts were settling major cases relating 
to tribal management authority.  Tribal rights had yet to be fully asserted and tribal capacity to 
carry out biological programs was too limited for their involvement in the early lake committee 
process.  After the tribal court cases affecting the waters of lakes Superior, Michigan, and Huron 
(which established that states did not have exclusive management authority in ceded waters), it 
was clear that the tribes would co-manage in some areas of the lakes.  Shortly after the court 
decisions, tribal members began to attend technical committee meetings to learn what was going 
on and to provide input into management.  At first, they did not receive a warm welcome.  Said 
one long-serving tribal participant interviewed for this research,  
The tribes had to prove themselves.  I remember when [my colleague] and I went to our 
first technical committee meeting—it was Michigan City, Indiana . . . in ’82.  Treaty 
rights were a big issue and people basically laughed at us. . . . [P]eople couldn’t believe 
that the tribes would actually hire a biologist and had people on staff.  And we were 
actually treated pretty rudely. 
 
Other colleagues corroborate the initiative that tribes took.  “We weren’t necessarily invited [to 
the lake committee and technical committee meetings], we just sort of showed up.” 
In addition to having tribal biologists attend the lake committee and technical committee 
meetings starting in the early 1980s, the tribes also took steps to organize themselves.  By this 
time, the courts had affirmed tribal management authority; the question was how the tribes would 
exercise their authority.  The tribes of western Lake Superior created the Great Lakes Indian 
Commission (later renamed the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission), partially to 
grow their biological expertise so they could work better with the other management agencies.  
The tribes party to the U.S. v. Michigan ruling (who were also party to the Consent Decree of 
1985) formed the Chippewa-Ottawa Treaty Fishery Management Authority (later re-named the 
 
 63
Chippewa-Ottawa Resource Authority) as a way to best assert their management authority in the 
treaty waters.  Tribal and state interviewees note that the formation of the two inter-tribal 
organizations did much to help everyone accept tribal participation on the lake committees and 
technical committees. In the spring of 1985, tribes officially requested a seat on the lake 
committees, starting with Lake Superior (Busiahn 1988), and the intertribal authorities formally 
signed the Joint Strategic Plan in 1989 after tribal authority was demonstrated and after the 
individual tribes endorsed the agreement.  A long-serving tribal participant, reflecting back, said  
“by the time [our membership on lake committees] came, I don’t think there was too much 
resistance because by then, again after that Consent Decree, everybody knew  . . . we were going 
to be there.”   
 
Fine-tuning the agreement:  The 1997 Revision of the Joint Strategic Plan 
 
The first (and, to date only) major revision to the plan occurred in 1997 after a detailed 
review.  The signatories gathered in 1996 to assess implementation and to discuss any needed 
changes.  The discussion led agencies to make several updates to the issues list and to the plan’s 
strategic procedures.  For instance, the 1997 revision added fish consumption advisories and 
climate change to the list of important issues affecting the fishery.  The updated plan further 
emphasized the impact of exotic species on the fishery, called upon the agencies to redouble their 
efforts to incorporate environmental objectives into their management plans, and enhanced 
reporting and accountability commitments.  The revised plan created a Council of Great Lakes 
Fishery Agencies—comprising senior fishery managers (usually heads of fishery departments) 
and senior environmental managers—to improve plan operations.  The U.S. Geological Survey 
became a signatory in 1997 to accommodate Department of Interior biologists who were moved 
from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to the U.S. Geological Survey after a departmental 
restructuring.  The most significant change was the commitment to hold major “state of the lake” 
conferences every year to focus on one of the five Great Lakes.  State-of-the-lake conferences 
 
 64
were intended to help lake committee members publish state-of-the-lake reports and fish 
community objectives.  Such publications, though important to the Joint Strategic Plan, were 
nevertheless a perennial problem as lake committee members were expected to produce them on 
top of their already over-extended agency responsibilities.  Appendix C summarizes the changes 
to the Joint Strategic Plan after the 1997 review. 
 Although the Joint Strategic Plan has been reviewed and revised since its inception in 
1981, the basic structure and procedures have remained intact.  The lake committee process 
remains the plan’s foundation and the plan’s strategic procedures remain in force.  U.S. tribal 
membership helped to clarify the tribal role in fisheries management after a turbulent period of 
court decisions.  Ongoing agency willingness to adhere to the Joint Strategic Plan process 
contributed to a new culture among fishery managers—a paradigm of cooperation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The Great Lakes basin is politically disconnected and fishery programs are spread among 
no fewer than fourteen binational, federal, provincial, state, and tribal governments and agencies.  
The primary fishery authority rests with the non-federal governments and because the 
jurisdictions were loath to cede their sovereignty, parochialism frustrated repeated attempts 
among the jurisdictions to work together.  This chapter argues that the parochial and diffuse 
nature of Great Lakes fishery management authority devolved into an era of non-cooperation, 
contributing to poor management and fishery degradation.  Nothing—not crisis, not an 
authority—compelled the jurisdictions to cede their responsibilities and, thus, until the 1940s, 
each jurisdiction carried out its management pursuant to its own will and political pressures.   
Cooperation began to emerge after a major crisis (the sea lamprey) and a leader (the 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission) helped convince the jurisdictions to work together to address 
some of the basin’s most pressing problems.  The formation of the lake committees in the 1960s 
projected the commission’s interest in forging lasting relationships. This helped prompt the 
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jurisdictions to participate regularly in meetings and share information.  Even though the 
meetings became routine in the 1960s and 1970s, they served as a useful forum for information 
sharing.  Another crisis in the eyes of the non-federal agencies—the possibility of usurpation of 
their management authority—helped jolt the agencies in the late 1970s into developing a more 
formal agreement, the Joint Strategic Plan, though the agencies were also motivated into strategic 
planning by the spirit of the environmental movement.  The agreement—rooted in consensus, 
accountability, information sharing, and ecosystem management—would be more strategic in 
nature than the previous process.  Like the 1950s and 1960s, the agencies relied on the soft, 
neutral Great Lakes Fishery Commission to help them organize, illustrating that expectations of 
self-organization alone would not be sufficient to develop lasting cooperative regimes. 
 The Joint Strategic Plan reflects the region’s political incoherence, non-federal 
sovereignty, sentiments of independence, and jealously-guarded authorities.  The plan also 
reflects the real needs to cooperate to achieve strategic, shared goals and to manage the fishery as 
an ecosystem.  Given the history of false starts, failed agreements, and independence, it should be 
no surprise that the emergent regime would be consensus-based, non-binding, and voluntary (see 
figure 6-1).  At the same time, the Joint Strategic Plan is no token agreement.  Through the formal 
arrangement, all jurisdictions agreed to change the way they interacted, as the plan called upon 
the signatories to commit to meet regularly, provide meaningful input, develop operational plans, 
and live up to their commitments.  As the next three chapters will argue, this history and the 
plan’s built-in structures, help the fishery managers take collective action, work synergistically 
with the federal governments, and move toward shared goals in a non-binding way that reflects 
the basic realities in Great Lakes fishery governance.  While the Joint Strategic Plan did not cause 
an immediate paradigm shift in collective action on the Great Lakes, it did help further develop a 
culture of cooperation on the Great Lakes that endures to the present day. 
 Given that representatives from independent jurisdictions work together in a cooperative 
regime, this dissertation now turns to a discussion about collective action, the conditions under 
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which collective action likely occurs, and why participants in the Joint Strategic Plan—who are 
accountable to their own jurisdiction—choose to work with others in the Great Lakes basin. 
 
 
YEAR EVENT RESULTS 
1883 to the 1940s:  Multijurisdictional conferences, false starts, roots of cooperation 
1883 First Great Lakes Interstate Conference Thirteen recommendations were agreed upon; none adopted by 
the states. 
1884 Second Great Lakes Interstate Conference Same issues covered as the first conference, same result. 
1891 International Fish and Game Conference Report produced containing resolutions about common 
regulations, fish size limits, and uniform closed seasons.  Nothing 
came of the resolutions. 
1892 Joint Commission Relative to the Preservation of the Fisheries in 
Waters Contiguous to Canada and the United States, formed to 
collect information and make recommendations. 
Commission advised uniform regulations, a joint management 
plan, and a permanent international body with regulatory 
authority.  Recommendations not widely appreciated; would have 
usurped non-federal management authority. 
1897 American Fisheries Society annual meeting:  committee of one 
representative from each state was formed. 
Stressed the need for uniform regulations.  Nothing came of the 
meeting. 
1897 International Commission formed to look at border issues, 
including Great Lakes fishery management. 
Commission recommended a treaty and permanent joint 
commission to supervise the fisheries, review science, and 
promulgate regulations.  No treaty proposed immediately. 
1896 Interstate committee of IL, MI, MN, and WI met to draw up a 
code of uniform regulations. 
No printed record of results. 
1904 Conference of State Officials, Chicago. Recommendations to state legislatures for uniform regulations.  
No two of the legislatures agreed to nor followed the 
recommendations.  “Nothing accomplished.”  (Gallagher et al. 
1942, p. 31) 
1906 American Fisheries Society annual meeting:  interstate committee 
meeting 
No record 
1908 Treaty between Canada and the United States agreed to 
concerning the fisheries of all waters between the two nations.  
Established a permanent international commission on the Great 
Lakes, though without regulatory authority. 
Failed to pass Congress; never went into force.  Great Britain 
withdrew treaty in 1914. 
1910 International Commission formed to investigate border issues, 
including Great Lakes fishery management. 
Same recommendations of the international commission of 1897; 
same results. 
1927 Lake Erie International Conservation Council, formed to 
coordinate action on Lake Erie. 
Resolutions adopted but no future meetings occurred. 
1928 International Fisheries Conservation Council of the Great Lakes 
(met twice in 1928) 
Agreements on general measures for the Great Lakes fishery, 
including use of fishing equipment, fish size, taking of spawn, 
pollution control, and data collection.  “Nothing definite was 
achieved and the conference was soon forgotten.”  (Gallagher et 
al. 1942, p. 31) 
1929 Meeting of Michigan and Ontario on Lake Huron. Effort to form a code uniform regulations.  No action by either 
government. 
1931 Conference held in Buffalo of Lake Erie jurisdictions. Resulted in the formation of the Lake Erie Advisory Committee, 
to study Lake Erie and propose uniform regulations.  Toronto 
Agreement of 1933 another result of this conference. 
1933 Toronto Agreement (result of 1931 conference) signed by each of 
the jurisdictions on Lake Erie. 
Agreement covered all vital regulations on Lake Erie.  However, 
implementation was a disaster.  Jurisdictions found enforcement 
of regulations impossible.  During a meeting later that year, the 
agreement was completely dissolved, as was the Lake Erie 
Advisory Committee.  The failure of the Toronto Agreement “led 
to endless controversy and even to the disruption of friendly 
relations among the representatives charged with its 
enforcement.”  (Gallagher et al. 1942, p. 32) 
1933 Meeting of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and the U.S. 
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries 
Attempt to draw up uniform regulations for states on Lake 
Michigan.  Measures failed to be enacted. 
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YEAR EVENT RESULTS 
1936 Meeting in Washington to resurrect the Lake Erie Advisory 
Committee 
Failed.  Began a sustained call for federal involvement. 
1936 Meeting in Chicago among Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin, and U.S. Federal Government to 
establish uniform regulations in Lake Huron and Lake Superior.  
A few recommendations were enacted by Illinois and Michigan. 
1936 Meeting in Toronto between Michigan and Ontario to develop 
uniform regulations for Lake Huron. 
Tentative agreement reached but held in abeyance. 
1937 Great Lakes fisheries meeting, during Eastern States 
Conservation Conference.  Only two Great Lakes states 
participated. 
Council of State Governments agreed to coordinate the 
development of an interstate compact for Great Lakes fisheries or 
a binational agreement. 
1938 Council of State Governments meeting of the eight Great Lakes 
states, Ontario, the U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, and the 
U.S. Department of State with the purpose of looking at ways to 
get uniform regulations. 
Recommended formation of the International Board of Enquiry 
(formed), and produced a resolution calling for federal 
management of the fishery.  A treaty (of 1946) resulted from this 
effort, but the treaty failed to be ratified. 
1938 Meeting of the Midwest Regional Assembly of the Council of 
State Governments, with the goal of developing uniform 
regulations for Lake Michigan. 
Nothing accomplished. 
1942 Report of the International Board of Enquiry (formed in 1938). Rejection of the idea of an interstate compact; support for a 
binational treaty. 
1943 to 1964:  The emergence of a cooperative regime 
1943  Interstate Conference, Madison, Wisconsin. Established the Great Lakes Lake Trout Committee (met in 1946) 
to discuss lake trout issues on Lake Michigan. 
1946 Formation of the Lake Trout Committee, established to discuss 
lake trout issues on Lake Michigan.  This committee was the 
result of the 1943 interstate conference held in Madison. 
First permanent, multijurisdictional fisheries committee on the 
Great Lakes.  This committee merged with an ad hoc sea lamprey 
committee in 1953 and became the Great Lakes Fishery 
Committee, a committee formed to look at lake trout, sea 
lamprey, and other issues.  This was to be the first robust 
multi-state/provincial committee on the Great Lakes.  The 
committee lasted until 1956, when its function was absorbed 
(though continued) by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission. 
1946 Treaty between the United States and Canada signed, creating a 
binational commission on the Great Lakes to make regulations 
such as open and closed seasons, gear restrictions, size limits, etc. 
Regulations would need approval by the President and the Privy 
Council. 
Not ratified; withdrawn. 
1949 Establishment of the sea lamprey committee, in response to the 
sea lamprey invasion of the upper Great Lakes. 
First on-going body to investigate and respond to the sea 
lamprey.  Precursor to the 1954 Convention on Great Lakes 
Fisheries.  This committee merged with the Lake Trout 
Committee in 1953. 
1951 Ad hoc Lake Erie Fish Management Committee formed to create 
dialogue between Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions on Lake Erie. 
This committee became permanent in 1952 and evolved into the 
present-day Lake Erie Committee. 
1953 Formation of the Great Lakes Fishery Committee, a merge of the 
Lake Trout Committee and the Sea Lamprey Committee. 
Integration of lake trout and sea lamprey investigations.  
Committee absorbed by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission in 
1956. 
1954 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries signed.  Formed the Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission, a binational body on the Great Lakes 
with the responsibility to control sea lampreys, coordinate 
research, and make recommendations to government about fish 
stocks of common concern.  (Note:  no authority to propose 
common fisheries regulations.) 
Ratified in 1955.  Still in force. 
1964 to 1978:  The evolution of lake committees 
1964 Lake committees (one for each lake) formed by the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission. 
From 1964 to the present, lake committees have been convened 
at least annually as a forum to report on agency activities and 
share information. 
1977 Great Lakes Basin Commission requests the agencies and the 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission develop a Great Lakes 
management plan. 
Agencies and the commission agree to develop a strategic Great 
Lakes fisheries management plan. 
1978 Council of Lake Committees formed by the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission. 
From 1978 to the present, the Council of Lake Committees has 
been convened at least annually to discuss issues of importance 
to the Great Lakes basin as a whole. 
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YEAR EVENT RESULTS 
1978 to the present:  A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries 
1978 Agencies form a steering committee to begin drafting a strategic 
fisheries management plan. 
Plan completed in 1981 as a Joint Strategic Plan for Management 
of Great Lakes Fisheries. 
1981 Provincial, states, and federal agencies sign A Joint Strategic 
Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries.  (U.S. tribes 
would sign the plan in 1989.) 
The Joint Strategic Plan, which is still in force, outlined issues 
and strategies for Great Lakes fishery management and 
established a regular process for cooperation and interaction 
among the non-federal jurisdictions and with the federal 
authorities and the binational Great Lakes Fishery Commission.  
Fish community objectives for the each of the Great Lakes, state-
of-the-lake reports, and other shared initiatives would be 
developed under the Joint Strategic Plan structure.  Lake 
committees, at first committees established to serve the Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission, would fall under the domain of the 
non-federal agencies, as they would be the “action arms” of the 
Joint Strategic Plan.  Technical committees would be formed on 
each of the lakes (some lakes have more than one technical 
committee) as a place for field biologists to interact, share data, 
and come to a common understanding of the biological issues 
facing the resource. 
1986 Agencies meet in Toronto to review the Joint Strategic Plan. No substantive changes made. 
1989 Two U.S. intertribal organizations—the Great Lakes Indian Fish 
and Wildlife Commission and the Chippewa-Ottawa Treaty 
Fishery Management Authority, today known as the Chippewa-
Ottawa Resource Authority—sign the plan. 
U.S. tribes, represented through intertribal organizations, become 
members of lake committees and technical committees. 
1997 Joint Strategic Plan reviewed by provincial, state, tribal and 
federal jurisdictions. 
No major changes made to the plan.  Continued emphasis on lake 
committees and consensus-based process.  Dispute resolution 
mechanism clarified.  Signatories called for renewed emphasis on 
development of environmental objectives.  Council of Great 
Lakes Fishery Agencies created (comprising senior fisheries 
managers) to be ‘keepers of the plan.’ 
Table 1-2:  The four eras of great lakes fishery management, 1883- present  
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RE-FRAMING SELF-INTEREST  
 




Given that fishery managers are accountable only to their own jurisdiction, and given 
conflict among independent jurisdictions is inevitable, this chapter asks:  How can 
multijurisdictional institutions help independent jurisdictions steer conflict toward 
cooperation rather than competition? How do fishery managers on the Great Lakes 
organize in a way that minimizes the clash between parochialism and the need for 
collective action and why do fishery managers expend time, energy and resources to 
coordinate fisheries policies?  This chapter argues that under the Joint Strategic Plan, 
fishery managers meet regularly to engage in three primary collective action activities:  to 
collect and share information; to decide on tasks and who carries them out; and to 
develop shared plans, policies, and objectives.  These collective actions strengthen the 
framework for cooperation, create durable relationships, help the managers engage in 
ecosystem management, and help produce policies that are more defensible with 
politicians and the public.  The Joint Strategic Plan helps the fishery managers re-frame 
self-interest from parochial needs to developing and achieving shared goals.  The formal 
process facilitates collective action by gently coercing members into adhering to the 
norms of the fishery management community.  Moreover, participants are rewarded for 
collective action because interactions with trusted peers are enjoyable, because ecosystem 
management is professionally and personally a better way to manage, and because 
scientifically and politically defensible policies create fewer implementation challenges 
in the home jurisdiction. 
 
 
 The philosopher Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes, p. 100) believed that people’s lives are 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”  In this condition, humans are constantly competing 
with one another and hardly concerned about cooperating to advance any shared goals they might 
have.  This conclusion seems counterintuitive, as humans are clever and should realize that at 
times, collective action could leave everyone better off.  After all, competition often squanders 
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time, resources, and lives.  Yet even enlightened, rational people—some argue particularly 
enlightened, rational people—look out for their own interests (Hardin 1968).  Perhaps nowhere 
does the tension between selfish parochialism and cooperative collective action appear more 
visibly than in the appropriation and management of shared natural resources.  Whether a local 
community, a region, or the world shares a resource, one person’s or group’s use often lessens 
benefits for others (Hardin 1968).  Unwilling to gamble potential rewards on collective action, 
people are known to appropriate wantonly to satisfy their own interests, with little concern for 
sustainability, causing resource degradation and eventual loss.  Nobody benefits from such 
behavior.  People do not readily act out of selfless concern for others and rational people, acting 
out of self interest, create an absurd outcome that they could have prevented had they cooperated.  
To Hobbes, cooperation is not natural; to others, it requires motivation. 
 Conflict over shared resources is indeed to be expected; the question is whether conflict 
leads to selfish competition or whether it leads to mutually beneficial collective action (Kohn 
1992).  The Great Lakes fishery is an example of a shared natural resource.  Two nations, eight 
states, the Province of Ontario, and Native American tribes have the authority to manage and use 
the fishery.  Primary management responsibility rests with the non-federal governments, and no 
overarching authority exists to compel these independent resource-users to cooperate.  The 
jurisdictions are free to manage and appropriate their portion of the shared Great Lakes fishery in 
the manner they choose.  Undoubtedly, the jurisdictions will face conflict over their fishery 
management activities, as the jurisdictions have differing management philosophies, needs, 
constituent pressures, and political dynamics.  Managers may feel conflicted over whether to 
satisfy their parochial interests or to consider everyone’s interests.  In the absence of 
communications, conflicting management philosophies could cause the jurisdictions to work at 
cross purposes; to permit selfish, unsustainable harvest; or to distrust others’ motivations or 
intentions.  These behaviors would illustrate conflict leading to competition.   
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 The Great Lakes basin’s management agencies, however, have chosen a different 
course—a course that attempts to channel parochial behavior—by establishing and adhering to A 
Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, a non-binding, consensus-based 
agreement.  As chapter 1 discusses, the plan is designed to help the provincial, state, and tribal 
agencies on the Great Lakes work together to identify and achieve their shared goals.  The 
agencies also work with the federal governments and the bi-national Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission to manage the lakes as a system.  The plan reflects the diffuse political authorities in 
the region and focuses on consensus among those independent authorities, helping them identify 
what they have in common.  In the absence of the plan, the agencies would have limited means to 
advance shared goals, as no overarching authority exists to span all the primary jurisdictions. 
  Recognizing that conflict among the jurisdictions is inevitable but could lead to 
undesirable outcomes, this chapter investigates how and why fishery managers work together to 
handle conflict.  This chapter asks:  Without a compelling authority, can independent 
jurisdictional actors establish institutions to help steer conflict toward cooperation rather than 
competition? Can fishery managers on the Great Lakes organize in a way that minimizes the 
clash between parochialism and the need for collective action and, if so, why do fishery 
managers—who are accountable only to their own jurisdiction—expend time, energy and 
resources to coordinate fisheries policies?   
To investigate these questions, sixty-two current and former Joint Strategic Plan 
participants—including all twenty current lake committee members—were interviewed.  
Participants were asked what they believe was the Joint Strategic Plan’s impact, why they chose 
to participate in the plan’s processes, and what they hoped to gain when they attended meetings.  
The interviewer also attended more than eighty lake committee, technical committee, and other 
meetings convened under the Joint Strategic Plan since 1995 and took fieldnotes related to this 
research from 2003-2005.  These observations of the lake committee and technical committee 
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processes supplemented and generally corroborated interview data.  Appendix A discusses 
methodology in greater detail. 
 Chapter 1 stresses that for much of the history of Great Lakes fishery management, 
conflict over the shared resource inhibited cooperation and often led to ineffective or 
contradictory policies.  By the  mid-twentieth century, crisis (the sea lamprey) and an organizing 
leader (the Great Lakes Fishery Commission) helped the jurisdictions work together, and the fear 
of federal intrusion, the environmental movement, and the commission prompted the creation of a 
permanent institution, the Joint Strategic Plan, to make those interactions ongoing and strategic.  
The literature about conflict and cooperation places much emphasis on arrangements that promote 
recurring interactions.  Such arrangements can help participants seek future opportunities and 
focus on shared goals rather than on how to compete over the resource.  This chapter argues that 
the Joint Strategic Plan was designed to overcome historical parochialism and turn conflict into 
collective action.  By focusing on relationships and process, the plan increases familiarity among 
participants and helps them recast self-interest in cooperative terms rather than in terms of 
parochial self-interest.  The participants become used to working together and because of the 
existence of an epistemic community—an elite community of like-minded professionals—
members value continual relationships, are gently coerced into adhering to the community’s 
norms, and are rewarded for working together.  The literature argues that rewards and coercion 
prompt collective action. 
 
COMMONS, CONFLICT, COMPETITION, AND COOPERATION;  A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE  
 
Common pool resources are natural resources available on such a scale that excluding 
potential users is difficult, if not impossible.  The resources are usually enough in demand that 
people compete to exploit them (Barkin and Shambaugh 1999; Ostrom 1990).  Chances are, a 
common pool resource transcends political boundaries and is stressed because of nonexistent or 
weak checks against unsustainable exploitation (Dietz et al. 2002).  Common pool resource 
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literature is often coupled with literature about cooperation because people must work together 
(through an institution, perhaps) if they are to protect and sustain the shared resource.  Collective 
action (or, simply, “cooperation”) results when people work together to achieve their shared 
goals.  Cooperation has connotations of synergy and reciprocity—synergy in the sense that people 
work together to gain more than if they worked alone, and reciprocity because all participants 
expect benefits from cooperation.  For cooperation to work, members of a group should know and 
respect each other’s interests, should recognize shared goals, and should be willing to coordinate 
activities to reach those goals (Sebenius 1992; Yaffee 1998).  Cooperation is working toward a 
goal “in such a way that each individual’s successes facilitates the other’s” (Kohn 1992, p. 4). 
Cooperation does not automatically mean harmony or lack of conflict.  In fact, says 
Keohane (1984, p. 53),  
[Cooperation] is typically mixed with conflict  . . . [and] takes place only in situations in 
which the actors perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict, not 
where there is harmony. Cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but 
rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict.  
 
Because common pool resources are resources that many can access, conflict is all but inevitable.  
The important issue is whether conflict leads to competition (often articulated through “game 
theory”) or cooperation (collective action) (Kohn 1992).  Olson (1965) argues that people are 
generally unwilling to act collectively without coercion or incentives because self-interest leads 
people to seek benefits without contributing to the collective action.  Given the chance, people 
will free-ride (i.e., receive benefits without sacrifice), as they perceive taking what they can to be 
more beneficial than the marginal impact of their individual (and personally costly) sacrifice, 
particularly if they believe others are unwilling to make the same sacrifice.  Olson discusses 
incentives largely in monetary or tangible terms but also stresses that social incentives, such as 
social pressure or social acceptance, also promote collective action.  “The recalcitrant individual 
can be ostracized and the cooperative individual can be invited into the center of the charmed 
circle” (Olson 1965, p. 61).   
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Hardin (1968), in his seminal article The Tragedy of the Commons, generally shares 
Olson’s view that people act in their self interest and ignore the benefits of collective action.  
Hardin uses a prisoner’s dilemma (game theory) model to make his points.  There are many 
different types of game theories, but a simple, underlying premise is that rational individuals, who 
have incomplete information about what others will do, will view it in their self-interest to 
appropriate as much as they can, lest someone else benefit.  Not wanting to be left with nothing, 
individuals act rationally, though selfishly, which produces irrational outcomes (Axelrod 1984; 
Hardin 1968).  In the case of common pool resources, if many appropriators have unimpeded 
access to the resource, acting in the resource’s interest requires a personal sacrifice that will only 
serve to benefit other appropriators who will choose not to sacrifice.  Conflict over the shared 
resource, in other words, leads to competition; a person sees it as in his self-interest to satisfy 
competitive urges.  This situation causes a strong incentive against collective action (Hardin 
1968; Ostrom 1990), which leads to resource degradation and collapse.  Hardin calls this “the 
tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) and uses game theories to show that competition, not 
collective action, is the case when dealing with a common pool resource.  Game theorists suggest 
that in the absence of coercion or incentives—which Olson says are necessary for collective 
action—people do not cooperate and the outcome is often tragic.  
Scholars have, for decades, scrutinized Hardin’s notion that self interest leads to 
uncooperative behavior, and many now conclude that acting out of self interest does not 
necessarily lead to the “tragedy of the commons.”  The skeptics point out that Hardin falsely 
assumed appropriators will act without communicating and that interactions among the 
appropriators occur only once (Axelrod 1984; Dietz et al. 2002).  Hardin’s assumptions ignore the 
fact that people do work together and that there are ways to make interactions regular.  Axelrod 
(1984) provides a rebuttal to the idea that self interest, games, and realism preclude cooperative 
behavior.  While accepting that actors might play games and act selfishly, Axelrod (1984, p. 3) 
asks nevertheless “in situations where each individual has an incentive to be selfish, how can 
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cooperation occur?”  In answering this question, he demonstrates—through the use of game 
theory—that cooperation can occur if actors have mutual goals, if they communicate regularly, 
and if they behave predictably.  Axelrod indeed places great emphasis on the positive function of 
ongoing relationships in contributing to cooperative behavior and predictability.  He also adds 
that cooperation is more likely when “the shadow of the future is enlarge[d]” (Axelrod 1984, p. 
129), that is, when participants consider and care about the affect of today’s actions on future 
relations.  When participants know they will work with the same people in the future, they will be 
more cooperative today for fear of jeopardizing future opportunities.  Frequent and strong 
interactions among members of the community are thus instrumental to cooperation. 
Other explanations for cooperation are rooted in the idea that being a member of a select 
community motivates collective action because members either feel obligated to play their role 
(coerced into participating through peer pressure) or are rewarded for doing so, or both.  These 
community-oriented scholars contend that relationships, commitments, social pressures, and a 
sense of ownership are powerful motivators for collective action.  As Haas (1992a; 1992b), Adler 
(2005), and Montpetit (2003) explain, “epistemic communities”15 exist that comprise people with 
a shared sense of identity, shared goals, and shared vision.  Members exist in a “shared paradigm” 
(Montpetit 2003) and consider their actions based on their epistemic community’s social context.  
They believe that collective learning takes place through that community.  In other words, an 
epistemic community is a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in 
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue-area” (Haas 1992b, p. 3).  Examples of epistemic communities might include like-
minded scientists from different countries, government officials in the same policy area, 
academicians who work in the same discipline, and global environmentalists.  Particular work 
                                                 
 
15The term “epistemic community” is similar in concept to “policy communities,” “issue networks,” and 




affiliation is less important than sharing a common understanding of an issue or how to achieve 
policy outcomes.  Because shared norms, values, and beliefs are the very essence of an epistemic 
community, it is difficult to fool other members of the group—members know who does and who 
does not belong.  An epistemic community is also a form of a peer-pressure group. 
Epistemic communities have the ability to affect policy in several ways.  On the global 
scale, epistemic communities have been credited with raising public awareness of issues and 
forcing politicians to deal with those issues (Haas 1992a; Wapner 1995).   Epistemic 
communities, by producing a credible base of knowledge, reduce uncertainty and help make 
political decisions clearer (Haas 1992b; Montpetit 2003).  When there are uncertainties or 
disagreements about an appropriate policy option, “the closest we can come to  . . . certainty is 
when an expert consensus emerges over a given issue” (Montpetit 2003, p. 23); epistemic 
communities help produce that expert consensus.  On a practical level, epistemic communities 
create a process—a network for example—to exchange information, share data, and develop 
shared policy responses (Sebenius 1992).  When community members meet frequently and 
deliberate, their dialogue helps them unite around a shared scientific understanding and standard, 
as the policies reflect the basis consensus of the community (Coleman and Pearl 1999; Montpetit 
2003).  Moreover, such repeated interactions influence policy by helping the members know each 
others’ intentions (and, thus, avoiding imprudent decisions for lack of information), by 
multiplying opportunities to interact with peers (thus satisfying one of Axelrod’s criteria for 
enhancing cooperation), and by establishing pleasant social networks or peer-pressure 
opportunities (thus creating the reward or coercive force that Olson says is important for 
collective action).   
Managing common pool resources is inherently conflict-laden.  The “tragedy of the 
commons” literature and the question of why people do or do not act collectively has been 
debated and refined since Olson’s and Hardin’s works of the 1960s.  The literature has focused 
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generally on ways in which conflict plays out:  as a competitive force or as a motivator for 
collective action.  Perhaps Dietz et al (2002, p. 3) summarize the evolution of this literature best:   
Three decades of empirical research have revealed many rich complicated histories of 
commons management.  Sometimes these histories tell of Hardin’s tragedy.  Sometimes 
the outcome is more like  . . . comedy.  Often the results are somewhere in between, filled 
with ambiguity.  But drama is always there. . .  [Some analyses] presume that self-interest 
is the only motivator and that social mechanisms to control self-interest, such as 
communication, trust, and the ability to make binding agreements are lacking or 
ineffective. . . People sometimes do, however, move beyond individual self-interest.  
Communication, trust, and the anticipation of future interactions, and the ability to build 
agreements and rules sometimes control behavior well enough to prevent tragedy.  [There 
are] a wide diversity of settings in which users dependent on common-pool resources 
have organized themselves to achieve much better outcomes than can be predicted on 
Hardin's model. 
 
Dietz’s concept posits that each common-pool-resource setting is unique and that people 
can organize to take collective action. 
 
HOW COLLECTIVE ACTION OCCURS THROUGH THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN 
 
 Jurisdictional sovereignty means conflict—conflicting regulations, political pressures, 
and constituent needs.  The Joint Strategic Plan, signed in 1981, is a consensus-based, non-
binding agreement among the non-federal fishery management agencies on the Great Lakes and 
is designed to turn conflict into collective action.  On a constitutional level, the plan itself 
facilitates collective action by creating a process under which managers meet regularly.  As 
chapter 1 describes, lake committees consist of senior fishery managers who work together to 
decide on and formulate policies.  Technical committees consist of field-level professionals who 
undertake such tasks as deciding on data needs, gathering data, interpreting data, and providing 
advice to the lake committees.  Technical committees for all lakes were formed as-needed after 
the Joint Strategic Plan was signed in 198116 and, over time, relationships among the members 
and between the lake committees and the technical committees emerged that helped strengthen 
the management regime.  Through regular meetings, members enhance communications and 
                                                 
 
16 As chapter 1 has noted, the Lake Ontario Technical Committee is less-formal than the technical 
committees on the other lakes because there are only two jurisdictions on Lake Ontario and that 
interactions among the managers—at all levels—occur on an on-going basis. 
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solidify their commitment to cooperate, while de-emphasizing competition and unilateral action.  
While the Joint Strategic Plan outlines strategic procedures, the members must make the process 
work, thus, it is important to learn from the participants themselves how and why they take 
collective action.  During the interviews, participants were asked what they do to work together 
and what they hope to accomplish by participating in the plan’s processes.   
First and foremost, the plan’s primary strategy is to create a forum for fishery managers 
to interact regularly.  Managers convene lake committees and technical committees at least once 
per year (sometimes more often), and conference calls, emails, and outside interactions are 
common and on-going.  The Council of Lake Committees—comprising all lake committee 
members—meets twice per year, and lake committee members deliver reports during the Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission’s annual meeting.  Because the meetings occur regularly, members 
expect to see and work with their colleagues from other jurisdictions.  Although the lake 
committees existed prior to the plan, the plan increased significantly the number of meetings 
among Great Lakes fishery managers at all levels.  Members strongly associate the plan with 
regular meetings, and while the participants provided a large list of collective actions they take 
because of their meetings, three main actions emerged (figure 2-1).  Through the plan, members 
together: 
• collect and share information,  
• decide on tasks that need to be done and identify who is to perform the tasks, and 
• develop broad policies that guide management.   
 
 
Collecting and sharing information 
 
The Joint Strategic Plan serves as a forum to manage information—information both 
about the resource’s biology and about jurisdictional management activities.  Information 
exchange provides members with opportunities to learn about the status of the fishery, about what 
other agencies are doing, and about emerging issues and problems.  The information they 
exchange originates mostly from two sources:  individual agencies and the technical committees.  
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Individual agencies conduct a variety of fishery management activities and managers use the lake 
committees as a place to share that information.  Technical committees receive direction from the 
lake committees and are designed to collect and manage scientific information.  The two 
information sources are deeply intertwined, as members bring their agency’s data to the technical 
committees and in turn they apply technical committee data to their agency decisions.  During 
lake committee and technical committee meetings, members routinely report to each other on fish 
stock status in each jurisdiction, forage base17 status, individual agency activities, progress in 
achieving shared objectives, and each jurisdiction’s harvest regulations.  In addition to that 
reporting, members discuss trends, significant changes in the fish communities, and the latest 
scientific research.  This reporting function is not unlike the pre-plan lake committees of the 
1960s and 1970s.  However, while the early lake committees focused simply on reporting, 
meetings under the plan are more strategic. 
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Figure 2-1:  Types of collective action under the Joint Strategic Plan. 
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 As much as the lake committees are a broad forum for using and sharing information, the 
technical committees are a focused forum for field-level biologists to generate and digest data.  
Data drives fishery management, and sound data are invaluable.  Collecting data requires major 
monetary resources, time, staff, and technical know-how.  Management of data is difficult 
because scientists do not always agree on what they need to collect nor on how best they can 
collect it.  The technical committees help overcome data collection and sharing problems, as 
members see it as their job to monitor the resource and to conduct the science necessary for the 
lake committees and the agencies to make informed decisions.  The lake committees provide 
direction to the technical committees.  For example, if the lake committees tell the technical 
committees to develop options to restore a particular species, the technical committee members 
will agree on what data they need to identify the restoration options.  Subsequently, technical 
committee members frequently parcel out data collection tasks, report back on their activities, and 
question each other over the meaning of technical data.  When asked about their function, 
technical committee members often expressed their responses in terms of how they carry out their 
duties.  For example, said a Lake Superior technical committee member, “we sit down and decide 
who is going to sample [what and] in which years.”  Technical committee minutes and reports are 
riddled with statements like:   
Lakewide coordination of data and assessment activities continued to be the main focus 
of the [Lake Michigan Technical Committee] this past year . . . Significant effort during 
the last year has been directed at standardization of the collection and reporting of creel 
survey and diet data18 (Holey 1995, p. 4), 
 
and “the technical committee conducted a third lakewide assessment of deepwater predators 
(siscowets) in Lake Superior” (Ebener 2001, p. 9).  With data in-hand, technical committee 
members analyze the information, conduct modeling exercises, test hypotheses, and apply the 
                                                 
 
18 “Creel survey” refers to the number of each species caught in angler fishing.  “Diet data” refers to the 
food (e.g., fish, plankton) that caught-fish had in their stomachs, illustrating the amount and types of 
organisms that serve as food for other animals (known as the “forage base”). 
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data to reports and management plans.  These plans are important to both individual agencies and 
to the lake committee members. 
 Information exchange at the technical committee and lake committee levels not only 
helps the members develop plans to manage the resource, but it also allows members to learn 
about what each of the other agencies is doing.  The participants indicated that learning about 
other agency activities is valuable for two reasons.  First, members want to be sure the other 
agencies are not doing things that would harm their efforts.  Said one retired Canadian federal 
official, “we ask ‘is there anything happening elsewhere on the lake, under the aegis of a different 
agency, that will undo what we’re trying to do?’”  Second, knowing what the others are doing 
gives members an opportunity to respond to the actions, particularly if the actions are inconsistent 
with shared objectives.  Such an opportunity to respond facilitates dialogue and helps turn 
disagreement into policies that are more consistent with shared goals.  Members discuss issues 
over which they disagree, but, in the words of a lake committee member, “my experience has 
been [that this discussion is] more about the critical dialogue  . . . rather than trying to be real 
negativistic and create allies and that sort of thing.”  This approach uses regular discussions to 
help the agencies avoid dealing with conflict competitively. 
 
Decide and Perform Tasks  
 
The second major way members say they act collectively is to together decide on tasks 
that need doing and then to identify who is to perform the tasks.  This function puts strategic 
plans into action; it spells out to the participants who is expected to do what and commits the 
members to their shared agenda.  Members view this task-management as a shared responsibility 
and as a way to achieve shared goals.  The lake committee members use the process to instruct 
the technical committees.  “The lake committees want the technical committees to tell them 
what’s going on with the resource,” said a tribal participant.  Added a lake committee member 
from Lake Erie, “my expectation is that [the technical committees] will do the best science, they 
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will assimilate the best information, . . . [and] give us the best ideas from a scientific standpoint . . 
. [W]e are extremely dependent on them to give us the best information . . . possible,”  Lake 
committee members spoke frequently in terms of how they turn the technical committee data into 
management, so not only do the lake committee members tend to view the technical committees 
as the “eyes and ears” of the resources, but they also rely on the technical committees to look into 
the issues that the lake committees feel are important.   
Minutes from lake committee and technical committee meetings are replete with 
examples of how the lake committees instruct the technical committees.  For instance, in 2004, 
the Lake Superior Committee charged its technical committee with developing environmental 
objectives for the fishery (GLFC 2004c), the Lake Huron Committee charged the lake trout 
technical committee with developing a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of pulse stocking19 
(GLFC 2004b), and the Lake Erie Committee handed several charges to its technical committees 
including tasks relating to assessing the status of walleye and yellow perch stocks, environmental 
objectives, and resource modeling (GLFC 2004a).  
Minutes, agendas, and participant-observation show that the technical committees devote 
a significant portion of their meetings to discussing and formulating responses to specific lake 
committee charges, and, in fact, technical committee participants, like the technical committee 
documents themselves, often framed their function in terms of how they respond to lake 
committee charges.  For example, typical in minutes are statements like “the [Lake Superior 
Technical Committee] was charged by the Lake Superior Committee to investigate what is 
happening to lake herring stocks on Lake Superior since herring have not reproduced very 
successfully in the last five years” (Ebener 1998, p. 3) or “the [Lake Erie Standing Technical 
Committee] forwards the following recommendations to the [Lake Erie Committee] for their 
consideration” (GLFC 1987, p. 77). 
                                                 
 
19 Pulse stocking favors concentrated stocking in certain areas that change from year to year instead of 
stocking the same areas year after year at a relatively constant rate. 
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Develop shared policies, plans, and objectives 
The third major collective action under the plan is the development of shared policies, 
plans, and objectives.  Beyond the lake committees of the 1960s and 1970s, today’s process is 
strategic, not just informative.  Before the plan, lake committee members focused on reporting 
individual activities to each other (see chapter 1).  While that remains an important function, 
managers use today’s process to strategize and develop shared policies, plans, and objectives.  “If 
data does not get converted to policy, what’s the point?” observed a technical committee member 
during a lake committee executive session.  The lake committees and technical committees 
indeed are established to turn talk into action; to turn science into policy.  The committees 
motivate members to focus on a shared purpose, to identify their shared goals, and to work 
Figure 2-2:  Typical lake committee products:  Fish 




together to advance those goals collectively.  “I went to meetings looking forward to pulling 
together with other agencies,” said a retired member.  “The lake committee meetings, of course, 
are [all] about the decision-making . . .” added a current member.  As the committees began to 
develop fish community objectives and specific fishery rehabilitation plans, lake committee 
meetings added to their regular agendas updates about progress to achieve fisheries rehabilitation 
and challenges in fulfilling shared objectives.  Lake trout restoration, for example, while a major 
topic of discussion long before the Joint Strategic Plan, attained renewed attention when the plan 
called for the development of shared lake trout objectives and restoration plans. 
Under the plan, agencies agree to work together to produce and fulfill fish community 
objectives and management plans, a major type of collective action.  Fish community objectives 
are the primary strategic lake committee product and lake committee and technical committee 
members see this exercise as a major responsibility.  The Joint Strategic Plan is rooted in the 
philosophy that each of the Great Lakes should be managed as a whole.  The plan calls for each 
lake committee to develop and publish the shared vision for the lake’s fishery—the desired 
species mix, how to attain and sustain the mix, and how to measure successful management (e.g., 
by the amount of fish it yields) (DesJardine et al. 1995).  Although the objectives vary in how 
they articulate the vision for the lake’s fish communities, they generally follow a uniform format:  
a description of the historical fish community, guiding principles for management agencies, 
specific objectives for the fish communities (usually organized by species or group of species), 
suggested strategies to reach the objectives, and challenges to attaining the objectives.  The fish 
community objectives are not specific management plans, rather, they articulate the consensus 
about what the fishery should look like.  They respect the fact that each jurisdiction will retain 
management authority, but they also acknowledge that collective action is necessary to reach the 
objectives.  Appendix D summarizes the fish community objectives for each lake.  
Beyond being a useful management guide for the agencies, members also see the process 
to develop objectives as important.  Said a lake committee member from Ontario:  “It was a big 
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struggle [to develop the objectives] but it was a good exercise.  It forced all the agencies to think 
cooperatively . . . [I]t’s big big stuff and it takes a lot of time and agency commitment to do it.”  
Lake committee members see the objectives as a “good starting point” for where fishery 
management on the lake will go, and they view the objectives as evolving documents.  Indeed, 
lake committee and technical committee members appear less concerned about publishing the 
objectives than they are about working together to keep the dialogue vibrant.  Said a technical 
committee member, from the Province of Ontario, 
I guess [the fish community objectives] had value [to the lake committee and technical 
committee] before they ever got finished.  They had no value to the [Great Lakes Fishery] 
Commission until they were finished because [the commission] didn’t acknowledge it is a 
living document . . . . [It has been] a consensus document of the [lake committee] for a 
number of years. And it evolved every time there was a new issue.  
 
Lake committees do not measure the plan’s success strictly through outputs like the number of 
published fish community objectives.  Instead, they also see value in a process that keeps them 
working toward their shared goals. 
As much as the lake committee meetings are an open, public forum, the technical 
committees and the lake committee executive sessions are the place for collective strategic 
planning.  During the lake committee meetings (and often during other times of the year), the 
members meet in executive session for in camera dialogue about the issues and to make 
recommendations. For instance, in 1998, the Lake Michigan Committee agreed to comment on a 
draft lake trout rehabilitation plan (GLFC 1998), in 2001, the Lake Superior Committee approved 
the fish community objectives and a walleye rehabilitation plan (GLFC 2001b), and in 2004, the 
Lake Ontario Committee completed fish community objectives for the St. Lawrence river (GLFC 
2001a).  Members discussed in detail during executive session these and many other lake 
committee products, and members had a chance to express concerns, question new ideas, review 
underlying data, and have frank discussions.  In 1992, for instance, the Lake Superior Technical 
Committee used its meetings to revise the lake trout restoration plan (Hansen 1992), the Lake 
Michigan Technical Committee evaluated the appropriateness of Lake Michigan Fish Community 
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Objectives (Holey 1992), the Lake Huron Technical Committee developed a sturgeon 
rehabilitation plan (Ebener 1992), the Lake Erie Technical Committee developed specific 
recommendations for species like walleye and yellow perch, and the two agencies on Lake 
Ontario worked directly to coordinate their activities.  Agendas and reports from other years show 
similar activities; activities focusing on developing data and discussing ideas related to restoration 
plans and fishery objectives. 
 
THE RESULTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
 Members use the Joint Strategic Plan to meet regularly and take collective action.  They 
collect and share information, manage tasks, and develop shared plans and objectives.  The plan 
increased the number of meetings among fishery experts at all levels and spawned new 
committees to deal with technical matters.  This section discusses what participants believe to be 
the results of their collective actions.  To be sure, what members perceive to be the results is as 
diverse are there are participants.  Nevertheless, participants, during the more than sixty in-depth 
interviews, tended to frame their comments in terms of four themes (figure 2-3).  First, regular 
collective action creates a durable framework and process for future collective action.  Second, 
collaboration builds durable relationships and has fostered an epistemic community.  Third, 
collaboration helps agencies manage the fishery across the political boundaries and view the 
resource from a larger “ecosystem” perspective, a perspective that takes into account multiple 
species and multiple needs.  Finally, collaboration helps members produce better policies that are 
more defensible with politicians and stakeholders.  The relationship between collective action and 
the result of collective action is highly synergistic.  For example, the act of gathering and sharing 
information solidifies a cooperative framework and makes the relationships more durable.  In 
turn, a more-solid framework with durable relationships makes the members more apt to take 
collective action.  In other words, the more the members see results of collective action, the more 




Regular collective action creates a durable framework and process for collective action 
 
Participants see regular meetings and the other forms of collective action under the plan 
as establishing a durable process for cooperation.  Said the participants, by meeting regularly, the 
plan served as a “framework for dealing with issues,” a “shining star for all of us to follow,” it 
gives us a sense of “common purpose,” it pushes people “in a uniform direction,” it is “common 
ground” for the agencies, and it “gives us an opportunity to focus on common threads and pull 
those common threads together and maybe weave them into positives.”  Said a long-serving 
member:  “The Joint Strategic Plan [showed] it would be possible for the states to agree on a 
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Figure 2-3:  Types and results of collective action under the Joint Strategic Plan. 
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that the plan is a framework to develop a shared vision is an important concept to the lake 
committee and technical committee members because they know that diffuse authority leads to 
conflict and without an overarching framework or process to follow, parochialism would prevail. 
That the plan is common ground or a framework is a concept that participants at all levels 
generally share.  When asked about the impact of the plan, nearly all participants, in one way or 
another, framed their response in terms of the structure that has resulted from their collective 
action.  Participants who were around before and after the plan was developed speak of the plan 
as the first move to change the way of thinking on the Great Lakes from parochial to cooperative.  
Many credit the plan with forcing them to work together to reach those goals.  This contributed to 
a feeling not only that cooperation occurs “because we all agreed to the plan,” but also because 
the plan created an “attitude” of working together.  Members recognize that agencies often have 
differing philosophies or opinions about how to reach goals, even goals they share with other 
jurisdictions.  Without a framework and a process for collective action, they sense there would be 
chaos.  When there exists a shared resource but not a shared vision for how the resource should 
be managed, the outcome is failure and harm to the resource, observed a tribal representative.  
 Participants believe that ongoing collective action makes the process durable.  The 
process is a regional forum for action, complete with decision records, deadlines, and timelines.  
Even though the process is voluntary, members feel committed to the process because their 
jurisdiction signed the agreement and agreed to the formal process.  Because they are used to 
regular interactions, they do not feel they can easily or flippantly ignore the plan.  Thus, the plan 
cements both personal relationships and agency relationships.  “I think the Joint Strategic Plan 
says you will not walk away from the table.  The Joint Strategic Plan says we are committed to 
this process,” said a state lake committee member.  A former member of the Great Lakes Fishery 




Part of the reason for [the Joint Strategic Plan’s] success is that it provided a lasting 
documentation of the process going on on the Great Lakes. It required agencies to not 
only participate, but actually put their signatures on the line.  So, it made some level of 
accountability to that process. And by doing so, it provided [things] like endurance, 
resilience, life…It’s the idea [to make] it more difficult if you wanted to dissolve it 
overnight; it’s very hard to do so. So it gave it an enduring life and …those are very good 
outcomes. 
 
Indeed, many observed that lake committee and technical committee meetings engage everyone 
in the process on a regular basis and allows for—some say forces—ongoing dialogue.  So, while 
collective action has solidified the framework, a solid framework has initiated more commitment 
to collective action. 
 
Collaboration builds durable relationships and has fostered an epistemic community 
 
Professional and personal relationships are critical to cooperation, and the Joint Strategic 
Plan’s impact is largely a function of ongoing interactions among members, through the lake 
committees and technical committees.  Relationships are important for four reasons:  they 
increase understanding among the members; they increase trust and, therefore, the feeling that 
decisions made will be kept; they make dishonesty or insincerity undesirable because such 
behavior threatens future relations; and they make interjurisdictional cooperation enjoyable.   The 
danger of a deep reliance on relationships, on the other hand, is the possibility of homogenous 
thinking (“group think”), characterized by an over-reliance on philosophies within the scope of 
the dominant paradigm, a shunning of members who do not conform, and a reluctance to present 
novel ideas and thereby risk embarrassment or being ostracized. 
 The Joint Strategic Plan is designed to maximize interactions among peers and, in doing 
so, to build a close-knit community of fishery managers.  Indeed, the lake committees and 
technical committees represent epistemic communities—communities of like-minded thinkers 
and members of these communities meet regularly—several times a year for some members.  
Meetings almost always include a group social and participation in the social is a time-honored 
highlight.  (“Never, never underestimate the importance of the social interactions after the 
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meeting,” implored a former lake committee member.)  Many members have been involved in the 
process for several years—some for decades.  These long-term professional and social 
interactions allow the members to know one another, to know each person’s perspective, and to 
better understand and predict individual positions.  Lake committee and technical committee 
members speak of “becoming friends” with colleagues from other jurisdictions.  They spend 
hours a day in meetings discussing issues and they usually continue their deliberations in social 
settings after the meetings have ended.  Said a tribal participant:  
Maybe it’s because people have been around now a while and they know each other, they 
work with each other.  I think . . . people know where the other agency is coming from 
[and] what they could or couldn’t live with.  A lot of schmoozing going on before you 
actually sit around the table and say ‘here’s what we want to do.’ 
 
Added a state manager, talking about the management community:  “It is a pretty small family, 
and it is a pretty . . . tight-knit family.” 
 Trust and understanding emerge from a tight-knit community that interacts frequently.  In 
epistemic communities, people want to be credible and trusted (particularly with people they 
Figure 2-4:  A typical lake committee meeting social.  Photo:  M. Gaden. 
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respect) and they also want to trust others.  Lake committee and technical committee members 
say that preserving and improving their own credibility drives their involvement.  Credibility 
depends on providing colleagues with the best data available, coming to the table in earnest, and 
following through on commitments.  “If you do something that’s totally at odds with what the 
science suggests, you’ve got to face those people around the table and you’ve got to look yourself 
in the mirror,” noted a former lake committee member from Ontario.  In relationships based on 
trust and credibility, discussions focus on the issues at hand, not on personalities.  Said one state 
lake committee member,  
The amazing thing is, people have these critical dialogues during the day and they 
disagree, they disagree, they disagree.  Nobody walks out of the door and says ‘you son 
of a bitch, I am going to screw you the next time.’  We go and have dinner and we 
continue the discussion. 
 
Trust also produces efficiencies.  Colleagues who know and trust each other do not have to start 
at the beginning with every issue.  Said a manager about a fellow technical committee member,  
So if [Pat20] is throwing something up on the screen, and it is highly statistical, and I 
might not fully understand everything he is saying,  . . . it is OK that I don’t understand it 
because I trust him.  Now if it is some Joe Blow from some university  . . . spewing off 
something, [and] I don’t know anything about the guy and I don’t understand what he’s 
saying, my red flags go up at that point.  
 
 
 Clearly, future interactions are also important to members.  Members are acutely aware 
that they will work with colleagues again, and they take that fact that into account when they act 
today.  Insincere or dishonest behavior comes at a price, perhaps paid in the future.  Said a long-
serving participant from the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, 
sometimes you have to take double the hit or to always take the high road . . .  [You 
must] reflect upon the nature of this particular decision relative to the overall process of 
cooperative management over the next 10 or 20 years. Do you win your battle for today, 
but jeopardize the process for the next 20 years? 
 
People in a tight-knit community who meet frequently indeed must be sensitive to future 
interactions and take into account whether headstrong behavior today will threaten future 
                                                 
 
20 Name has been changed. 
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opportunities.  Members who are continually obstructionist or closed-minded, or possess a hidden 
agenda, are taken less seriously than those who have a track record of cooperation.  Moreover, the 
trust that takes years to develop could evaporate with a single transgression, illustrating how 
fragile trust is and how important it is for members to respect the relationships.  People who go 
back on their word for a short-term gain must live with the consequences in the future, when 
others are less willing to trust them. 
 Strong relationships built on trust have the added benefit of making the meetings more 
enjoyable.  Lake committee and technical committee members generally come from similar 
academic backgrounds and have similar worldviews about how the fishery should be managed.  
Some even went to school together or worked together in the same agency.  They share mentors.  
Lake committee and technical committee members generally agree that members are mostly of 
the same professional caliber, though technical committee members more readily accepted that 
some of their peers have less expertise than others.21  Members generally value talking to one 
another as peers not only because they gain information that is important to their jobs, but also 
because they simply appreciate rubbing shoulders with esteemed colleagues.  (These are indeed 
common traits of epistemic communities.)  “I really enjoy renewing acquaintances” during the 
lake committee meetings, said a Great Lakes Fishery Commission staff member.  Added a lake 
committee member from Ontario, “in most cases, we like each other, so it’s a highlight of the job 
to get together at these meetings and interact with the other side of the table.”  Members speak of 
camaraderie, and, as a lake committee member from Ontario described, look forward to a break 
from the daily grind: 
I think most of the committee gets along very well together. We are like friends. And I 
think it is a chance to get away. We don’t have to answer the phone. We don’t have to 
deal with our constituents. It is like any job. You get together with people who have 
similar interests or jobs and you can sit around and bitch and complain and feel better 
because you are not alone. Most of the other people have similar problems and headaches 
                                                 
 
21 This variation in professional expertise is probably due to the fact that technical committee members are 
earlier in their professional careers than those who are at the lake committee level. 
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that you do. So at least you don’t feel that you are the only one. And it is always 
interesting. It reinvigorates us too to get back into the biology and [to recall] why you are 
in it in the first place. How often do you get sidetracked into the politics?  To get back 
and hear about some biology and some interesting developments on the lake is 
reinvigorating. So when you head back home you can feel a little refreshed. 
 
The word “refreshed” is not a term one would expect people to associate with meetings that go on 
for several days and involve massive amounts of data.  Yet, participants describe returning from 
the meetings with a renewed vigor for the job.  An official from Ontario perhaps captures it best:  
“I suspect that for most fisheries managers, it is the highlight of their existence to go meet with 
their international counterparts.  I suspect it’s a perk rather than a burden . . .  Otherwise, being a 
lake manager is a very lonely job.” 
 
Collaboration helps agencies manage the fishery properly, from an ecosystem perspective:  
 
Collective action, say participants, broadens their thinking; it helps them manage the 
resource as an ecosystem.  Although managers rarely agree on a single definition of ecosystem 
management, they widely accept two aspects of this approach:  (1) that the species inhabiting the 
resource—including humans—are interconnected, and (2) that management action should be 
based on ecological (not political) boundaries (Grumbine 1994; Krueger and Decker 1999).  
Today, most institutions on the Great Lakes recognize explicitly ecosystem management as the 
foundation for actions (Ferreri et al. 1999; Jude and Leach 1999).  By embracing the ecosystem 
approach, people and governments agree to work together to manage transboundary resources 
(Donahue 1988).  If fishery managers acknowledge ecosystem management as a motivator for 
their actions, they move toward framing their self-interest in terms of collective action and 
cooperation rather than competition. 
Biologists on the Great Lakes understand and appreciate that they share the fishery with 
others and that it would be futile to manage based on political boundaries.  On the other hand, 
fishery managers are responsible to their own jurisdiction, which is akin to being strongly 
motivated by self-interest, a threat to collective action.  Indeed, a fishery manager’s professional 
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performance is evaluated not so much by the amount of time spent working with other 
jurisdictions, but rather by whether he advances his department’s interests.  Said a senior state 
manager,  “People naturally want to manage their area.  Constituent pressures and politics are 
significant and naturally push a manager to be turf-conscious.”  “Ecosystem management,” on the 
other hand, is a more holistic approach, and many Joint Strategic Plan participants see their 
collective actions as leading to ecosystem-based policies.  In turn, accepting ecosystem-based 
management leads to more collaboration as more and more disciplines are integrated.   
The first aspect of ecosystem management—that species are biologically 
interconnected—is simple reality to the fishery managers.  Accepting this principle means that 
managers must incorporate many disciplines—disciplines such economics, water and air quality, 
human needs and desires, physical habitat, aesthetics, goals of different constituencies—into 
fishery management (Krueger and Decker 1999).  For instance, it makes little sense to manage 
the lake for one species when the species has an affect on and is affected by so many other 
species and environmental elements like habitat and pollution.  Participants do believe that 
working together helps them think about the resource in terms of ecosystem management, like 
preserving the structure and stability of the entire fish community, rather than focusing on single-
species management.  Said a manager from Ontario, observing fishery management on the Great 
Lakes over time,  
The process [of fishery management is] constantly evolving about aquatic management.  
The environmentalists and water quality people are now working with the habitat people.  
The people are starting then to see that this is a system out there.  We went from 
extremely non-productive, reductionist mode into the holistic situation.”  
 
Others agree.  Reflecting on his career, a long-serving member of the lake committee process 
noted that previous generations of fishery managers did not always think in terms of ecosystem 
management.   
But as [managers of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s] retired, and a younger generation came 
in,  . . . you could see it was going more towards fish communities lake wide –this is a 
broad, nebulous way of saying ‘ecosystem management.’ . . .  [Previously, the managers 




The Joint Strategic Plan, in the minds of many, has helped the fishery managers better 
understand and manage the biological interconnections.  Part of this relates to the fact that the 
Joint Strategic Plan, under the 1997 revision, calls upon the agencies to develop environmental 
objectives as a way to better connect fisheries to other related areas.  Several of those interviewed 
noted that while the fishery managers still have a long way to go before environmental objectives 
are meshed with fishery objectives, they nevertheless believe that the process of developing fish 
community objectives prompts them to cooperate with each other and with those in other 
disciplines. 
 The second aspect of ecosystem management, that management should be based on 
ecological boundaries, requires that fishery managers understand that many jurisdictions share the 
resource and that collaboration is essential to sound management.  On the broadest level, the very 
reason for agreeing to the plan was to create a mechanism to facilitate cross-jurisdictional 
cooperation.  Deeper than that, the participants do share an ecosystem mindset.  Throughout the 
interviews, most participants, in one way or another, acknowledged that jurisdictions are parts of 
a larger community.  Common were comments like:   “we don’t operate in a vacuum,” or “this is 
a shared fishery,” or “fish don’t observe the political boundaries.”  They know that actions in one 
jurisdiction affect the others.  Perhaps more importantly the participants understand that 
interconnectedness requires cooperation; that in acknowledging the existence of a shared 
resource, they also acknowledge the existence of shared goals.  “Any conversation we have about 
the Great Lakes,” said a senior official from Ontario, “always takes place with at least a 
backdrop—and very often explicit reference—to the fact that the fish swim around and are shared 
with the U.S. jurisdictions; they are not exclusively ours.”  “You have to take other jurisdictions 
into account before you take actions that could effect the whole,” added a retired biologist from a 
large state, and, said a lake manager from Ontario, the Joint Strategic Plan “forces people to 
recognize that the fish stocks in the Great Lakes are shared.”  Tribal representatives agree.  Said 
one:  “Tribal leadership understands that you can’t manage the resource independently.”  Perhaps 
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most clearly stated, said a long-time academic participant in the lake committee process, “It 
doesn’t take rocket science for biologists to figure out that you can’t manage the lake 
independently from the other jurisdictions.” 
 Participants see collaboration as nurturing a culture of ecosystem management.  While 
there is some variation on just how strongly participants believe the plan compels members to 
act—some say, for instance, the plan forces them to work together while others say the plan 
encourages cooperation (see chapter 4)—participants nevertheless believe that their collective 
action has helped them think more on an ecosystem level than they would have without the plan.  
Said a fishery manager on Lake Michigan, “I think [the plan] has been primarily to force—if I 
could use that word—other agencies into considering ecosystem management.”  Added another 
state lake committee member, “It holds agencies together and it has that subtle pressure on 
agencies to work together and share information instead of going off on their own path.”  Said a 
long-serving Joint Strategic Plan participant, now retired, “After the plan, it was well accepted 
that one had to be circumspect about what one did and to engage the other players before doing or 
undertaking any kind of major management initiative.”  Whether the plan forced, exerted subtle 
pressure, verbalized a shared goal, caused circumspection, or simply helped provide the big 
picture, participants link the plan to the broader concept of working together to achieve 
ecosystem management, a management strategy that they see as essential. 
 
Collaboration leads to policies that are more defensible with politicians and stakeholders 
 
Lake committee and technical committee members believe that collective action has 
helped them produce better policies that are more defensible with politicians and stakeholders. 
Likewise, when better policies emerge through a collaborative process, managers have an 
incentive to collaborate further.  Fisheries is a politically charged policy area.  Each of the non-
federal jurisdictions has the ability to promulgate regulations and institute policies within their 
jurisdiction, independent of other jurisdictions’ will.  Politicians, bureaucrats, and leaders have 
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considerable leeway to significantly impact fishery managers’ actions in a parochial way.  
Stakeholders who want such things as greater access to the resource, lower license fees, higher 
quotas, or fewer restrictions on behavior, for instance, exert direct pressure on  politicians and 
senior officials.  Because “all politics is local,” there could be considerable political and 
constituent pressures to force fishery managers to do parochial things.  On the other hand, relying 
on science and developing shared objectives have made others less likely to second-guess fishery 
managers’ decisions and have made the decisions sound more reasonable to politicians and 
constituents. 
  Joint Strategic Plan members and observers are acutely aware of political and constituent 
pressures.  Whether the participant is at the lake committee or technical committee level, most 
noted that constituents and politicians almost always affect their decisions and thinking.  Many 
noted, however, that they believe politicians, and constituents are often operating without the 
benefit of relevant data or an appreciation for the shared nature of the resource.  Constituent 
pressures usually move what should be ecosystem-based policies in a parochial direction.  
Participants believe their collective action helps protect them from these parochial pressures.  For 
one, the plan is a document to which senior officials have agreed and, therefore, deviation from 
the plan would entail some political costs from the other jurisdictions.   Moreover, to the 
participants—particularly to the senior-level participants who are directly accountable for 
policies—the plan allows them to remind politicians that a meaning exists to their decisions—
even decisions that might not appear to be in the immediate best interest of the home jurisdiction.  
A retired senior manager recalled that arguments he couched in the Joint Strategic Plan were a big 
help.  “There were times [when politicians] would want to go off on their own. . . . [That is when] 
I gave them a copy of the plan and [said] ‘look, [my decision] is part of an interstate [agreement].  
This is bigger than [the state of ***].’”  Managers see the plan as a buffer, as a way to explain to 
politicians that there are other jurisdictions they need to consider.  Managers, at many levels, say 
they have used the plan to explain policies to politicians and, often, the politicians accept the lake 
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committee decisions.  For instance, during an Ontario Commercial Fisheries’ Association 
meeting in January, 2004, the Honorable David Ramsay, Minister of Natural Resources for 
Ontario, standing before a hostile audience of commercial fishermen who were about to have 
their quotas cut substantially, defended Ontario’s Lake Erie manager for accepting the lower 
quota and remarked that good bilateral relations with the U.S. states was an important factor in 
his agreeing to the manager’s decision.  “Managing fish stocks is an international endeavor . . . it 
is a shared resource,” remarked the minister.   
 The plan also helps managers deal with stakeholders.  Fishery managers throughout the 
Great Lakes basin, in one way or another, interact with their stakeholders, and managers believe 
that the collective decisions can help them explain their policies to the public.  At times, the 
shared decisions run counter to the jurisdictions’ parochial interests.  Like politicians, the 
stakeholders are somewhat persuaded by non-parochial initiatives that have the endorsement of a 
larger community or are grounded in quality information—information generated through the 
lake committee process.    A senior fishery manager from a state on Lake Erie noted that after 
explaining a tough decision,   
one of the very first constituent or stakeholder responses is ‘why are you doing this?  Is 
this just some sort of altruistic thing?  Why are you doing this?’  And when you tell them 
about [the Joint Strategic Plan], they seem awfully impressed with the fact that we have 
the kind of collaboration with the other agencies that we do.  
 
Added a senior manager from Ontario,  
When there is a stakeholder that is challenging our management action and it becomes a 
political issue, you can say ‘we have international [fish community objectives]; we have 
an international agreement on this.  We are working cooperatively internationally.’  That 
carries an awful lot of weight in terms of dealing with what can be quite politically active 
and assertive stakeholders in different jurisdictions.  
 
A retired state manager recalls how the plan helped him with an unpopular decision: 
We told the public ‘look we are a part of this deal and we have to be good team players. 
And we can’t get everything we want but we are going to get stuff that we wouldn’t be 
able to get if we didn’t belong.’ And that is the way we sold the plan. When you have 
people that just said ‘screw lake trout, we don’t want lake trout—they are fat and greasy 
and they don’t taste good and they don’t fight hard; we just want salmon,’ we could say 




The stakeholders might or might not agree with the decision, but they at least want to know that 
the agreement among the jurisdictions is reasonable and fair and that everyone will adhere to it.  
The managers believe that the collaborative process often creates safety in numbers and helps 
make the policies they develop better and more defensible with politicians and constituents.  This 
allows members to use the Joint Strategic Plan process as a way to focus on the collective needs 
rather than on parochial interests.  Parochialism, in such a cooperative process, manifests itself as 
political and constituent pressures outside of the process rather than as fishery managers using a 
meeting structure to advance their jurisdictions’ particular will.  Self-interest, in other words, is 
internalized in terms of seeking shared goals. 
 
RELATIONSHIPS, COERCION, AND REWARDS:  THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN’S 
TACTICS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
A Great Lakes fishery manager must have a pretty good reason to expend time, energy, 
and resources to consider other jurisdictions’ interests and needs.  After all, strictly from an 
accountability perspective, the manager must please only his agency’s hierarchy, his 
jurisdiction’s politicians, and the stakeholders who scrutinize his actions closely.  A manager 
could be forgiven for thinking parochially.  Yet, through the Joint Strategic Plan, Great Lakes 
fishery managers expend considerable effort to collaborate with colleagues from other 
jurisdictions, to transcend parochialism, and to take collective action.  The final section of this 
chapter focuses on the question why do fishery managers—who are accountable only to their own 
jurisdiction—expend time, energy and resources to coordinate fisheries policies?  The interviews, 
participant observation, and documents suggest the Joint Strategic Plan gently coerces 
cooperation and it rewards collective action.  In particular,  
1. because the process is formal and because in signing the plan, members agree to 
participate in it, participation in the plan is viewed as somewhat mandatory and, 
therefore, the plan gently coerces managers into collective action;  
2. an epistemic community of like-minded thinkers stokes strong relationships.  
Relationships among individuals in such a select community both coerces managers 
into adhering to the norms of the community and rewards the participants personally 
 
 102
and professionally, as the members benefit from the information they share, the 
policies they develop, and the intellectual stimulation;  
3. managers know that ecosystem management (not parochialism) is the best way to 
manage and managers are rewarded professionally and personally by managing most 
appropriately; and  
4. defensible policies are more rewarding—both professionally and personally—than 
policies that stakeholders and politicians believe are misguided. 
 
Either coercion or reward-based encouragement (or both) is needed to frame conflict among the 
jurisdictions in terms of cooperation rather than competition.  The Joint Strategic Plan, in the 
minds of participants, has fulfilled this function.  These four reasons for collective action 
illustrate how gentle coercion and rewards together encourage fishery managers to work 
collectively (figure 2-5). 
The literature this chapter reviews stresses that one should expect there to be conflict over 
shared natural resources.  Kohn (1992) and Keohane (1984) observe that conflict is channeled 
either toward competition or cooperation.  First and foremost, in Great Lakes fishery 
management, conflict does not appear to lead to competition over the fishery resources.  Joint 
Strategic Plan participants rarely provided competitive, game-theory-like explanations for why 
they participate in the lake committees or technical committees.  This is not a surprise.  With the 
important exception of the Lake Erie Committee—which explicitly uses the process as a way to 
allocate the fishery and which will be discussed thoroughly in chapter 5—the lake committee and 
technical committee meetings seldom focus on competitive-type issues, issues such as whether 
one jurisdiction is harvesting more than others or whether one jurisdiction is shouldering a larger 
stocking burden than others.  While the interviews did suggest elements of self-centered behavior 
among the lake committee and technical committee members (for example, members participate 
to keep an eye on each other), the prevailing reason for participation is not to secure a competitive 
advantage, rather, it is to find and employ ways to work together, to move in the same direction, 
and to maximize information sharing.   
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Why, then, do the members act collectively?  Process, relationships, coercion, and 
rewards are most important, says the literature, and collective action through the Joint Strategic 
Plan creates a durable process, durable relationships, an ecosystem mentality, and defensible  
policies.  These in turn help the participants know each other and care about relationships, which 
are coercive and rewarding.  Together, these factors help explain why members work collectively 
in the Great Lakes basin.  First, a discussion of the formal process as a coercive force.  Nothing 
compels fishery managers to participate in the plan; it is not a binding agreement like, say, a 
treaty or an interstate compact.  However, the fact that the plan is in writing and was agreed-to by 
senior officials from all fishery agencies coerces the Great Lakes fishery managers into 
participating in the process.  Coercion can come in many forms and in varying degrees.  Usually, 
coercion is synonymous with forcing action or creating a situation where people are forced to do 
something they do not want to do.  Coercion, though, can also be more gentle.  It might not 
harshly force action but it certainly could persuade or pressure action.  Signatories consider 
participation in the plan to be somewhat mandatory because fishery managers are gently coerced 
into cooperation by the mere existence of an agreed-to framework.  
The formal process is also somewhat coercive in that it helps keep members accountable 
to each other; it helps ensure that the members follow through on their responsibilities to develop 
and implement shared objectives and plans.  Fish community objectives, restoration plans, joint 
assessment activities, and other lake committee and technical committee products are shared; they 
reflect a common vision.  The products are by the members and for the members and, as such, 
members expect the other members to adhere to them.  Participants see the formal lake committee 
and technical committee processes as important to achieving the shared objectives, and agencies, 
by agreeing to the plan, pledge their commitment to contribute what they can to the process.  
Since the proverbial chain “is only as strong as its weakest link,” agreeing to be a part of the 
process involves a commitment—a coercion of sorts—to do one’s part.  Since accountability is a 
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removing some discretion over how agencies will manage the Great Lakes and, thus, making the 
plan mildly coercive.  (Chapter 4 discusses implementation factors in more detail.)  Coercion, 
says Olson, prompts collective action. 
The formal process also has created stable patterns of interactions, interactions which 
Axelrod says help improve the chances that members will cooperate.  Under the plan, managers 
agree to meet frequently and to carry out what they agree to under the plan.  Lake committees 
meet over a one- or two-week period every year, the Council of Lake Committees meets twice a 
year, technical committees meet several times a years, task groups meet regularly, and data 
collection and management are ongoing.  Moreover, once tasks are parceled out, members are 
tagged with fulfilling them and reporting back to the committees on their progress.  This means 
that members are in constant communication with each other to gather and digest information and 
to write-up reports.  The formal process ensures that members will meet again and that they will 
be responsible for certain tasks.  Regular meetings are, indeed, stable patterns of interaction, they 
help members care about future interactions, and they help members care about the relationships. 
The second result of collective action—the development of strong relationships—is, of 
course, a direct result of the stable patterns of interactions that the plan creates.  Clearly, a strong 
epistemic community of Great Lakes fishery managers exists.  Members of the lake committees 
and technical committees, all of whom know one another and share a similar scientific 
background, have the ability to filter out unsound data and opinion, either presented from outside 
the group or from within the community itself.  An important thing about epistemic communities, 
say Haas and Adler, is that members have a strong sense of “we;” a sense of community.  Joint 
Strategic Plan participants have this sense of community.  They speak of the group as a “tight-
knit family” with whom they work for long periods of time.  Frequent meetings help the 
participants know each other and accentuate the community’s legitimacy and influence.  
Recurring interactions among colleagues build trust, create predictability, break down 
professional reticence, and reassure the members that their fellow peers will deliver on their 
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promises.  Confidence that others will adhere to the group’s decisions is a strong benefit to being 
a member of a community. Axelrod stresses that such recurring interactions help the members 
move beyond the issues that lead to competitive, game-theory-like responses and instead allows 
the members to work cooperatively.   
The relationships among the lake committee and technical committee members are both 
rewarding and coercive.  Many social benefits to participating in the Joint Strategic Plan exist, 
and while being a member of the Great Lakes fishery management community brings with it 
obligations that coerce participation, it also brings a personal satisfaction that comes with being a 
member of an elite group.  Recall that Great Lakes fishery managers expressed how they enjoy 
the social interactions, how they enjoy “renewing acquaintances,” and how many see the 
meetings not as a burden but as a “highlight of the job.”  The meetings are a pleasure for many 
because they are the chance to interact with respected peers on an international level.  They can 
talk science, they can commiserate over wacky political decisions, they can plan major initiatives, 
and they can float new ideas with an open-minded, less-judgmental group.  They grow as a 
community.  An epistemic community—a community that meets frequently and places a high 
value on the social parts of the meetings—means that the members find the interactions to be 
rewarding and look forward to the next meeting.   The professional rewards a manager 
experiences is linked to the epistemic community’s interests. 
Another, perhaps stronger, facet of relationships under the plan is the peer pressure that 
comes with an epistemic community.  The Joint Strategic Plan is designed to heighten the number 
of interactions that occur among specialized community members.   By relying on strong 
relationships among members of an epistemic community, the plan creates an atmosphere where 
members are expected to participate in earnest, to adhere to the norms of the community, to not 
disappoint respected colleagues, and to strategize with those who understand the world of 
fisheries management.  This is gently coercive.  Indeed, under these conditions, members have an 
obligation to behave pursuant to the community’s rules and follow through on one’s 
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commitments lest the relationship and the manager’s professional esteem be jeopardized.  While 
such behavior has incentives as well, being a member of an epistemic community requires 
members to work together and adhere to the high principles of their community. 
The third result of collective action—that it helps the managers manage as an 
ecosystem—is dependent on sound information, sound management practices, and regular 
interactions among the policy players.  Information is valuable to the participants because it helps 
them manage the Great Lakes properly and as an ecosystem.  People are known to hoard 
information, particularly if relationships are weak or contentious (Scheberle 2004) because 
information is power.  The Joint Strategic Plan is a major source of precious data for the 
participants and it creates a culture of sharing, not hoarding.  All sorts of information is 
exchanged during the lake committee and technical committee meetings, from information about 
a particular agency’s management activities to lakewide fishery trends.  Scientists report on new 
findings.  Policy professionals introduce hot-button issues.  Government agencies disseminate 
their annual reports.  Graduate students speak about their research.   The Joint Strategic Plan 
demands that managers from around the basin share their information, and a manager from one 
jurisdiction thus benefits from another’s information; information he might not have had 
otherwise.  Despite incentives to be parochial, participants understand that the plan links 
achieving their agency’s goals to how well the jurisdictions work together and manage the 
resource as an ecosystem, not to how much of the resource a manager can bring back to the 
jurisdiction.  That is, because the lakes are interconnected, what is good for the whole system is 
good for any jurisdiction.  This attitude suggests that managers are concerned about how to 
overcome collective action problems rather than fixated on how to maximize benefits vis-à-vis 
the other participants (i.e., a competitive approach). 
Collectively generating and using information, and ecosystem management, relate 
directly to the fourth primary result of collective action:  making policies more defensible with 
politicians and stakeholders.  Information is valuable to the members in that it gives them the 
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knowledge they need to make their policies stronger and more defensible with politicians and 
stakeholders.  Interview participants stressed time and again that they need to ground their 
policies in science, but political and other social pressures are sometimes at odds with good 
science.  The better the information, the more defensible the management action is against 
criticism.  The participants benefit professionally by cooperating through the Joint Strategic Plan 
because the information they receive makes their collective and their individual policies more 
ecosystem-based and less vulnerable to attacks from politicians, stakeholders, and other skeptics.  
Fishery managers are hired to manage fisheries and do biology.  As far as they are concerned, the 
less politicians and stakeholders second-guess their work the better.   
By expending time and effort to develop shared policies, the policies reflect the broad, 
collective will of the management jurisdictions and, thus, have the potential to withstand 
parochial attacks from constituents and politicians.  Fishery managers are spared constituent and 
political grief if they can argue that the proposed policies reflect a broad consensus.  Even 
politicians and constituents find it hard to argue for parochialism in the shared Great Lakes if 
there is an alternative available that other jurisdictions accept.  Stronger policies mean fewer 
implementation challenges for the managers and, thus are rewarding.   Better policies are 
rewarding because, in the words of one participant, “they enlarge the sphere of esteem with 
success.”  Likewise, should there be a policy failure, the fact that the members moved forward 
with broad consensus “enlarges the sphere of embarrassment.”  These rewards (esteem for good 
success; cover for embarrassment) are significant and are a major motivator for collective action 




 The Joint Strategic Plan is an institution structured to enhance interactions among Great 
Lakes fishery managers and build lasting relationships.  As such, the plan strengthens the 
epistemic community of fishery professionals in the Great Lakes region, which makes the 
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members more interested in and willing to take collective action.  Members of such a community 
care about future interactions, worry about lost opportunities if they are uncooperative, desire to work 
with esteemed colleagues, and place a high value on giving and receiving important information.  By 
helping the members know one another, share information, and develop long-term relationships, the 
plan heightens the chances that participants will view their jurisdiction’s interest and the interest of the 
larger resource as one in the same.  The intent is to turn conflict into cooperation, not competition; to 
seek shared goals.  Parochialism becomes more a force from outside of the epistemic community 
rather than a force brought forward by the members themselves. 
 An agreement that takes into account the needs of its members can facilitate collective 
action.  The Joint Strategic Plan process suits its members’ needs by creating a robust meeting 
process that helps participants exchange information, manage tasks, and develop shared policies.  
The plan has created a formal process for interactions, durable relationships among members of 
an epistemic community, ecosystem management, and defensible policies, all of which, in turn, 
spawn more collective action.  Considering the political reality, it is somewhat remarkable that 
members exert their energies to working together.  However, consistent with the literature, 
members participate in this process because it gently coerces participation, it provides them with 
substantial rewards, it creates relationships, and it helps the members know each other.  These 
realities characterize Great Lakes fishery management and underscore Dietz’s conclusions that 
unique situations can rely on unique structures to nurture collective action. 
A major reality in Great Lakes fishery governance is that while the jurisdictions are 
indeed independent, non-federal governments in both Canada and the United States work in 
federal systems; there are different levels of government working on the Great Lakes.  This 
chapter has discussed how and why collective action occurs among individuals.  This dissertation 
now turns to a discussion about how the plan manages issues of federalism; how it facilitates 
“vertical” cooperation when relationships between different levels of government have the 





SUSPICION AND SYNERGY 
 




The non-federal jurisdictions retain primary management authority over Great Lakes 
fisheries, though the Canadian and U.S. federal governments and the binational Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission play a role in fisheries as well.  Using Denise Scheberle’s 
(2004) federalism model—which characterizes federal-non-federal relationships—this 
chapter asks:  Can an institution in a non-federally-dominant region ease inherent 
federalism tensions?  How do the states, the U.S. tribes, and the Province of Ontario 
work together and with the federal governments to identify and implement shared fishery 
policies?  Interview and other data indicate that non-federal managers are at once 
suspicious of federal involvement and appreciative of it.  Participants (particularly the 
U.S. participants) believe the federal governments wish to expand their authority at the 
expense of the non-federal governments.  However, members believe the Joint Strategic 
Plan helps maintain a federalism balance and facilitates synergy among levels of 
government.  As such, the non-federal participants generally trust their federal colleagues 
and rely on federal resources.  Participants also believe the binational Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission’s involvement in the plan is appropriate so long as the commission 
does not attempt to overstep its limited authority.  This chapter concludes that because of 
this trust and an active process to work together, the federal and non-federal governments 
have what Scheberle describes as a “pulling together and synergistic” relationship, a 
highly desirable state. 
 
 
Sir John A. MacDonald, a Canadian “Father of Confederation” and the nation’s first 
Prime Minister, did not much admire the United States Constitution.  At a convention in Quebec 
in 1864, during the formative debates leading to the 1867 British North America Act (BNA, 
Canada’s constitution), and, coincidentally during the fifth year of the U.S. Civil War, Sir John 
sparred with New Brunswick’s E.B. Chandler, who argued vigorously for provincial supremacy 
at the expense of the federal government.  “I think the whole  . . . system [would] be a failure if 
we adopted Mr. Chandler’s views,” said MacDonald at the convention.
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It would be adopting the worse features of the United States. We should concentrate the 
power in the Federal Government, and not adopt the decentralization of the U. States 
[sic].  Mr. Chandler would give sovereign power to the local legislatures, just where the 
United States failed . . . It would be introducing a source of radical weakness. It would 
ruin us in the eyes of the civilized world.  All writers point out the errors of the United 
States”  (McGee 1864, quoted in Vaughan 2003, p. 105).  
 
To MacDonald, the “radical weakness” in the U.S. system was the considerable power the U.S. 
constitution granted to state governments.  The U.S. mode was for free and independent states to 
be supreme, leaving a national government to oversee truly national matters like defense and 
commerce.  With the Civil War and a rabid “state’s rights” mentality raging, MacDonald was 
likely convinced the new Canadian system could only escape the U.S.’s errors by keeping the 
provinces in check and relying on a strong central government to lead the way (Simeon and 
Robinson 1990).  As such, MacDonald and like-minded Fathers molded the BNA to grant 
sweeping powers to the federal government and to leave specific, enumerated powers to the 
provincial governments.   
Ironically, neither country would follow the paths so carefully crafted by their founding 
fathers.  In Canada, the provinces attained substantial authority at the federal government’s 
expense and in the United States, the federal government aggregated power at the states’ expense 
(Lower 1958; Nagel 2001; Thompson 1974; Vile 1973).  In both countries, the shifts occurred 
over time through court cases and exertion of reserved powers. 
The relationship between the federal and non-federal governments affects Great Lakes 
fishery management today and reflects the evolution of federalism in both countries.  In Canada, 
Ontario’s authority over its Great Lakes fisheries became relatively absolute as provincial 
authority over most matters grew.  In the United States, state authority over freshwater fisheries 
was strong from the beginning and eroded little over time, even as federal power grew 
substantially in other policy areas.  Thus, in both countries, the non-federal governments became 
the primary fishery managers on the Great Lakes.  As chapter 1 has demonstrated, non-federal 
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governments have guarded jealously and successfully protected their freshwater fishery 
management authority—even authority over multijurisdictional fisheries.   
The non-federal authority exists despite the fact that both constitutions provide for 
substantial federal involvement in interjurisdictional and commercial matters, certainly matters 
which could relate to the shared Great Lakes fishery.  Whether the dominant non-federal 
governments like it or not, they must co-exist with federal officials, making the vertical 
relationships between levels of government a major variable in Great Lakes fishery governance.  
Given this situation, this chapter asks:  Can an institution in a non-federally-dominant region 
ease inherent federalism tensions?  How do the states, the U.S. tribes, and the Province of 
Ontario work together and with the federal governments to identify and implement shared fishery 
policies?   
Denise Scheberle, in her book Federalism and Environmental Policy, explores cases 
where state and federal governments needed to cooperate to implement environmental statutes.  
Scheberle’s cases follow a pattern where, as defined in the enabling statute, the federal 
government is responsible for or capable of  leading policy implementation, whether by providing 
resources or forcing state action.  While the federal government’s role in her cases might be 
secondary in many situations, and while the federal agencies are not always over-eager to 
preempt or take aggressive action, the statutes nevertheless define the relationships.  In 
Scheberle’s analyses, the vertical relationship between levels of government is an important facet 
of policy implementation.  Scheberle’s model considers the amount of trust and interactions 
between the levels of government to gauge the way laws are implemented.  In doing so, she 
identifies relationships ranging from synergistic to antagonistic to outright avoidance and denotes 
trust, level of interactions, and specific implementation factors as key variables influencing the 
relationship.  
Chapter 1 outlined the spheres of authority in Great Lakes fishery management, 
demonstrating that, compared against Scheberle’s model, the Great Lakes fishery management 
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regime is an unusual example where federalism is reversed; where the federal governments’ role 
is secondary despite the fact that two nations share the Great Lakes and the fish routinely 
transcend many political boundaries. These spheres of authority, with the non-federal 
governments taking the lead, might seem counterintuitive given the international boundary bisects 
the lakes, rendering just about any policy an international affair.  Both the Canadian and U.S. 
constitutions discourage state and provincial involvement in foreign affairs and envision federal 
authority over multi-state/multi-provincial matters.  Moreover, both countries have federal 
environmental laws on the books, giving the federal governments some authority to limit 
provincial, state, or tribal autonomy.  Despite these factors, provincial, state, and U.S. tribal rights 
to manage their fisheries are well established, and the federal governments are reluctant to 
intrude, as such action would be extraordinarily preemptive.  In contrast to some aspects of 
Scheberle’s cases, in Great Lakes fishery management, the federal governments do not have an 
inherent ability to force non-federal compliance with federal wishes.  Nevertheless, fishery 
officials from both levels of government know they need each other for optimal implementation 
of fisheries policy. 
Using Scheberle’s model as a guide, this chapter discusses how the Joint Strategic Plan 
relates to federalism and investigates whether participants have used the plan as a way to progress 
beyond classic federalism tensions and instead focus on the quality of the relationship.  This 
chapter argues that the Great Lakes fishery management regime resembles what Scheberle has 
identified as a positive “pulling together, synergetic” relationship among governments.  This 
relationship benefits from a high level of trust and a high level of involvement among all 
participants, including the federal and non-federal managers.  However, consistent with the 
history of Great Lakes fishery management, and not unusual in cases involving federalism, non-
federal fishery managers are at once suspicious of federal intentions and reliant on federal 
resources for effective policy implementation.  The Joint Strategic Plan eases these tensions by 
helping to delineate and maintain the federal and non-federal spheres of authority, developing and 
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maintaining positive relationships among fishery managers, and facilitating meaningful, long-
term relations among the jurisdictions.  The plan helps federal and non-federal agencies pursue 
complementary fisheries policies that often depend on each level of government playing its role.  
Through the plan, agencies accept the Great Lakes region’s spheres of authority, agree to adhere 
to the plan’s way of doing business, and pledge to implement shared fisheries policies that they 
develop together through the plan.  Given the region’s political complexity, and given the 
substantial non-federal management authority over a shared natural resource, examination of 
Great Lakes fishery management yields a deeper understanding of federalism, demonstrating that 
positive relationships in federalist systems can function even when the federal governments do 
not have primary authority. 
 
 Methods 
 Using data from sixty-two semi-structured interviews, from participant observation, and 
from Joint Strategic Plan documents (e.g., minutes, fish community objectives), this chapter 
explores how Great Lakes fishery managers from all jurisdictions view their relationship with the 
federal governments and with each other.  (Methodology is discussed in greater detail in 
Appendix A.)  It probes their attitudes and behavior as they work within the Joint Strategic Plan 
framework to cooperate and coordinate their management activities.  In many interviews, the 
participants were quick to offer their ideas about the federal-non-federal relationship, making it 
readily apparent that the relationship weighed heavily on many participants’ minds.  This chapter 
also looks at two case studies of Great Lakes fishery management— the implementation of the 
Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act and lake trout restoration in Lake Superior—to 




THE FACES OF FEDERALISM 
 
 Federalism is an important feature of Great Lakes fishery management, given fishery 
management occurs at the non-federal level, but not in the absence of federal involvement.  
Indeed, as chapter 1 has demonstrated, the non-federal governments retained and attained primary 
management authority over Great Lakes fisheries, though federal responsibilities are also 
intertwined, creating an inextricable relationship among governments.  Federalism relates to how 
the national and sub-national levels of government interact with one another and exert or share 
power (Elazar 1993).  Scholars have identified three major types of federalism:  dual, 
cooperative, and coercive federalism.  Dual federalism describes a situation where the federal 
government or the non-federal governments are dominant in a policy area, but each level stays 
within its area of authority (Grodzins 1969; Nice 1987; Vile 1961; Zimmerman 1992).  In cases 
of cooperative federalism, the spheres of authority are muddled, overlapping, or complementary 
such that the levels of government must integrate their efforts to deliver a better program than if 
either level acted alone; the work of the levels of government are intertwined (Grodzins 1969; 
Nice 1987; Peterson et al. 1986; Vile 1961; Zimmerman 1992).  Coercive federalism has evolved 
from cooperative federalism and describes instances where the federal government uses its 
superior powers, at its will, to preempt non-federal authority or to force the non-federal 
governments to do or not do something (Arganoff 2001; Elazar 1969; Zimmerman 1992). 
Although the United States and Canada are each federal systems, the relationship 
between the federal governments and the non-federal governments evolved differently in each 
country.   In the United States, the constitution, on paper, established a system of dual federalism, 
where the spheres of federal and state authorities were supposed to be relatively clear, with the 
federal government’s powers specifically enumerated (Article I, § 8,) and the balance of power 
reserved for the states (the Tenth Amendment) (Vile 1973; Zimmerman 1992).  As the U.S. 
federal government slowly concentrated power from the time of the U.S. Constitution to the New 
Deal (Nagel 2001; Peterson et al. 1986; Zimmerman 2005), and then through a massive 
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concentration of power since Lyndon Johnson’s Administration (Vile 1973; Zimmerman 1992), 
the clear lines between federal and state powers have blurred so much that dual federalism has all 
but been dismissed as an unrealistic concept (Zimmerman 1992).  Cooperative or coercive 
federalism are more accurate models for illustrating the relationship between national and sub-
national governments in the United States (Elazar 1969; Zimmerman 1992; Zimmerman 2005) 
because each level of government, in may policy areas, needs the other for successful 
implementation to occur (Peterson et al. 1986).  
In Canada, the founders wanted a strong central government, and their strategy was to 
enumerate provincial and federal powers and leave un-enumerated powers to the federal 
government (opposite the strategy of the U.S. framers) (Smith 2004; Vaughan 2003; Vile 1973).   
The constitution granted Crown (i.e., sovereign) authority to both the national and provincial 
legislatures, thus giving each level of government, within its sphere of enumerated or reserved 
powers, sovereignty (Lower 1958; Smith 2004).  Over time, the provinces attained substantial 
authority (Vaughan 2003), though the twin crises of the Great Depression and World War II 
helped slow the aggregation of provincial powers and re-establish the federal role in Canadian 
governance (Hodgetts 1974; Simeon and Robinson 1990).  Today, national and provincial powers 
overlap considerably (Simeon and Robinson 1990; Vile 1973).  Says Vile (1973, p. 14), “the 
Canadian ‘solution’ [to overlapping powers was] to turn away from constitutional expansion of 
power to financial and other cooperative arrangements which depended upon a genuine 
bargaining between Dominion and Province.” 
Denise Scheberle, in her book Federalism and Environmental Policy (2004), develops a 
contemporary framework for federalism in environmental policy.22  Scheberle stresses that the 
                                                 
 
22 Although Scheberle’s focus is on the relationship between the U.S. federal government and states, for the 
purposes of discussing Great Lakes fishery management, this chapter applies her analysis more generally to 
the relationship between federal governments and all types of non-federal governments.  In Great Lakes 
fishery management, a group of non-federal entities (eight states, the Province of Ontario, and U.S. tribes) 
interact with two federal governments to carry out fisheries policies. 
 
 117
federal-non-federal relationship is critical in environmental policy and she examines cases where 
the federal government and the states must cooperate to achieve policy implementation.  In her 
cases, the federal government has some authority to compel, encourage, or coerce state actions.    
Her concept of environmental federalism consists of two parts:  a typology of working 
relationships and an implementation framework for how policies are executed.  Concerning 
typology, Scheberle identifies four main types of relationship between the federal and non-federal 
governments.  These types of relationship depend on the amount of trust between the two levels 
of government and the amount of involvement each level has in a particular law, policy, or 
initiative.  The interplay of trust and involvement often determine whether and how well policy is 
implemented.  The four types of relationship are: (1) “pulling together and synergistic,” where 
high levels of trust and involvement by federal and non-federal governments lead to information 
sharing, respect, consultation, and good working relationships; (2) “cooperative but autonomous,” 
where relationships have high trust but low levels of involvement, resulting in not enough 
interaction to create the positive relationship needed to pull together; (3) “coming apart with 
avoidance,” where the federal and non-federal governments neither trust each other nor interact 
much, resulting in ineffective programs, as cooperation is superficial or for show; and (4) 
“coming apart and contentious,” a relationship with low trust yet high levels of interaction, 
leading to micromanagement, pointless bureaucracy, hidden agendas, and antagonism.  The 
integration of trust and involvement gets to the heart of policy implementation because, in the 
federal system, where cooperative or coercive federalism predominates, how the levels of 
government interact is important to implementing programs as intended.    
Scheberle’s implementation framework—the second component of her concept of 
federalism—recognizes the nuances and context of individual policies and lists several factors 
relating to how policies are implemented.  Says Scheberle (2004, p. 51) about implementation,  
[E]very point in the process is subject to a unique set of conditions and constellation of 
actors, employing various strategies to alter the course so as to maximize their position in 
the eventual outcome. . . . [F]ederal-state working relationships form an important subset 
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of policy implementation.  As programs mature, the daily operations of federal and state 
agencies become paramount to policy success or failure.  These regular interactions 
among personnel may greatly influence the eventual outcomes of a public program.” 
 
Beyond interactions, her case studies identify several other implementation factors including: 
• the specific statutory language of the federal law and what it requires of the non-
federal partners; 
• whether the non-federal entities implement national decisions; 
• how officials respond to changes in organizational, technical, and political 
environments; 
• how success is measured (output or outcome); 
• whether monetary, human, or other resources are available for implementation; 
• the presence of innovative bureaucrats at the implementation level; 
• the political climate; 
• how accountability takes place; and  
• other intrinsic and extrinsic factors.   
 
These implementation factors are discussed further in table 3-1 (page 152).  While the importance 
and nuances of these factors are clearly unique to individual cases, Scheberle is able to identify 
them as some of the key aspects influencing environmental policy implementation in a federalist 
setting. 
Scheberle’s model is a useful framework for better understanding federalism in Great 
Lakes fishery management.  However, her model is not entirety applicable to the region.  
Scheberle’s model suggests that the specific statutory language which establishes a program is a 
major factor in the relationships that develop and in how the program is implemented.  Also, her 
model emphasizes policies where the federal government is either the policy-architect (with the 
states implementing) or the regulation-enforcer (should the states fail to deliver), or both.  In 
other words, her cases have some elements of coercive federalism, where the relationships are 
top-down-driven, but also elements of cooperative federalism, where the federal government 
remains secondary and reluctant to take preemptive action. 
In the Great Lakes region, however, the state and tribal authorities, and to a lesser degree 
the provincial authorities, do not face a threat of direct federal oversight over their fishery 
programs.  The non-federal governments do not carry out their fishery programs pursuant to a 
federal statute and the default, if fisheries policies fail or go unimplemented, is not for the federal 
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governments to step in automatically.23  Federal and non-federal responsibilities are mostly 
defined and respected, and limited opportunities exist for the federal governments to regulate the 
fisheries directly without first taking extraordinary steps.  While the federal governments could 
assert, for example, their treaty-making or interstate commerce powers at the expense of non-
federal powers, the current federal role is not to lead or preempt non-federal authority, as is often 
the case in Scheberle’s study.  Rather, Canadian and U.S. federal governments play a supporting 
role in Great Lakes fishery management.  That said, both levels of government acknowledge that 
each needs the other for the optimal implementation of fisheries policies, resembling more of a 
cooperative federalism relationship.  This creates a different relationship between federal and 
non-federal governments than if a federal law preempted non-federal laws or mandated non-
federal behavior.   
Considering Scheberle’s federalism model and the situation in the Great Lakes region, 
this chapter now turns to an analysis of the relationship between federal and non-federal 
participants in the Joint Strategic Plan process. 
 
BENEFITING FROM SYNERGY WHILE REMAINING SCEPTICAL:  THE FEDERAL-
NON-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
 In the Great Lakes region, the federal and non-federal spheres of authority are fairly well 
defined and accepted and, as such, successful working relationships among the governments are a 
major factor in the success of Great Lakes fishery policies.  While the non-federal governments 
dominate day-to-day management, the federal role is also important.  Several federal agencies are 
involved in Great Lakes fisheries (see table 1-1, page 27) and two—the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the U.S. Geological Survey—are particularly active and signatory to the Joint 
                                                 
 
23 In Canada, while the federal Fisheries Act must contain Ontario’s fishery regulations, such assent is a 
relative formality under the long-standing agreement between the province and the federal government for 
freshwater fisheries management.  Thus, the Canadian federal government, despite promulgating 
regulations under the Fisheries Act, does not threaten to preempt Ontario’s management authority as might 
appear at first glance. 
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Strategic Plan.  This chapter, when it refers to federal involvement in Great Lakes fisheries, has 
these two agencies primarily in mind, though the other federal agencies involved in fisheries—the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Department of State, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans—also possess enough authority 
to affect non-federal policies.  Indeed, these federal agencies have significant resources and latent 
powers that could affect policy implementation.   
Benton and Morgan (1986) point out that relations among government officials depend 
on the participants making the relationships function.  Chapter 2 indeed stressed the importance 
of solid personal relationships among Great Lakes fishery managers; relationships that encourage 
multijurisdictional cooperation.  However, cooperative federalism—relationships affected by 
governmental authority—depend somewhat on the existence of a structure, an institution, or a set 
of norms to define how the cooperation is to occur.  The relationship between federal and non-
federal governments permeated many of the interviews with Joint Strategic Plan participants—
particularly with the U.S. participants at senior levels.  Although not all participants framed their 
discussion in the context of their relationship with those from other levels of government, those 
who did generally expressed their thoughts in one or more of three ways:   
 
1. In the U.S., many non-federal participants suspect that the federal government wants to 
expand its authority.  They see the Joint Strategic Plan as a way to keep the lines clear 
between federal and non-federal responsibilities.  Canadian participants did not identify 
this issue. 
 
2. Participant interviews and their behavior show the plan facilitates cooperative federalism, 
particularly in areas where federal and non-federal programs are complementary.  The 
non-federal participants generally trust federal participants because the members share 
goals and visions, are professional and proficient, and are highly engaged in the process.  
Thus, the Joint Strategic Plan creates a process that helps both federal and non-federal 
officials interact and leverage each others’ resources. 
 
3. Participants acknowledge that the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, without acting as a 
compelling force, helps the jurisdictions respect the spheres of authority by facilitating 
the implementation of the Joint Strategic Plan.  Thus, the existence of a perceived neutral 
institution to facilitate cooperation is important to federalism in the Great Lakes because 
it serves as a check against the federal governments from extending their authority into 




Despite some strong feelings against federal authority in Great Lakes fishery management 
(particularly on the U.S. side), the federal and non-federal officials generally trust each other, 
respect the lines of authority, rely on each others’ resources, and work synergistically to achieve 
their goals.  In this sense, the Joint Strategic Plan process resembles what Scheberle (2004) 
describes as the desirable “pulling-together-and-synergistic” relationship.  Participant observation 
and a review of two major cases of cooperative management— the Fish and Wildlife Restoration 
Act and lake trout restoration in Lake Superior—provide evidence for active, synergistic, and 
trusting relationships between federal and non-federal officials.  Participants believe these 
working relationships will continue so long as the federal officials do not go beyond their sphere 
of responsibility. 
 
Managers suspect federal intrusion and rely on the plan to ease the tension 
 
 The very existence of different levels of government, coupled with the possibility of 
federal intrusion into non-federal authority, creates inherent tensions, and such tensions are 
present in Denise Scheberle’s analysis of federalism cases.  Tension is also reflected in non-
federal suspicion that the U.S. federal government (particularly the Fish and Wildlife Service) 
wishes to expand its authority over Great Lakes fisheries.  A mechanism like the Joint Strategic 
Plan, which establishes a process for engagement and delineates how participants are expected to 
behave, helps all participants focus on shared goals rather than on fending off jurisdictional 
intrusion. 
As chapter 1 has demonstrated, for much of the basin’s history, the non-federal 
governments were outwardly hostile toward federal encroachment on their management 
authority.  Also, fearing the erosion of their individual sovereign rights, the jurisdictions resisted 
establishing a mechanism to work together to achieve their shared goals.  A binational treaty to 
impose regulations was out of the question, an interstate compact was too intrusive and would 
have required federal approval (which was also out of the question), and interstate conferences 
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were much talk and little action, as such action would have required individual state and 
provincial legislatures to impose unwanted regulations to suit the needs of the other jurisdictions.   
As chapter 1 notes, the Joint Strategic Plan itself was partially motivated by the fear of federal 
intrusion and the need to protect non-federal authority.  Even with the plan, both countries’ 
federal governments possess enough authority to make a case for heightened involvement in 
Great Lakes fishery management, and non-federal fishery managers are aware of that fact.  These 
feelings of insecurity over authority, and the need to preserve independence, are deeply ingrained 
in the culture of Great Lakes fishery management and such feelings emerged during the 
interviews with participants.   
 During the interviews, non-federal participants continually asserted that they have the 
primary management responsibility over Great Lakes fisheries.  They volunteered this assertion 
frequently enough as to give it an air of defensiveness, indicating that they suspected federal 
intrusion.  A few participants (particularly U.S. participants) stated outright that they believe the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is waiting in the wings to take over fishery management, and some 
non-federal managers expressed visceral hostility to any federal presence in the Great Lakes (“get 
the feds the hell out!” said one).  Such extreme sentiments, however, were rare.  More typical was 
the sentiment expressed by a long-serving state manager:  “There is a lot of conflict sometimes 
because they [the federal government] think they have more authority than they do.”  Added a 
state colleague: “the [U.S.] Fish and Wildlife Service always struck me as kind of standing on the 
outside of the window with its nose pressed to the glass, desperately wanting to get inside, and 
the states quite determined to make sure they did not.”   
Some state fishery managers harbor these views about the federal government because 
they see their U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service counterparts as meddlesome or working against the 
state interests.  They view federal officials as having the luxury of being able to involve 
themselves in fisheries without having to be accountable to local constituents or legislators.  For 
instance, many state participants noted that while state officials are in the field meeting with 
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stakeholders and explaining state regulatory action (often to hostile crowds), the federal officials 
are talking to stakeholders, legislators, and the media, second-guessing state management 
decisions, trying to divert the direction of policy, or simply being pushy.  A technical committee 
member, who has public outreach responsibilities, captures the sentiment:  
They [the federal agencies] are out there promoting some program where it is either 
counter to what we want to do or the timelines do not work with what we want to do.  
And it’s just like we have enough people taking shots at us we don’t need you making 
more work for us. 
 
Added a now-retired senior state manager, 
The feds always tried to influence us.  It was one thing going to a meeting to argue.  But 
they would start going out into the countryside and giving talks to sportsmen’s clubs [to 
urge the state DNR to do something]. . . . Then, of course, if [it] goes wrong, they could 
run back to their labs and hide and we would have to live with the stakeholders. 
 
U.S. federal officials, for their part, understand why their non-federal colleagues fear 
federal preemption:  federal authority in Great Lakes fisheries could be significant should the 
federal governments choose to be involved.  Indeed, each of the four U.S. federal officials 
interviewed for this research expressed some need to be sensitive to the appearance of federal 
intrusion into state affairs.  While the participants cited many federal laws and the federal treaty-
making power as power enough for the federal government to take a leading role in Great Lakes 
fishery management, they each took pains to assuage concerns about potential federal usurpation.  
They were quick to point out that the federal government has chosen explicitly not to take full 
advantage of its authority and added that the current arrangements are agreeable.  As well, no 
federal official, even when speaking in absolute confidentiality, hinted at an interest in assuming 
state management authority.  Said a federal official: 
I think that this is one area of the country where collaborative management is working 
about as well as it ever could . . . . I think that the federal government deliberately elected 
not to pursue all of the authority that it has with respect to fisheries. That’s been a 
conscious decision made at the highest levels of federal government here in the basin and 
I think that it’s been a wise choice. 
 
 Ontario participants rarely expressed fear over Canadian federal intrusion into provincial 
management authority.  While the provincial governments exercise primary management 
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authority just like the states and U.S. tribes, the provincial managers do not seem concerned about 
the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans wanting to upset the balance.  Because the 
federal and provincial governments must always negotiate agreements to carry out major or 
overlapping authorities, the tension between the provincial and federal governments in Canada is 
not based so much on a fear of preemption as it is on a continual need to come to agreement.  
Indeed, one senior manager from Ontario noted that the federal government was rarely a 
consideration in his decision-making process largely because, as discussed in chapter 1, the 
effective Canada-Ontario Fisheries Agreement spells out the relationship between the province 
and the federal government.   Overall, provincial fishery managers seem less concerned about the 
federal-non-federal relationship than their state counterparts because the agreement successfully 
keeps the arrangements clear and, as such, Ontario officials have minimal reason to be suspicious 
of their federal counterparts. 
While non-federal managers are concerned about federal intrusion, they view the Joint 
Strategic Plan as helping to prevent such intrusion into their affairs.  By maintaining the Joint 
Strategic Plan, members believe they remove a major argument in favor of heightened federal 
authority in Great Lakes fishery management, as the plan creates a mechanism for coordination 
that the federal governments might otherwise feel compelled to fulfill.  Said a state fishery 
manager,  
If kids in the sandbox can’t work it out together, then teachers have to come over and lay 
down some law . . . . [I]f we as states don’t use that structure to address 
[interjurisdictional] problems, then we risk a loss of the management authority. 
 
When asked whether this potential federal stick motivated action at the lake committee level, the 
manager replied:  “It motivates me.”  It motivates many other lake committee participants as well. 
 Another state fishery manager made the direct connection between the lake committee 
process and keeping the spheres of authority distinct.  He stressed that because some federal 
agencies are signatory to the Joint Strategic Plan, they agree to keep the arrangements as they are.  
Said the manager:   
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All of the federal agencies—everybody—signed off on this thing [the Joint Strategic 
Plan], and it carries a lot of weight. I have had conversations with some of the federal 
people and they assure me that all the way up through the top there is complete buy in to 
states having authority to manage and the federal partnership and commitment to the 
process. 
 
Other non-federal managers observe that because some federal laws and agreements mention the 
Joint Strategic Plan or the lake committees by name, the federal government not only 
acknowledges, de facto, the plan’s legitimacy, but accepts the relationships that the plan helped 
establish.  The 1998 and 2006 Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Acts (U.S. Congress 
2006; USGPO 1998), the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (USGPO 2000), and the 
Michigan-federal-tribal agreement (United States District Court 2000) for fisheries all mention 
the Joint Strategic Plan, and many believe that in doing so, the laws and agreements recognize 
how the Joint Strategic Plan keeps the spheres clear. 
Preventing federal intrusion into state authority (commonly called “creeping federalism”) 
is indeed a major virtue of the plan, according to the participants.  The plan, they say, was a 
breakthrough in helping to assuage the constant fears of federal intrusion by creating a process—
that all participants agreed to—for cooperative management and, therefore, articulating 
management authority.  If the federal agencies were to attempt to assert a higher level of authority 
than was articulated in the plan, the other signatories could ask the agency why it was doing 
something counter to what it agreed to.  This situation actually occurred in the late 1990s when a 
regional bureaucrat from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service circulated a white paper (later 
published as Busch 2003) challenging the Joint Strategic Plan’s legality and questioning the 
federal government’s secondary role in Great Lakes management.  This assertion prompted some 
concern among the states that the service was planning to expand its sphere, contrary to the Joint 
Strategic Plan.  The service, in Washington, quickly responded that the employee’s white paper 
in no way represent[ed] Service thinking or policy . . . . As a signatory to the Joint 
Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, the Service firmly supports the 
spirit and intent of this landmark agreement that serves as the model for addressing 
complex, multiple jurisdiction natural resource issues.  The Service remains committed 





Evolving federal participation in a non-federal process:  The U.S. Great Lakes Fish and 
Wildlife Restoration Act 
 
 The U.S. Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act  provides an illustration of how 
the U.S. federal government and the U.S. non-federal governments use the Joint Strategic Plan 
process to forge a synergistic, working relationship that respects the accepted spheres of 
influence.  The act is a major authority for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s activities in the 
Great Lakes basin.  Congress passed the act originally in 1990 and reauthorized it in 1998 and 
2006.  Non-federal agencies heavily criticized the original act of 1990 for duplicating non-federal 
management authority, creating unnecessary federal fisheries offices and staff capacity, and 
failing to recognize the well-established authority of the non-federal management agencies.  In 
stark contrast, the 1998 reauthorization established a collegial, effective process for cooperative 
federalism through the Joint Strategic Plan.  The 2006 reauthorization, however, envisioned 
more federal leadership, placing more responsibility in the federal government to lead the 
restoration process while offering more federal dollars—dollars that require a non-federal cost-
share—for restoration.  The act is a prime example of how the federal Fish and Wildlife Service 
has operated in the Great Lakes basin since 1990 and how it has interacted with the non-federal 
fishery managers.  
The mandate of the original (1990) version of the act was threefold.  First, the act 
required the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to evaluate the status of the fishery and evaluate the 
effectiveness of interagency management plans.  Second, the act directed the service to produce 
fishery management and rehabilitation proposals and recommendations from that evaluation.  The 
proposals were to include action plans for cooperative restoration of depleted fish stocks, 
planning and technical assistance for non-federal and Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
initiatives, measures to restore and improve fishery resources, habitat initiatives, and research 
plans, among other things.  Third, the act authorized the service to establish several offices so that 
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it could interact with the non-federal entities, the commission, and outside interests (USGPO 
1990).   
 Advocates of the 1990 act were convinced that the authorization was needed to allow the 
service to fulfill its fisheries assessment duties on the Great Lakes and to be more active in 
coordinating fisheries activities.  Said Congressman Henry Nowak of New York, the bill’s chief 
sponsor,  
We do not have an adequate federal program to carry out basic assessment and 
management work that is necessary to sustain the largest fresh water system in the world . 
. . . This bill would engage the Fish and Wildlife Service as a full partner in a cooperative 
interagency and international effort to clean up and responsibly manage the Great Lakes 
ecosystem” (Nowak 1990, p. 3). 
 
Representative Robert Davis of Michigan, a co-sponsor of the legislation, added that the service, 
among other agencies, “has not been given adequate funding to address existing problems or put 
programs in place to prevent new ones” and that the bill was designed to direct more restoration 
dollars to the Great Lakes (Davis 1990, p. 2).  Constance Harriman, Assistant Secretary for Fish, 
Wildlife, and Parks for the Department of Interior added that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
was eager to conduct a study of Great Lakes fishery resources and make management 
recommendations, but that the service needed the funds to do so (Harriman 1990).  Bruce Schupp, 
chief of fisheries for the State of New York also testified in support of the act because he believed 
the legislation would lead to more resources for fisheries research “to complement the 
management activities of the state and provincial fishery management agencies” (Schupp 1990, p. 
46). 
Despite the belief that the legislation would improve the service’s capacity to conduct 
research and assessment, however, the 1990 act also gave the service some ability to duplicate 
effort, perhaps seriously upsetting the federal-non-federal relationship by suggesting it was 
appropriate for it to produce sweeping recommendations, develop action plans, and establish 
offices to implement its will.  Moreover, the act duplicated many Joint Strategic Plan functions.  
For instance, the act directed the service to “encourage cooperative conservation” and evaluate 
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the “adequacy, effectiveness, and consistency” of multi-agency fisheries plans while the plan, 
similarly, committed the federal and non-federal signatories to work together to produce state of 
the lake reports and fish community objectives (Fetterolf and Krueger 1990; Krueger 1995; 
USGPO 1990).  Another major concern about the act was that it granted an inordinate amount of 
authority to the service, thus opening the door for the service to meddle in non-federal 
management affairs with little value added.  For example, the act granted the service authority to 
restore and maintain fish populations and to protect and restore fish habitat, functions that the 
non-federal entities delivered, though not exclusively.  The act also authorized the service to 
develop action plans for fishery management and granted them the capacity (through offices and 
staff) to carry them out.  Finally, the act applied only to activities of the United States, ignoring 
the needs and possibilities for collaboration with Canada. 
During the hearing leading up to the passage of this act, Carlos Fetterolf, then executive 
secretary of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, and Charles Krueger, then chairman of the 
commission, testified that they had one overriding concern:  that the act  
could be interpreted as duplicating the duties and responsibilities of the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission [in carrying out its research mandate and in facilitating the Joint 
Strategic Plan] . . .  The commission’s cooperators [i.e., state, provincial, tribal, and 
federal agencies] work through an infrastructure of [lake] committees . . . We are 
concerned that the Service will become a competitor, rather than a cooperator as intended 
by the Parties to the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries” (Fetterolf and Krueger 1990, 
p. 7-8). 
 
Fetterolf and Krueger went on to recommend that the act, instead focusing on duplicating existing 
structures, direct more dollars to the service’s essential needs such as fish stock assessment and 
research—needs that were being unfulfilled.  Thus, while Fetterolf and Krueger had hopes that 
the act would bolster the service’s ability to deliver on its core mission in the Great Lakes region, 
they were deeply skeptical about provisions in the legislation that would allow the service to 




 Optimism that the legislation would provide the service with an influx of resources, plus 
a perceived need for a major restoration study about Great Lakes fisheries, prevailed and the 
legislation became law.  Supporters clearly focused on the possibility of more funds for the 
service in the Great Lakes basin.  Said Fetterolf, in a post-passage letter about the act to Jim 
Cady, a member of the commission, “Some states like this legislation (New York).  Many others 
are leery of it, but they like the idea that they will get money for Great Lakes research and 
assessment, so they seem willing to ride along” (parenthetical reference in original) (Fetterolf 
1991).  Indeed, the Fish and Wildlife Service, until a departmental reorganization in 1994, was 
responsible for conducting assessments of the deepwater fish communities,24 particularly the 
condition of the forage base.25  The assessment information was (and remains) extremely valuable 
as state, provincial, and tribal managers use the information as the foundation for many of their 
management decisions.  The possibility of more dollars for this essential function was very 
attractive to many officials in the Great Lakes region and, as is often the case, the expectations of 
new funds, was apparently enough for people to ignore other, less desirable components of the 
legislation.  Perhaps Congressman Nowak, even while downplaying the potential to upset the 
federal-non-federal relationship, captures the overall sentiments about this act.  Said Nowak: 
We do not view this bill as authorizing or encouraging a Federal takeover of fish and 
wildlife activities in the Great Lakes.  To the contrary, the bill provides for a partnership 
approach.  It calls for the Federal Government to undertake cooperative studies and 
activities in partnership with the states, tribes, Canadians, and other interested parties. . . . 
Enactment of this legislation will result in an important new Federal/state/tribal 
partnership and will be a significant step towards the critical goals of conserving, 
protecting, and restoring the fish and wildlife resources of a vitally important ecosystem.  
(Nowak 1990, p. 6)  
 
                                                 
 
24 The U.S. Geological Survey today performs this assessment function.  The laboratory under which the 
work is performed—the Great Lakes Science Center in Ann Arbor, Michigan—was under the service’s 
tutelage prior to the 1994 departmental reorganization. 




The implementation of the 1990 act did in fact cause considerable distress among non-
federal fishery managers.  Said Fetterolf in his letter, many states are “leery [of the act and] have 
called me asking what the Service is going to do with all that money and personnel” (Fetterolf 
1991).  Krueger, in a 1995 statement to the House Resources Committee, expressed similar 
sentiment:   
In authorizing the [Fish and Wildlife Service] Director to develop proposals for 
implementing [its] recommendations . . . the act allows the Director . . . to develop and 
implement the recommendations in a unilateral manner.  This is in stark contrast to 
existing processes used by the States, Tribes, and the Province, wherein new fishery 
management initiatives in the Great Lakes are developed in a consensual manner 
(Krueger 1995). 
 
The 1990 act indeed represented the service going from “having its nose pressed against the glass, 
looking in” to gaining the authority and the capacity to enter the long-established non-federal 
sphere of influence.  Why, for instance, would the service be given the authority to develop 
restoration plans, to rehabilitate fish stocks, and to enhance habitat (and given the authority to 
establish offices and hire staff) if it did not intend to use it?  For senior managers who were active 
before and after 1990, the restoration act only confirmed their worst fears:  that the service 
wanted to mix up or supersede the non-federal management authority.  The Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission cautioned the service “not to abandon its critical and historical role as it assumes 
new roles that are, at times, duplicative of the roles of the states and tribes” (Krueger 1995, p. 4). 
In 1998, when the time for reauthorization arrived, the non-federal governments 
demanded a significant change to the top-heavy act, and federal officials who worked on the 1998 
reauthorization recalled the pains they took to fix the problems with trust and the hurt 
relationships caused by the 1990 act.  The result of these efforts was a completely different 
approach.  As much as the first iteration of the act duplicated effort and appeared to grant the 
service more authority than its sphere would allow, the reauthorized act in 1998 was a model for 
U.S. cooperative federalism.  In fact, the entire emphasis of the 1998 reauthorization was less on 
developing plans, recommendations, and office capacity, and more on using the cooperative Joint 
 
 131
Strategic Plan to carry out fishery restoration.  For example, the 1998 act allowed for more money 
to go to projects than to Fish and Wildlife Service offices and overhead, authorizing $4.5 million 
annually to fund restoration initiatives while providing $3.5 million annually for the service to 
support its Great Lakes offices (USGPO 1998).  More significant was the process to implement 
the 1998 act.  The reauthorization created a “Fish and Wildlife Proposal Review Committee” that 
operated under the auspices of the Joint Strategic Plan’s Council of Lake Committees.  This 
review committee—comprising state and tribal officials with the service observing—would 
review restoration proposals and make recommendations to the service for funding.  The Council 
of Lake Committees, not the service, would drive the process by requesting restoration proposals, 
soliciting peer reviews, and making recommendations for projects in light of funds appropriated 
(USGPO 1998). 
The reauthorization helped to assuage feelings that the original act changed the federal-
non-federal relationship in favor of the federal government.  The fishery commission, for 
instance, in a 1997 letter to members of the House and Senate during the reauthorization process, 
noted with pleasure that “the proposed reauthorization bill now draws on existing mechanisms 
[the Joint Strategic Plan] that facilitate a cooperative, ecosystem-based approach to management 
of the Great Lakes fishery” (Krueger 1997), and Robert Lange of the New York State Department 
of Environmental Conservation, then chair of the Council of Lake Committees, wrote to Congress 
that the act was an “extremely positive model for collaborative decision-making” (Lange 2002).  
Federal employees were pleased, if not relieved as well, over the newly reauthorized act and the 
relationship it helped mend with the non-federal partners.  They expressed their belief that 
interactions between the federal government and the non-federal agencies improved markedly 
since the 1998 reauthorization. The 1998 version solidified the federal-non-federal relationship, 
stating that both levels of government would be involved in restoration but also recognized the 
unique non-federal authority by relying on the plan to implement the act.  While the federal 
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managers still sense tension in the relationship, they also expressed their belief during interviews 
that the relationships are now less tense than before the 1998 version. 
The act was again reauthorized in 2006 and now focuses intently on the need for project 
funding.  The lack of funds for projects was a continual issue since the act’s reauthorization in 
1998.   Despite $4.5 million authorized annually for restoration projects, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service never requested funds for projects in a federal budget, even while the budget requested 
dollars for the service’s field offices.  While Congress has, since 2001, appropriated 
approximately $500,000 annually through budget add-ons, the fact that the service did not request 
funds, particularly given the substantial authorization, has clearly annoyed the non-federal 
partners and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission.  Some argued that the lack of federal 
leadership was the result of the 1998 act detaching the federal government too much from the 
process.  That is, because implementation was couched in the Joint Strategic Plan’s Council of 
Lake Committees, there was no incentive for the service to expend scarce political capital to 
request funds for the act. 
Two major changes in the 2006 reauthorization attempt to address this implementation 
problem, though in doing so, the changes move the act from the Joint Strategic Plan process back 
to the federal government.  The first change is a significant increase in the authorized amount for 
restoration projects.  While the 1998 act authorized $4.5 million annually for projects, the 2006 
version authorizes $16 million annually, including $6 million for special, regional projects (U.S. 
Congress 2006).  This increase is designed to provide the federal government with a major 
opportunity to affect restoration in the Great Lakes.  The second change moves the management 
of the project review committee from the Joint Strategic Plan’s Council of Lake Committees (as 
mandated in the 1998 act) to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (U.S. Congress 2006).  This 
proposed movement away from the council is a major change in the federal government’s role, 
considering the 1998 act deliberately chose to house implementation in the Joint Strategic Plan, 
partially to assuage federalism concerns.  Indeed, in light of the non-federal suspicion of federal 
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intrusion and despite the major gains made in the 1998 act, it is remarkable that the non-federal 
agencies supported the changes in 2006 as they did.  As in 1990, during the passage of the 
original act, the non-federal managers supported the 2006 version out of hope that the changes 
would encourage the service to become more engaged in the project funding process.  Also, by 
moving the review committee to the Fish and Wildlife Service, the expectation is that the service 
will take its leadership responsibility more seriously.   
This major change in approach raises two federalism questions that only time will 
answer.  First, will the Fish and Wildlife Service, as it manages the review committee as 
mandated in the 2006 act, respect the non-federal jurisdictional authorities?  One reason the 1998 
act placed the review committee under the auspices of the Council of Lake Committees was 
because the act needed to acknowledge the unique working relationships between the primary 
non-federal managers and the secondary federal government.  The 2006 reauthorization appears 
to ignore that history and it is uncertain whether the 2006 reauthorization will affect the vertical 
relationships or the intergovernmental working relations among all levels of government .  
Second, with the Fish and Wildlife Service now leading the process, will the service take a more 
active interest in implementation?  That is, will the service propose funds for projects in the 
federal budget instead of relying on Congress to add what it can to the budget?  The state and 
tribal agencies, by supporting the proposed changes, certainly expect more federal support, 
though they are taking a significant risk in giving up the process without a clear assurance that the 
service will make the act a budget priority. 
 
Leveraging resources for synergistic relationships 
 
State and tribal support for the 2006 act reveals another important factor in Great Lakes 
fishery management:  that agencies need to leverage each others’ resources for successful policy 
implementation.  Given the history of federalism in Great Lakes fisheries, and given the hard-won 
gains in the 1998 reauthorization of the act, it is somewhat astonishing that the non-federal 
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fisheries officials—many of whom have been involved in the Joint Strategic Plan process for 
years—proposed and advocated the 2006 review committee changes, which seems contrary to 
their concerns about creeping federalism.  However, like in 1990, the major reason the partners 
accepted a perhaps heightened federal role in Great Lakes fisheries in 2006 was because with that 
role comes the potential for more federal dollars for fishery restoration.  In the minds of fishery 
managers, the threat of upsetting the spheres and inviting more federal involvement was less 
important than the opportunities that additional federal resources would bring.  After all, the 2006 
act still focuses on state and tribal rights by mandating their membership on the proposal review 
committee and by mandating a non-federal cost-share for projects.   
 The interviews support the view that non-federal fishery managers depend on 
participation and resources from their federal counterparts for fisheries policies to be successful.  
Although participants were far less vocal in their outright support for their federal colleagues’ 
contributions than expressing their concern about creeping federalism, when participants did 
mention their federal colleagues, it was almost entirely positive, indicating appreciation for the 
federal contributions to the process.  On the one hand, managers are concerned about a 
heightened federal presence, mostly a presence that would restrict state management authority.  
This possibility of coercive federalism has long been resisted.  On the other hand, the non-federal 
managers respect, trust, and at times need their federal counterparts for policies to be successful.  
This reflects an appreciation for cooperative federalism.  Clearly, tensions between levels of 
government exist in Great Lakes fishery management and a governance mechanism—in this case, 
the Joint Strategic Plan—can help the participants from both levels of government work together 
to achieve shared policy goals.   
The interviews alone do not fully illustrate this tension because the U.S. participants 
could rarely bring themselves to express overt support for federal officials, possibly because they 
did not want to even suggest inviting a larger role.  However, the researcher’s observations (see 
methodology, Appendix A) of technical committee meetings and an analysis of federal 
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contributions to Joint Strategic Plan-related documents (e.g., fishery objectives, state-of-the-lake 
reports) indicate that the federal-non-federal relationship is important, positive, and synergistic.  
Thus, while the non-federal managers are watchful for federal intrusion, they simultaneously rely 
on the federal partners for scientific, technical, and financial assistance. 
A former U.S. federal participant in the technical committee process provides an 
overview of how the federal participants view their role.  The members of the technical 
committee   
recognized the ecosystem approach, and everybody brought to the table their portion, the 
assignment that they had done. There was rough but fairly effective coordination. . . . 
Everybody had a role.  [What is] interesting, of course is the federal role:  there was no 
lake committee representation. The only representation was on the technical committees, 
because [the process] really was designed around the states who are the managers. So we 
were not managers per se.  We were very cognizant of saying we are providing the 
research, we will provide the information to help the managers. 
 
Another U.S. federal official added: “I am in the management assistance program, which sort of 
means we are heavy into the lake trout production, and propagating lake trout for restoration fits 
very well into national and federal mandates.”  The federal participants in the Joint Strategic Plan 
process—particularly Fisheries and Oceans Canada, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and U.S. 
Geological Survey officials at the technical committee level—have a clear understanding of what 
they contribute and where they fit into the process. 
 The non-federal participants expressed some appreciation for the federal involvement in 
the technical committee process, though, again, not as openly as they expressed concern over 
usurpation of non-federal authority.  The federal participants, when discussing the federal role, 
almost always framed their comments in terms of the federal government supporting their 
activities.  One long-serving participant in the lake committee process, after expressing vehement 
concerns about creeping federalism, conceded that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
involvement in the technical committee process “eventually became the foundation for successful 
lake trout restoration initiatives.”  Additionally, more than one technical committee member 
observed that the federal agencies shine in this process when they stick to what they do best:  
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support shared initiatives.  Other non-federal participants view the federal role as supportive, 
helping the jurisdictions to achieve what they might not otherwise have the resources to achieve.  
A state fishery manager captures this sentiment: 
I think the federal government jurisdictions are pretty much a tool to help us manage 
better. They provide us with the forage data that we need  . .  . [and t]hey provide us some 
very important information that we need to run our models for the Great Lakes. And I 
think it kind of encapsulates their role, as helping us manage, not making decisions. And 
that is the way I think it should remain. I think it has evolved to that over a period of 
time. And it is getting to a better comfort level than I think it was 10-15 years ago.  
 
 While Joint Strategic Plan process provides some insights into participants’ feelings 
about federal involvement, participants’ behavior and output better illustrate the relationship.  The 
technical committees are where the federal agencies work most closely and most directly with the 
non-federal agencies.  Non-federal agencies regulate harvest to protect native and stocked fish 
and they stock recreational fish.  The U.S. Geological Survey assesses the state of the food web 
and the service works to rehabilitate native fish species.  The Great Lakes Fishery Commission, 
in partnership with its federal partners, delivers sea lamprey control; sea lamprey control supports 
native fish stocking, as the native fish would not survive the sea lamprey predation if the 
lampreys were not controlled.  Likewise, all agencies need information about the status of the 
food web (i.e., the small fish that are eaten by the larger fish) to know how many fish to stock or 
how many can be harvested.  The success of each activity is dependent on each level of 
government doing its job.     
The federal technical committee members operate just like any other member, bringing 
data to the table, discussing theories, and inserting ideas into fishery plans.  Of the several 
technical committee meetings the researcher attended, no hint of angst existed about improper 
federal intrusion into Great Lakes fishery management.  On the contrary, the technical committee 
members relied on the federal participants to fulfill their obligations and bring forward their 
resources, consistent with their sphere of influence.  For example, during a Lake Superior 
Technical Committee meeting, the participants stressed the need for each agency—including the 
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federal agencies—to collect data properly.  During other technical committee meetings, federal 
representatives from both Canada and the United States reported at length about their sea lamprey 
control efforts, and U.S. federal representatives reported on their involvement in environmental 
meetings.  Not only was it apparent that the technical committee members knew their respective 
spheres, but all of the members expected the others to deliver on their commitments. 
 More telling, perhaps, is the use of the lake committee and technical committee process 
to develop comprehensive reports, action plans, and fishery objectives for the lakes.  These 
objectives are written by the fishery managers for the fishery managers.  They contain detailed 
discussions about who is responsible for which activities and when the activities should be 
accomplished (see chapter 2 and Appendix D).  It is apparent in many of the plans that the federal 
and non-federal efforts are complementary and synergistic.  That is, not only do the plans rely on 
each level of government to participate where it is most appropriate, but the plans often 
acknowledge, if not just tacitly, that without the involvement of all levels of government, the 
plans would not be successful.  Likewise, the fishery literature, often the foundation for the plans 
and reports, is heavily dependent on contributions from federal officials. 
The main criticism of the federal government in the technical committee process comes 
when the federal officials fail to deliver on their promises. For example, one important federal 
function is to report on the status of the forage base.  The U.S. federal government26 has been 
responsible since at least the 1920s for conducting this research and, since the 1960s, reporting it 
to the lake committees.  All agencies use these data as the foundation for their stocking and 
harvest decisions.  The U.S. Geological Survey’s ability to deliver the research eroded badly 
during the 1990s due to budget cuts and the fact that the agency did not make the work a priority 
                                                 
 
26 This deepwater assessment function has been under the auspices of the Department of Interior’s research 
laboratory, located in Ann Arbor, Michigan, first under the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, then under the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and today under the U.S. Geological Survey.  This is also the same function 
that was so strongly supported during the 1990 authorization of the Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act, 
discussed above in the case study. 
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(Anonymous 2003).  Interview participants—and a report from a blue ribbon panel (Anonymous 
2003)—reported that this program reduction caused anger and disappointment from non-federal 
agencies, exacerbated by the fact that the geological survey continued to express an overly 
optimistic (some felt dishonest) view of its capabilities despite the fact that everybody knew they 
were exaggerating.  Reflecting on the value of the U.S. Geological Survey’s work, an official 
from Ontario noted “This whole [U.S. Geological Survey] thing has been frustrating for a long 
time. [The lack of assessment data] has caused a lot of grief within the technical committee, no 
question.”  The non-federal fishery managers considered this loss of federal capacity to be so 
devastating that they—through the Council of Lake Committees—launched a massive effort, 
beginning in 2001, to persuade the U.S. Geological Survey and Congress to devote more 
resources to the program or move it to another federal agency. 
Overall, although the non-federal participants in the lake committee process are not shy 
about expressing their distaste for federal authority, it would be erroneous to conclude that the 
federal officials do not play a key role in the Joint Strategic Plan or that the non-federal managers 
do not appreciate federal involvement.  While these opinions might appear two-faced or 
disingenuous, they instead reflect the stresses and emotions inherent to cooperative federalism.  
Lake committee participants tolerate (and actually rely on) federal agency input so long as the 
federal agencies contribute in ways that are consistent with shared objectives and the accepted 
federal sphere of influence.  In this regard, the Joint Strategic Plan helps maintain the federal-
non-federal relationship in the Great Lakes basin by helping to delineate each level of 
government’s responsibilities (resembling dual federalism) and helping to facilitate the 
integration of federal and non-federal fishery programs (resembling cooperative federalism). 
 
A perceived neutral institution can help keep spheres of authority clear 
 
The Joint Strategic Plan is a tool to delineate spheres of authority and to remind officials 
at federal and non-federal levels of government of their accepted roles.  Since the plan does not 
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implement itself, a third party—the Great Lakes Fishery Commission—provides the non-federal 
governments with some confidence that a check against federal intrusion exists.  That is, by 
facilitating the Joint Strategic Plan in a way that is seen as neutral, the fishery commission helps 
facilitate cooperative federalism.  The ongoing role that the commission plays in making the plan 
function is consistent with the commission’s historical role in affecting cooperation.  As chapter 1 
has argued, the jurisdictions, being independent and jealous of their sovereignty, were unable and 
unwilling to cooperate, as such cooperation would have weakened their independence.  The 
formation of the non-regulatory fishery commission created an institution that did not threaten 
non-federal independence while at the same time created enough of a force to persuade hitherto 
uncooperative jurisdictions to work together. 
The Great Lakes Fishery Commission is the closest thing to an overarching body for 
Great Lakes fishery governance.  As such, do Joint Strategic Plan participants view the 
commission with the same suspicion as they do the federal authorities?  Generally, no, but not 
unequivocally.  The non-federal jurisdictions requested that the commission implement the Joint 
Strategic Plan by convening the meetings and publishing their reports, though the jurisdictions 
remain cautious about the commission overstepping its bounds.  In the minds of the participants, 
the commission makes the Joint Strategic Plan work so long as the commission facilitates 
cooperation and does not force direct action.  Although the commission has a basinwide scope, at 
the treaty level, participants generally accept the commission’s role because the commission’s 
mandate under the treaty is extremely narrow, thus limiting its sphere.  The plan originated under 
the commission’s umbrella and the plan essentially appropriated the commission’s lake 
committee process.  Participants see the Joint Strategic Plan process as heavily dependent on the 
commission’s willingness to maintain a process—and the bounds of authority—that they all 
agreed to. 
 Participants see the value of the commission’s involvement in its willingness to be an 
honest broker and to stay out of fishery management (beyond its mandate to manage sea 
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lampreys).  “It’s nice to have the commission as being the happy broker,” said one retired 
provincial official.  “I think of the commission as an overall coordinator,” added a state official.  
Said a manager from Ontario,  
Really, people laugh about facilitation. And where is the value in that?  There’s a lot of 
value in that, because if it’s about people and people aren’t dealing responsibly with each 
other and trying to reach consensuses, and if there are [not] processes to force the people 
together, it wouldn’t happen. 
 
Added a tribal participant, the role of the commission is to be “facilitator and information 
developer, leveling the playing field, getting people together, keeping people on task and on 
vision, and providing support for the right decisions to be made.”  Said another senior state 
manager, iterating how he explained the commission’s role to new managers, the commission 
“will organize the effort to see an initiative completed.  They are working for you [the state].  
You are not working for them, it is your process.”  
Participants continually cautioned, however, that while they appreciate the commission, 
there still exists the potential for problems, particularly if the commission were to get out in front 
of the management agencies on a fishery matter.  Said a technical committee member from 
Ontario: 
If [the commission] become[s] regulatory, then it is antagonistic.  And I think we have 
got enough of that.  We have got enough institutions, countries, and various jurisdictions:  
federal, provincial, state.  We have enough mandates running into each other.  We need 
the [commission] as an umbrella organization that can try and coordinate and knock 
down barriers and not create their own regulatory barriers. 
 
Thus, as with the federal agencies on the Great Lakes, the non-federal agencies do view 
commission authority with suspicion.  They invite the  commission’s role in the Joint Strategic 
Plan so long as the commission acts as a neutral facilitator (not a regulator) and serves as a 
persuader (not a compelling authority).  Participants see the commission as maintaining 
relationships without being a dominant force, though they remain vigilant to unwarranted 




Lake trout restoration in Lake Superior:  Pulling together for a multijurisdictional, multi-
generational effort to restore a major fishery 
 
Lake trout restoration in Lake Superior is the poster child of a multijurisdictional, multi-
generational effort to rehabilitate a key native species, and work to restore this species illustrates 
how the Joint Strategic Plan process recognizes the spheres of authority and facilitates synergy 
and leveraging of resources among all levels of government.  The restoration effort is a case study 
about federal and non-federal relationships and about how the jurisdictions exercised the 
intergovernmental relations necessary to carry out their work strategically, over a long period of 
time, on a lakewide basis.  Lake trout restoration began in the 1940s with regular, report-like 
interactions among the jurisdictions.  After the Joint Strategic Plan, the effort evolved into 
intensive, restoration-plan-driven work through the lake committee process.  The lake trout 
rehabilitation effort has tested the binational, federal, provincial, state, and tribal willingness on 
Lake Superior to work together over a long period of time to reach biologically difficult goals.  
Rehabilitation has depended on several independent jurisdictions working together to develop 
restoration objectives, to agree on how to reach those objectives, and to commit to policies—
through their own agencies—to further the objectives.  This case study investigates two elements 
that are particularly illuminating to federalism:  the consensus among the fishery managers about 
how lake trout could be rehabilitated and the process they chose to achieve their goals. 
Figure 3-1:  Lake trout.  Photo:  M. Gaden.
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Lake trout, a key native species, are well-suited to life in the Great Lakes (Scott and 
Crossman 1973).  The species is a top predator in the food web and fills a unique ecological niche 
by inhabiting the deep, cold waters of the lake.  Lake trout helped support aboriginal populations 
and was the foundation for tribal and commercial fisheries afterwards (Hansen 1999; Lawrie and 
Rahrer 1973).  By the late 1800s, improved fishing methods and better ways to bring the fish to 
market facilitated a rapid growth in the lake trout commercial fishery (Bogue 2000; Hansen 
1999).  The commercial lake trout yield peaked at 7 million pounds in 1903, fell to around 4 
million pounds by 1913, and then held steady until around 1950 (Baldwin et al. 1979).  After 
1950, harvest declined severely, falling rapidly from more than 4.5 million pounds that year to 
only 371,000 pounds in 1961 (Baldwin et al. 1979; Pycha and King 1975), prompting a 
commercial fishery closure in 1962.  The literature suggests several causes for this disaster.  Hile, 
Eschmeyer, and Lunger (1950, p. 280) observed that the lake trout fisheries of lakes Michigan 
and Huron were wiped out by the sea lamprey invasion of the mid-1930s and warned that as sea 
lampreys became more abundant in Lake Superior, the lake trout fishery would be in “awful 
danger of early destruction” there as well.  Other factors have included overfishing, intentional 
and unintentional introductions of species, changes in the food web composition, chemical 
pollution, and spawning habitat loss caused by dams in rivers or debris on open-lake spawning 
beds (Eshenroder 1987; Hansen 1999; Hile et al. 1950; Jensen 1978; Krueger and Ebener 2004; 
Zint et al. 1995). 
Lake trout management in Lake Superior has long been a federal and non-federal matter.  
Historically, the non-federal jurisdictions did little to coordinate their management activities and 
instead imposed commercial fishing restrictions and angler harvest limits to suit their individual 
needs or political circumstances.  Uniform fishery regulations were proposed many times from 
the late 1800s and on, but being the purview of non-federal governments, such regulations were 
never imposed because the jurisdictions were either unwilling or unable to agree on regulations 
(Bogue 2000).  The jurisdictions were also unwilling to cede regulatory authority to the federal 
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governments or to a bi-national institution (Fetterolf 1980).  The federal governments, for 
decades, were involved in monitoring the state of the fishery and commercial harvest.  They were 
also involved in rehabilitation, particularly from the 1940s onward. 
In the 1940s, even before the lake trout collapse of the early 1960s, the jurisdictions did 
understand that lake trout needed rehabilitation.  They acknowledged that management would be 
based on three primary activities:  stocking to build up lake trout numbers, sea lamprey control to 
reduce predation, and harvest control to reduce human-induced mortality.  Early efforts to 
undertake the three restoration activities were ad hoc; agencies met informally to inform each 
other about such things as individual lake trout management actions (including their commercial 
and sport regulations), licensing, lake trout egg collection (to serve the hatcheries), stocking 
schedules, sea lamprey predation, and fish marking (Anonymous 1946).  The Lake Superior 
Committee minutes from 1965 through 1980 record regular discussions about lake trout, routine 
agency updates about individual management activities, and considerable interest in where the 
federally-reared lake trout would be stocked.  The minutes, however, reveal little discussion about 
Figure 3-2:  Sea lamprey mouth. Sea lampreys prey on fish, particularly lake trout, and control is a 
prerequisite for lake trout restoration.  Photo:  T. Lawrence. 
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long-term rehabilitation needs, goals, or plans.  Consequently, the lake trout rehabilitation 
program during this period received far less attention and scrutiny than it needed (Eshenroder et 
al. 1984). “By the end of the 1970s, it was evident that the original goals of establishing self-
reproducing stocks of lake trout in the Great Lakes might never be met without some substantial 
changes in management” (Eshenroder 1987, p. 310).  Indeed, in 1977, the federal and non-federal 
agency officials acknowledged that it would be “essential that they interact in developing 
common management goals and objectives for future management of each stock of common 
concern in the Great Lakes” (GLFC 1977d).  
A retired senior manager from one of the states, reflecting back on the early days of the 
restoration effort, noted that before the Joint Strategic Plan, “we all approached lake trout 
rehabilitation in a different [manner]; we all had our own ideas about what would work.”  What 
they needed was a cohesive process to invite the individual federal and non-federal agencies to 
assess what each could bring to the table and then assign the tasks needed to achieve success.  
Instead of having a compelling authority (e.g., a regulatory federal government or a bi-national 
institution) that would force action on lake trout restoration, the agencies wanted a way to 
integrate and align agency activities and to facilitate the intergovernmental relations needed to 
restore lake trout.  The Joint Strategic Plan—signed in 1981—was the impetus to integrate the 
restoration activities.  To the extent that pre-plan efforts were ad hoc, informative, halting, and 
irregular, the plan served to drive the agencies toward a lakewide initiative to achieve restoration 
goals.  The plan used lake committees as its mechanism for action.  In 1982, the year after the 
plan was signed, the Lake Superior Committee established a technical committee to focus on lake 
trout rehabilitation and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission called for the committee to develop 
a clear lake trout restoration plan that was to include goals, policies, and criteria for declaring 
stocks “restored” (Thomson 1982).   
The resulting restoration plan—produced in 1986—changed the way agencies 
approached restoration.  “Cooperation and concurrent action by all regulatory agencies is 
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essential to the attainment of this objective,” the restoration plan stressed (Lake Superior Lake 
Trout Technical Committee 1986).  For instance, instead of hoping a set formula would ensure an 
appropriate and equitable distribution of federal hatchery fish (reared by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service), state, provincial, tribal, and federal hatcheries, under the restoration plan, 
would more closely coordinate their respective fish production and more explicitly tie that 
production to the restoration plan (Lake Superior Lake Trout Technical Committee 1986).  The 
fishery commission—in partnership with Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service—agreed to control sea lampreys consistent with the lake trout restoration 
objectives to ensure that sea lampreys did not cause high enough fish mortality to undermine 
restoration.  All non-federal agencies agreed to do what was necessary in their waters to regulate 
the commercial and sport harvest, consistent with the rehabilitation goals (though they stopped 
short of imposing uniform regulations) to protect the fish long enough for the fish to grow old 
enough to reproduce.  Said a senior state manager, reflecting on the lake committee evolution:   
[As the Lake Superior Committee] continued to function, those that were members got to 
know their roles, what was expected, and what they needed to . . . [do] to commit their 
agency.  [We said] ‘here’s how we’re going to do it’.  
 
Said a senior federal manager from Canada,  
I know that the staff and the research staff do go to some of the lake committee meetings 
because it’s a good way to find out where their research fits in . . . .   [T]hey have to tie 
[their work] to issues and priorities, and . . . a good example is the work that we’re doing 
on lake trout rehabilitation . . . . If we were not involved in the lake committees . . . I 
don't think we would have ever done that. 
   
A former tribal participant, looking back on how lake trout rehabilitation was handled over the 
years, added:  “The agencies divvied-up the management units.  And you have got the feds and 
the tribes as well as the states doing assessment, all doing it the same way—feeding the 
information into a common database, so you have got information sharing.” 
In 1996, the Lake Superior Committee endorsed a revised edition of the 1986 lake trout 
restoration plan, which again called upon the agencies to “prudently regulate harvest” 
(particularly of wild stocks of lake trout), continue stocking, and address other problems such as 
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habitat and the forage base (Hansen 1996).  Table 3-1 summarizes how the lake trout restoration 
duties were “parceled out” in Lake Superior, consistent with the restoration plan. 
 
LAKE SUPERIOR JURISDICTION RESPONSIBILITY 




Tribes (individually and collectively through the 
Chippewa-Ottawa Resource Authority and the Great 
Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission) 
Wisconsin 
• Regulate lake trout harvest within their boundaries 
• Conduct lake trout assessment 
• Rear and stock lake trout 
• Protect and restore habitat 
• Conduct law enforcement 
• Meet as the Lake Superior Committee and Lake Superior Technical 
Committee 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (federal) 
• Conduct sea lamprey control in partnership with the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission 
• Protect and restore fish habitat 
• Conduct fisheries research 
• Participate in the Lake Superior Technical Committee 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission (bi-national) 
• Control sea lampreys 
• Convene lake committee and technical committee meetings 
• Publish restoration plans and fish community objectives 
• Fund fisheries research in support of lake trout restoration 
• Participate in the Lake Superior Technical Committee  
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (federal) 
• Rear and stock lake trout, consistent with the restoration plan 
• Protect habitat 
• Participate in the Lake Superior Technical Committee 
• Conduct sea lamprey control in partnership with the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission 
U.S. Geological Survey, Biological Resources Division 
(federal) 
• Conduct essential forage base research 
• Maintain a long-term data set on Lake Superior fish stocks 
• Help evaluate lake trout restoration 
• Participate in the Lake Superior Technical Committee 
Table 3-1.  Responsibilities of the jurisdictions involved in lake trout restoration on Lake Superior.  
 
In Lake Superior, the lake trout restoration effort—begun in the 1940s—has seen 
success:  in 1996, the agencies marked a “major victory” in fisheries restoration by declaring lake 
trout to be self-sustaining in most areas of Lake Superior, allowing them to cease stocking in 
many locations (Lake Superior Committee).  They further cut lake trout stocking in 2004 and 
2005 in the remaining areas of Lake Superior such that almost no lake trout stocking occurs 
today.  The strength of wild lake trout came about because agencies remained committed to the 
plan and each contributed to its implementation.  The commission reduced sea lamprey 
abundance, the federal agencies stocked fish to bolster the fishery, and the non-federal agencies 
issued prudent regulations to limit human-induced mortality.  Although the individual 
jurisdictions’ regulations are still not completely harmonized, the Lake Superior Committee has 
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helped the agencies gear the regulations to be consistent with the lake trout rehabilitation plan and 
to prevent sport, commercial, and tribal fishers from over-harvesting lake trout (Hansen 1999).  
Fishery managers and the literature attribute the success to sound science and a 
multijurisdictional commitment—over the long run—to get the job done.  As a long-time 
participant summarizes,  
Oh, I think the Joint Strategic Plan impact has been tremendous. I think that there’s no 
question that we wouldn’t have rehabilitated [lake trout in] Lake Superior without the 
Joint Strategic Plan and the commitment to  . . . sea lamprey control, the commitment to 
reductions in harvest that were agreements among all the states and . . . the commitment 
to stocking. So I think that the development of fish community objectives and the fact 
that the agencies are working together has [been] wonderfully beneficial  . . . in terms of 
management of fisheries in the Great Lakes.  I think for the first time you actually had the 
agencies sitting down and working collectively to say this is how we see the fish 
communities in the future. This is the goal we’re working toward or the target we’re 
working toward.  And what we’re starting to see now is the implementation of fisheries 




“PULLING TOGETHER”:  SCHEBERLE’S MODEL AND THE GREAT LAKES 
FISHERY REGIME 
 
 Scheberle’s model for environmental federalism deals with cases involving an unequal 
relationship between levels of government.  In her cases, the federal government often has some 
ability to coerce or encourage state participation; such authority is found in the enabling statute.  
Scheberle stresses that despite the federal government’s leverage in some situations, 
implementation can vary considerably depending on trust, involvement, and specific 
implementation factors.  She notes that the federal government is often able to fall back on its 
powers and resources to affect the relationship, though she also adds that the federal role is not 
always immediately preemptive and that the federal agencies are, at times, reluctant to take 
aggressive action.  Nevertheless, the statute enabling the program often defines the powers of the 
federal government and specifically allows federal leadership.  Federalism in environmental 
policy, in Scheberle’s analysis, has elements of both cooperative and coercive federalism.  Her 
model identifies relationships in this situation that range from synergistic to avoidance. 
 
 148
Scheberle’s model applies to Great Lakes fishery management, despite the absence of an 
authorizing statute and despite the clear non-federal dominance.  In the Great Lakes, as in her 
cases, trust, level of activity, and specific implementation factors indeed relate to how well the 
levels of government work together.  Beyond her model, Great Lakes management is not reliant 
on a federal statute to define the relationship; history and court cases have generally delineated 
the spheres of responsibility.  Instead of having a statute that establishes an implementation 
structure, the Great Lakes jurisdictions use the Joint Strategic Plan to help delineate each 
participant’s role and to help guide the interactions, and use the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
as a neutral facilitator.  Instead of relying on federal resources and a federal stick to ensure 
implementation, the Great Lakes jurisdictions use the Joint Strategic Plan to identify what 
resources are needed and who is able to provide them; they rely on the strategies they develop 
together to ensure implementation.  The Joint Strategic Plan process is thus more than an example 
of Scheberle’s “pulling together and synergistic” relationship, it is an example of how such a 
relationship can emerge when federalism is reversed; when the non-federal governments have 
primacy in management.  It illustrates the need for and the use of an institution like the Joint 
Strategic Plan to provide a non-traditional regime in the absence of the overarching authority or 
top-down structure evident in Scheberle’s cases. 
The Great Lakes regime, when applied to Scheberle’s typology model, most resembles 
the “pulling together and synergistic” type of working relationship, the most desirable level of 
cooperation.  This relationship comes about because high trust plus high interaction equals 
synergy and pulling together.  Consider, first, the trust portion of the equation.  At first glance, 
trust might appear to be quite low in Great Lakes fishery management.  The interviews illustrate 
considerable mistrust in the minds of the non-federal managers that the federal agencies 
(particularly the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) wish to stay within their sphere.  This is not a 
completely unwarranted fear given the constitutional powers of the federal governments, the 
existence of strong federal environmental laws in both countries, and plentiful federal resources.  
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Moreover, the non-federal reaction to the first iteration of the Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act of 
1990 illustrates a general suspicion of the federal government and a lack of trust that the federal 
governments want to stay within their sphere of authority.  The participants, however, use the 
Joint Strategic Plan as a way to assuage their concerns.  This plan provides a working 
arrangement for all levels of government, thereby buffering against federal intrusion and 
precluding a heightened Great Lakes Fishery Commission involvement.  Moreover, the federal 
governments have signed the plan, indicating their acceptance of the structure 
This mistrust about federal intrusion is not the same, however, as mistrust of federal 
activities or personnel.  That is, for trust to be low in Scheberle’s model, the non-federal fishery 
managers would have to mistrust any federal involvement in fisheries.  This is clearly not the 
case, and it illustrates the basic paradox in the minds of Great Lakes fishery managers.  On the 
one hand, non-federal managers value their autonomy and desire to keep the federal governments 
out of their affairs.  On the other hand, not only do the fishery managers rely on federal 
involvement, but the success of many initiatives depends on the federal governments contributing 
to the effort.  In the lake trout case, the federal role is to support non-federal management 
activities, contribute consistent with the federal sphere, and support the shared restoration goals.  
The lake trout case study illustrates how the agencies trust each other to deliver on their 
commitments and rely on the federal contributions to the larger effort.  Likewise, the Fish and 
Wildlife Restoration Act shows where trust has grown, as the act has allowed for federal 
involvement in meaningful ways.  At least from 1998 through 2006, the act was couched in a 
cooperative process, led by the Council of Lake Committees, that depended on both levels of 
government for its implementation.  The non-federal managers generally trust their federal 
colleagues so long as they stay within their sphere.  The fact that the 2006 act shifts the process to 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service while increasing project authorization, and the fact that Joint 
Strategic Plan state members not only proposed this change but supported it actively, suggests 
that they do trust the service and rely on it for scientific, technical, and financial assistance.  The 
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risk, of course, is that this change will allow the federal government to become more coercive 
once they control the process, particularly if the act brings with it significantly more resources. 
Trust is also heightened because the federal government does not have an automatic 
leveraging stick over the non-federal governments.  In Great Lakes fishery management, the non-
federal entities have primary authority and the federal agencies support non-federal actions.  
Scheberle’s model, on the other hand, considers programs where the enabling statutes allow the 
federal government to enforce, regulate, or take the lead if states do not act.  Scheberle’s model, 
thus, is based on some degree of an underlying threat of federal enforcement or preemption 
should the circumstances warrant it, giving federal authorities a leveraging stick the states do not 
have.  This affects trust, says Scheberle (2004, p. 204), as “trust is hard to come by, if only 
because of oversight orientations . . .”.   In the Great Lakes, U.S. federal statutes do not enable 
state and tribal fishery management.  In Canada, while the fishery is managed on paper through 
the federal Fisheries Act, Ontario’s will is reflected in the act rather than the federal government 
dictating Ontario’s activities.  Although lake trout restoration depends heavily on federal 
participation, the restoration plan was carried out in the absence of a federal “stick;” no 
overarching authority compelled action, rather, each entity helped produce and then execute a 
shared plan.  The fact that fishery management oversight does not automatically shift to the 
federal governments helps the non-federal managers trust their federal colleagues, knowing that 
the federal government cannot easily usurp state authority. 
On the involvement side of Scheberle’s model, participation by all the agencies—federal 
and non-federal alike—is quite high and necessary.  All federal and non-federal agencies have 
signed the Joint Strategic Plan and have committed themselves to the process.  The process 
demands regular interactions, ongoing research and data collection, and the development of 
fishery plans, reports, and objectives.  The lake committee and technical committee meetings 
generate the synergy needed to drive this process and the agencies come to the table with their 
resources and authority to contribute to their shared management initiatives.  Recall, for instance, 
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the cooperative process established by the second and third iterations of the Fish and Wildlife 
Restoration Act, or all agencies’ high level of involvement over the course of more than five 
decades in the lake trout restoration effort.  The interviews and participant observations indeed 
indicate that the Joint Strategic Plan regime involves all agencies in appropriate ways and that the 
interactions are constant, sophisticated, and productive. 
Together, the two cases also illustrate the inherent tensions between non-federal 
autonomy and federal involvement.  The lake trout restoration case shows that no one agency or 
level of government has complete authority or ability to implement policies or compel action to 
restore lake trout in Lake Superior, yet success has depended on implementing a comprehensive, 
long-term, lakewide restoration effort.  To restore lake trout, the agencies—particularly after 
years of ineffective policies—needed to work together, as the task was too great for any one 
agency to undertake alone.  The agencies used the Joint Strategic Plan process to address the 
problem on a lakewide, all-jurisdictional level.  With the restoration act, the project review 
committee, when it was under the Council of Lake Committees, also relied on the plan to foster a 
cooperative and synergistic relationship and integrate the functions of each level of government.  
Both cases are prime examples of the involvement of both levels of government and cooperative 
federalism as it exists today in U.S. Great Lakes fishery management. 
 The second portion of Scheberle’s model—the implementation framework—is highly 
contextual, and many of her framework elements are applicable to the two Joint Strategic Plan 
case studies.  Table 3-2 lists many implementation factors in Scheberle’s cases and compares 






In Scheberle’s Case Studies In Joint Strategic Plan Case Studies 
A federal law is passed that requires some level of federal 
leadership or oversight. 
A federal law did not initiate lake trout restoration.   
 
The first restoration act, with federal “command and control,” 
changed to implementation within an existing non-federal 
process, the Joint Strategic Plan, after protests from the non-
federal governments.  Realities of Great Lakes fishery 
management prevailed. 
States implement federal laws. 
State and tribal governments do not require a federal law to 
authorize their day-to-day fishery management.  Ontario’s 
regulations are promulgated under the federal Fisheries Act, 
consistent with tradition and contradictory constitutional 
provisions, but the Fisheries Act reflects Ontario’s will and, 
thus, is more procedural than substantive.  On both sides of the 
border the federal and non-federal agencies work together and 
individually to implement shared priorities. 
Officials respond to changes in organizational, technical, and 
political environments. 
Same response, though officials also respond to natural 
conditions, science, migratory fish, etc. 
Implementing agencies remain concerned about 
accountability. Same. 
Statutory language is a key factor in how implementation 
occurs. 
Specific legislative mandates are not present in the lake trout 
case. Regulations are not specified in the lake trout restoration 
plan, rather, are left up to the individual entities and are a means 
to an end.    
 
Legislation only set into motion a process in the restoration act 
case.  Regulations are not part of the restoration act. 
Federal authorities have more resources, which might give 
them power over the non-federal entities.  Programs, however, 
are re-shaped by the non-federal entities. 
In the lake trout restoration case, the availability of resources did 
not necessarily translate into power.  Respecting authority and 
the roles of the jurisdictions were the important factors.  The 
lake trout restoration plan was produced collectively by federal 
and non-federal entities, so the danger of having the issue re-
shaped by other entities was not an issue.   
 
In the restoration act case, the federal government provided the 
majority of resources, but the process precluded role usurpation.   
 
In both cases, all participants generally recognized that everyone 
had something to bring to the table, and achievement of shared 
objectives would not have been possible without contributions 
from all. 
Bargaining among the participants is “an inevitable part of the 
implementation process.” 
Bargaining was less an issue in these case studies as was getting 






In Scheberle’s Case Studies In Joint Strategic Plan Case Studies 
“Street level” bureaucrats are important, as their values, 
choices, attitudes, etc. make the difference. 
The officials who led the development of the Joint Strategic 
Plan, who began the cultural change that occurred after it was 
signed, and who today maintain positive evolution set the tone 
for behavior and the standard for expertise that has developed 
into the culture of cooperation that exists today in Great Lakes 
fishery management. 
“Heroes,” those who innovate, often make the difference in 
successful implementation. Same. 
 
Table 3-2:  Implementation factors of Scheberle’s case studies compared to the Joint Strategic Plan 
case studies. 
  
Many of Scheberle’s implementation factors are also on the minds of Great Lakes fishery 
managers and are factors of the two Joint Strategic Plan case studies.  Accountability, individual 
leadership, innovation, and politics are likely to be universal influences in implementing any 
natural resource policy, and the Joint Strategic Plan cases are no exception.  The Joint Strategic 
Plan’s implementation factors diverge from Scheberle’s factors in two major ways.  First, factors 
relating to federal coercion are nearly non-existent in Great Lakes fishery management.  While 
the managers often fear federal intrusion, the specific federal ability to compel non-federal action 
is quite minimal.  Second, the availability of federal resources is far less a driving force in Great 
Lakes management than it is in Scheberle’s cases, as the non-federal governments have 
departments, ministries, or other natural resource bureaus, and funding mechanisms exist for their 
management activities.  Nevertheless, resources are always scarce, and the fishery managers 
clearly want more federal resources whenever possible.  More important to the Great Lakes cases 
is each agency following through on what it promised.  In the case of lake trout, the important 
issue was what commitment and resources each jurisdiction brought to the table to fulfill the 
shared restoration plan objectives.  The implementation of the Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act 
was predicated on federal willingness to provide resources, but equally important to this act was 




Semi-structured interviews, participant observation, meeting documents, and the lake 
trout and restoration act cases have shown that federalism is an integral component of fishery 
management on the shared Great Lakes.  Federalism influences significantly the on-going 
interactions among the government units, and non-federal managers, particularly on the U.S. side, 
are conflicted over the relationship.  On the one hand, managers are intensely protective of their 
sovereign right to manage their fisheries (a subject discussed in greater detail in chapter 4), so 
much so that they are constantly on the lookout for federal intrusion.  On the other hand, the 
managers realize that the federal governments play an important supporting role in Great Lakes 
fishery management and, in fact, the success of many fishery initiatives depends on federal 
involvement.  They do welcome (and rely on) cooperative federalism, with each level doing its 
part and respecting the roles of the others.  The Joint Strategic Plan helps keep the lines of 
authority clear and helps facilitate synergistic interactions.  The Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission, in managing the plan’s process, is seen as the honest broker needed to keep the 
relationships clear.  The Joint Strategic Plan resembles Scheberle’s “pulling together and 
synergistic” typology because trust exists and interactions occur because they are right and 
natural, not because federal statutes mandate or coerce such relations.   
 This “pulling together and synergistic” relationship is theoretically significant on three 
levels.  First, the Joint Strategic Plan serves as a mechanism to delineate and gain acceptance of 
the many independent authorities in the Canadian and U.S. federal systems, in the absence of top-
down authority.  Through the plan, the federal governments, like the non-federal agencies 
recognize the responsibilities of each level of government and, in doing so, generally stay within 
their bounds.  Unlike Scheberle’s model, federal oversight or preemption is not automatic or 
immediate, yet the relationships are relatively clear.  Second, the Joint Strategic Plan recognizes 
that various entities bring resources to management and, therefore, creates a process whereby all 
federal and non-federal agencies can coordinate their activities.  The fishery objectives, 
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restoration plans, and other research publications are shared products of federal and non-federal 
fishery managers.  Thus, all entities are involved in both the development and implementation of 
many management initiatives, and plans implicitly and explicitly describe the federal and non-
federal involvement and depend on all participants doing their share.  Instead of continually 
focusing on fending off federal intrusion, managers work through the plan to identify shared 
goals and to achieve them.  Managers transcend coercive federalism and move toward 
cooperative federalism.  Third, the collegial regime facilitates synergy and pulling together 
among different levels of government because it heightens trust and interactions.  The non-federal 
governments are confident that the federal agencies are going to do what they say, the plans 
commit all of the agencies to a course of action, and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, by 
being a neutral facilitator, instills confidence in the participants that the process will move 
forward as the participants expect and accept. 
One element of coercive federalism is the ability of the federal government to force non-
federal behavior through coercion or resources.  Such ability could bind the non-federal 
governments to a course of action and could affect implementation.  In the case of the Joint 
Strategic Plan, however, the regime is non-binding and serves the needs of equal, independent 
governments.  This dissertation now turns to a discussion of the nature of binding and non-





WHY A NON-BINDING AGREEMENT  




Multijurisdictional agreements are usually designed to prompt or compel certain behavior 
among the signatory members.  Agreements come in many forms and in varying degrees 
of strength.  Some are binding and some are not.  This chapter investigates the pros and 
cons of binding and non-binding agreements, why Joint Strategic Plan members prefer a 
non-binding agreement for the Great Lakes, and whether non-binding agreements can 
enhance implementation in the absence of binding enforcement provisions.  Based on 
literature and the results of semi-structured interviews, this chapter argues that a non-
binding fisheries agreement is most appropriate for the Great Lakes region because 
members must preserve jurisdictional autonomy, policies must be flexible, and members 
wish to work together to promote ambitious policies rather than to constrain behavior.  
The Joint Strategic Plan was designed to respond to those needs.  Participants also prefer 
a non-binding agreement like the plan because it contains meaningful mechanisms to 




In 1925, long before “ecosystem management” came of age, future Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter and his colleague James Landis observed that natural resources create 
their own boundaries, independent of political borders.  “Regions, like the Southwest clustering 
about the Colorado River, or the States dependent upon the Delaware for water, are less than the 
nation and are greater than any one State” (1925, p. 707).  States, they said, would have to come 
up with creative ways to share and protect such multijurisdictional natural resources.  This reality 
creates unique governance issues because political jurisdictions are usually not congruent with the 
natural resources they govern.  Frankfurter and Landis could very well have been talking about 
the Great Lakes.  Eight states, the Province of Ontario, and several U.S. tribes manage the lakes’ 
fisheries, and proper management requires the jurisdictions to coordinate their work.  As chapter 
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1 has demonstrated, the region’s jurisdictions have lived with the dilemma of being less than 
nation and greater than any one state since the days of European colonization.  Many proposals to 
create a formal, overarching agreement to manage the fishery at the regional level were rejected 
(Gallagher et al. 1942) until one, the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, was approved because 
it did not intrude on state management authority (Fetterolf 1980).  It was not until the early 1980s, 
though, that the jurisdictions created a non-binding, regional arrangement—A Joint Strategic 
Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries—to help them work together strategically.  Being 
less than nation and greater than any one state, and being leery of losing sovereignty, the sub-
national jurisdictions opted for a basinwide non-binding agreement to institutionalize on-going 
cooperation. 
Multilateral agreements, established to help jurisdictions address regional issues, come in 
many forms, and each is designed to suit the parties’ particular needs.  Some forms are more 
formal and binding than others.  Frankfurter and Landis, for example highlighted the possibilities 
of the interstate compact, a formal, binding contract among states.  Treaties among nations, 
somewhat like compacts, are also binding.  Other types of agreement are less formal or binding.  
Administrative agreements, for instance, are a way for jurisdictions to harmonize their laws or 
policies.  All types, whether binding or otherwise, require the parties to comply with and 
implement what they agree to.  Thus, the agreement is usually designed to compel behavior and 
ensure that participants implement it.   
This chapter helps explain the motivations behind why the Great Lakes jurisdictions rely 
on the non-binding Joint Strategic Plan to coordinate their management activities.  It investigates 
their reasons for eschewing a binding agreement while still expecting the plan to help them 
comply with and implement what they agree to.   Because multijurisdictional agreements are 
usually designed to prompt or compel certain behavior among the signatory members, this 
chapter asks:  Under what circumstances are non-binding agreements preferable to binding 
agreements?  Why do Joint Strategic Plan members prefer a non-binding agreement and how do 
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participants use the agreement to enhance the likelihood that policies developed under it will be 
implemented?  To investigate these questions, this chapter relies on the literature and data from 
sixty-two semi-structured interviews with plan participants (Appendix A). 
  Literature about agreements suggests that non-binding agreements allow for flexibility 
and more-ambitious policies than binding agreements, which rely on clearly defined bounds of 
action as a strategy to define behavior.  Non-binding agreements depend on the goodwill of 
members for implementation, as they tend to lack the enforcement mechanisms often found in 
binding agreements.  Non-binding agreements also preserve sovereignty and independence.  Non-
binding agreements, thus, are more appropriate than binding agreements when conditions change 
frequently, making flexibility important; when participants seek progressive, cutting edge policies 
rather than the most basic policy to which they could all agree; when compliance and 
implementation can still occur without a compelling force; and when members are concerned 
about preserving independence. 
In the Great Lakes region, participants believe multijurisdictional governance can be 
fulfilled with a non-binding agreement because members must be flexible in their response to 
fluctuating natural conditions.  The participants believe a binding agreement would limit (not 
improve) cooperation by being too inflexible and constraining.  Moreover, because participants 
direct conflict toward cooperation rather than competition, they believe a process that focuses on 
seeking and advancing shared goals is more valuable than a process that constrains behavior, 
even though a binding process might enhance compliance.  Above all, members are well aware 
that historical and political realities in the region are such that, with diffuse political authority and 
guarded independence, a binding agreement would be out of the question.  While the members 
acknowledge that the non-binding Joint Strategic Plan does not compel action, they do believe it 
does change behavior—they believe it contains meaningful mechanisms to foster cooperation, 
thus heightening the chances that the shared policies will be implemented.  Also, the participants 
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believe the Great Lakes Fishery Commission’s role as process-facilitator is enough to keep them 
committed to their decisions without a binding force. 
 
SOVEREIGNTY, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 
 
 Managing the global environment revolves around issues of national sovereignty, 
institutions to facilitate governance, and multilateral agreements that compel participation and 
compliance (Soroos 1999; Vogler 2000).  Sovereign nations, being independent, have control 
over matters within their authority.  However, because many natural resources extend beyond 
borders, and since one nation’s actions could affect another’s, managing multijurisdictional or 
global natural resources requires cooperation among independent entities.  The mechanism 
typically comes in the form of a multilateral agreement among sovereign nations, often bolstered 
by an institution (e.g., a commission) that facilitates or compels cooperation.  This chapter draws 
upon both international and regionally focused literature to establish how sovereignty affects 
independent jurisdictional behavior and how agreements and institutions help jurisdictions work 
together to achieve their shared goals.  This review of international environmental agreements 
and compliance is necessary and appropriate for two reasons.  First, as chapter 1 has argued, the 
states, Ontario, and the U.S. tribes have relatively autonomous authority to manage Great Lakes 
fisheries; they exercise considerable sovereignty over their waters.  Therefore, the non-federal 
entities on the Great Lakes behave somewhat like nations in a global setting.  Second, as 
Zimmerman (2002) has pointed out, except for discussions about interstate compacts, a paucity of 
academic literature exists about formal and informal agreements among state governments or 
between non-federal governments of different countries.  The literature about the behavior of 
nations serves as a suitable substitute in the absence of literature specific to multijurisdictional 






 A “sovereign” government has defined territory, defined population, autonomy, 
governmental powers, a legal identity, and fiscal independence (Holloway 1972).  Sovereignty 
has two basic elements:  the government’s ability to control its own domestic activities and its 
ability to interact with other sovereigns on an equally autonomous footing (Haas and Sundgren 
1990).  More simply, sovereignty allows governments to pursue their own interests (Weiss 1999).  
On the international level, says Young (1994, p. 121), “States [nations] are territorially based 
units that are jurisdictionally equal; each of them can appeal to the principle of sovereignty as a 
barrier to intervention in its domestic affairs in the name of collective goals or values.”  A 
nation’s sovereignty and its ability to exercise its will is limited by such things as its ability to 
defend itself from the encroachments of other nations, its ability to expend resources to encroach 
upon the sovereignty of others, or its willingness to give up some sovereignty to achieve a 
collective goal.  
As chapter 1 has argued, state, U.S. tribal, and Canadian provincial governments, in both 
nations’ federal systems, are sovereign within their sphere of authority.  The U.S. constitution 
grants explicit, enumerated powers to Congress (Article I, § 8,) and reserves all other powers to 
the states (the Tenth Amendment) (Vile 1973; Zimmerman 1992).  The states were thus 
established to be strong and sovereign, as was the federal government, with federal authority 
confined to enumerated powers (Vile 1961).  Native American sovereignty is also well-
established.  Tribal authority, in its most basic form, is rooted in the 1832 Supreme Court 
decision Worcester v. Georgia (Peters [1832] 1901), where the court affirmed that an Indian tribe 
is a political power with authority of self-governance (Cohen 1988).  In Canada, the British North 
America Act (BNA, its constitution) created a federal system with a partition of powers between 
the central and provincial governments.  Sovereign authority (a.k.a., the “Crown”) is present in 
both the national and provincial legislatures.  Each level of government, within its sphere of 
enumerated or reserved powers, is sovereign (Lower 1958; Smith 2004).  The BNA enumerates 
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provincial (§ 92) and federal (§ 91) powers and leaves un-enumerated powers to the federal 
government (Smith 2004; Vile 1973).  Court cases in the late 1800s and the early 1900s 
strengthened provincial sovereignty by first establishing the sovereign authority of the provinces 
and then significantly whittling away at the federal powers (Lower 1958).  Non-federal Great 
Lakes governments have a long history of guarding and exercising their sovereignty over their 
fisheries. 
Given their sovereignty over fisheries, how free are provinces, states, and U.S. tribes to 
work with each other and with foreign governments?  At first glance, strong federal powers 
would appear to preclude non-federal involvement in foreign or cross-border activities.  
Certainly, in both Canada and the United States, federal authority over international, interstate, or 
interprovincial matters is strong.  Both nations’ constitutions grant treaty-making powers to the 
federal governments.  In Canada, while the BNA grants sovereignty to both the federal and 
provincial governments, purists point out that the basic tenets of international governance demand 
that the central government speak for Canada and, thus, that provinces be limited in their ability 
to enter into agreements with foreign governments (Martin 1968).  In the U.S., the Supreme Court 
case Missouri v. Holland  established that federal treaty power could preempt state power 
(Knaebel 1920; Moore 1965), thus granting the U.S. federal government the ability to have a 
strong influence over a state authority.  Moreover, since the BNA and the U.S. constitution grant 
the federal governments the trust responsibility toward the tribes, the federal governments have 
some ability to limit direct tribal interactions with other governments. 
Notwithstanding federal dominance in foreign affairs and intergovernmental issues, 
however, and while the treaty power is strong and supreme, foreign matters are not necessarily 
exclusive to the federal governments.  For instance, while the BNA suggests that the federal 
government, by virtue of its treaty power, take the lead in foreign affairs, the BNA does not 
expressly prohibit provincial involvement in foreign agreements.  The provinces are often called 
upon to implement treaties to which the federal government agrees (Kennett 1997; Rutan 1971), 
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and because provinces retain authority over their enumerated powers, provinces have 
considerable leeway to enter into foreign agreements over issues within their domain (Rutan 
1971).  The BNA is silent in addressing whether or how provinces can enter into agreements 
(Rabe 1997), though it is generally settled that provinces can freely enter into agreements with 
each other and with foreign governments, so long as the agreement pertains to a provincial 
authority (Rutan 1971).   
In the United States, while the constitution prohibits states from entering into interstate 
compacts, treaties, or alliances with foreign nations without the consent of Congress, state 
governments in fact are involved routinely in interstate and foreign issues.  The absence of 
Congressional consent, a treaty, or a domestic statute does not preclude states from entering into 
agreements with each other or with foreign entities.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1893 case 
Tennessee v. Virginia, ruled that interstate or state-foreign agreements could be valid without 
Congressional consent so long as the agreement relates to a state matter and does not encroach 
upon the federal government’s rights and responsibilities (Davis 1893; Goldsmith 1997; Killian 
and Beck 1987; Zimmerman and Wendell 1951; Zimmerman and Wendell 1976; Zimmerman 
2002).  Thus, while the constitution calls for Congressional consent for multilateral agreements or 
alliances, such consent is actually not always necessary.  As Ytreberg (p. 831) said,  
The articles inhibiting any treaty, confederation, or alliance between the states without 
the consent of Congress were intended to prevent any union of two or more states having 
a tendency to break up or weaken the league between the whole; they were not designed 
to prevent arrangements between adjoining states to facilitate the free intercourse of their 
citizens or remove barriers to peace and prosperity. 
 
In the Great Lakes region, the non-federal governments exercise sovereign control over 
their fisheries, including migratory fishes.  Because the state and provincial boundaries extend to 
the international border (Bogue 2000; Piper 1967), and because tribal fishing areas are defined by 
treaties (Busiahn 1985; Flanagan 2000; Zorn 1989), jurisdictional authorities are usually clear.  
Each jurisdiction formulates and executes its own policies in its own waters, illustrating that a 
jurisdiction will be motivated, ultimately, by its legal needs and political desires (Francis and 
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Regier 1995).  Non-federal governments are free to enter into agreements so long as the 
agreements do not intrude on federal authorities, disrupt the political balance among non-federal 
governments or nations, or are superseded by legitimate federal action such as a treaty.  Just how 
bound the non-federal governments wish to be in their agreements, however, depends on the issue 
at hand and the participants’ political desires.  
 
Binding and non-binding agreements and compliance 
 
Although multijurisdictional agreements and arrangements take many forms, essentially 
two types of arrangement exist:  those that bind the participants and those that do not.  
Compliance with and implementation of either type of environmental agreement is, of course, an 
important element of multijurisdictional cooperation, and the literature distinguishes between 
binding and non-binding agreements in how they achieve compliance.   
Governments have many options for binding arrangements to achieve their policy goals.  
The most common way for U.S. states to enter into a binding arrangement is through the use of an 
interstate compact, which the U.S. Constitution authorizes.  (The BNA mentions no 
commensurate institution.)  Compacts are legally binding contractual arrangements (Frankfurter 
and Landis 1925; Zimmerman and Wendell 1951; Zimmerman and Wendell 1976).  Because each 
member state’s legislature must approve the compact, the compact is considered statute in each 
signatory state and is, therefore, binding with the force of law (Zimmerman and Wendell 1976).  
Interstate compacts are attractive because they are clear in what they do and they create a formal 
process;  such agreements are not entered into lightly.  Another factor motivating states to enter 
into compacts is that such an agreement usually authorizes an institution (such as a commission) 
to ensure implementation (Donahue 1987).   
Beyond the interstate compact, there are other types of binding arrangements.   On the 
international level, treaties are the strongest, most legalistic way nations cooperate.  They are 
enforceable through international law and often are supported by commissions or secretariats to 
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facilitate compliance.  On a regional level, arrangements like “federal-non-federal agreements” 
(for example, the Canada-Ontario agreement, a formal arrangement addressing issues of shared 
authority between the Canadian federal government and the Province of Ontario) and “federal-
state commissions” (an arrangement with legal status between the federal government and states), 
serve to bind the participants (Donahue 1987).   
Non-binding arrangements among sovereign governments—whether the governments be 
nations or non-federal governments—also are common.  Non-binding arrangements come in 
many forms and have varying levels of formality (Elazar 1969; Weiss 1999; Zimmerman and 
Wendell 1951; Zimmerman 2002).  Routinely, governments discuss shared matters with each 
other and seek, in less-formal ways, to harmonize regulations, share information, and establish 
reciprocal practices.  In a comprehensive study of Great Lakes institutions, Donahue (1987) 
provided a taxonomy of arrangements and analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of each 
agreement type.  Typically, said Donahue, jurisdictions that wish to work together, in a non-
binding way and on a regional level, have several options.  These options could be exclusive to 
non-federal jurisdictions, could involve federal and non-federal jurisdictions, or even could 
involve states and foreign governments (Donahue 1987).  The “interstate council or commission,” 
for example, while established formally through an agreement or through legislation, typically 
vests the council or commission with “soft” management authority, related to coordinating 
policies and persuading compliance (Donahue 1987).  Similarly, the “basin interagency 
committee” is typically a less-formal version of the interstate council, serving as a forum for 
information exchange or for coordinating disparate management plans into a unified plan 
(Donahue 1987).  Other non-binding arrangements include such things as informal interstate 
agreements, conferences among government officials, reciprocal legislation, uniform laws, verbal 




 Binding and non-binding agreements each have inherent advantages, disadvantages, and 
compliance issues, and their formation depends on the unique circumstances on hand and what 
participants hope to accomplish.  At one level, binding agreements may present a higher stature 
and could reduce transaction costs, as on-going bargaining is often unnecessary after parties reach 
an agreement (Abbott and Snidal 2000).  Another attribute of a binding agreement is that 
compliance is often high.  Participants only sign binding agreements they know they can comply 
with (Birnie and Boyle 2002; Victor 1998); parties are less likely to sign the agreement if they 
could not comply with it, as they would not want their sovereignty limited against their will.  As a 
consequence, binding agreements tend to focus on the “lowest common denominator,” the least 
ambitious agreement that will attract the maximum number of participants (Axelrod and Vig 
1999; Crossen 2004; Soroos 1999).  Indeed, “high compliance comes at a cost,” says Victor 
(1997, p. 243).  “Conservative commitments do not much push the real capabilities and 
willingness of societies to change their behavior. . .”   
Being contractual, a binding agreement might also enhance the chances that the 
signatories will comply with it because the agreement can be enforced (Raustiala and Victor 
1998; Victor 1997; Weiss 1999; Zimmerman 2002).  However, despite being binding, 
enforcement is not automatic.  Many times, enforcement measures tend to be meaningless, as 
many types of coercive measures—like war, sanctions, or legal action—are wholly impractical 
for routine enforcement, as they require significant political and economic costs (Chayes and 
Handler-Chayes 1995) to invoke.  As such, members rarely use a binding agreement’s 
enforcement measures and routine compliance is either ignored or left up to each participant 
(Bjorkbom 1988).   
Non-binding agreements are often more flexible in dealing with compliance, generally 
rely on the participant’s consensus, and are more ambitious because the signatories are more 
likely to push the envelope if they know they will not be held, legally, to the agreement (Raustiala 
and Victor 1998; Victor 1997).  Compliance is heightened when all participants think the process 
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is fair (Franck 1995; Ostrom 1990), when a party’s reputation is at stake (Guzman 2002), when 
external pressures become too great, and when it serves the domestic interests (Faure and 
Lefevere 1999).  Compliance with non-binding agreements is reduced when the agreement 
contradicts domestic interests, when it is not clear how to comply, when it contradicts other 
agreements, when it runs contrary to cultural traditions, or when members are unable to comply 
(e.g., for budgetary reasons) (Faure and Lefevere 1999).  Donohue (1987), though not 
distinguishing between binding and non-binding agreements, notes that “informal” arrangements 
can be more flexible and dialogue-focused than “formal” arrangements.  After a study of 
environmental agreements, Victor (1997, p. 245) draws a similar conclusion:  “states [nations] 
appear to be more willing to adopt clear and ambitious commitments when these commitments 
are codified in nonbinding form,” as such agreements can prompt members to go beyond what is 
on paper, can lead to more enlightened discussions, and can be flexible enough to adapt to 
changing needs or participants. 
A major problem with binding agreements is that they rely on parties to relinquish some 
of their sovereignty, something independent entities are loath to do.  With interstate compacts, for 
instance, the agreement is a binding contract and because the compact supersedes regular state 
statutes, it has the potential to reduce state autonomy (Ridgeway 1971).  Non-binding agreements, 
on the other hand, are at times desirable precisely because they do not require nations or non-
federal governments to give up their sovereignty.  Sovereignty is jealously guarded—regardless 
of the level of government—and non-binding arrangements honor such sentiments by focusing on 
collective opportunities rather than on constraining sovereign activities.   
Likewise, one of the most important issues relating to compliance and implementation is 
whether each of the sovereign participants has the will to implement an agreement once members 
make a decision  (Jacobson and Weiss 1998; Martin and Simmons 1998; Victor et al. 1998; 
Young 1994).   Implementation becomes more challenging if the people who make the agreement 
(e.g., negotiators from an executive branch of government) are reliant on others (e.g., legislators, 
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through such acts as appropriations or regulations) to implement the agreement.  As Jacobson and 
Weiss (1998, p. 661) observe, “governments cannot ensure that national performance will 
conform with international commitments.”  Rabe (1997) makes a similar observation in the 
context of implementing regional agreements among non-federal actors.  He says implementing 
multi-state efforts depends on the members’ “goodwill” to pursue the goal.  Rabe understands this 
as an implementation issue as “states and provinces vary enormously in both their degree of 
commitment and their demonstrated capacity to pursue goals consistent with ecosystem 
management principles” (Rabe 1997, p. 425).  Thus, relying on the individual states to implement 
is dubious given their often inconsistent capabilities to live up to commitments. 
Non-binding agreements may be less able than binding agreements to raise an issue’s 
profile, thus lowering the perceived urgency to address the problems at hand (Miles 2002).  
Moreover, non-binding agreements are often costly to implement as they require continual 
support and evolution if they are to be meaningful, and such a process requires on-going 
dialogue, meetings, consensus-based negotiations, strong commitment to process, devotion of 
time, and a willingness to exert energy to change policies or adapt to changing conditions (Victor 
1997).   
Overall, the literature presents the importance of sovereignty in explaining behavior, the 
importance of institutions in facilitating agreements, and the pros and cons of binding and non-
binding agreements.  In the Great Lakes region, the sovereign entities have the ability to interact 
with each other as they see fit and to establish any institution—binding or otherwise—to facilitate 
their cooperation.  This chapter now turns to a discussion about the Great Lakes and why the 




WHY A NON-BINDING PLAN FOR THE GREAT LAKES FISHERY 
 
 The Great Lakes fishery management regime relies on a non-binding agreement, the Joint 
Strategic Plan, to guide cross-jurisdictional cooperation.  Based on an understanding of the 
history of Great Lakes fishery management (see chapter 1), and reflective of the semi-structured 
interviews with Joint Strategic Plan participants (see Appendix A), members believe that a 
binding agreement would be unsuitable for Great Lakes fishery governance.  In fact, when asked 
whether they believe a binding agreement would improve the process, only one participant (out of 
sixty-two interviewed) thought a binding agreement would increase agency commitment to the 
agreement.27  All other participants categorically rejected the idea of a binding agreement for a 
variety of reasons.   Consistent with the literature, a non-binding agreement is attractive for the 
Great Lakes (1) when participants guard their sovereignty and independence strongly, (2) when 
flexibility is important, helping managers focus on issues that go beyond the lowest common 
policy to which members can agree, and (3) when mechanisms exist that can heighten compliance 
with the non-binding agreement.  These three factors are present in Great Lakes fishery 
governance and help explain the desirability of a non-binding agreement for Great Lakes fishery 
management. 
 
Sovereignty and independence are supreme 
 Nothing automatically prohibits provinces, states, and U.S. tribes from entering into any 
type of fisheries agreement (binding or otherwise) and being sovereign, these entities are 
relatively free to establish the type of agreement that best suits their needs.  Notwithstanding 
federal dominance in foreign affairs and some intergovernmental issues, the literature makes it 
clear that non-federal governments are able to enter into agreements with each other, so long as 
                                                 
 
27 This participant was most versed in Lake Erie management.  Around the time of the interview, the 
agencies on Lake Erie had just endured a particularly tense challenge to the agreed-to walleye quota (the 
subject of chapter 5’s case study).  This participant’s beliefs might reflect frustration over the unwillingness 
to adhere to the hard-won harvest agreement. 
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the agreement does not intrude on federal rights and responsibilities; federal involvement is not 
inherently required for inter-state/inter-provincial and international affairs.  A non-binding 
agreement like the Joint Strategic Plan is particularly appropriate when the participants want to 
preserve their independence.  The plan is not a specific management plan containing, say, binding 
management regulations, rather it created a process for cooperation.  Signatories never intended 
the plan to be a substitute for, or an abdication of, individual state management authorities.  
Moreover, the federal governments participate in the plan, giving it de facto sanction. 
As chapter 1 argues, jurisdictional independence is a reality in Great Lakes fishery 
management; such independence accounts for the nature of the Joint Strategic Plan.  Not only are 
the non-federal jurisdictions legally responsible for managing their fisheries, they are also capable 
of doing so, though they need a mechanism for cross-border cooperation.  The interjurisdictional 
governance void caused problems when the non-federal entities were reluctant to coordinate their 
activities, as was the case until the mid-twentieth century.  Strong feelings of independence also 
explains the non-federal unwillingness to cede authority to an overarching jurisdiction.  Indeed, 
two fisheries treaties—one in 1908 and one in 1946—failed because the non-federal governments 
were unwilling to surrender their management authority to the federal governments or to a 
binational commission (Looney 1955; Swift 1955).  The non-federal governments were also 
unwilling to create a lasting structure by themselves.  In 1942, the International Board of Inquiry 
dismissed outright the idea of an interstate compact for Great Lakes fisheries because such an 
agreement would be large-scale, would involve each state’s legislature, and, by virtue of being a 
binding agreement, would be inflexible and unwieldy (Gallagher et al. 1942).  The board 
concluded “it would appear that negotiations and ratification of a compact is filled with so many 
pitfalls that is it no wonder that it has been so infrequently used to bring about solution of our 
interstate fishery problems” (Gallagher et al. 1942, p. 38).  Because of these sentiments of 
sovereignty and independence, jurisdictions continually rejected binding agreements to deal with 
cross-border fishery issues. 
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The sentiments of fishery officials during the development of the Joint Strategic Plan in 
the late 1970s illustrate the intent to protect their authority.  First, the non-federal entities asked 
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission to develop a process for coordinated fishery management 
because they did not want the U.S. federal government or the federally dominant Great Lakes 
Basin Commission leading the process.  The also feared federal involvement through the 
paradigm-shifting Magnuson Act.  While they knew they needed to do something to avoid a 
Magnuson Act regional council, the non-federal entities also soundly rejected the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service or the basin commission developing the structure because, in the words of 
commissioner Fred Fry, “since the states and province have the responsibility for exploiting the 
resources they therefore have the responsibility for the management plan” (GLFC 1978a).  They 
wanted to avoid anything that might appear to intrude on non-federal management authority. 
Second, beyond protecting from federal intrusion, the plan would respect their individual 
sovereignty and independence.  Letters from 1978, from the non-federal governments, illustrate 
the intended character of the multijurisdictional fisheries plan.  In a letter to the jurisdictions, the 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission summarized the nature of the plan as it addressed the issues of 
sovereignty and independence: 
First, a word about the Commission's choice of the words ‘Strategic Plan.’ This is a plan 
that will act as an umbrella.  It should be a plan derived from your concepts of what 
needs to be done to develop fish management objectives or programs in the Great Lakes.  
It will not be a plan to dictate how these goals should be obtained’ . . . . The 
implementation portion can be incorporated in individual state and provincial fish 
management plans.  It is in the development of these goals and opinions that your 
agencies’ commitment and involvement is needed to insure a usable Strategic Great 
Lakes Fishery Management Plan [emphasis in original] (GLFC 1978d, p. 13). 
 
Ralph Able from Pennsylvania noted that such a plan needed to be strategic, not operational, so as 
not to preempt states’ rights, and Mike Conlin of Illinois added that the primary concern would be 
whether such a plan would limit state management options (i.e., limit state sovereignty) (GLFC 
1978a).  The agencies completed and signed the Joint Strategic Plan in 1981 and the plan itself is 
quite clear about where true authority lies:  “from the start, the plan recognized the constitutional 
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and other legal responsibilities of the management agencies to manage their respective fishery 
resources” (GLFC 1981a, p. 1).   
Today, participants appear to respect and understand the reasons why the Joint Strategic 
Plan is non-binding.  The interview participants, when asked about their opinions of binding and 
non-binding agreements, dismissed a binding agreement as simply unfeasible given agencies 
would never agree to something that would usurp their sovereignty.  A state manager captures 
this common sentiment:  “There is no overarching authority here that has a legal framework to 
trump the individual authorities of the agencies.”  Observed a manager from Ontario, 
“Management authority  . . . is currently vested in various agencies.”  A colleague from a large 
state added concisely, “What, really, can another jurisdiction say to you about what you can and 
cannot do?”  The Joint Strategic Plan members remain independent and the plan’s success 
depends on how willing the province, the states, and the tribes are to adhere to the agreement.  
This shows that participants understand each jurisdiction’s independent ability to manage its own 
affairs; interviewees were quick to dismiss any idea of a binding agreement, citing that such an 
agreement, as one put it,  “would never happen.”  The Joint Strategic Plan itself states as much in 
the introduction and participants are mindful of that reality. 
 
Fishery management needs flexibility 
 Non-binding agreements are more desirable than binding agreements when participants 
seek to be flexible rather than committed to a specific course of action.  Great Lakes fishery 
management requires flexibility because fishery policies must evolve as fish populations ebb and 
flow, as political pressures come and go, and as natural conditions change.  Regulations react to 
the needs of the fishery, stocking and harvest levels are tied to changes in the forage base, 
rehabilitation strategies are altered as scientists learn what works and what does not, and 
managers are often moved by internal politics.  Fisheries management practices, in other words, 
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change as better knowledge becomes available and as managers react to ecosystem and political 
changes. 
 As chapter 1 discussed, early concepts of the plan were not strategic, they were 
operational.  The Great Lakes Basin Commission, which proposed the idea for a fishery plan, 
expected the plan to outline the specific steps that agencies would agree to to manage the fishery.  
Such a plan would have entailed the development of fishery objectives and specific plans for how 
those objectives would be met.  The agencies would have been expected to take the steps 
necessary to adhere to the established plan.  Many of the early attempts at cooperation—even as 
late as the 1940s—were aimed at gaining agreement among the jurisdictions to install identical 
fishery regulations in each of the states and the province.  This approach was rejected and, in the 
late 1970s, while the jurisdictions agreed that a fishery plan would be beneficial, they were still 
quite dubious of any approach that was proscriptive, as such an approach would have been 
unnecessarily constraining and less reflective of the protean nature of fisheries.  Instead, the 
jurisdictions saw the benefits of establishing a strategic plan that could set in motion a process of 
ongoing scientific discovery and deliberation capable of changing with the needs of the fishery 
(GLFC 1978a).  A non-binding, strategic plan would be flexible.  A binding, operational plan 
would not. 
Fishery managers, today, acknowledge the importance of a flexible plan and connect such 
flexibility with the non-binding nature of the Joint Strategic Plan.  Several interview participants 
expressed their belief that a non-binding fisheries agreement is superior for the Great Lakes 
because it allows the members to address any issue they find important.  Because the plan does 
not attempt to lock jurisdictions into a specific course of action, lake committee and technical 
committee members say they are able to use their best judgment and to be innovative in their 
approach to shared policies.  Said an Ontario manager, “once [a firm, specific agreement] is 
signed, sealed, and delivered, there is no wiggle room. . . . Battles [would] be even more intense 
than they are now.”  A non-binding agreement like the plan allows the members to be flexible, 
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relatively free from superiors who may not be comfortable with innovation had there been a 
binding agreement without wiggle room. 
 Moreover, a few participants observed that a binding agreement would be simply 
unnecessary for what they use the lake committee process to achieve.  The agencies do not need 
to be bound in a legal sense to what they develop through the lake committee process because the 
issues themselves are not wholly conducive to a binding agreement.  For example, with the 
important exception of the Lake Erie Committee (see chapter 5), the lake committees do not use 
the process to establish common harvest quotas.  They might use the process to come to a shared 
understanding of the lake’s biology and the management practices needed to sustain the resource, 
but they do not use the process to determine a quota to which adherence is mandatory.  Said a 
tribal member, “in the upper lakes, we haven’t [had to deal with] the most difficult issue of all, 
and that’s allocation. . . .  That is where the rubber hits the road.”  Instead, the lake committees 
are set up to deal with issues like rehabilitation plans, articulating shared goals, balancing 
interests, and keeping everyone within their sphere of authority.  The process depends on 
proactive scientific understanding, planning, creative thinking, flexibility, and a constant 
application of new information to changing conditions for its success rather than on having an 
enforcement mechanism to ensure that members adhere to the agreement.  In other words, the 
plan is designed to focus more on shared needs and goals and less on how to hold the jurisdictions 
to specific, delineated provisions. 
Finally, members believe that a binding agreement would be undesirable for Great Lakes 
fishery management because such an agreement would be weak and based on the lowest common 
denominator to which the agencies could agree.  Said a senior state manager, who is intimately 
involved in other multijurisdictional agreements, binding agreements “can force people to comply 
[with] the minimum standards, whereas they might voluntarily choose to do something better than 
that.  [With a binding agreement, t]hey know that they can’t be forced to do something better and 
they can always explain doing the minimum to their constituents.”  A Canadian participant, 
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reflecting on other strong agreements, noted that such agreements are “wishy-washy,” and an 
academician who is also versed in agreements noted that “as soon as binding elements get set, 
they are either too general or they are too rigid [and, thus are] . . . less workable.”  As one Ontario 
manager noted simply, “sometimes, the more teeth you give something the less effective it 
becomes.” 
 As a non-binding agreement, the Joint Strategic Plan was intended to create a process 
capable of staying on top of changing conditions in the Great Lakes basin.  To do so, the plan 
relies on an ongoing process to maintain continual ecosystem monitoring, to develop new and 
improved management plans, and to advance science in areas where members believe research is 
needed.  The process is designed to allow members the ability to react quickly to the fishery’s 
needs and to help them focus on their shared goals, rather than on forcing behavior.  A binding 
agreement, on the other hand, would allow for less flexibility because the provisions of the plan, 
being enforceable, would be more concrete. 
 
Compliance is enforced by peers and overseen by a neutral third party 
As a non-binding agreement, the Joint Strategic Plan is only as effective as the agencies’ 
willingness to implement it.  That is, nothing in the agreement compels agencies in a legal way to 
adhere to the plan nor are there provisions mandating notification if a jurisdiction chooses to drop 
out of the agreement.  The members recognize that each jurisdiction has its own mix of politics 
and regulations that make each jurisdiction’s fisheries management different.  “I remember in our 
dealings we always tried to make sure that our colleagues understood that if we had to go back 
and change the regulations that there was this [internal] process that we had to go through.  [The 
state] process had a life of its own,” said a state manager, an observation several participants 
echoed.  “You can’t get around it,” added another.  In other words, participants know that no 
matter what the Joint Strategic Plan says or no matter what they come up with through the 
process, the agreement can only be so binding.  Because of this reality, the lake committee 
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members know that they must work together to develop shared policies and they must promote 
those policies internally when they return to their home jurisdiction.  Said a member of the Lake 
Superior Committee, 
I think anything that a state management agency wants to do they can do in spite of the 
Joint Strategic Plan.  I mean, the state entities have voluntarily agreed to go through this 
plan but we are all run by political animals.  [W]e can make the case to do what is 
biologically sound, we can make the case to follow what is in the Joint Strategic Plan, but 
it ultimately comes down to what our political masters are going to dictate. 
 
Said an official from the Great Lakes Fishery Commission:  “The agreement can’t hold if the 
political will of the agency isn’t going to stand behind it or if the stakeholders are going to raise 
such a stink.”  These sentiments about implementation internally, within a jurisdiction, are 
important for two reasons.  First, they indicate that the participants recognize and appreciate their 
jurisdiction’s sovereignty.  That is, no matter what the lake committee process develops, an 
individual agency has the final discretionary authority.  Second, successful policies depend on the 
home jurisdiction’s will and capacity to implement the policies.  Thus, compliance with and 
effectiveness of the agreement is a function of how willing the jurisdictions are to go along with 
what they produce. 
While the literature suggests that binding agreements enjoy higher compliance than non-
binding agreements, such is the case simply because members are more likely to sign agreements 
they know they can adhere to, which are agreements that usually reflect the lowest common 
denominator.  However, an agreement that enjoys a high degree of support, commitment, and 
sense of ownership by the members, and that has built-in structures like regular meetings, strong 
relationships, and a strategic process, can also assure the members that implementation is likely.  
The non-binding Joint Strategic Plan reflects the Great Lakes region’s characteristics—there 
exists a process for regular interactions, an epistemic community that coerces and rewards 
participants, and a reliance on consensus to better convince participants that the policies need 
implementation.  Rabe (1997) notes that many non-binding agreements that address basinwide 
environmental issues are hamstrung by the need for the entities to take individual action to 
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implement.  However, relying on members’ goodwill is precisely what the plan-framers intended.  
They were preoccupied with protecting state and provincial (and later, tribal) sovereignty and the 
plan itself reflects that desire.  The plan’s purpose was not to force agencies to adhere to fishery 
management plans through a top-down process, rather, it was to develop science, share 
information, and articulate shared goals so that the individual non-federal governments could 
align their policies in common ways.  The strategy was that if the science, goals, and plans came 
from the members themselves, through a consensus-based process, there would be a heightened 
incentive to comply. 
Despite implementation challenges, participants do believe that the non-binding Joint 
Strategic Plan can address compliance.  While they believe the plan does not compel unwilling 
action (as might a binding agreement), they do feel it contains ample strategies to facilitate 
cooperation, thus allowing the participants to achieve their goals without a more heavy-handed 
agreement that might constrain flexibility or creativity.  Interviewees were asked whether they 
believe the Joint Strategic Plan has ever forced or compelled them to act in a certain way.  The 
responses are nuanced and reflect differences in how participants define “compel.”  One of the 
most common responses—irrespective of jurisdiction—is similar to the response from a state 
manager:  “I can’t think of examples where [the plan] forced us to do something we didn’t want 
to do.” Participants’ feelings about whether the Joint Strategic Plan has ever compelled them to 
do anything generally corroborate their belief that agencies are sovereign and have the final say 
on implementation. 
 While members do not believe they are forced to do something against their will, they do 
feel very strongly that the plan has compelled them to do things that they might not otherwise 
have done.   When asked for instances where the plan has changed their behavior, participants 
were often unable to identify specific examples. They stated instead that they simply knew that 
the Joint Strategic Plan process itself affected their thinking beyond the perspective of their own 
agency, stating that the plan offered them a different viewpoint and a motivation to find common 
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ground.  In a few cases, participants could recall instances where one jurisdiction wanted to stock 
a certain species of fish, but when the issue was discussed through the lake committee and 
technical committee process, such stocking proved to be less attractive.  A broadening of thinking 
occurs because a small group of managers in a particular jurisdiction interact with a much larger 
group of peers, which leads to fresh thinking outside of the particular agency’s culture, resulting 
in refined ideas and improved positions.  In this regard, the plan has, in soft, persuasive ways, 
compelled a change in mindset and behavior.  For example, members note that the plan has 
compelled them to “take other jurisdictions into account before they take actions that could affect 
the whole system,” has “forced a lot of people to re-think what they were doing,” and has 
prompted members “to think about things and to make some changes.”   
Joint Strategic Plan participants pointed out, however, that rethinking their actions, 
tempering activities, or compromising with other agencies is not the same as forcing unwilling 
action.  They believe this because they view their behavioral change in the context of the shared 
fishery objectives that they develop together.  In other words, while the participants believe the 
plan has compelled rethinking and behavioral change, they do not believe anything has been 
forced upon them.  Rather, for lake committee activities to be successful, members must stay 
committed to what they develop jointly; members rely on forces besides a binding agreement to 
“compel” them to adhere to what they decide.  These implementation forces include following a 
regular process (i.e., lake committees), a feeling of ownership in the plan, and decision by 
consensus.  As one technical committee member observed tellingly, we feel compelled to stick to 
the plan “because we have been involved so much in drafting [the policies].”   
Members indeed have a sense of ownership in the plan, which could lessen the need for a 
binding agreement.  The discussions that take place under the plan, in the words of one technical 
committee member, are “us versus us.”  Observed a long-serving federal employee, “you can’t 
make anybody show up to the lake committee meetings.  The fact that they show up should tell 
you a lot.”  Said one technical committee member,   
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I don’t know of anybody in life who is always happy when someone else comes in and 
tells them what the decision is.  I think we all want to be a part of [the decision-making 
process]. . . . But you know what?  When you realize you have to reach a decision and 
you find out that the level of commitment is extremely high, you do it.  
 
A now-retired senior state manager added that he preferred, the plan to other agreements 
“because it originates from the parties; it is not imposed.”  The managers understand that no 
higher force compels cooperation, rather, cooperation occurs because the members are vested in 
the plan’s products.   
The sense of ownership is deeply related to this non-binding agreement’s most 
fundamental strategy:  decision by consensus.  Consensus occurs after members express all 
viewpoints and when no participant objects to the opinion (GLFC 1997a).  Participants generally 
have a shared understanding of what consensus means, a shared understanding that has developed 
from past experiences in lake committees.  They recognize that consensus does not mean 
unanimity or universal happiness.  Rather, in the words of a Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
participant, “consensus to me means everybody agrees or chooses not to disagree.”  Said a tribal 
member, with consensus, “people are satisfied enough  . . . that they don’t fuss anymore.”  Said 
an academic participant, consensus means “I’m not happy but I’ll go along.”  Consensus, the 
members observe, happens when the group clearly articulates goals, when there is sound 
information and science, when there is a clear rationale for ideas and decisions, when the 
members come to the table in good faith, and when there is a willingness to adjust, adapt, and 
compromise their positions on issues.  Participants say consensus is threatened when people do 
not have the authority to commit, when arguments are poorly supported, when a perception exists 
that a member is not acting in good faith, when people are inflexible in their positions, and when 
agencies are just too far apart on issues.  Consensus is more than a definition of a decision-
making process.  It is a mindset that develops over time as members become more involved in the 
process.  It is a way of doing business that emerged out of the jurisdictions’ history of information 
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sharing, coming together as equals, participating voluntarily, and preserving jurisdictional 
autonomy. 
Joint Strategic Plan members are aware of why consensus is important and how it relates 
to the plan’s implementation.  Members emphasized many elements of consensus that make them 
feel somewhat bound to the decision that arises from it.  For instance, they feel professionally 
accountable to their peers (to the epistemic community discussed in chapter 2) and believe that 
breaking consensus (or being too obstructionist if the group is near consensus) is unprofessional.  
Members are also aware that reaching consensus helps prevent agencies from taking unilateral 
action.  Said one participant from a large state, without consensus, “each jurisdiction would do its 
own thing.”  Said another, without consensus, “nothing would happen.”  Consensus reflects the 
members’ work and sentiments, and because they feel they own the plan, members generally have 
a lessened incentive to break consensus willingly, as they would be contravening their own 
opinions and flouting the community’s conventions. 
Members readily admit that implementing lake committee decisions is a challenge 
because of  internal resistance within their home agency, a lack of resources, and other variables.  
They acknowledge these implementation challenges and, thus, are tolerant and understanding if 
fellow members have implementation problems.  Said a technical committee member, reflecting 
on struggles over the years to put into affect what the committee developed, if implementation did 
not occur quickly or as intended, “there wouldn’t be any hostilities or accusations or finger 
pointing like that.  Everybody was usually pretty much in the same boat.”  Or, as a senior state 
manager conceded, “I think there is just a general understanding that there are some things we 
can control and other things we can’t control.  So I think we just shake our heads and move on.  
What else are you going to do?”  The most important thing, they say, is a desire to implement 
their decisions in good faith.  Participants become upset when a lake committee or technical 
committee member agrees to something with no authority to do so or agrees knowing it is 
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impossible to implement back home.  Members will understand if another member acknowledges 
up front a decision cannot be implemented.   
Another reason participants reject the idea of a binding agreement is that they believe the 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission serves as an alternative—albeit a soft, neutral substitute—for 
an overarching authority with responsibility to bind the entities.  The commission, they believe, is 
neutral enough to facilitate the process and gently pressure the agencies into implementing their 
agreements.  In general, participants expect the commission to push them along, but not so 
forcefully that the commission upsets the basin’s spheres of authority.  This means that the 
commission is expected to facilitate the process and to help the agencies learn about and address 
issues of concern.  This understanding of the fishery commission's involvement in the Joint 
Strategic Plan is consistent with the history of Great Lakes fishery management and the reasons 
for accepting the commission in the first place, as discussed in chapter 1.  Participants generally 
agree that the role of the commission is “to facilitate professional, appropriate standards of 
behavior of individuals participating in the process.”  This means, said a senior state official, that 
the commission is asked to “create the appropriate level of support where it’s easier for [the lake 
committee members] to do the right thing than it is the wrong thing.”  To create that atmosphere, 
Joint Strategic Plan participants very much expect the commission to make sure the meetings take 
place, to help them keep the data flowing, to retain an institutional memory (e.g., prepare 
minutes), to serve as an honest broker, and to stay neutral.  Said one lake committee member, the 
commission’s job is to “provide the prodding to the follow up; [to] gently nudge people along.”  
 The commission’s involvement in cooperative processes, while encouraged in its 
enabling treaty, are based more on a mutual understanding between the commission and the other 
jurisdictions than on any legal provisions.  Like the federal agencies that do not retain primary 
management authority on the lakes, the commission walks a fine line between facilitating and 
meddling in others’ affairs.  During the interviews, commissioners and staff noted several times 
that they are sensitive to overstepping the bounds of the commission’s authority while at the same 
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time trying to actively facilitate the plan process proactively.  The dilemma that the commission 
faces is trying to be involved enough in the process to encourage the development and 
implementation of proactive, shared policies yet detached enough so that the commission itself is 
not the only entity compelling the participants to rethink their policies.  The fact that the 
commission is the only basinwide fishery entity on the lakes makes it naturally prone to 
overstepping its bounds or even having the jurisdictions expect too much from the commission if 
their home authorities are reluctant to act.  One former commission member described his 
understanding of the commission’s role:  
I know that there were times when different jurisdictions wanted the commission to act as 
a tribunal, act as an intra-constitutional, an intra-treaty entity. . . . And [the commission] 
has resisted that.  And I think one of the reasons why they have resisted it is . . .because it 
would compromise their [the Joint Strategic Plan participants’] success and extra-
constitutional consensus.  It would.  Soon as they did that they would be compromised. 
 
The commission would likely be made aware of when the line between facilitation and 
interference in others’ affairs has been crossed.  Said a long-serving lake committee member, 
“facilitating is one thing . . . but don’t push them [the agencies] too much because it wouldn’t 
take long for talk to start on the street that ‘man, they’re into everything; they’re going to take 
over the Great Lakes.’”  Said another:  “One concern I have heard from [our lake manager] over 
and over again,” said a senior state official, “is how much the commission drives the agenda 
rather than really having the CLC [Council of Lake Committees] or the lake committees 
themselves take responsibility for driving what they are doing.”  Said another manager, “I think 
it’s a mistake when the commission becomes an obvious advocate of specific fishery 
management strategies. . . . [and there is] the danger that they’re stepping into an arena where 
they have no responsibility.”  The non-federal entities are leery of any outside authority meddling 
in their affairs, and just as the jurisdictions become infuriated when the federal governments 




Over the long term, if the commission were to be perceived as continually overstepping 
its role as facilitator, the lake committee process would likely break down.  Members would grow 
reluctant to participate in commission-facilitated meetings and, instead, either not work 
cooperatively or establish processes outside of the Joint Strategic Plan to cooperate.  The 
commission, in the eyes of non-federal agencies, would likely be viewed with the same suspicion 
as the federal agencies.  The process would devolve from trustful and synergistic to contentious.  
Members would be forced to focus more on their relationship with the commission and on 




Natural resources routinely transcend political boundaries, and the tools available to 
facilitate collective action—treaties, interstate compacts, informal interstate agreements, 
conferences, shared understandings—are numerous.  Each type of agreement has its own benefits, 
drawbacks, and ability to bind the participants.  Members decide on the type of agreement and its 
binding nature based on their circumstances and needs.  The literature notes that non-binding 
agreements can be more flexible and ambitious than binding agreements, but that compliance and 
implementation will be a struggle.  Participants who desire to protect their independence and 
sovereignty will turn toward a non-binding agreement more readily than a binding agreement.  In 
the Great Lakes region, a non-binding agreement is suitable because fishery management requires 
flexibility, because participants desire a strategic and progressive approach that identifies shared 
goals, and because institutions and norms exist to nurture compliance without a heavy-handed 
entity or agreement to bind their activities.  Participants also recognize that jurisdictional 
independence essentially precludes a binding approach.   
The Great Lakes are unique in that the non-federal governments, together, manage an 
international resource.  Paraphrasing Frankfurter and Landis (1925), the jurisdictions long ago 
recognized that they were smaller than nation and greater than any one jurisdiction and twenty-
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five years ago, established a formal process—tailored to suit their needs—to together mange 
fisheries.  While these non-federal entities guard their own independence and sovereignty jealously, 
they are also quite aware that independence and sovereignty means that one jurisdiction’s actions 
affect everybody.  They chose a consensus-based, non-binding agreement because they felt it would 
maximize collaborative action while still respecting jurisdictional sovereignty.  The managers who 
participate in the process today have not deviated from those sentiments.  
The interviews demonstrated that, on the one hand, Joint Strategic Plan members believe 
they must work together to develop and achieve their shared goals, while on the other hand, they are 
aware that much of the success of their deliberations depend on the individual will of their home 
jurisdiction to implement their decisions.  In the Joint Strategic Plan’s case, members dismiss 
outright the idea that the plan binds their jurisdiction, but participants do point to the fact that it 
changes behavior and contains elements that heighten the chances that members will take the non-
binding agreement seriously.  These elements include the on-going, consensus-based process itself 
and a sense of ownership in the plan.  A sense of ownership, aided by the consensus-based nature of 
the agreement motivates the members to adhere to the plan, lessening the need for a binding 
agreement.  A neutral third party, the commission, helps keep the process moving and instills 
confidence that some entity is keeping the process fair and the members true to their word.  In 
essence, the members, through the Joint Strategic Plan, have acknowledged that some entity needs 
to be present to coordinate the process and that a soft force is all that is needed to make it work. 
This dissertation has thus far presented how jurisdictional independence affected the 
history of Great Lakes fishery management and how the independent entities, recognizing the 
need for coordinated action, have used the Joint Strategic Plan to foster relationship-based 
collective action, to ease federalism tensions, and to cooperate through a non-binding approach.  
This dissertation now turns to a case study—the Lake Erie Committee’s struggle in 2004 to 
establish a total allowable catch for walleye—and discusses how the plan helped the committee 








The 2004 dispute over walleye total allowable catch in Lake Erie  




Walleye management can be contentious on Lake Erie because the fish is valuable 
economically to both Canada and the U.S. and because harvest methods vary markedly 
between the two nations  Unlike the other lake committees, the Lake Erie Committee 
uses the Joint Strategic Plan process to establish harvest quotas, known as total allowable 
catch (TAC).  Most of the time, the Lake Erie Committee can agree on and adhere to an 
annual walleye TAC.  However, the committee failed to maintain consensus on the 2004 
TAC after consensus was achieved and announced.  The committee could not resolve the 
dispute on its own and, in late 2003, invoked the Joint Strategic Plan’s dispute provisions, 
a rare occurrence.  This chapter asks: What is the mechanism for dealing with conflict 
when there are no binding enforcement provisions?  How did the participants understand 
the walleye dispute as it occurred?  How did the non-binding plan help the committee 
members resolve their dispute?  This chapter argues that the concept of consensus, the 
existence of an epistemic community of scientists, and other factors are critical to 
building the trusting relationships necessary to make the TAC process function.  
Moreover, the plan, though mostly designed to facilitate non-distributional policies, 
nevertheless can address distributional issues like TACs, despite being non-binding.  




Wheatley, Ontario, at the base of the famous Point Pelee, is a busy commercial fishing 
port on Lake Erie.  The city was built on the economics associated with the fishery, particularly 
walleye, and large commercial companies like Omstead Foods and Presteve Foods run a fleet of 
boats, operate fish processing equipment, and employ hundreds of workers.  Walleye (“pickerel” 
to many Canadians) is big business and each year, commercial operators send millions of pounds 
of the fish to processing plants for filleting, packing, and shipping to market.  During the 
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twentieth century and today, Wheatley has prospered and suffered with the vicissitudes of Lake 
Erie’s fishery resources.  Commercial Walleye landings in Ontario waters of Lake Erie have 
ranged from a high of 4.5 million fish in 1996 to a low of just 157,000 fish in 1976.  In 2005, the 
harvest was 3 million fish (Lake Erie Walleye Task Group 2006).  Wheatley’s story is played out 
across nearly a dozen other commercial fishing communities along Ontario’s Lake Erie coast.  
Across the lake, in Port Clinton, Ohio, walleye is also big—so big, in fact, it has reached 
cult status.  Each New Year’s Eve, the town celebrates “Walleye Madness,” a festival that 
includes singing the Walleye Blues, dancing the Wallarena (Port Clinton’s version of the 
Macarena), and reading the Mayor’s “Walleye Proclamation.”  Restaurants serve walleye 
chowder, walleye sandwiches, walleye cinnamon chips, walleye popcorn, and even a local 
wine—Walleye White—bottled especially for the occasion.  Walleye Madness reaches a fever 
Figure 5-1:  Commercial fishing vessels, Wheatley, Ontario (Photo:  M. Gaden).   
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pitch when Wylie the Walleye, a 20-foot, 600-pound fiberglass fish drops from the sky (figure 5-
2) in a countdown to midnight with the crowd chanting “give me a ‘W,’ give me a ‘Y,’ give me a 
‘L,’ give me an ‘I,’ give me an ‘E.’”  While recreational fishing in towns like Port Clinton is 
down from its peak in the early 1990s, the fishery still attracts hundreds of thousands of tourists 
each year to Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York and supports a lucrative charter 
fishing industry in those states. 
This tale of two cities illustrates how enormously important walleye is to the people of 
Ontario and the four states that border Lake Erie, though in starkly different ways.  In Canada, 
walleye is fished almost exclusively commercially.  Commercial fishers seek small, young 
walleye and desire generous and stable abundances that support their investments in boats and 
processing equipment.  In the United States, with the exception of a single commercial fisher in 
Pennsylvania who harvests around 200 walleye a year, anglers fish walleye exclusively 
recreationally.28  While recreational fishers, too, desire abundant fish, they favor a quality fishing 
experience based on older and larger fish.  Provincial and state governments manage walleye, and 
because hatchery programs are not used to support walleye stocks, management tools are limited 
to habitat protection, habitat restoration, and prudent harvest regulation through annual quotas.  
Commercial and recreational harvest quotas are adjusted annually based on the species’ natural 
changes in abundance.   
Provincial and state managers use the Lake Erie Committee to manage walleye on a 
lakewide basis.  The committee and its Walleye Task Group gather and digest scientific data, 
develop walleye management plans, and use those plans and data to determine the annual harvest 
quotas, known as total allowable catch, or TAC.29  Like other lake committees, the Lake Erie 
                                                 
 
28 Michigan, Ohio, and New York do have commercial fisheries for other species. 
29 New York and Pennsylvania are not part of the TAC, as their walleye fisheries are a fraction of those of 
the other jurisdictions on Lake Erie.  New York and Pennsylvania do, however, participate actively in the 
TAC process, as their data contribute to the overall understanding of the fishery and decisions over TACs 
do affect them. 
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Committee members use the process to reach consensus and they agree to adhere to their 
decisions when they bring them forward to their own agencies.  While these are normal functions 
for all lake committees, developing a TAC is not.  Walleye TACs on Lake Erie are needed 
because of harvest pressures on this naturally occurring stock of fish.   
Lake Erie state and provincial managers face considerable challenges in managing 
walleye because of its high profile, the different types of exploitation, and the natural fluctuations 
in the stock’s abundance.  Observed one long-serving participant in Great Lakes fishery 
management, “Lake Erie seems to be the hotbed of disputes. Although problems exist on the 
other lakes, they don’t seem to boil up to the surface quite the way they do on Lake Erie.”  Said 
another, “there is no good time to be chair of the Lake Erie Committee.”   Nevertheless, the Joint 
Strategic Plan, most of the time, can and does help the Lake Erie Committee members come to 
Figure 5-2:  Wylie the Walleye drops from the sky at the stroke of midnight, New Year’s Eve in Port 
Clinton, Ohio.  (Photo courtesy Port Clinton Times Herald).  
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consensus on and adhere to an annual TAC.  The members participate in the process in good 
faith, invest considerable time and energy into science, and are usually able to reach a TAC 
agreement.  Usually, but not always.  In 2003, the process to establish the 2004 TAC broke down 
such that the plan’s dispute resolution provisions were invoked for only the second time in the 
plan’s history.   
The committee’s behavior as it grappled with this dispute is a case study of how the non-
binding, consensus-based Joint Strategic Plan handles the toughest of situations—allocation.  Not 
only was the committee under the deadline to establish a TAC for the coming year, but the 
members had to contend with broken consensus, lost trust among members, strained 
relationships, conflicting goals, constituent pressures, and differing opinions about science.  This 
chapter asks: What is the mechanism for dealing with conflict when there are no binding 
enforcement provisions?  How did the participants understand the walleye dispute as it 
occurred?  How did the non-binding plan help the committee members resolve their dispute?   In 
addressing these questions, this chapter does not set out to determine which side was correct in 
the dispute nor does it assess whether the TAC decisions were appropriate.  The Province of 
Ontario acknowledged that it precipitated the dispute by breaking the committee’s original 
consensus to cut the TAC forty to sixty percent and, thus, this chapter takes Ontario’s actions as 
the starting point.  It focuses on how the Canadian and American jurisdictions perceived and 
responded to the situation. 
To address this case study’s questions, this chapter relies primarily on data from semi-
structured interviews conducted for the larger research project about the Joint Strategic Plan (see 
Appendix A).  Coincidentally, the walleye dispute unfolded shortly after the research project 
began.  All five Lake Erie Committee members and several other officials from Ontario and the 
states were interviewed and were asked specific questions about the dispute; this chapter draws 
primarily from their responses.  In addition, two Walleye Task Group (a technical subcommittee 
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of the Lake Erie Committee) members were interviewed30 along, with several academicians and 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission commissioners and staff.  The researcher reviewed public and 
confidential documents and participated in public and non-public Lake Erie Committee meetings, 
including Lake Erie Committee executive meetings and the dispute resolution session.  
Confidential documents and emails referenced in this chapter are used with permission.   
The dispute occurred because, in the words of one participant, “not everyone did what 
they said they would do.”   The two major (and somewhat related) reasons for the broken 
consensus were (1) differences between the Americans and the Canadians in their respective 
tolerances for risk and (2) considerable pressure by the Ontario commercial fishing industry for 
Ontario to revisit the 2004 TAC decision (and the threat of a formal challenge to Ontario’s TAC 
regulations if Ontario did not revisit the decision).  These pressures and risk perceptions created 
an “us versus them” division among the committee members, with the Americans strongly 
wishing to adhere to the original TAC decision and the Canadians interested in revisiting it.  This 
polarization emerged even though the jurisdictions together collected and interpreted the science 
and developed overarching strategies for Lake Erie walleye management.  The chapter argues that 
consensus is essential for reaching the TAC and strict implementation is critical to the Lake Erie 
Committee process if members, politicians, and constituents are to believe the TAC is fair.  The 
process breaks down when consensus is ignored, when members detract from the agreed-to 
                                                 
 
30 A limitation of this chapter may be that only two Walleye Task Group member were interviewed.   This 
small number of participants is not intended to suggest that the task group’s role in this dispute was 
unimportant.  On the contrary, the task group’s sentiments were important because the group’s work 
heavily influenced Lake Erie Committee decisions and Lake Erie Committee members’ arguments during 
the dispute.  Only two Walleye Task Group member were interviewed because this case study (and, thus, 
the importance of understanding the sentiments of Walleye Task Group members) had not fully emerged at 
the time the researcher selected participants for the larger project and, thus, the researcher was not sensitive 
to the need to include more participants from this population.  While the sentiments of Lake Erie 
Committee members were derived directly from interviews, the researcher was able to gain a reasonable 
understanding of the role and views of Walleye Task Group members by consulting their annual reports 
and other committee documents including the Coordinated Percid Management Strategy and the Walleye 
Management Plan.  These documents remain critical to the annual TAC process and were instrumental in 
guiding the committee during the 2004 dispute.  Further research into this case would be enhanced by in-
depth interviews with Walleye Task Group members. 
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committee procedures, and when members violate the norms of the epistemic community.  
Relationships become weakened as trust deteriorates and members become less interested in 
accommodating other members’ needs. 
The dispute over the 2004 TAC tested the limits of the non-binding Joint Strategic Plan.  
While the process to develop the 2004 TAC did lead to broken consensus, lost trust, hard 
feelings, and third-party mediation, the Joint Strategic Plan process did allow the participants, 
eventually, to agree on a TAC and avoid total stalemate.  The non-binding plan was able to 
facilitate agreement in this difficult situation because of several design principles.  First, the plan 
contains a dispute resolution process, which outlined how members could manage disagreements.  
Second, the plan relies on a perceived-neutral third party—the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission—to help the members achieve what they might not otherwise be able to achieve on 
their own.  Third, by relying on consensus, science, and strategic objectives the members develop 
together, the plan helps the members themselves answer their own questions, leaving little debate 
over the issues, as the data and plans are of and for the committee members.  Finally, the plan, 
being non-binding, is designed to be flexible, allowing the members the ability to alter their 
decisions as-needed instead of being rigidly bound.  This flexibility helps new consensus emerge 
and heightens the chances that members will comply.  Importantly, members remain convinced 
that the Joint Strategic Plan is robust enough to deal with such a challenge effectively and they 
remain committed to interjurisdictional management through the plan.  In the aftermath of this 
dispute, the Lake Erie Committee is going through a healing process and members say they have 
learned from the experience. 
 
BEYOND THE USUAL LAKE COMMITTEE PROCESS:  USING THE PLAN TO SET 
TACS 
 
In many respects, the Lake Erie Committee operates just like the other lake committees.  
The committee serves as a forum for the managers to meet regularly, to share information, to 
reach consensus on science, and to develop shared objectives.  The Lake Erie Committee 
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facilitates intergovernmental relations and because shared fish community objectives and 
rehabilitation plans guide their work, members feel obligated to adhere to their agreements and 
implement them, though the agreements are non-binding in any legal sense.  Like the other lake 
committees, the members also use the process to know one another, to come to an understanding, 
and to implement shared policies while still respecting each jurisdiction’s autonomy and 
independence. 
The Lake Erie Committee, however, differs from the other lake committees in remarkable 
ways.  While other lake committees manage shared, natural fish socks, and while the others must 
balance competing interests, no other committee involves itself in distributional politics to the 
level of the Lake Erie Committee; the committee comes to a shared agreement, annually, over 
harvest quotas.  For instance, while issues on Lake Michigan over Chinook salmon are certainly 
complex and require consensus on science and management (e.g., stocking levels), sport fishers 
do not compete with commercial fishers over salmon, as the salmon are fished almost exclusively 
recreationally.31  Moreover, because the species is stocked, managers do not need to set a TAC, as 
their stocking decisions affect abundances more so than lakewide harvest decisions.  The Lake 
Erie Committee, on the other hand, must manage naturally sustaining walleye stocks over which 
commercial and sport fishers compete.  Since the 1970s, when the agencies decided to manage 
walleye under a quota system (Berkes and Pocock 1987), the agencies have had to work together 
to come to an agreement on that quota, and the Lake Erie agencies use the Joint Strategic Plan’s 
framework as their mechanism to negotiate.   
Individual agency sovereignty is a major issue with the Lake Erie Committee.  As chapter 
1 has shown, the jurisdictions have a history of independence, creating an inherently parochial 
and uncooperative situation.  Agencies on Lake Erie have the ability to license their fishery and 
exploit the resource as they see fit.  Chapter 4 has noted that such independence means 
                                                 
 
31 Some tribal fishers opt to keep salmon. 
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jurisdictions have the ability to do what they please and, as such, implementation of a non-
binding agreement like the Joint Strategic Plan is dependent on goodwill and other mechanisms 
like consensus to enhance the chances of compliance.  Setting a TAC is a thus a challenge 
because of competing uses of the same fish stocks (e.g., commercial versus sport harvest; 
preference for younger versus older fish), differing agency goals, and the strong need for all 
agencies to implement the agreement once it is reached.  In the case of Lake Erie, unlike the other 
lake committees, self-interest is often framed in protecting the particular needs of the jurisdictions 
and ensuring the jurisdiction receives the appropriate allotment of fish, though self-interest also 
appears in the form of pleasing constituents—the Canadians tend to advocate commercial needs 
and the Americans to support recreational needs.  Said an American Lake Erie Committee 
member,  
at a minimum, you have two very differing agendas.  Those very different agendas 
[affect] how the resource gets allocated, how it gets used and  . . . how we interpret the 
data. . . . Our philosophies are not dissimilar . . . but these different agendas tend to 
change our individual risk analysis and our individual comfort levels. 
 
Indeed, if the TAC is conservative, some Canadian stakeholders and politicians generally criticize 
the managers for not taking full advantage of the resource (“What do you want to do, fill up the 
lake with fish?” a politician once asked an Ontario manager).  If the TAC is liberal, the managers 
often fear they are not protecting the stocks from bad times and some American stakeholders and 
politicians generally complain that the fishery is being given away to the Canadian commercial 
fishers. 
 However, self-interest, driven by exploitation pressures, is far from the only thing 
motivating Lake Erie Committee members.  They are also aware that walleye, being natural 
stocks that fluctuate, must be protected at times and conserved for the future.  In this case, self-
interest is also framed in terms of resource conservation (at least long enough to allow the fish to 
reproduce).  The process to determine the TAC, thus, begins with science and an understanding of 
what needs to be done to protect and sustain the fishery.  The Lake Erie Committee has a Walleye 
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Task Group—like a technical committee, made up of biologists and experts at the field level—
which is responsible for collecting data annually on the status of walleye stocks in Lake Erie, 
using data and modeling to estimate the size of the walleye stock, developing a risk assessment 
analysis tool, and producing a recommended annual harvest level for the Lake Erie Committee’s 
consideration (Lake Erie Committee 2004c; Lake Erie Walleye Task Group 2006).  The Lake 
Erie Committee members expect the Walleye Task Group members to remain objective and to do 
their work free from constituent pressures and social considerations.32  Say the Terms of 
Reference, “the Walleye Task Group maintains objectivity through emphasis on a scientific 
approach . . . [and] is dedicated to employing the best science in order to support international 
management of walleye on Lake Erie” (Lake Erie Committee 2004c).  The Walleye Task Group 
is expected to develop as pure an understanding of the resource as possible so that the lake 
committee can later factor in the social considerations.  All jurisdictions on Lake Erie (including 
New York and Pennsylvania, which are not part of the TAC) have members on the Walleye Task 
Group.   
With information from the Walleye Task Group in hand, the Lake Erie Committee 
members bargain over an annual TAC.  This bargaining process is necessary for three primary 
reasons.  First, bargaining is necessary simply because the jurisdictions share (and, thus, compete 
over) the walleye stocks.  Thus, without a TAC, exploitation would be chaotic and potentially 
ruinous.  Said a Lake Erie Committee member, without the process, “it would be much more of a 
free for all, with everybody trying to get everything they could so that somebody else didn’t get 
                                                 
 
32 Lake Erie Committee members stressed that they try hard to keep the political and social issues away 
from the Walleye Task Group.   “I have told them we want to keep the [technical committees] pure in the 
scientific arena,” said a state lake committee member, “and that it is not for you [the Walleye Task Group 
member] to get into management issues.”  Despite these good intentions, however, the lake committee and 
the technical committee members do not always believe the technical committees operate free from outside 
pressures.  Said a technical committee member, with a bit of sarcasm, “we try to stay out of [politics, but] 
it’s a sanctimonious attitude to try to keep the technical committee pure—a bunch of virgins running out 
there.”  “We all bring certain biases to whatever issue,” said an Ontario lake committee member, and a state 
colleague added that if anybody looks you in the eye and says “I just do science . . . [he] is lying or [he] 
lives in a cocoon somewhere.” 
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it.”  Second, members believe the process is needed to create a sense of fairness.  “Perceptions are 
important,” said a Great Lakes Fishery Commission official, and a state member added (perhaps 
with a bit of optimism), “our recreational anglers are willing to accept anything we come up with 
so long as it relates to what everyone else is doing and that it contributes to the well-being of the 
lake.”  Third, and related to fairness, Lake Erie managers use the process to bolster their decisions 
and to make them more defensible with politicians and constituents.  Said one member,  
That is one of my challenges: . . . appeas[ing] the politicians . . . . [I need to tell them] we 
have this shared resource and that is why it is important that we are dealing back and 
forth.  And yes, sometimes the quotas may not [be as the politicians wish] but it is still 
better than working on our own.  And that is what I sell to them. 
 
Said another member, “the Lake Erie Committee gives me the high ground when I talk with my 
constituents.” 
The Lake Erie Committee, like the other lake committees, relies on strong relationships 
to build trust, and on consensus as the foundation for its management decisions.  Relationships in 
Lake Erie are important because members need to trust one another and believe that negotiations 
Figure 5-3:  Steve Gray, Director of Fish and Wildlife, State of Ohio (right) and charter captain Jerry 
Abele, Headhunter Charters, fishing walleye during the Governor's Fish Ohio Day 2006.   (Photo 
courtesy L. Fletcher, Ottawa County Visitor's Bureau.) 
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are done in good faith.  Participants must care about future interactions for the process to work.  
Consensus is critical because members are aware that each jurisdiction is independent and has the 
potential to harvest in ways that would deny benefits to the other jurisdictions.  Thus, the 
jurisdictions need to come to an understanding amongst themselves.  Consensus occurs after all 
viewpoints are heard, when a shared understanding emerges, and when members reach a point 
when they all accept—or at least can live with—the decision (GLFC 1997a).  Consensus does not 
mean complete unanimity but it does mean that all members accept the decision to the degree that 
they will support and adhere to it.  As outlined in chapter 4, a consensus-based process, based on 
strong relationships, helps develop policies that are perceived as fair, more defensible, and more 
likely to be implemented in the absence of a compelling authority because they reflect the true 
attitudes of the members.  Breaking consensus undermines trust with colleagues and jeopardizes 
the relationships that are critical to the Joint Strategic Plan process.  Moreover, because the 
members collect, share, and interpret the data together, and because they develop management 
plans, breaking consensus breaks one’s word to one’s colleagues and is contrary to one’s own 
data and opinions.   
Members use the Lake Erie Committee to come to consensus on data needs and 
interpretation, management plans and objectives, and the TAC.  Strategies like the Coordinated 
Percid Management Strategy (Lake Erie committee 2003a), the Walleye Management Plan 
(Locke et al. 2005), and Lake Erie Fish Community Objectives (Ryan et al. 2003) reflect the 
group’s consensus and communicate the agencies’ management objectives.   As chapter 2 has 
stressed, development of plans is a key feature of collective action because the process allows for 
positive interactions and the product reflects the consensus of the participants.  Despite personal 
relationships among members, despite a regular process for interactions, and despite written 




LAKE ERIE WALLEYE EXPLOITATION, 1920s TO THE PRESENT 
  
 
 While walleye has always been a high-value commercial species on Lake Erie, it has not 
always been near the top of the list in terms of fish production.  Of the top ten commercial species 
in Lake Erie, walleye, until around the 1940s, ranked ninth in landings, just ahead of channel 
catfish (Baldwin et al. 1979; Nepszy 1999).  As important commercial species such as lake trout, 
ciscoes, and blue pike collapsed after the 1920s (due to overfishing, habitat loss, and degraded 
water quality) harvest shifted to other species like walleye, yellow perch, and smelt.  From the 
1940s to around 1960, walleye was extremely abundant and the mainstay of the Lake Erie 
commercial fishery (Parsons 1970), with harvest peaking in 1956 at 6975 tons.  After 1960, 
however, the fishery crashed, falling to 267 tons in 1962 and bottoming out in 1969 at only 161 
tons (Baldwin et al. 1979; Hatch et al. 1987).  Scientists blame this fast and severe decline 
primarily on overexploitation, in addition to competition with invasive species, habitat loss, and 
pollution (Hatch et al. 1987; Knight 1997; Koonce et al. 1996; Regier et al. 1969; Schneider and 
Leach 1977). 
 Until the early 1950s, American commercial fishers harvested approximately eighty 
percent of the walleye in Lake Erie (Parsons 1970).  Between the 1940s and the mid-1950s, 
Canadians made significant investments in commercial fishing equipment, boats, and fish-
processing infrastructure, leading to an increase of about eight-fold in its walleye harvest while 
the American exploitation rate stayed about the same.  Thus, by the mid-1950s, Canada was 
harvesting approximately thirty percent more walleye than the Americans (Parsons 1970).   This 
level of exploitation from both countries contributed to the walleye collapse of the late 1960s 
(Schneider and Leach 1977).  During this period, neither the Canadian nor the U.S. jurisdictions 
imposed harvest quotas on commercial walleye fishing.   
In 1970, just when people thought things could not be any worse for walleye, the Ontario 
Water Resources Commission discovered dangerously high levels of mercury in walleye flesh, 
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prompting the American and Canadian governments to close the commercial fishery entirely and 
prompting Michigan and Ontario to prohibit sport anglers from possessing walleye (Hatch et al. 
1987; Knight 1997).   In 1972, as mercury declined, Ontario, given its major investments in 
commercial fishing, re-opened its commercial walleye fisheries.  Also during this period, sport 
fishing for walleye began to grow in popularity and all jurisdictions re-opened their sport 
fisheries.  With larger sport fishing populations in the states compared to Ontario, sport fishing 
interests grew and successfully shifted state management focus away from commercial fishing 
(Hushak et al. 1986; Hushak et al. 1988).  Because of the new emphasis on sport fishing, Ohio 
and Michigan opted not to re-open their commercial walleye fisheries after the mercury crisis.33  
All state jurisdictions on Lake Erie instead focused on supporting a burgeoning (and 
economically important) sport fishery; walleye were officially declared a game fish in Ohio in 
1984 (Hushak et al. 1986). 
 Walleye management changed markedly after the dual crises of collapse and mercury 
contamination, particularly as water quality improvements and eased exploitation pressures 
(because of closed fisheries) gave managers a chance to rehabilitate the stocks.  In 1973, after a 
multijurisdictional walleye meeting, the provincial and state agencies created the Scientific 
Protocol Committee “to evaluate walleye population dynamics and develop forecasts of 
abundance” (Hatch et al. 1987, p. 16).  This committee—which became the Lake Erie 
Committee’s Standing Technical Committee and which evolved into the present-day Walleye 
Task Group—was responsible for developing a new TAC regime.  This TAC regime began in 
1975 and Michigan, Ohio, and Ontario agreed on quotas based on each jurisdictions’ surface area 
(Hatch et al. 1987; Knight 1997).  Then, as today, each of the three jurisdictions in the TAC area 
remains responsible for implementing the TAC and retains the right to allocate the harvest 
between sport and commercial fishing as it sees fit.  Since the TACs began in 1975, given the 
                                                 
 
33  Though other species are still fished commercially in those states. 
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major investments in commercial fishing and the low sport fishing population, Ontario has 
allocated most of its harvest to commercial fishing.  Michigan and Ohio, given the large sport 
fishing interests, have allocated all of their share to sport fishing.  Today, New York’s and 
Pennsylvania’s walleye fisheries are also exclusively recreational.34 
 The management changes of the 1970s not only set the stage for the current management 
regime but also contributed to a dramatic walleye recovery.  Quotas did much to limit walleye 
mortality (Koonce et al. 1996) and improved water quality and habitat contributed to walleye 
survival (Knight 1997).  The walleye fishery also benefited from strong year-class recruitment35 
in the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s such that by the late-1980s, walleye abundance was 
estimated to be around 80 million fish, many orders of magnitude higher than the early 1970s 
(Lake Erie Walleye Task Group 2006).  The recovery of the 1970s and the booming walleye 
fishery in the 1980s precipitated major investments in Canadian commercial fishing and 
prompted a surge in American sport fishing.  Sport fishing increased from approximately 100,000 
fish36 harvested in 1974 to more than 3 million by 1982 (Hushak et al. 1986).  To take advantage 
of the prosperous sport fishery, a charter fishing industry expanded rapidly on Lake Erie, peaking 
at more than 1,200 licensed charter captains in 1990 in Ohio alone (Lichtkoppler and Hushak 
2001). 
After the mid-1980s, however, walleye again experienced a serious decline such that by 
1996, walleye abundances were at less than 20 million fish, near the low numbers of the 1970s.  
Biologists on the Walleye Task Group attributed this sharp drop to recruitment failures for several 
years in the 1990s due to fewer fish being available to reproduce.  Major changes in the Lake Erie 
ecosystem also occurred at this time, most notably the disruption in the food web caused by 
                                                 
 
34 With the exception of a single commercial fisher in Pennsylvania who harvests an extremely small 
number of walleye, approximately 200 fish, for local sale 
35 The annual hatch of new fish. 
36 After the quota management system began in the 1970s, managers moved from establishing walleye 
harvest in weight to setting TACs by number of fish 
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invasive species (Lake Erie committee 2003a), which also likely contributed to this ebb in 
walleye abundance.  The interest in sport fishing waned accordingly such that the number of 
charter fishing operators fell by nearly forty percent (Kuehn et al. 2005; Lichtkoppler and Hushak 
2001). 
 The decline in walleye abundance became increasingly disconcerting to Lake Erie 
Committee members by the late 1990s, particularly because the fishery had become so important 
economically and socially to Canadians and Americans.  Commercial fishers had invested 
millions of dollars in boats, staff, and processing equipment, and sport anglers had devoted 
considerable resources to establishing charter fishing businesses.  (Even with the reduced number 
of charter fishers, recreational angling was still strong.)  The provincial and state governments 
also benefited from royalties and license sales.  Constituent groups in both countries became 
better organized and more powerful politically, particularly as they took a more active interest in 
the Lake Erie Committee’s TAC-setting process.  In Canada, the Ontario Commercial Fisheries’ 
Association grew in stature during the 1980s and 1990s as it hired professional staff and lobbied 
government.  In the U.S., fishing clubs and organizations—most notably the Lake Erie 
Charterboat Association—closely followed state management activities and have been vocal with 
Lake Erie managers and politicians.   
The sharp slide in the walleye fishery in the 1990s made everyone uneasy and prompted 
managers to think more strategically about their management actions.  As such, the Lake Erie 
Committee announced in March, 2000, that it would produce with the help of the Walleye Task 
Group, a three-year Coordinated Percid Management Strategy to guide walleye (and yellow 
perch) rehabilitation in Lake Erie.37  The goal was to set appropriate TACs that would stabilize 
the fishery’s age structure (i.e., avoid an over-reliance on one or a few year classes), prevent wild 
                                                 
 
37 Elements of the Coordinated Percid Management Strategy were developed in 2000 and served to guide 
the Lake Erie Committee’s decisions.  However, the actual management strategy document was not 
published until 2003, a fact that was not lost on the constituent groups (particularly the Ontario commercial 
fishers) who wished to see the strategy that was guiding Lake Erie Committee decisions. 
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fluctuations in walleye numbers, and restore the fishery.  Management decisions, including 
TACs, would be weighed against the Coordinated Percid Management Strategy.  The strategy 
said that TAC decisions would be made to prevent the lakewide abundance of two-year-old and 
older walleye from falling below nineteen million fish, a threshold designed to protect the 
younger fish from harvest to improve the chances they would grow old enough to reproduce 
(Lake Erie Committee 2000; Lake Erie committee 2003a; Lake Erie Walleye Task Group 2006).  
The Coordinated Percid Management Strategy ended in 2003 and was replaced in 2005 with the 
Walleye Management Plan, a plan also developed by the Lake Erie Committee with the help of 
the Walleye Task Group.  The management plan stayed the course set by the management 
strategy by maintaining the nineteen-million-fish-threshold, though it also significantly refined 
the criteria for setting TACs.  The management plan is based on the broad Lake Erie Fish 
Community Objectives published in 2003 (Ryan et al. 2003.  See also Appendix D).  Thus, like 
other lake committees, the Lake Erie Committee relies on plans and objectives to guide its 
management decisions. 
 
THE 2004 TAC DISPUTE AND WHY LAKE ERIE COMMITTEE MEMBERS BELIEVE 
IT OCCURRED 
  
The Lake Erie Committee’s process to establish TACs usually leads to consensus and the 
individual agencies usually implement what they agree to.   Normally, the Joint Strategic Plan 
helps the members develop a TAC because the Lake Erie Committee process is well-established.  
Members have ample opportunities to develop relationships, trust exists, the committee provides 
the Walleye Task Group with the resources to do its job, members rely on consensus-based plans 
and objectives to guide their decisions, and members realize the alternative to reaching a decision 
is chaos.  In 2003, however, the process to establish the 2004 walleye TAC broke down to the 
degree that the Lake Erie Committee declared itself at an impasse and requested the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission facilitate third-party mediation, as permitted under the Joint Strategic Plan.  
This chapter does not attempt to determine who was right and who was wrong in the dispute nor 
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does it evaluate the appropriateness of the final resolution.  Instead, this chapter presents how 
those who participated in the Lake Erie Committee process during the time of the dispute 
perceived the situation and how they expected the Joint Strategic Plan to help them resolve it.  
Because Ontario acknowledged it broke consensus (and, thus, precipitated the events of 2003 and 
2004), this chapter outlines Ontario’s arguments and discusses how the states reacted to them. 
 
What led to the dispute? 
 
 Poor walleye recruitment during the 1990s and early 2000s resulted in a severely reduced 
fishery.  Provisions of the Coordinated Percid Management Strategy thus called for conservative 
TACs to rebuild the stressed walleye stocks.  In 1998, the TAC was at a near-high level of just 
over 10 million fish, even though walleye abundances were estimated to be near a 20-year low of 
20 million fish (figures 5-4 and 5-5) (Lake Erie Walleye Task Group 2006).  This situation 
prompted the Lake Erie Committee to reduce the 1999 TAC to 9 million fish and to further 
reduce it to 7.7 million fish in 2000.  Leading up to (and during) the late 1990s, weak or below-
average walleye hatches suggested that walleye abundances approaching the mid-1980s high of 
70 million fish in the lake would be very unlikely in ensuing years.  In fact, in July, 2000, the 
committee announced it was taking action to “halt any further decline” in walleye abundances 
which would, starting with the 2001 fishing season, entail “substantial changes to the walleye 
harvest strategy by  . . . setting more conservative Total Allowable Catch (TAC)” (Lake Erie 
Committee 2000).  In 2001, the committee slashed the TAC to 3.4 million fish (a fifty-nine 
percent cut from the previous year) and agreed to “not go higher than 3.4 million fish [per year] 
over the next three years . . .” (Lake Erie Committee 2001).  Said the committee, the TAC could 


































































































Total Allowable Catch (TAC) Acutal Harvest in TAC Area
Figure 5-4:  Lake Erie estimated walleye abundance, walleye abundance threshold, 
TAC, and actual harvest in TAC area (Michigan, Ontario, and Ohio), 1978-2006.   All 
data in millions of fish.  Figure:  M. Gaden.  Data Source:  Lake Erie Walleye Task 
Group, 2006. 
Figure 5-5:  Lake Erie walleye TAC and actual harvest in TAC area (Michigan, Ontario, 
and Ohio), 1978-2006.  Same data as figure 5-1, but different scale.  All data in millions 
of fish.  Figure:  M. Gaden.  Data Source:  Lake Erie Walleye Task Group, 2006. 
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 Poor it remained and the Walleye Task Group, in March, 2003, recommended that the 
Lake Erie Committee reduce the 2004 TAC “below the 3.4 million ceiling agreed upon by the 
[committee] as part of the [Coordinated Percid Management Strategy].”  In fact, the Walleye  
Task Group, using the nineteen-million two-year-old-plus fish threshold as a benchmark, noted 
scenarios where the 2004 TAC would have to be cut to as few as 0.8 million fish (a sixty-seven 
percent cut from the 2001-2003 TAC), just to ensure “the minimum [population] level required to 
prevent further declines” (Lake Erie Walleye Task Group 2003, p. 135).  As such, the Walleye 
Task Group encouraged the committee “to advise stakeholders that the [Recommended 
Allowable Harvest] for 2004 will be considerably below 3.4 million fish” (Lake Erie Committee 
2003b, p. 135).  The Lake Erie Committee took this advice and, noting no improvement in 
walleye hatches or abundances, announced in April, 2003 that the 2004 TAC would be cut by  
forty to sixty percent from the 2001-2003 annual TAC (Lake Erie Committee 2003b).  Some 
committee members, in fact, would liked to have reduced the TAC starting in 2003 but instead 
agreed to stay the course of the Coordinated Percid Management Strategy.  One reason they did 
not change the 2003 TAC was because the states needed a year-long lead-time to change their 
sport regulations (e.g., bag limits, seasons, size limits).  Thus, it would have been unfair to ask 
Ontario to cut its commercial TAC—as it could have done immediately—without a 
commensurate change in American regulations.  As it stood, the members were comfortable with 
delaying the TAC reduction until 2004 because all members consented to reducing the 2004 TAC 
by forty to sixty percent, a level they believed would protect the fishery.  With this reduction, the 
TAC would fall from 3.4 million fish in 2003 to as few as 1.4 million fish in 2004.  During a 
meeting of March 25, 2003—the day before the committee would announce the 2004 TAC-cut 
publicly—the committee engaged in a lively discussion, in camera, to ensure everyone was clear 
about their decision and to draft the public announcement line-by-line.  The committee members 
were well aware of the momentousness of the decision.  Members who were interviewed for this 
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research reported they walked out of that meeting believing they had reached consensus on the 
forty to sixty percent reduction for 2004.   
Noting the year-long lead time the state agencies needed to change fishing regulations, 
the group agreed to meet in June, 2003, to discuss the steps their individual agencies would take 
to implement the 2004 reduction.  Ontario, having the ability to issue regulations just prior to a 
commercial fishing season as a “condition of license,” did not require the same lead time as the 
states.  However, such lead time was seen as beneficial, as it would give Ontario the chance to 
advise its industry to prepare for the substantial cut.  During the period between the March, 2003 
TAC announcement and the June meeting, the members went back to their jurisdictions and 
began taking the steps necessary to implement the agreed-to TAC reduction for 2004—the 
members met with stakeholders, discussed the consensus opinion, and argued the case.  By the 
time the June meeting occurred, the state members, believing the committee’s consensus opinion, 
had begun to change their fishing regulations (action from which it was difficult to retreat) to 
implement the TAC reduction.  All jurisdictions reported receiving pointed comments from their 
stakeholders. 
 During the June, 2003 meeting, however, Ontario informed the states of its intention to 
reduce its commercial TAC by only twenty percent (half the reduction Ontario agreed to in 
March) and to institute a commercial fishing closure from January to 15 May to protect spawning 
stocks.  Ontario argued that upon reflection and based on its information, such actions would be 
more beneficial to the walleye stocks than a forty to sixty percent TAC reduction.  Ontario 
believed its proposal to reduce commercial harvest by twenty percent and to close the season 
from January to May 15 would be sufficient to protect the fishery, and in a June, 2003 letter to the 
Lake Erie Committee chair, Ontario noted “We believe that walleye population growth is being 
limited primarily by poor recruitment and not only by exploitation and that deep cuts to the 
already small harvest will not be relevant.”  Thus, Ontario, by June, was arguing that the 
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recommended actions—to cut the TAC in order to strengthen the fishery—was unnecessarily 
risk-averse would in fact do little to improve recruitment. 
Ontario also argued that new scientific information warranted a new look at the March, 
2003 consensus decision.  Preliminary reports from the Walleye Task Group (not available in 
March, 2003) indicated that the 2003 walleye hatch would be very large, suggesting that good 
times were ahead for Lake Erie.  Ontario interpreted those data to mean that a forty to sixty 
percent TAC reduction would be too conservative.  (The 2003 hatch was indeed, as one member 
put it, “off the scale;” by far the largest hatch in decades.)  Ontario thus believed that the 
committee’s March decision was premature; the committee had decided to reduce the 2004 TAC 
substantially in the absence of relevant information.  Ontario, during discussions in February, 
2004, stated that the Walleye Task Group science that underpinned the March, 2003 consensus, 
was difficult to justify and “arbitrary.”  Therefore, it was perfectly reasonable to revisit the 
decision.   
Moreover, Ontario argued, the states, in its estimation, were not adhering to the TAC 
decision anyway.  In a September, 2003 letter to the committee chair, Ontario stated that “if all 
[state] proposals [for how they will adhere to the 2004 TAC decision] are taken at face value, no 
jurisdiction is currently achieving a 40% harvest reduction.”  Ontario believed that Michigan’s 
regulation changes would amount to a twenty-seven percent reduction in harvest and Ohio’s 
changes in only a five percent reduction in harvest.  Ontario pointed out that its twenty percent 
reduction was similar to what the states were proposing and that no jurisdiction was taking action 
to achieve a forty to sixty percent reduction. 
The state lake committee members were stunned that Ontario would break the consensus 
in June after the TAC decision was crafted so carefully, after it was announced publicly in March, 
and after the states had taken steps to implement the decision.  The states vehemently disagreed 
with Ontario’s arguments.  Said one lake committee member in an email, 
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It was clear [after the June, 2003 meeting] that the [Ontario] viewpoint on how to best 
rehabilitate walleye stocks and associated fisheries in Lake Erie is not in concert with a 
TAC of 1.4 to 2.0 million fish [the forty to sixty percent cut]. 
 
Said another state member in an email:   
I was caught off-guard at our [June, 2003] meeting by the proposal put forth by [Ontario] 
to modify Ontario’s walleye harvest strategy in 2004. . . . [W]e had a consensus 
agreement in March 2003 to lower the walleye TAC by 40 to 60%. 
 
 
Ohio and Michigan also took strong exception to Ontario’s claim that those states’ 
harvest reductions fell short of the agreed-to TAC cut.  Ohio pointed out that it had, for years, 
harvested far below its TAC—in 2003, for instance, Ohio harvested a little over 1 million 
walleye, or just sixty percent of its 1.75 million allotment (Lake Erie Fisheries Units 2004; Lake 
Erie Walleye Task Group 2004).  Ohio thus argued it could in fact absorb a forty percent TAC 
reduction with absolutely no changes in regulations and that Ontario’s criticisms about its five 
percent reduction were groundless.  Ohio added that although it did not need to install changes to 
adhere to the committee’s 2004 TAC decision, it planned to reduce its catch limits and increase 
the minimum size for walleye to take some conservation steps and to show it stood in solidarity 
with the other members.  Michigan also rejected Ontario’s claim, pointing out it had a TAC of 
0.18 million fish while harvesting 0.13 million fish (Lake Erie Walleye Task Group 2004) or 
seventy-two percent of its TAC.  Michigan increased the size limit for walleye, reduced the daily 
catch limit, and closed the fishery in April.  These measures, they argued, plus the fact that it did 
not harvest all of its TAC, would amount to a forty percent reduction in harvest. 
The Americans also believed Ontario’s proposal to reduce harvest by twenty percent 
would be too little to reach their shared objectives.  They reminded Ontario that it had a TAC of 
1.47 million fish and actually harvested 1.46 million (Lake Erie Walleye Task Group 2004), or 
approximately ninety-nine percent of its TAC in 2003.  Thus, in order to achieve the desired 
harvest reductions, Ontario would have to reduce its TAC by at least a full forty percent.  Ontario 
did question the validity of the sport-harvest statistics, observing that while commercial harvest is 
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calculated precisely (there are port observers and other measures to ensure the accuracy of 
commercial catch), far more uncertainty exists about sport harvest, as sport harvest data relies 
almost entirely on the assumption that sport anglers will stay within their bag limits.  Thus, 
Ontario argued, its proposal for a twenty percent cut was reasonable because when Ontario 
reduces its TAC, the harvest falls by that same amount, as Ontario can control its commercial 
harvest very precisely.  The states could not be so accurate, prompting Ontario to question the 
states’ plans. 
What particularly irritated the Americans, however, was Ontario’s use of science.  
“[Ontario] came back to us and tried to argue that [they] had a change of heart because of the 
data,” said an American committee member.  Americans indeed believed vehemently that it was 
inappropriate for Ontario to announce it was abandoning a decision because it thought it had 
better science, particularly because the committee members—from both sides of the border—
developed and interpreted the science together prior to the consensus.  American members—
members of an epistemic community of scientists and managers—were insulted that Ontario 
would try to re-interpret the data in a way that they felt was political.  Said one state manager, 
Let me tell you what caused the most grief to me over this whole thing:  to have [Ontario] 
sit there . . . and mouth technical considerations as being why they did what they did.  I 
mean, just tell us you can’t do it.  But don’t come back and say ‘your science is no good,’ 
‘we’ve got better science,’ that ‘the assessments were incorrectly done.’  Because number 
one, [Ontario does not] know that.  And it’s not true.  And that bothered me . . . . How do 
you build consensus if folks are blowing that kind of stuff at you? 
 
Americans believed Ontario was under intense pressure from commercial fishing 
interests and was unable to stomach the criticisms they received from the organized commercial 
fishing industry after the TAC was announced.38  Said one American during the interviews for 
this research, reflecting a universal view among American managers, “the only reason I can come 
                                                 
 
38 The Ontario Commercial Fisheries’ Association did make it clear that they believed the 2004 TAC was 
too conservative and that if Ontario agreed to it, the association would formally challenge it before the 




up with [for them breaking consensus] is that their stakeholder group made it very well known 
that they wouldn’t stand for it.”  The state managers believed Ontario was thus using the strong 
2003 year class as a convenient excuse to go back on its commitment.  While some in the U.S. 
acknowledged that the 2003 year class “softened the level of crisis,” they also pointed out that 
one strong year class after a long string of barely average (many below average) year classes did 
not constitute a recovery.  They argued that the fundamental science behind the Coordinated 
Percid Management Strategy and the committee’s decisions was still consistent with their shared 
goals for Lake Erie.  Noted one American,   
The truth was, when you sat down and looked at the numbers—think about the [walleye] 
population dynamics—what we have is an opportunity to protect a strong year class [the 
2003 hatch] and then allow that year class to grow and eventually contribute to other year 
classes . . . And so the argument that they [Ontario] were making—[that] we should use 
the other information—I would argue we did.  We looked at the new information and said 
‘we’re right on the mark.  We should be protecting the 2003 year class.’ 
 
 
Beyond rejecting Ontario’s claim that the new data necessitated a new decision, 
Americans were quite disturbed about the manner in which Ontario broke consensus and its 
perceived lack of respect for the other jurisdictions.  The Americans were caught off-guard by 
Ontario’s announcement, which violated the norms of a process that places a high value on trust, 
openness, and personal relationships.  The accepted approach to scientific uncertainty is to work 
together, through appropriate technical committees, to reach consensus on the science.  Said one 
American member, in an email after the June meeting,  
While I have the utmost regard for the scientific competence of Ontario fishery scientists, 
this perspective [Ontario’s new interpretation of the science] must be reviewed via the 
extant interagency framework (i.e., the [Standing Technical Committee] and Walleye 
Task Group) before being considered as an alternative to the LEC decision to reduce the 
TAC by 40%-60%. 
 
Added another, 
While I have tried to understand the rationale proposed by [Ontario] . . . [t]his newly 
proposed approach . . . is clearly a shift from the consensus-based decision making 
process we have all enjoyed in the past interjurisdictional and international management 




Americans believed they had an effective process—the Walleye Task Group—to understand the 
science and that Ontario’s unilateral interpretation of science sidestepped the committee’s 
procedures. 
Overall, the American reaction to Ontario’s claims was negative because they saw 
Ontario as operating outside of the norms of the Lake Erie Committee.  The Joint Strategic Plan 
process is designed to facilitate joint scientific discovery so that all members can be confident in 
the information they have and can use that information to affect shared decisions.  The Walleye 
Task Group comprises Canadians and Americans and the group functions as an epistemic 
community, with members generally sharing an understanding of appropriate scientific protocols.  
The Lake Erie Committee also functions as an epistemic community, agreeing to base its 
decisions on the best science available and the group’s consensus.  The fact that the participants 
together reached consensus on the science helped the members spot when their decisions were 
being ignored for inappropriate reasons.  By abandoning a consensus decision because of its 
singular interpretation of the science, American members believed Ontario tried to argue its case 
on interpretations that were not accepted by the scientific or management communities.  When 
one or more jurisdictions depart from the community’s norms, the Joint Strategic Plan members 
know it readily, and the epistemic community served as a check against politicized science. 
More consistent with the norms of the Joint Strategic Plan process would have been for 
Ontario to frame its arguments in terms that everyone could appreciate—implementation 
challenges.  As chapter 4 has argued, implementation of lake committee decisions is always a 
challenge, and internal forces have the potential to work against shared decisions.  Indeed, 
members know that jurisdictional independence is the reality in Great Lakes fishery management, 
and it would have been better, Americans argued, if Ontario had confessed it was skewered by its 
stakeholders and could not implement the commitment.  Instead, Ontario, in their view, attacked 
the very science it helped to generate and support.  Said one manager:  “If there is better science . 
. . get it to the table.  Don’t come to me after the fact and say ‘my scientists said this.’  Wait a 
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minute:  who stuffed a sock in their mouth during the process?”  Said a long-time American 
observer, “Once you have made a commitment, you can always come back into the arena and say 
‘guys, you have got to help me.  I am getting killed.  I shouldn’t have agreed to this,’ and say 
‘how can we work on this together?’ as opposed to coming back and saying the ‘science isn’t 
good enough.’”  Said another observer, if Ontario had just come to us and said “‘We’re sorry, we 
screwed up.  We talked a good show in March 2003 but I can’t deliver.  I just need your help to 
get through this one.’  But [Ontario] didn’t say that.”  
Ontario, for its part, was not convinced the Americans would have been helpful 
regardless of what they argued.  Ontario believed the American Lake Erie Committee members 
were closed-minded, inflexible, and altogether unwilling to make a change in policy, even in light 
of the new information about the spectacular 2003 hatch.  Said an Ontarian: 
If I make a decision and I get new information, then I am prepared at any time to revise 
that decision to reflect that new information, because I think you get a more informed 
outcome as you get more information.  And the LEC [Lake Erie Committee] folks were 
not interested in looking at anything other than what the consensus decision was in 
2003.”   
 
Ontario added:   
Every time [Ontario] tried to bring up the fact that [there was new data] and say ‘well, 
let’s have a look at what you are doing,’ [the answer was] ‘no.’  It certainly was a fair 
assessment that the four U.S. jurisdictions were more concerned with keeping the 
consensus agreement than looking at new information and revising what [Ontario] termed 
a poor decision. 
 
 Ontario, in other words, felt the American inflexibility was not only unwarranted given the new 
information, but was significantly undermining sound management and Ontario’s relationship 
with its key stakeholders.  Ontario saw the Americans as unwilling to take steps to help Ontario 
ensure defensible policies and implementation.  If the Joint Strategic Plan indeed relied so heavily 
on relationships and goodwill among the members, Ontario wondered, why were the Americans 
so uninterested in their future relationship with Ontario officials?  If the process was designed to 
allow members to be flexible and to base policies on the best science available, why were the 
Americans adhering so strongly to decisions based on what Ontario saw as outdated information?  
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If the plan was designed to heighten the chances the policies would be implemented in the 
absence of a binding agreement, why were the Americans so unwilling to help Ontario deal with 
the major implementation challenges?  From Ontario’s perspective, the Lake Erie Committee 
process was not serving its needs nor was it helping to build defensible policies.  
As Ontario observed, the Americans were, in fact, uninterested in revisiting the decision, 
partially because they did not believe the “new” science was truly new.  They did not believe the 
2003 hatch information was compelling enough for the committee to detract from their long-term 
goal of rebuilding and protecting the fishery, particularly because there was no indication that the 
2003 hatch, while strong, would be more than a one-time event.  Mostly, however, the Americans 
saw it as imperative, for the sake of the committee’s credibility, to stick with their consensus 
decision and maintain the process.  They felt that Ontario was not interested in long-term 
relationship-building, rather, was ready to disregard hard-won consensus for short-term political 
reasons.  “It’s not a question of recognizing what consensus is,” said an American observer, 
“[Ontario] didn’t recognize they were in a consensus-building process.”   
The Lake Erie Committee held another meeting in August, 2003, to try and reach 
consensus on a new TAC.  In light of the strong 2003 hatch, and to help foster an agreement, the 
Americans proposed changing the TAC reduction from forty percent to thirty percent.  While 
they had not changed their minds that significant cuts in the TAC needed to occur to protect the 
fishery (recall, the Walleye Task Group did recommend major reductions), the Americans 
reported during interviews that they wanted to avoid mediation, primarily because they worried a 
mediator would be willing to compromise too much and that mediation would suggest it was 
appropriate to substitute a third party’s opinion for real decision-making.  Moreover, reliance on 
mediation, some feared, could unravel the preferred, consensus-based process to develop TACs 
and allow a third party to usurp their independence.  Ontario, confident in its twenty-percent-cut 
proposal, felt a thirty percent reduction was still too risk-averse and rejected the Americans’ 
counter-offer.  On September 24, 2003, Lake Erie Committee chair Rickalon Hoopes of 
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Pennsylvania wrote to Great Lakes Fishery Commission executive secretary Chris Goddard 
declaring an impasse over the 2004 TACs and formally requesting that the Joint Strategic Plan’s 
conflict resolution procedures be invoked. 
 
How Lake Erie Committee members expected the Joint Strategic Plan to handle the dispute 
 
The Joint Strategic Plan acknowledges that the normal lake committee process might not 
be able to settle all issues.  The Great Lakes Fishery Commission is expected to lead the dispute-
mediation process.  The plan gives the commission four options:   
If consensus cannot be achieved, a party may (a) request the [Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission] to arrange/facilitate an information exchange forum, (b) seek advice of 
existing plan committees, (c) ask the commission to arrange third-party mediation with 
any resolution being endorsed through the normal plan procedures, and/or (d) ask the 
commission to arrange a process involving a mutually acceptable third-party intermediary 
to make a non-binding recommendation (GLFC 1997a). 
 
Only one time prior to 2003 did lake committee members invoke the plan’s dispute resolution 
provisions.  In 1992, Ohio and Ontario could not agree over whether yellow perch quotas should 
be based on each jurisdiction’s geographical waters or on historical harvest levels (Mehan 1996).  
The Joint Strategic Plan, at the time, called upon the Great Lakes Fishery Commission to “hold a 
hearing and arbitrate differences, report its findings, and make recommendations for resolution to 
proper agencies” (GLFC 1981a).  When the commission began the process to arbitrate the 1992 
dispute, the Canadian federal government objected, citing among other things the fact that the 
commission had an inherent conflict of interest in that Canadian commissioners were also 
representatives of the parties to the dispute39 (Mehan 1996).  The Canadian federal government 
instead proposed that the two federal governments arbitrate disputes in a binding way, but the 
U.S. federal government, citing states’ rights, rejected the idea.  The fear of significant federal 
                                                 
 
39 One Canadian commissioner is traditionally a representative of the Ontario Ministry of Natural 




involvement in arbitrating the dispute prompted Ohio and Ontario to settle their disagreement 
without invoking the Joint Strategic Plan’s dispute resolution provisions.40 
Today’s dispute resolution provisions, developed in 1997, are different from those used 
in the 1992 dispute.  During discussions leading to the plan’s 1997 revision, participants in a 
workshop noted that the then-existing dispute mechanism was not helpful, primarily because 
(being binding) it did not respect management authorities, it did not acknowledge jurisdictional 
sovereignty, and it did not facilitate jurisdictions’ trying to solve their problems before going full-
force into arbitration (GLFC 1997b).  The present-day dispute mechanism focuses on the concept 
of “mediation” as opposed to “arbitration.”  Arbitration is akin to a ruling from a judge, who 
would decide who was right and who was wrong.  In contrast, mediation is way to help the parties 
themselves come to a decision they can accept (Mehan 1996).  In 1997, the members thought a 
process based on arbitration was inconsistent with the plan and thus changed the plan to its 
present wording—wording that focuses on helping the participants solve disputes themselves, but 
with a little help from the commission.  It was such a process the Lake Erie Committee invoked 
in its September 23, 2003 letter to the commission.  The members expected the commission to 
help them re-reach consensus.  They did not expect the commission—or any other party for that 
matter—to assign blame or to provide a ruling on what the TAC should be. 
Because the Joint Strategic Plan includes four options for mediation (information 
exchange, advice from committees, third party mediation with recommendations for lake 
committee action, and third-party mediation with a recommendation), the fishery commission had 
some discretion over how it would structure the mediation process.  Consistent with the spirit of 
the plan, the commission wanted to do as much as possible to help the Lake Erie Committee 
members reach their own settlement quickly—the 2004 fishing season was fast approaching.  As 
such, the commission held a single conflict resolution session in February, 2004.  With the 
                                                 
 
40 The literature lacks an accounting of the 1992 dispute.  Such an accounting would shed much light on 
federalism and how the non-federal jurisdictions perceive the involvement of their federal agencies. 
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consent of the Lake Erie Committee members, the commission asked Burton Ayles, a retired 
senior official from the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (and a former commission 
member), and Mike Conlin, the sitting chief of fisheries for Illinois, to lead the mediation.  
Neither of these two officials, participants believed, had a vested interest in Lake Erie walleye, 
both were aware of the 1992 dispute and the process’ shortcomings, and both were familiar 
enough with the Joint Strategic Plan to appreciate the importance of helping the disputants 
themselves reach consensus.  The commission assembled background information in a briefing 
book and Lake Erie Committee and Walleye Task Group members made presentations during the 
conflict resolution meeting. 
After participants presented their positions and (sometimes pointedly) aired their opinions 
about each others’ views, the mediators attempted to help the group gravitate toward a new 
consensus.  While Ontario and the states did move in the direction of the states’ proposal of a 
thirty percent TAC reduction, Ayles and Conlin reported:  “It is with regret that we tell you that, 
despite some progress towards a consensus, the group failed to reach a final decision.”  The 
mediators, however, believed the participants were close enough to agreement that a new 
consensus could be reached through the regular Lake Erie Committee process.  The mediators 
provided the Lake Erie Committee with a report containing recommendations and, subsequently, 
the committee met to come to a shared understanding of what the mediators were recommending 
and to try to reach a new consensus on the 2004 TAC.  Members discussed the report, weighed its 
recommendations against their understanding of the science and what they could implement, and 
settled on a 2004 TAC of 2.4 million fish, a thirty-percent reduction from 2003 (Lake Erie 
Committee 2004b).  They announced this decision publicly during the regular March Lake Erie 
Committee meeting.  While the Americans still had hoped for the forty-percent reduction (they 
had, after all, taken regulatory steps to adhere to it and believed the science justified it), the 
committee was able to accept a thirty-percent reduction based on the strong 2003 hatch and 
knowing that Ontario would have serious difficulty adhering to a larger cut. 
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Although the Lake Erie Committee did reach a new consensus on the TAC, Ontario had 
one more hurdle:  the Ontario Commercial Fisheries’ Association, believing a thirty percent cut to 
be too conservative, formally asked the Hon. David Ramsay, Ontario’s Minister of Natural 
Resources, to reject the TAC Ontario agreed to during the lake committee meeting.  This appeal 
illustrates that while the Lake Erie Committee develops a TAC and agrees to implement it, the 
managers can be overruled by other forces at home.  (Though rare, state managers could just as 
well have had their proposed regulation changes rejected by the home agency or the state 
legislatures.)  The province convened a hearing on July 7, 2004 to hear the commercial fishing 
industry’s complaint.  A retired Ontario Deputy Minister, George Tough, chaired the hearing and 
the researcher attended.  During the hearing, the commercial fishing industry argued that the Lake 
Erie Committee process was dysfunctional.  The states were too risk averse in setting the TAC 
(even the new, less-conservative TAC that emerged after the mediation) and the process allowed 
the four state jurisdictions to band together and out-maneuver Ontario.41  They also argued that 
consensus was poorly understood, that the state members were unwilling to even consider 
Ontario’s opinions about the new science, and that the process was too cloaked in secrecy to be 
credible (Tough 2004).  The industry pointed out that it did not have access to basic information 
from the Lake Erie Committee, and the fact that committee decisions were made without 
participation from key constituencies led to unreasonable, indefensible policies.   
                                                 
 
41 The researcher (Marc Gaden) attended this hearing as a participant-observer, to collect data for this 
chapter.  Gaden also attended at the request of Ontario to provide testimony on behalf of the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission about the Joint Strategic Plan process.  The hearing officer, however, denied Ontario’s 
request to have Gaden deliver his presentation because Ontario had failed to notify the Ontario Commercial 
Fisheries’ Association that it had requested the presentation.  With the consent of the association, the 
hearing officer did ask Gaden to provide an abbreviated version of his presentation, focusing on the role of 
consensus in the committee’s decision-making process.  Given the floor, Gaden used the opportunity also 
to provide his thoughts about earlier statements that the state managers on the Lake Erie Committee were 
“closed minded” to any of Ontario’s proposals.  Gaden pointed out that the state members did in fact agree 
to revisit the 2003 TAC, to review the scientific data, and to work with Ontario to improve the decision-
making process (Tough 2004).  The industry was not moved by Gaden’s comments, stating it “did not 
expect this defense of the system; the claim that the system works is a good indication of the problem” 
(Tough 2004, p. 9).  The hearing officer was not impressed either, noting in his conclusions that the state 
committee members “seemed to have been more concerned about the need to maintain consensus than the 
legitimacy of reviewing decisions based on new information” (Tough 2004, p. 26). 
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Industry’s arguments resonated with Mr. Tough.  Although Mr. Tough observed that 
Ontario’s participation in the multijurisdictional Lake Erie Committee is “essential to successful 
management of Lake Erie’s fisheries,” he also noted that the ministry needed to be “concerned 
about its stakeholders—in this case, the commercial fishing industry” (Tough 2004, p. 23).  Mr. 
Tough believed that the states were indeed inflexible and closed-minded, and, as such, Ontario 
was faulted for breaking consensus when 
nothing at the hearing explained why a new consensus, reflecting faithfully the latest 
information, could not be reached.  The implication in the Ministry’s submission seems 
to be that Ontario had, at some cost to the system and to itself, broken ranks with its sister 
agencies, and that its views would not prevail (Tough 2004, p. 24). 
 
Mr. Tough informed Minister Ramsay that, in his view, the revised 2004 TAC (a 30% reduction) 
was too conservative and that the process did not respect Ontario’s rights.   
Minister Ramsay disagreed with Mr. Tough and upheld Ontario’s and the Lake Erie 
Committee’s revised 2004 TAC decision.  In a September, 2004 letter to industry (months after 
the start of the 2004 fishing season), the minister stated he was “satisfied that the Ministry of 
Natural Resources’ (MNR) management of commercial fish licenses [had] been appropriate” 
(Ramsay 2004).  While the Minister did call for improvements in the Lake Erie Committee’s 
process (including making Walleye Task Group data and other products available to industry), he 
ultimately supported the committee’s revised consensus decision and affirmed Ontario would 
implement the new TAC.  The dispute was over. 
All participants acknowledge it was a difficult year.  Ontario recognized it broke 
consensus and relationships suffered.  The states grappled with how to accommodate Ontario’s 
requests while still preserving the process and adhering to the science.  The Walleye Task Group 
operated under intense pressures while still staying true to its scientific mission.  The Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission had to invent and carry out a legitimate dispute resolution process.  The 
commercial fishing industry was hurt economically by the reductions and fought to become 
players in what it saw as a non-transparent process.  Politicians had to make the hard decisions 
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and decide whether to support their fishery managers.  Overall, the dispute damaged trust and 
personal relationships, undermined the role of science, and prompted questions about the process’ 
legitimacy.   
Although the Lake Erie Committee was able to come to a new consensus agreement that 
the agencies ultimately supported, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission was concerned about 
damage to the working relationships; relationships that are so important to the Joint Strategic 
Plan.  In a postscript to the dispute, and perhaps sensing the need for relationship-repair, the 
commission invited the five Lake Erie Committee members to a dinner meeting in London, 
Ontario, to conduct a post-mortem on the dispute and to gauge just how damaged the process 
was.  Said one dinner guest,  
One of the biggest benefits that came out of the whole mess was after the mediation, the 
five of us sat down over dinner with [Great Lakes Fishery Commission executive 
secretary] Chris [Goddard] and we came to a new personal understanding on how we 
were going to operate to avoid those kinds of mistakes from happening again. 
 
The commission clearly believed that along with the formal conflict resolution process there 
needed to be attention to the personal relationships. 
 
THE DISPUTE’S IMPACT:  THE PARTICIPANTS’ PERSPECTIVES 
 
 The 2004 walleye dispute illustrates how the circumstances tested the Joint Strategic 
Plan’s ability to foster allocation issues.  This section relates this case study to three major 
concepts of the Joint Strategic Plan, as presented in earlier chapters:  the importance of process; 





Chapter 1 outlined in detail the Joint Strategic Plan’s history and intent, demonstrating 
that for most of the basin’s history, cooperation was not forthcoming and parochialism was 
standard practice.  The plan, in 1981, created an on-going cooperative regime and as chapter 2 
 
 218
stressed, the members use the plan as their tool to achieve collective action.  This case study 
illustrates that the Lake Erie jurisdictions, despite a serious challenge to their process, continued 
to use the plan as it was intended; they adhered to the plan’s consensus, accountability, 
information sharing, and ecosystem management structures.  Indeed, they deviated very little 
from the plan’s framework.  They met as often as was necessary to reach consensus and they 
expected the dispute resolution process to help them converge on a consensus opinion.  They 
shared information readily, they relied on data to help them reach their new consensus, they 
looked at the lake as a whole, and officials used the Walleye Task Group and several unscheduled 
meetings to share information and keep each other informed.  They respected the fact that by 
signing the plan, they remained accountable to each other.  Each jurisdiction, for instance, openly 
brought forward plans for how they intended to implement the TAC and the members used the 
process to discuss whether those plans would be sufficient.  They recognized, ultimately, that 
because walleye stocks migrate, they needed to manage the lake as an ecosystem.  At no time did 
the members simply “agree to disagree” and, thus, permit chaotic, parochial policies to result. 
 Despite their steadfast adherence to the plan, Ontario’s broken consensus did expose the 
fundamental reality that when ecological conditions are stressed (for example, when recruitment 
of a species is down considerably), managers face allocation decisions that might cause conflict 
between protecting the resource and satisfying constituent needs and expectations.  Moreover, 
when shared fisheries are highly important to stakeholders for differing reasons (such as 
commercially important to Ontario and recreationally important to the states) and when 
management actions affect stakeholders differently (such as imposing size limits, which affects 
the commercial fishing industry because they prefer smaller fish), stakeholder and political 
pressures become intense and managers are challenged to balance the competing interests.  These 
realities could result in a breakdown of an effective process like the Joint Strategic Plan when 
members see other members as ignoring science and ignoring consensus for reasons the 
community finds unacceptable.  Members become less willing to trust, respect, and work with 
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those other members, thus undermining the relationship-building and other benefits that the Joint 
Strategic Plan was designed to promote.  Indeed, when members agree to something they know 
they cannot implement, the other members become less willing to be flexible or to accommodate 
the recalcitrant members. 
Previous chapters have pointed out that the Great Lakes Fishery Commission plays a 
unique role in the Great Lakes setting, and its function in facilitating the 2004 dispute speaks to 
the commission’s larger role in the plan.  Chapter 1 argued that the U.S. and Canada were not 
able to form the commission until they created it in such a way that it would have limited ability 
to intrude upon non-federal management authority.  As a neutral body with few regulatory 
functions, the management agencies look to the commission to convene their lake committee 
meetings, to publish plans and objectives, and to do other things to ensure the process continues.  
Chapters 1, 3, and 4 pointed out that the jurisdictions are comfortable with the commission’s role 
so long as the commission does not overstep its authority and meddle in their affairs.  Moreover, 
Figure 5-6:  The Lake Erie Committee of 2004 (photo March, 2005).  L-R:  Mike Morencie, Ontario; 
Bill Culligan, New York; Kurt Newman, Michigan; Roger Knight, Ohio; Chairman Rick Hoopes, 
Pennsylvania.  (Photo:  M. Gaden.)
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the fact that the commission is there as a “neutral third party,” a “facilitator,” or a keeper of the 
process lessens the need for a binding agreement, the members say, because the commission 
remains committed to maintaining the process and mediating (not arbitrating) disputes.  The 
commission helps the agencies implement their plan.  The commission’s role (and the members’ 
opinions of it) in the dispute resolution process appears entirely consistent with sentiments 
outlined in the previous chapters.  The commission’s behavior in mediating the 2004 TAC 
dispute is similar to the commission’s behavior in implementing the Joint Strategic Plan more 
broadly—to create the forum for the participants themselves to deal with their issues. 
While conflict is expected in Great Lakes fishery management, rarely does it lead to the 
use of the Joint Strategic Plan’s dispute resolution mechanisms.  What implications, if any, do the 
Lake Erie Committee members believe the dispute had on the plan’s robustness and on the role of 
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission in facilitating the process?  Members believe the plan itself 
proved to be robust enough to help the Lake Erie Committee get past this dispute.  Indeed, the 
commission’s mediators were clear in their report that while they did not reach a new consensus 
during the mediated session itself, they believed the Lake Erie Committee process could turn their 
recommendations into a new consensus decision.  Unlike the dispute of 1992, which all agree the 
plan handled clumsily, the 2004 dispute was settled almost entirely through the plan’s ongoing 
processes.  The commission did little more than keep the jurisdictions talking and provide a safe, 
neutral place for them to bring the issues forward.  In fact, the use of the plan’s dispute 
mechanisms in and of itself did not seem to cause major concern among the members.  Said one 
participant:  “This does not demonstrate a broken system.  If we cannot agree, we ask for help, 
they give us help, and we move on.  This might not be completely healthy but this is better than 
doing nothing.”  Other members were quick to point out that the mechanism should be used 




The Interplay of Trust, Relationships, and collective action 
 
 Chapter 2 investigated how the Joint Strategic Plan is used to minimize the clash between 
parochialism and collective action in situations where conflict exists.  This case study 
demonstrates that the Joint Strategic Plan is based on relationships and helps create a durable 
framework for cooperation that leads to trust and more defensible policies.  Relationships 
strengthen the epistemic community, which in turn gently coerces behavior consistent with the 
community’s norms.  Relationships are also rewarding for the participants.  Chapter 2’s literature 
review stresses that relationships are important to creating a cooperative culture because members 
need to trust each other and need to care about future interactions.  In situations where allocation 
decisions are present—as is the case in Lake Erie—trust is critical because members need to 
know, deep down, that everyone is bargaining in good faith.  Also, successful collective action 
breeds ongoing collective action because the more participants benefit from or are coerced into 
engaging in collective action, the more likely the relationships will grow stronger and lead to 
more collective action (see figure 2-5). 
 The broken consensus over the 2004 walleye TAC affected the Lake Erie Committee in 
several ways relating to chapter 2’s conclusions about collective action and why it occurs.  In the 
minds of Lake Erie Committee members, trust was probably the dispute’s first and most 
significant casualty, and the erosion of trust affected their ability to work together and it 
jeopardized future interactions.  Said one observer, “trust is really hard to rebuild once it is 
broken down.”  Added a state member, “the bottom line was they [Ontario] didn’t do what they 
said they were going to do [and I am] forever . . . going to be wondering ‘OK, we set a TAC, are 
they going to adhere to it?’” 
In the highly charged walleye management arena, with stakeholders on both sides of the 
border interested in the committee’s decisions, managers need to know they can trust their 
colleagues.  This trust is important because members believe a process requiring collective 
bargaining—such as establishing TACs on Lake Erie walleye—needs to be seen as fair, as 
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stakeholders and politicians need to know that the agreement did not unduly harm one party over 
another.  Indeed, while stakeholders and politicians might not always agree with the decision, a 
policy developed through a fair process will make the policies more defensible.  If managers 
cannot trust their colleagues to implement what they agree to, the process will not be seen as fair 
and their defense of the policies with stakeholders and politicians will be undermined.  The 
committee believes, thus, it is absolutely imperative to speak with a single voice because 
stakeholders and politicians need to believe that all agencies agree with the decision.  Recall, for 
instance, Ontario’s sentiments that the Americans seemed more interested in preserving the 
process and the consensus decision than taking into account new science.  On this point, the 
Americans appear to agree with Ontario; they did seem very interested in preserving the 
consensus decision because they had, by June, already taken steps to justify the March decision 
with their stakeholders and their politicians.  Ontario’s break with consensus likely reduced 
Michigan and Ohio’s credibility with their stakeholders, who were expecting all members to 
adhere to their decisions. 
The relationships among members of the epistemic community was also an important 
facet of the dispute.  The Americans truly and vehemently disagreed that the science was new, 
and were quite offended by the manner in which Ontario applied and attacked the data.  As 
chapter 2 has argued, epistemic communities, communities of like-minded individuals, have the 
ability to spot their colleagues’ inconsistent or unreasonable arguments.  In the walleye case, the 
Americans believed Ontario’s argument—that the TAC could be more liberal considering the 
spectacular hatch of 2003—was unconvincing and certainly not relevant to the decision they 
needed to make for 2004.  In other words, members of the epistemic community were put off that 
Ontario would present scientific arguments they perceived were weak, with the expectation that 
the community would somehow accept the arguments.  Indeed, some American members 




The 2004 dispute also likely did much to remind the members that decisions must be 
based on science and that the Walleye Task Group, to the greatest extent possible, must be 
insulated from social pressures.  Said a Lake Erie Committee member, there must be “sound 
technical and scientific underpinnings for . . . making decisions and in this instance, we departed 
in remarkable ways from that.”  Throughout all stages of the dispute—during the initial setting of 
the TAC, during the subsequent discussions over Ontario’s counter proposals, during the 
commission’s mediation, and during the industry’s appeal—Walleye Task Group members were 
called upon continually to provide their best assessment of the state of the fishery and to explain 
how they analyzed the data.  The Joint Strategic Plan says this is the most credible approach to 
underpinning policy decisions because a science-based process—in this case, the Walleye Task 
Group—is inclusive of all jurisdictions and is consensus-based.  If the biologists agree on the 
information—particularly if they collect and interpret it together and produce joint reports, as 
they do—the lake committee members are armed with the best, most defensible information 
available upon which to base their decisions. 
The strength of the epistemic community and the way it reacted to Ontario’s arguments 
speaks to another larger issue related to the lake committee process:  the politicization of science.  
Fisheries is politically charged, with vocal constituents and politicians second-guessing 
managers’ decisions.  The fact that the Lake Erie Committee uses the process to establish a 
TAC—a high-profile exercise wrought with politics—means that this committee is likely to be 
most affected by political pressures.  The epistemic community, in serving as a professional peer-
review of managers’ and others’ claims, is able to serve as a bulwark against the politicization of 
science.  The existence of an epistemic community, as illustrated by the Lake Erie Committee’s 
behavior during the 2004 dispute, provides one explanation for how fishery managers are able to 
deal with a strong temptation to politicize science. 
 The interviews also indicate that the members believe the dispute affected relations with 
each other and, potentially future interactions.  Said one American, “we had a great opportunity to 
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sell and strengthen the interagency relationship and [instead, Ontario] sold us right down the 
river.”  To the Americans, sacrifices needed to be made by all parties, and when one party refused 
to share the concomitant blame, the others are apt to take them less seriously in future 
negotiations.  To further strain the relationship, Americans believe Ontario used the plan to drive 
a wedge between the decision and its constituents, not to use the plan to make the decision more 
defensible.  Said an American manager, he believed Ontario was playing to a home audience 
when it claimed it was “being outweighed by everybody else and just being bullied around.  That 
just confirmed everything I suspected.  I couldn’t believe [Ontario] said that.” 
 From Ontario’s perspective, however, trust was also a major issue.  Ontario, after having 
its proposal in June, 2003 rebuffed, felt that the other committee members were being inflexible 
and unwilling to accommodate Ontario’s needs.  Ontario, as a member of the committee, needed 
to know that state colleagues would provide the support to make the committee’s work defensible 
to stakeholders and politicians on both sides of the border.  The states, however, were not keen on 
Ontario’s arguments.  Said an Ontario participant,  
trust and credibility [are] crucial things, which help make [the Lake Erie Committee] 
work well together . . . . [Right now] there is not a lot of understanding and their 
credibility and trust was really shot and lost by our side as well . . . There really wasn’t 
any wherewithal from [the states] to really quantifiably look at what [they] were doing 
and measure it against what we were doing . . . So there was a lot of trust broken with 
[Ontario], from that perspective. 
 
 Overall, do the committee members believe this dispute irreparably harmed future 
interactions?  American members of the Lake Erie Committee indicated they are ready to get past 
it all.  There are indeed reasons to believe members have learned from this experience.  Said one 
state member,  
We have had conference calls since then [and] we are in a healing process now.  So, to 
the extent people follow through with future decisions will depend on how much faith 
you can put in them and how quickly we can rebuild the trust.  I am kind of ready to 
move to wipe the slate clean and just move forward and get on to the more serious issues 
of trying to manage the resource. . . . I want to give [Ontario] the benefit of the doubt . . .  




Said another member, noting the differences among the Lake Erie stakeholders, the entire 
incident helped him better understand others’ points of view:  “I guess the challenge is 
recognizing the continued importance of the commercial fishing industry in Canada and the 
differing values among those fishermen, those anglers, and for what their expectations are out of 
the resource.”  
The durable framework and the members’ commitment to the process perhaps has made 
the relationships more durable, a major contributor to why members wish to take collective 
action.  While the members certainly felt somewhat coerced into participating (their agencies, 
after all, are signatory to the plan) they also strengthened their knowledge of each others’ 
positions and gained a greater understanding of what motivates each other.  The fact that they 
went to great lengths to continue to meet, to keep each other informed, and to reach a new 
consensus indicates that the members are acutely aware that they must work together again in the 
future.  Even with a divisive dispute, they know they are going to meet again and that they 
sacrifice future opportunities if they refuse to cooperate.  They have grown to care about the 
relationship, a major factor in collective action. 
 
Consensus and Implementation In a Non-binding Setting 
 
At the heart of implementation in a nonbinding setting is the use of consensus as the 
plan’s foundation, and this dispute brought the issue of consensus in the lake committee process 
front and center.  Chapter 4 argued that members feel more compelled to adhere to a consensus 
decision because it reflects the opinions of all the members, it prevents unilateral actions, it 
makes them feel professionally accountable, and it demonstrates good faith.  Chapter 4 also 
demonstrated that lake committee members understand that implementation challenges will 
always exist.  With a non-binding agreement like the Joint Strategic Plan, and with nothing 
compelling a jurisdiction to implement a decision, committee members understand that the home 
jurisdiction does, from time-to-time, weaken the implementation of consensus decisions.  
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Consensus is one way to heighten the chances the policy will be implemented, as consensus 
reflects the sentiments of the members themselves, and ignoring the consensus not only 
embarrasses the colleagues who trusted the others, but also undermines what is really one’s own 
position.  The Americans believed Ontario should have been up-front with why it was breaking 
consensus—by admitting it could not implement the decision.  Instead, the Americans did not like 
the fact that Ontario attacked the consensus decision itself—a decision Ontario was fully involved 
in reaching.  The Americans felt this was disingenuous and claimed they would have been much 
more receptive if Ontario had confessed it could not deliver on a promise.  
Ayles and Conlin, in their report from the Great Lakes Fishery Commission’s mediation, 
stated that “based on the sum of actions since its March, 2003 meeting, it is apparent that the 
concept of consensus is not clearly understood by the LEC” (Ayles and Conlin 2004).  Some have 
interpreted that observation as suggesting it is fiction to believe the committee actually reached a 
true consensus-based decision, as a process that pits four jurisdictions against one is not a 
consensus-based process at all; it allows the majority to ignore the minority.  The Americans, on 
the other hand, pointed out that the process is not about voting, it is about allowing all sides to air 
their issues with the intent of common ground emerging.  Besides, nothing stopped any 
jurisdiction from objecting to anything.  In fact, the group did reach consensus in March, 2003 
and Ontario, during the July, 2004 appeal of the 2004 TAC, stated “there is no question that 
Ontario broke the consensus decision of March, 2003.”  Ayles and Conlin, in their comments that 
consensus was not well-understood, observed not that members had a differing opinion about 
whether consensus was reached, rather, they observed that not all members fully appreciated why 
it was important to adhere to the consensus decision once it was made. 
Ontario, for its part, believed consensus was reached, but saw no point in sticking to a 
consensus agreement that it came to conclude was inequitable, un-implementable, and un-
supported by new data.  To Ontario, just because everyone agreed to a bad policy did not make 
the policy sound.  It was better to bring new information to the table and revisit the decision than 
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to continue to adhere to something that it could not defend.  Yet, Ontario apparently failed to 
appreciate how such an approach would be received.  The manner by which Ontario attempted to 
go back on the consensus—and how casually it did so—most certainly affected the Americans’ 
willingness to entertain Ontario’s new position.  In a non-binding agreement that requires 
commitment and a belief that all members will stay committed to the decision, process is 
important, and members were clearly surprised when it was broken in the way it was.  Said one 
American Lake Erie Committee member, reflecting on consensus: 
We reached it. It was done. And we announced it publicly. We all walked out of there 
and started our process [to comply with the agreement] and we were as surprised—we 
were shocked—when Ontario came to the June meeting and announced they weren’t 
doing what we said.  [This was] after we had already met with stakeholders and pushed 
our process well into the stages that we needed to go through. And we had already started 
catching flack for what we were planning to do. So that was a very shocking moment and 
it caused a lot of angst when I went home and had to tell my senior administrators that 
Ontario wasn’t going to do what they were planning to so.  
 
 
Ontario, however, believed that the Americans were inflexible and closed-minded to new 
ideas.  This sentiment exposes a major challenge for epistemic communities:  the potential for 
members to grow firm in their opinions and less open to new thinking when they believe a 
member or an idea is outside of the norms of the community.  This ostracizing of Ontario was not 
healthy for the Lake Erie Committee and might have reflected “group think” at work, a 
phenomenon whereby members of a group continue to adhere to, or even intensify their own 
opinions at the expense of outside or unconventional views. 
Moreover, Ontario grew to believe that it was being out-numbered on the committee and 
that no matter what it did, it could not overcome the bias against its interests.  Ontario believed 
that as the dispute wore on, “it was basically . . . four against one—no doubt about it.”  How 
could Ontario have trust and faith in colleagues who were closed-minded to anything it brought 
forward?  “They wouldn’t look at failings of their own; they were just looking at us,” said an 
observer from Ontario.  Moreover, Ontario likely had little ability to overcome the group think of 
the American members, even though the committee operated by consensus and, thus, offered 
 
 228
even a single member a strong voice.  Ontario argued that with four jurisdictions pressing the 
issue from one perspective, holding out inherently made Ontario look like the recalcitrant party.  
Ontario’s ability to defend the Lake Erie Committee’s policies with stakeholders and politicians. 
Americans, on the other hand, argued that nothing prevented Ontario from disagreeing with the 
decision in March, 2003 and, in fact, when the process relies on consensus for a decision to occur, 
a single entity, whether it be Ontario with a large coastline or Pennsylvania with a small coastline, 
can carry enormous weight.  In the end, the process did not increase the decision’s defensibility 
(in fact, it was lowering it) and, Ontario, in particular, was not benefiting from collective action. 
 Implementation challenges are ever-present, but consensus is a way, in a non-binding 
setting, to improve the chances that the agreement will be implemented.  Consensus and trust are 
synergistic and often inseparable; consensus cannot emerge without trust and trust helps nurture 
consensus.  Recall the considerable efforts the committee went through, during the March, 2003 
executive session, to make sure they all agreed to the forty to sixty percent TAC reduction and 
then to craft a public statement that made the decision clear.  The consensus was a statement of 
commitment and intent.  With that statement, said one member, we had a “specter of public 
revelation, and such public revelation is intended to make it clear to everyone the intent to 
implement the decision.”  As chapter 4 argued, in the absence of a force that compels agencies to 
adhere to their agreements, they are left with almost nothing else except publicly stating their 
intent.  Thus, if consensus is broken and trust is lost, not only are members flouting the policies 
they agreed to, but the discord is apparent publicly, which embarrasses members and makes 
implementation more difficult.  The trust that took years to build becomes fragile and can 
evaporate quickly when decisions are not respected.  Members become less willing to trust their 
colleagues in the future, further harming collective action.  Thus, while trust and consensus are 





 Conflicts in Great Lakes fishery management are common.  Conflicts that invoke the 
Joint Strategic Plan’s dispute resolution processes are rare.  Only twice in the plan’s twenty-five-
year history have agencies asked for mediation; both times the dispute involved TACs in Lake 
Erie.  The 2004 dispute provides a useful case study about how agencies behave when shared fish 
stocks are at low abundances, when constituent pressures are high, when consensus breaks down, 
and when trust and interactions are stressed.  The dispute occurred because Ontario broke 
consensus.  How the participants handled this deviation from normal procedures illustrates that 
loss of trust and jeopardized future interactions did weigh heavily on participants’ minds.  
Members appear to have gained a higher appreciation for the importance of reaching and 
respecting consensus.  They were clearly interested in handling the issue themselves through 
continued interactions.  In this case, while Ontario and its commercial stakeholders fought for a 
higher quota, politicians in both countries ultimately respected the committee’s new consensus.   
The Joint Strategic Plan process is designed to blunt the temptations for jurisdictions to 
use science to justify actions that are not-so-defensible.  The plan acknowledges that jurisdictions 
will be tempted to politicize or ignore science to suit their needs. By creating a process 
demanding joint scientific discovery and consensus over the information, the Joint Strategic Plan 
establishes norms for proper behavior and helps the members spot immediately when other 
members depart from the agreed-to process.  In the case of the dispute over the 2004 walleye 
TAC, the American members’ behavior illustrates an expected reaction to departure from the 
norms of an epistemic community.  Ontario was perceived as basing its judgments not on the 
science they helped develop and interpret but on political considerations unique to Ontario.  
While the members know that there will always be unique jurisdictional issues, they agree that 
members must be up-front with each other about what those issues are rather than agreeing to 
something and then detracting from it by discrediting the consensus that it was a part of. 
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The walleye dispute of 2004 illustrates many of the major points of earlier chapters.  
Trust and future relationships are important to the Lake Erie Committee process.  Consensus is 
necessary because members rely on it to make the policies better and more defensible.  The plan 
remains the mechanism for intergovernmental relations, consensus heightens the chances that the 
agreement will be implemented, and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission’s role is appropriate. 
In the end, the managers expressed their belief that the plan is capable of handling a significant 
crisis.  Their ability to agree to a new TAC affirmed the members’ willingness to rely on the best 
science available, to work out their problems together, and to manage the fishery in a truly 
multijurisdictional fashion.  That, the members affirm, is what the Joint Strategic Plan is all about. 
Despite the relative success of the Joint Strategic Plan process in handling this dispute, 
however, there are likely deep ramifications that the Lake Erie Committee will have to resolve 
over time.  The loss of trust and the lack of confidence in support from colleagues has the 
potential to undermine the process over the long term.  Trust takes years to build yet can be 
erased in one incident.  Because the plan relies on consensus, trust, relationships, and 
expectations that everyone will implement what they agree to, and because all of these elements 
were stressed during the walleye dispute, members of the Lake Erie Committee will likely have to 
make an extra effort to re-build the working relationships that the process needs to succeed.   
In the end, the Lake Erie Committee process will undoubtedly survive and succeed.  The 
members have indicated that, already, they better understand each other and are rebuilding trustful 
relationships.  The fishery commission demonstrated its willingness to help the members reach their 
own consensus, thus protecting the jurisdictions from having a decision imposed upon them from an 
external source.  Committee members demonstrated a willingness to be flexible (after all, the states 
did agree by August, 2003, to a thirty percent TAC reduction, though they were motivated by comity 
and fear that some other political force would impose an even less-protective TAC) and even the 
commercial fishing industry suggests it has grown more comfortable with the process—now that it 
has access to data—than it was before the 2004 dispute (Meisenheimer and Reid 2006).  If nothing 
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else, the process will continue because there is no alternative.  Beyond the sentiment that “agreeing to 
disagree is not an option,” perhaps one Lake Erie Committee member summarized it best: 
Well, in terms of this process [and how] it was implemented in this particular crisis, my 
feeling was we had gone as far as we were going to go [through the normal lake 
committee process]. . . There is no binding arbitration at the end, there is only the 
understanding that this is the only mechanism—and maybe the only reasonable 
mechanism—whereby we can work cooperatively to manage a shared resource.  And we 
either worked cooperatively or it doesn’t happen at all.  It has to be everybody’s 





CONCLUSION:  DESIGN ELEMENTS OF AND A CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM FOR 




This chapter considers the conditions under which the Joint Strategic Plan emerged and 
asks What are the key design elements that make the Joint Strategic Plan an appealing 
institution for regional fisheries governance in the Great Lakes basin?  This chapter 
identifies four emergent themes from previous chapters as the plan’s major elements:  (1) 
respect for jurisdictional independence, (2) the benefits of shared strategies and plans, (3) 
reliance on science and the work of technical committees, and (4) personal relationships 
and social interactions.  These four themes speak to why the plan functions as a 
meaningful multijurisdictional governance regime.  This chapter concludes with a 
discussion the plan’s applicability to the Great Lakes region and its replicability as an 
institution for other common pool resources. 
 
 
Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) major work about common pool resources—Governing the 
Commons—evaluates the success of common-pool-resource institutions.  Ostrom identifies the 
key design features of these institutions and, like others who have written about the commons 
(e.g., Hardin 1968; Dietz 2002), she acknowledges the inherent conflict over shared resources.  
Her analysis focuses on overcoming Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons,” which occurs 
because of competition problems.  In looking at human behavior and at arrangements to 
overcome conflict, her study illustrates the types of design principles that heighten the chances 
that a resource management regime will help the participants use the resource in fair and 
sustainable ways.   
Like Ostrom, this dissertation has considered the Joint Strategic Plan’s design and has 
focused on several of the plan’s features that members believe make it function.  However, this 
dissertation departed from Ostrom and like-literature that addressed common pool resources from 
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a “tragedy of the commons” perspective because the governance institution on the Great Lakes 
was set up for partially different reasons than Ostrom’s institutions.  Ostrom addresses how 
institutions can facilitate competition in situations of conflict.  On the other hand, when agencies 
on the Great Lakes established the plan, their intent was more to seek and advance shared goals 
than to overcome competition problems, though the Lake Erie Committee does resemble some 
elements of Ostrom’s institutions.  The plan reflects a self-organization among the Great Lakes 
basin’s governing entities and, thus, serves the members’ needs.  Both Ostrom’s institutions and 
the Joint Strategic Plan, however, depend on collective action taking place, thus some benefit 
exists in considering Ostrom’s design principles in the context of Great Lakes fishery governance.  
This dissertation has contributed to and expanded literature relating to common pool 
resources, governance, collective action, federalism, sovereignty, and binding-non-binding 
agreements.  Building upon the literature and based on the conclusions from the previous 
chapters, this chapter identifies jurisdictional sovereignty, shared plans and goals, science, and 
relationships as the four major elements of Great Lakes fishery governance that make the Joint 
Strategic Plan robust and contribute to the plan’s ability to serve the members’ needs.  These four 
elements suggest that the Joint Strategic Plan has endured in the Great Lakes region because it 
does not intrude on the individual governments’ management authority;  because it defines the 
members’ self-interest in the context of collective action; because it fosters a shared 
understanding of scientific information, thus deflating disputes over the underpinnings of policy; 
and because it relies on relationships among the members, heightening the fishery official’s sense 
of duty to the process and forging partnerships that make collective action happen. 
While this dissertation provides hitherto undocumented insights into members’ beliefs 
about the plan, it does not discuss or evaluate other regional institutions in-depth and, thus, cannot 
provide a direct comparison between the plan’s regime and other regimes.  However, the 
conceptual framework for Great Lakes fishery governance, identified in this chapter, does permit 
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some speculation into the Joint Strategic Plan’s robustness and whether the design elements could 
be transferable to other areas where common-pool-resource management is important. 
 
BEYOND OSTROM: EMERGENT THEMES AND A CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM FOR 
GREAT LAKES FISHERY GOVERNANCE 
 
The Joint Strategic Plan emerged out of several specific conditions in the Great Lakes 
region: 
• Political authority is diffuse; 
• Fishery management authority is vested in non-federal governments; 
• Independent non-federal governments posses a strong interest in preserving their 
autonomy; 
• The threat of federal preemption is ever-present, which created a need for the non-
federal governments to organize; 
• An acceptable third party—the Great Lakes Fishery Commission—is present to help 
facilitate cooperation; and 
• The members share a mutual interest in strategic planning, seeking shared goals, and 
working to achieve their goals. 
 
The Joint Strategic Plan emerged in the Great Lakes region under these circumstances.  The plan 
contains design features to reflect these conditions and helps the jurisdictions achieve their 
objectives for organizing. 
Elinor Ostrom (1990), in her study about common-pool-resource-governance, focused on 
facilitating resource allocation and preventing the “tragedy of the commons” as the conditions 
under which users organize to sustain local, small-scale resources that they share.  More-specific 
conditions relate to the particular circumstances of the resource.  Based on her analysis, she was 
able to identify several institutional design principles present in the successful institutions 
including the basic right of the members to organize, defined resource and behavior boundaries, 
collective-choice arrangements, mechanisms to monitor participant behavior, sanctions for 
violators, and conflict-resolution processes.  The purpose of these design principles is to help the 
members go beyond Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons;” to help the participants allocate the 
resource in ways that are agreeable to participants and that sustain the resource for future use. 
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In Great Lakes fishery management, Ostrom’s design principles are also relevant, though 
not always for the same reasons as in her analysis.  The Joint Strategic Plan process was 
established largely to promote collective action and to help the agencies identify and work toward 
their shared goals, and less to facilitate the allocation-type issues so prominent on Ostrom’s study.  
Allocation (appropriation), after all, was and remains the purview of the individual Great Lakes’ 
jurisdictions, and the history presented in chapter 1 illustrates that the independent-minded 
agencies are not willing to cede that authority.  The important exception, as presented in chapter 
5, is the Lake Erie Committee, which does use the process to establish a lakewide allocation of 
fish.42  The Joint Strategic Plan seeks to facilitate cooperation on lakewide and basinwide levels, 
thus many of Ostrom’s design principles are indeed present in the plan and contribute to the 
plan’s applicability to the Great Lakes region.  The major design principles for common pool 
resource management, as identified by Ostrom, are compared to the Joint Strategic Plan in table 
6-1. 
The Joint Strategic Plan contains all of Ostrom’s major design principles except for the 
principle of punishing violators.  (The plan, being non-binding and respectful of jurisdictional 
authority, was not intended to be directly enforceable.)  The Joint Strategic Plan, thus, as a 
governance institution designed to address common pool resources, is consistent with other 
institutions that Ostrom identifies as successful.  This dissertation identifies four additional design 
elements beyond Ostrom’s that reflect the unique characteristics of the Great Lakes and are 
designed to help the participants take collective action.  As evident in previous chapters, those 
design elements are (1) respecting  jurisdictional independence, (2) calling for the development of 
shared strategies and operational plans, (3) relying on science and technical committees, and (4) 
fostering personal relationships.  In addition to Ostrom’s design principles, these four features of 
the Joint Strategic Plan suggest a conceptual diagram for Great Lakes fishery governance in the  
                                                 
 
42 In some areas, particularly in the upper lakes, lake committee members do use the process to discuss the 






IMPORTANCE TO COMMON POOL 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 




Appropriators (e.g., citizens) are not 
challenged by external authorities to 
organize. 
Similar.  Non-federal authorities have the 
right to manage.  Federal governments are 





The governance institution defines users’ 
rights and the bounds of those rights. 
Similar.  Non-federal jurisdictions’ 
boundaries are legally defined and 
management authorities are known; the 
plan does not define these elements.  Non-
federal jurisdictions define the bounds for 
their own appropriators (e.g., sport, 




Those who follow the governance rules 
can modify the rules. 
Same.  Joint Strategic Plan participants 
established the arrangement and can alter 
it to suit their needs. 
Monitoring All users can observe the activities of others and hold them accountable. 
Similar.  The Joint Strategic Plan process 
calls for regular reporting and information 
sharing.  This helps the members know 





Those who violate the rules can be 
reprimanded. 
Different.  The Joint Strategic Plan has no 
provisions for direct sanctions or 
enforcement; it relies on rewards and 
consensus to affect behavior.  The 
epistemic community exerts gentle 





Mechanisms exist—that are perceived as 
fair—to resolve conflicts. 
Same.  Mechanisms exist in the Joint 
Strategic Plan (Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission mediation) that members 
believe is appropriate to address disputes. 
Table 6-1:  Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for successful common pool resource management 
and relevance to the Joint Strategic Plan 
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multijurisdictional setting (figure 6-1).  This concept posits that the Joint Strategic Plan has 
endured in the Great Lakes region because it does not intrude on the individual governments’ 
management authority;  because it defines the members’ self-interest in the context of collective 
action (e.g., shared plans and objectives); because it fosters a shared understanding of scientific 
information, thus deflating disputes over the underpinnings of policy; and because it relies on 
relationships among the members, heightening the fishery official’s sense of duty to the process 
and forging partnerships that make collective action happen.  Young (1994) says a regime is 
“robust” when it is able to last and be effective over time, particularly in the face of “disruptive 
changes.”  Given these four major design elements that hold the plan together, how fragile is this 
process?  That is, how much do these design elements contribute to the plan’s robustness?  This 
section discusses the four design elements and analyzes the degree to which the element 
contributes to the robustness of the process.   
 
The basic respect for jurisdictional independence and sovereignty 
Because jurisdictions are sovereign and independent, the non-binding nature of the 
agreement, rooted in consensus, is an essential design element, as it facilitates collective action 
while still respecting jurisdictional authorities. 
After decades of parochial behavior, the sea lamprey crisis of the 1940s and 1950s 
prompted the jurisdictions to begin cooperating, and the neutral Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
assuaged their concerns about losing independence by simply convening regular meetings, in a 
non-threatening setting, for information exchange and other discussions.  In the late 1970s, the 
Joint Strategic Plan was developed to help the jurisdictions interact in more strategic ways while 
still protecting jurisdictional independence.  The plan explicitly stressed it was not intended to 
supersede any jurisdictional authority or constrain unwilling behavior.  The focus instead would 
be to help the jurisdictions positively seek commonalities and progress toward their shared goals.  




Figure 6-1:  The great lakes fishery management regime, with an emphasis on A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries 
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Diagram:  M. Gaden 
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similar to that of the previous eras—do not attempt a plan that would weaken autonomy.  
Members were partially motivated to develop the plan out of concern that if they did not create a 
structure for intergovernmental relations, the federal government—particularly the U.S. federal 
government—would step in as it was doing in other parts of the country pursuant to the 
Magnuson Act, and involve itself in Great Lakes fisheries.  Members felt that by organizing 
themselves, the plan would remove an excuse for the federal governments to exercise broad, 
coordinating authority.   
The independence and sovereignty theme emerges quite prominently in this dissertation’s 
previous chapters.  Beyond the history presented in chapter 1, chapter 2 demonstrates that 
collective action does occur, but in ways that respect jurisdictional independence.  Members use 
the lake committee process to share information, decide on tasks and who carries them out, and 
develop shared plans and objectives.  The plan is a process to focus on collective action rather 
than on how to constrain behavior.  Chapter 3 demonstrates that the non-federal jurisdictions use 
the plan to work collectively and to work with the Canadian and U.S. federal governments.  They 
use the plan, in some respects, to keep the federal governments from intruding on their authority.  
While the non-federal members (particularly the Americans) do not always believe the federal 
governments wish to stay within their area of authority, they nevertheless work synergistically 
with the federal officials to leverage resources and manage the lakes as a whole.  Chapter 4 
illustrates that members do not want a more structured, binding agreement, as they view binding 
agreements as unnecessary for what is needed to manage Great Lakes fisheries, limiting, and 
inconsistent with jurisdictional independence. 
 Lake committee members (including those on Lake Erie, the extreme case) are motivated 
to cooperate for reasons beyond being forced in a legal sense to do so.  The fact that the plan is 
rooted in consensus emphasizes that it respects individual authorities.  Consensus means that no 
jurisdiction can be forced to do something it does not want to do.  Consensus-based decision-
making is as much a process to develop a shared understanding as it is a final product.  Indeed, 
 
 240
the process the members went through to reach consensus over the 2004 walleye total allowable 
catch was as important to them as the total allowable catch that emerged from the process.  
Consensus is important because it means the decision comes from the members themselves, not 
imposed by any higher or outside authority.  If the consensus is ignored, the recalcitrant party 
disrespects his colleagues and flouts the norms of the epistemic community; his colleagues will 
believe he did not participate in good faith.  The recalcitrant party also ignores his own opinion 
because he helped develop and agreed to the position.  Consensus, thus, inherently respects each 
participant’s independence. 
The design element of respecting independence helps the Joint Strategic Plan endure 
because it does not attempt to create an arrangement that disregards the lessons of history.  A 
threat to the Joint Strategic Plan process would be for the members to perceive the plan as 
encroaching on autonomy, constraining behavior too much, or not helping to keep the federal-
non-federal relationship positive.  By focusing on helping the jurisdictions understand their 
shared goals and seeking cooperative approaches to achieving them, rather than on how to 
constrain behavior, the plan is suitable to the region.  This design contributes to the plan’s 
robustness because jurisdictions have proven they are unwilling to cede management authority, 
and a heavy-handed institution would simply not last, as members would ignore it.  The plan 
makes it clear that authority is still left to the respective jurisdictions.  So long as members do not 
attempt to use the plan to force another jurisdiction to do something it does not want to do, and so 
long as the federal governments accept the plan as the preferred way of doing business in the 
Great Lakes region, the plan’s structures that promote and draw upon the strengths of 
jurisdictional independence will contribute significantly to the plan’s robustness. 
 
The need for, and benefits of, developing shared strategic and operational plans 
Because the members seek to redirect the focus of conflict away from competition and 
toward shared goals, the plan’s mandate that agencies together develop and implement clearly 
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articulated objectives and plans is a key design element in helping the members achieve their 
shared goals. 
The Joint Strategic Plan places a heavy emphasis on the development of strategies and 
plans for fishery management.  Members report that they participate in the process because they 
find information sharing and the subsequent development of shared objectives to be valuable to 
them as they manage fisheries.  As chapter 2 has argued, the plan’s intent is to create an on-going 
process for agencies to share information and then to use that information to identify the 
objectives they share and how they, together and separately, can move toward those objectives.  
By stressing the joint development of and adherence to plans and objectives, the plan defines self-
interest in terms of collective action, not competition.  By calling for the development of shared 
plans and objectives, members use the process to focus on those collective-action-types of output 
rather than on using the process as way to compete over a finite resource.  (The Lake Erie 
Committee is the exception as it also uses the process to establish allocation quotas.) 
 Developing shared plans and objectives is a key element of the Great Lakes fishery 
governance regime because such products focus the members on shared goals, not points of 
difference or conflict.  Such products perpetuate the collaborative process, guide real 
management decisions, and help the participants articulate those decisions to stakeholders.  
Consider, first, the re-definition of self-interest.  As chapter 2 has demonstrated, members 
participate in the process because they are gently coerced into working together and rewarded for 
doing so.  By having the goal to produce shared plans and policies, the plan makes it so members 
see it as consistent with their self-interest to work together.  It is in their interest to conform to the 
norms of the epistemic community; it is in their interest to produce better, more defensible 
policies; and it is in their interest to be rewarded professionally and personally for working 
toward shared products.  This focus stands in contrast to a regime that might be established, say, 
to provide a forum for members to engage in direct negotiations over a shared resource.  In such a 
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situation, self-interest would be defined by how much of the resource the manager has allocated 
to his jurisdiction or whether the manager imposed his jurisdiction’s will upon others. 
Chapter 1 stressed that the members desired a strategic plan (not an operational plan) 
partially because they wanted to remain flexible in their response to fishery needs.  Chapter 4 
argued that Great Lakes fishery management benefits from flexible, ambitious approaches to 
management rather than a set-in-stone approach that might clearly define action but might be less 
helpful in addressing ecosystem changes and fluctuating fisheries.  The Joint Strategic Plan of 
1981 was never intended to be an operational fisheries management plan—such a plan would 
have been outdated by 1982.  One major product that the Joint Strategic Plan calls for are fish 
community objectives (e.g., Ryan 2003; figure 6-1), objectives that the members on each lake 
develop together and use to guide their individual management actions.  Each of the lake 
committees has produced fish community objectives and there are many operational plans (e.g., 
Hansen 1996) to advance those objectives.  Also, reliance on shared strategies and plans is related 
to protecting jurisdictional authority because it helps the jurisdictions together identify areas of 
agreement, thus sidestepping the possibility that members will feel pressured to adhere to 
something to which they disagreed.  Recognizing that the plan neither compels action nor forces 
an agency to do something it does not want to do, the members look to what they have in 
common and develop the policies and initiatives that reflect those common goals.   
Chapter 5 presented a case where the Lake Erie Committee, in going beyond the work of 
the other lake committees by establishing TACs, nevertheless relies on strategies and plans to 
underpin and bolster its decisions.  The Coordinated Percid Management Strategy and the 
Walleye Management Plan are the two major examples of how the committee uses the Joint 
Strategic Plan process to develop their objectives and how important the plans are to the Lake 
Erie Committee.  The plans reflect the consensus of the committee and serve as the way to ground 
the TAC decisions, particularly when the dispute arose.  The members could always go back to 
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the most basic objectives to which they agreed to guide and gauge the appropriateness of 
decisions. 
The design element of mandating shared strategies and objectives helps the Joint 
Strategic Plan endure because it frames the plan’s success in terms of whether the members 
produced shared objectives and took steps that members all agree help them adhere to the 
objectives.  If the participants agree on the objectives and what needs to be done, working toward 
those goals and objectives is consistent with the jurisdiction’s interest.  Producing sound policies, 
says chapter 2, is rewarding to the members because it helps them manage the fishery properly 
(on an ecosystem level) and makes the policies more defensible.  So long as the plan helps the 
members produce strategies and plans that add value to fishery management, the plan will be 
useful to the members.  This feature of the plan would be undermined if members did not 
appreciate the importance of shared objectives, if they did not share information, or if they did not 
actively contribute to developing shared objectives.  Because the Joint Strategic Plan process 
itself is designed to have members meet regularly, share information, and come to the process 
with the specific intent of developing such strategies and plans, the continuous need to develop 
goals and objectives appears to contribute to the plan’s robustness. 
 
The reliance on science and the work of technical committees to help the lake committee 
members make decisions 
 
Because fishery managers require sound data and science to produce better, more 
defensible policies, the plan’s support for on-going development of scientific information and 
interactions among scientists is a critical design principle contributing to the plan’s impact. 
Related to the development of strategies and plans is the members’ reliance on science, as 
science underpins the products developed through the process.  The Joint Strategic Plan stresses 
that decisions and strategies must be based on science, and this dissertation has highlighted that 
members use the plan’s processes to direct the technical committees’ work and use technical 
committee information as the basis for their decisions.  As Young (1994, p. 101) says, removing 
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the “veil of uncertainty” through science and knowledge, helps the participants reach agreement.  
While the plan places great emphasis on science, it also emphasizes that there must be consensus 
over the science—consensus over the data needs, consensus over how and when to collect the 
data, and consensus over the meaning of the data.   
The Joint Strategic Plan is both a top-down and a bottom-up process.  It is top-down in 
the sense that lake committees, comprising senior fishery managers, charge the technical 
committees with tasks and make decisions.  It is bottom-up in the sense that management 
decisions, fish community objectives, operational plans, and other lake committee actions depend 
on the technical committees’ work.  Information sharing preceded the plan with the formation of 
lake committees in the 1960s.  The Joint Strategic Plan in 1981 linked information sharing to 
strategic objectives and plans and, therefore, placed a high value on consensus-based scientific 
understanding.  Chapters 2 and 5 demonstrate that ongoing information sharing, among an 
epistemic community of like-minded individuals, creates an atmosphere where nonsensical 
arguments or political biases are easily recognized and exposed.  This heightens the chances that 
the discussions will be based on science, not on other considerations.  Moreover, the fact that lake 
committees are supposed to insulate the technical committees from outside influences 
demonstrates some interest in basing management decisions on science.  However, several 
participants—including lake committee and technical committee members—expressed their 
concern that keeping politics and science separate is a significant challenge though still a major 
goal of the lake committee/technical committee process. 
 The reliance on science and technical committees is important for two related reasons.  
First, science provides the information the lake committees need to approve meaningful 
operational plans.  Before the lake committees develop or approve objectives or plans, they often 
ask the technical committees to provide them with certain information.  Recall from chapter 2 
how the members use the Joint Strategic Plan process to identify information needs and ask the 
technical committees to perform tasks to fulfill those needs.  The technical committees, for their 
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part, focus on the charges from lake committees.  If the lake committees, say, wish to identify 
broad goals for stocking or harvest, they will need data to back up their policies and plans.  The 
technical committees fulfill that function.   
Second, reliance on science helps make plans and policies more defensible.  Lake 
committee members must consider social needs when they make management decisions, and, 
sometimes, the social needs are not in consort with scientific realities.  If the technical committee 
members together gather data and come to consensus on what the data are saying, lake committee 
members have much of the information they need to support their decisions.  Recall from chapter 
5, for instance, the important role the Walleye Task Group played in supporting the lake 
committee’s decision about the Coordinated Percid Management Strategy and the total allowable 
catch.  The Joint Strategic Plan is designed to heighten scientific exchange by stating explicitly 
that science must be the foundation of decisions and by calling for regular procedures for 
members to together share information, discuss data, and develop consensus on the interpretation 
of the science.  A strong epistemic community helps ensure that members adhere to the highest 
scientific standards. 
The design element of reliance on science helps the plan endure because it means that the 
polices which emerge from the process are based on solid foundations.  As such, members come 
to believe that by participating in the process, there is value added to their deliberations.  Not only 
can the jurisdictions leverage information from each other by meeting and exchanging science, 
but through the interactions of an epistemic community, members gain a greater understanding of 
the science by discussing it with trusted and respected peers.  The plan’s robustness, however, is 
threatened when participants lose their appreciation for science, when agencies do not devote 
enough resources to scientific discovery when the epistemic community fosters “group think,” or 
when science-based recommendations are ignored for political reasons.  Part of the stress to the 
walleye TAC process, for instance, as discussed in chapter 5, was the perceived misuse of 
science.  The Americans felt that Ontario was trying to use science inappropriately to justify 
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political decisions.  Also, interview participants acknowledge that when the technical committee 
process becomes politicized, the process’ usefulness comes into question.  Thus, while the plan’s 
reliance on science contributes significantly to its robustness, considering the intense political 
pressures on fishery managers, this element of the process is under continuous assault and has the 
potential to be fragile. 
 
The critical importance of social interactions and personal relationships in making the 
process function 
 
Because the success of the plan depends on cooperation and consensus among 
individuals, ensuring regular social interactions and nurturing personal relationships are a 
(perhaps the) key design principle of the Joint Strategic Plan.   
Perhaps the most important theme to emerge from this research is the strong role of social 
interactions and personal relationships.  The plan roots decisions in consensus and calls for an on-
going process to help the managers share information and reach consensus.  In doing so, the plan 
places great emphasis on face-to-face meetings, ongoing interactions, and personal relationships.  
Without those interactions and relationships, the plan would not work.  Thus, people and how 
they relate to each other are fundamental to the Joint Strategic Plan process.   Previous chapters 
have revealed that cooperation occurs because members are gently coerced and rewarded for 
doing so.  The process encourages members to know one another, as familiarity spawns trust or, 
at a minimum, an understanding that today’s interactions will affect future interactions.  The plan 
is designed to enhance the chances that members will care about the future by helping them 
benefit professionally from interactions, by creating opportunities for rewarding social 
interactions, and by helping them avoid future opportunity costs.   
Chapter 2 demonstrates that the lake committee process, by facilitating regular 
interactions among like-minded individuals, greatly broadens Robert Axelrod’s (1984) “shadow 
of the future,” making participants care about future interactions and become cognizant of future 
opportunity costs should they be seen as stubborn, obstructionist, or recalcitrant.  By caring about 
 
 247
the future, members are motivated to cooperate, to solve contentious issues amicably, and to 
facilitate the free-flow of information.  Moreover, strong relationships built on trust significantly 
enhance the chances that shared decisions will be implemented, as members would dread 
promising colleagues something and then having to face them again after they renege.  The 
failure to appreciate future interactions is one reason why Ontario had such a difficult challenge 
advancing its position during the dispute over the 2004 walleye total allowable catch.  American 
members believed Ontario was not being honest with them about the rationale behind their 
breaking consensus.  That offended the Americans and undermined their interest in working with 
Ontario.   
This dissertation, in several instances, makes reference to social interactions and after-
hours receptions.  The process is designed to create opportunities for off-duty relationship-
building.  Relationship-building is important and the participants generally enjoy seeing one 
another.  They also respect one another professionally.  The managers are like-minded and 
operate as an epistemic community, a community of individuals who speak the same language 
and understand each others’ perspectives.  The lake committee members share philosophies, often 
have common mentors, and were educated in similar biological programs.  The lake committee 
and technical committee meetings are a place for these like-minded individuals to talk science.  
The meetings and the socials are a time to commiserate over untenable policies or strange politics 
back home and they are a place to renew acquaintances.  Members of this community know when 
science is not being adhered to, they care about the community, and they are often friendly 
enough with each other to disagree without jeopardizing future interactions.  The social functions 
and other outings of course make the meetings more enjoyable but they also are a place to discuss 
issues, float new ideas, and help the members get to know one another better.  These interactions 




Relying on relationships as a major design element, however, could be risky and 
unpredictable.  While there is little doubt about the virtues of strong relationships, relationships, 
being human interactions, are susceptible to collapse if members grow to distrust one another, if 
members flout the norms of the community, or if members simply do not like one another.  Some 
groups have poor dynamics; a mix of personalities that do not mesh.  Does any plan, then, that 
relies on relationships so fundamentally as the Joint Strategic Plan put its robustness at risk?  
Certainly.  The plan is dependent on people to make it work, and if people do not participate in 
earnest or do not interact positively, the process becomes fragile.   
The plan, however, contains many elements that heighten the chances that relationships 
will remain strong and positive.  The on-going process itself means members meet frequently, 
giving them ample opportunities to get to know one another and to trust one another.  The 
associated meeting socials are time-honored, enjoyable, and allow for discussions in friendly, 
relaxed atmospheres.  The lake committees and technical committees are elite, epistemic 
communities, and regular interactions among the esteemed members reinforce the members’ 
willingness to adhere to the norms of the community, building predictability, trust, and 
accountability.  Knowing and trusting one another increases the chances that members will care 
enough about future relations and cooperate.   
Perhaps most relevant to relationships in the Joint Strategic Plan process is precisely the 
fact that human interactions are fragile.  Members are generally sensitive to the consequences of 
diplomatic missteps or acting in a recalcitrant manner.  Not only does such behavior make 
relationships unpleasant, but members jeopardize future relations and opportunities.  Because the 
Joint Strategic Plan process is voluntary, dependent on the goodwill of all for it to succeed, and 
could lead to substantial rewards for cooperative relationships, members likely pay extra attention 
to protecting and building relationships, taking great pains to work well with others.  The sheer 
fragility of a process based on relationships could prompt members to make an extra effort to 
ensure the relationships flourish.  Thus, the inherent fragility of relationships could actually serve 
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to strengthen relationships as members pay close attention to their interactions.  This design 
element likely contributes significantly to the plan’s robustness. 
 
APPLICABILITY TO OTHER AREAS OF GOVERNANCE 
Typical with multijurisdictional arrangements, the Joint Strategic Plan reflects the 
particular conditions of the region to which it applies (figure 6-1).  Based on the discussions 
outlined in previous chapters, several conditions exist under which a Joint Strategic Plan-like 
institution would be applicable to other regions.  Consider, first, the basin’s political and 
jurisdictional realities and how cooperation emerged out of a parochial history.  The Great Lakes 
region is politically diffuse yet the fisheries are shared.  Primary management authority occurs at 
the non-federal level, thus creating a governance vacuum at the cross-border level.  Fishery 
challenges and the need for some uniformity in management regulations was not enough to 
convince the independent jurisdictions to cooperate.  It took the sea lamprey crisis and an 
organizing entity—the Great Lakes Fishery Commission—to prompt interjurisdictional 
cooperation.  The commission, when it established lake committees in the 1960s, helped the 
movement toward cooperation because the commission served as a magnet attracting independent 
jurisdictions and not as an authority compelling unwilling behavior.  The plan itself was a 
response to a possible crisis—federal intrusion—and strategic planning in an environmental era.  
Again, a neutral third party, the commission, assuaged jurisdictional fears that something was 
being forced upon them.   
The plan’s goal was to address conflict, though not necessarily to address allocation-type 
issues and prevent the “tragedy of the commons.” Rather, the plan was designed to nurture 
positive, ambitious collective action.  The plan’s founders desired a non-binding approach 
because they did not want to jeopardize their autonomy and because they recognized that a non-
binding agreement would provide a larger payoff—in the form of flexible, ambitious policies—
than would a binding agreement, which would produce less ambitious results.  
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As a governance institution, thus, a Joint Strategic Plan-like structure is most applicable 
to situations where jurisdictions wish to preserve their autonomy, where they do not need to 
overcome competitiveness, and where they find it more important to have ambitious, flexible 
policies than to bind each other to less-ambitious agreements.  Such an institution is also 
particularly applicable when the federal governments are not able to exert preemptive authority 
and when a neutral institution like the Great Lakes Fishery Commission exists and is willing to 
facilitate a process without forcing action.   
Contingent on a Joint Strategic Plan-like institution’s success is the participants’ desire to 
build and maintain relationships.  Relationship-building takes time.  The Joint Strategic Plan 
benefited from the fact that lake committees existed for fifteen years before the plan was 
produced.  This pre-existence of a solid, respected, science-based epistemic community helped 
the plan from the start, as the community developed the plan itself (the lake committee 
participants were also the people who conceived and wrote the plan) and its members did not 
have to first establish the relationships needed for them to work together effectively.  Although 
the relationships were less formal before the plan, participants nevertheless for many years had a 
place to meet, to get to know one another, and to get used to interacting.  Thus, the existence of 
an epistemic community could be a major factor in the successful replication of the Joint 
Strategic Plan in other areas of multijurisdictional governance. 
An epistemic community also enhances the replicability of another major design feature 
of the plan:  decision by consensus.  The plan is an agreement of independent equals and is rooted 
in consensus.  Consensus emerges readily in the Joint Strategic Plan process because the plan 
demands regular interactions and deliberations.  Additionally, the relative agreement over 
information exists because the community of peers shares a basic understanding of the resource, 
and that understanding is reinforced through meetings, discussions, and participants’ interest in 
adhering to the community’s norms.  With an epistemic community present, consensus—and the 
members’ willingness to try to reach it—is more forthcoming.  The plan’s replicability would be 
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limited if policy makers in a region were not in fundamental agreement over basic tenets of 
management or if no epistemic community existed to refine thinking or help produce consensus. 
The Joint Strategic Plan would also likely be less replicable in situations where the 
participants interact on an unequal footing.  In a situation where unequals interact—such as in 
systems dominated by federal governments—elements like synergy, trust, relationships, and 
consensus become skewed.  The terms of the relationship are different than the terms outlined in 
the Joint Strategic Plan.  If the goal is to build a cooperative regime, with unequals, the terms 
must be drafted in a way that either clearly delineates the roles of each of the participants or that 
empowers the weaker partners and provides bounds for the stronger partners. 
 While the Joint Strategic Plan is perhaps most replicable in circumstances that do not 
require a binding agreement (e.g., where the focus is on identifying and advancing shared 
objectives, where sovereignty and independence are important, where allocation decisions are not 
the primary focus of the arrangement), the walleye case study in chapter 5 does suggest certain 
applicability in situations where the parties seek to use the agreement to address allocation issues; 
issues that typically rely on binding agreements, considering the temptations to cheat and the 
concomitant need to hold members to the agreement.  The Joint Strategic Plan was not designed 
specifically to guide the allocation of shared resources, but the plan does not preclude its 
application to such activities either.  Like those who use arrangements to seek progressive 
collective action over shared goals, those who seek to address allocation issues also benefit from 
regular interactions, information sharing, and trusting relationships, and strategies.   
The Joint Strategic Plan lacks enforcement factors that other writers (e.g., Ostrom, 1990) 
have said are critical to allocation-type regimes.  Yet, the Lake Erie Committee successfully uses 
the plan to facilitate an agreement over allocation; to address competition.  It seems the 
foundation of consensus, science, plans and objectives, and relationships through an epistemic 
community are enough to help the Lake Erie participants negotiate in good faith and assure them 
that what they agree to will be implemented.  The fact that politicians and others in the home 
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agency generally do not interfere with the committee’s work also helps the process, as the 
committee members are motivated by the fact that their decisions will be honored; that an 
external force will not supersede their decisions.  If allocation were to be an issue in other lake 
committees, as it is in Lake Erie, would the Joint Strategic Plan be applicable?  It appears so, but 
probably because there exists a decades-long culture of cooperation in the Great Lakes region and 
because the participants are used to working with each other in good faith.  It is difficult to 
speculate the extent to which a non-binding process like the Joint Strategic Plan would be 
replicable in other allocation-type situations, particularly if those situations lack a community of 




The Joint Strategic Plan emerged in 1981 from the unique set of conditions in the Great 
Lakes region.  The many non-federal jurisdictions, each with its own authority to manage, each 
with a sense of autonomy, and each concerned about preemption of its rights, shunned 
cooperation for much of the region’s management history, but finally managed to cooperate after 
crisis forced collective action and a neutral third party facilitated it.  The jurisdictions desired a 
process that would help them advance their mutual interest in strategic planning, identify shared 
goals, and implement common policies. 
 Like other governance institutions identified in other literature (e.g., Ostrom 1990), the 
Joint Strategic Plan was designed to suit the members’ needs.  The plan contains major design 
elements that reflect the conditions under which it was established and that contribute to the 
plan’s robustness.  First, by respecting jurisdictional sovereignty and independence, and by 
basing the plan on consensus and non-binding goals, the plan is able to function within the 
realities of the Great Lakes political situation.  An agreement that ignored the fact that 
jurisdictions would not relinquish autonomy or that bound the jurisdictions would be either too 
weak to be meaningful or ignored.  Second, the development and implementation of clearly 
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articulated objectives and plans helps the agencies focus on their shared goals in flexible and 
ambitious ways.  Such an approach adds value to fishery management because members are able 
to gain more information than if they acted alone.  Third, by relying on science and the technical 
committees’ work, the Joint Strategic Plan improves the quality of its products and makes the 
decisions better for the resource and more defensible.  Finally, social interactions and personal 
relationships are fundamental to the plan’s operations and account for much of the plan’s success.   
In conditions where sovereignty and independence are important, the plan could be a 
relevant model for others who wish to establish an institution for multijurisdictional 
collaboration.  Because solid working relationships are critical to making the plan work, the 
plan’s applicability to other regions would be limited if an epistemic community did not exist or 
needed to emerge.  The growth of such a community took decades in the Great Lakes region, 
though thanks to regular interactions and a commitment to information sharing, a culture of 
cooperation emerged that allowed the Joint Strategic Plan to further develop in a ready-made 
collective action regime.  Indeed, by the late 1970s, when the members were ready to interact 
more strategically, the existing culture was conducive to improved collective action.   
Today, twenty-five years after it was produced and signed, the Joint Strategic Plan still 
serves to bridge jurisdictional divides in the politically diffuse Great Lakes region.  Managers 
have used the process to share information, improve their understanding of the resource, and to 
get to know one another.  They have used the process to identify shared goals and visions for the 
fishery and to develop strategies to reach those goals.  They have used the process to develop 
more defensible policies and to seek new avenues for collective action.  Remarkably, the plan is 
designed to achieve its goals in a voluntary and non-binding fashion.  Despite the fact that the 
plan commits members to more meetings, more research, and more tasks above their already 
over-extended portfolios, participants value and adhere to the process.  Their interest in the 
agreement remains strong, their appreciation for science is solid, their pledge to produce 
objectives and plans is ongoing, and they value relationships.  The plan is generally robust, owing 
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mainly to its design principles, is applicable to conditions in the Great Lakes region, and has the 
potential to be replicable in other regions.  Members believe the plan adds value to Great Lakes 
fishery management and, therefore, approve of the extra effort they must make to work with their 





METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
This research is about how and why fishery managers throughout the Great Lakes basin, 
from many different jurisdictions, interact with each other.  It focuses on the managers’ 
participation in A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, their tool for 
multijurisdictional cooperation and asks:  Why do fishery managers take collective action in 
Great Lakes fishery management and what do fishery managers hope to achieve when they 
participate in the Joint Strategic Plan? 
 This research is qualitative and designed to evaluate the Joint Strategic Plan regime in 
the context of theories related to cooperation, collective action, federalism, and binding/non-
binding institutions.  The strategy to reach the goals of this research was to first attain a rich 
understanding of what this regime means to the people who are a part of it and then to apply that 
understanding to existing literature and extend hypotheses related to the theory discussed.  This  
design is based on the principles of “interpretive” and “grounded theory” research.  Interpretive 
research is a technique where the researcher enters into a dialogue with the participants to learn 
what the situation means to them (Lin 2001).  Because the fishery managers’ participation in the 
Joint Strategic Plan is voluntary and because the plan is only as successful as the members want it 
to be, understanding the plan means one must interpret or construct an idea of what the process 
means to the participants themselves.  The research seeks to know, for example, what managers 
see as the plan’s purpose.  Therefore, it is most suitable to use qualitative methods to construct a 
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framework that illustrates these attitudes.  Grounded theory is an approach where a researcher 
develops categories, hypotheses, and theories based on collected data and the literature (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967; Lin 2001).  A grounded theory approach helps the researcher relate his data and 
hypotheses (developed during the interpretive phase of the research) to literature that might not be 
suitable enough to serve as the foundation for a “positivist” (theory-driven, hypothesis-testing) 
approach yet still might be relevant to the project (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  A grounded-theory-
based analysis helped turn the managers’ feelings about the Joint Strategic Plan into a conceptual 
illustration of Great Lakes fishery management. 
To understand how and why managers participate in the Joint Strategic Plan process, and 
to understand how the attitudes toward cooperation work in practice, this research relied on four 
main methods of data collection and analysis:  semi-structured interviews, participant 




The purpose of the interviews was to talk one-on-one with those who participate in the 
Great Lakes fishery management regime.  The researcher chose semi-structured interviews over a 
fixed-form approach, recognizing that each participant would bring a unique perspective to the 
process and, therefore, should be afforded a free-flowing opportunity to talk about particular 
issues within his or her interest or area of expertise.  A fixed-form interview would have been too 
rigid.   
The participant pool included lake committee members, technical committee members, 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission members and staff, and people (active or retired) with particular 
knowledge of the lake committee process (e.g., senior fishery managers, academicians, federal 
agency personnel).  Managers began to formulate the Joint Strategic Plan in 1978, so the 
researcher reviewed lake committee minutes from 1978 to the present to generate a broad list of 
individuals active in the fishery management regime through the years.  All current and former 
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lake committee members were included on the list, along with individuals who clearly influenced 
fishery management (some names appeared regularly, indicating long-standing involvement in 
management).  The researcher also asked key individuals still active in fishery management to 
provide him with ideas for potential interviewees.  After removing deceased or inaccessible 
individuals, the list contained approximately 175 names.  Time and resources permitted 66 
interviews. 
To narrow the list, the researcher sought participants from each of the jurisdictions and 
from each of the lakes.  Because the number of current lake committee members is small (twenty 
total), he kept all lake committee members on the list.  Several former lake committee members,  
current and former Great Lakes Fishery Commission members and staff, academicians, and 
technical committee members were selected based on their expected knowledge of the process, 
their geographical distribution, and their willingness to participate in the research.  To judge 
whether the potential participant indeed participated meaningfully in the process, the researcher 
relied on his own familiarity with participants, on references to individuals in minutes, and on 
expert advice from long-serving Joint Strategic Plan participants.  Table A-1 provides details 
about the participants, the reasons their input was seen as valuable, and the criteria to invite their 
participation.  
Sixty-six individuals were asked to participate in the interviews.  No invited participant 
declined to be interviewed, though four interviews were not conducted for logistical reasons.  
Twenty-nine percent of the participants were Canadian and 71 percent American, a ratio roughly 
consistent with the surface area of the Great Lakes in each country (all of Lake Michigan is in the 
United States).  Participants were informed that the interviews would be voluntary and 
confidential.  The researcher attained informed consent from each participant prior to the 
interview.  Participants were asked questions about their professional background, the Joint 
Strategic Plan’s impact, why they attend Joint Strategic Plan meetings, potential changes to the 
plan, and their philosophy about fishery management.  During the interviews, most questions on  
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Category Type of  Participant 







Senior fishery managers, 
appointed to lake 
committees by parent 
jurisdiction; primary 
participants in Joint 
Strategic Plan process 
Provided direct insights 
into lake committee 
process; primary 
participants 







primary participants in 
Joint Strategic Plan 
process 
Provided insights into 




lake they represent, and 
willingness to participate 
Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission and 
Staff 
Officials from agency 
responsible for 
implementing the Joint 
Strategic Plan 
Provided insights into the 
nature of and reasons for 
cooperation; observations 
about sub-national 
adherence to the plan; 
institutional knowledge 
Knowledge of the 
process, accessibility, and 
willingness to participate 
People with 
Particular  
Knowledge of Lake 
Committee Process 
Officials from agencies 
not signatory to the Joint 
Strategic Plan; retirees;  
academicians; those with 
particular knowledge of 
the process 
Provided historical 
insights and insights from 
knowledgeable outside 
observers 
Knowledge of the 
process, accessibility, and 
willingness to participate 
Table A-1:  Participant pool, reason for input, and selection criteria for interviews. 
 
 
the list were asked, though not always in the same order or in the same context.  Additional 
questions, suitable to the participant’s particular experience, were pursued as probe questions.  
Appendix B contains the list of interview questions and the list of participants.  The first 
interview was conducted on February 23, 2004 and the last on February 10, 2005.  Participants 
were generally interviewed at their place of business or (in the case of several retirees) at their 
homes.  Two interviews were conducted by telephone.  Table A-2 provides details about the 
sixty-two participants. 
All interviews but four were tape recorded.  Two declined to be tape recorded and the 
two telephone interviews, for technical reasons, were not recorded.  One of three disinterested 
third parties transcribed each recorded interview verbatim; the researcher compiled detailed notes 





PARTICIPANTS BY COUNTRY             
 Canada USA              
N 18 44              
% 29 71              
                
PARTICIPANTS BY JURISDICTION            
 Academic CORA 
Fed 
Canada Fed U.S. GLFC GLIFWC IL IN MI MN NY OH ON PA WI 
N 5 2 2 4 6 4 3 1 10 2 4 2 11 2 4 
% 8 3 3 6 10 6 5 2 16 3 6 3 18 3 6 
                













         
N 8 10 3 8 4 29          
% 13 16 5 13 6 47          
                






Manager GLFC Fed Oth 
        
N 20 9 9 8 8 3 5         
% 32 15 15 13 13 5 8         
                
Table A-2:  Interview participants by country, jurisdiction, lake, and affiliation.   
 
Not all percentages add due to rounding.  Abbreviations:  CORA=Chippewa-Ottawa Resource Authority; GLIFWC=Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife 
Commission; GLFC=Great Lakes Fishery Commission; LC=lake committee; TC=technical committee.  IL=Illinois, IN=Indiana, MI=Michigan, NY=New 
York, OH=Ohio, ON=Ontario, PA=Pennsylvania, WI=Wisconsin. 
 
*Some participants have more than one affiliation.  For example, some federal participants are also technical committee members.  Only one affiliation was 





Participant observation is about becoming a part of the research setting and observing 
people as they go about their business (Emerson et al. 1995).  Fortunately for a researcher 
interested in Great Lakes fishery management, the Joint Strategic Plan calls upon participants to 
meet frequently and share data, develop shared objectives, and socialize.  Thus, there were 
abundant opportunities to observe the plan in action.  Lake committees meet in public every 
March.  In addition, the Council of Lake Committees meets twice a year (in April and October) 
and numerous technical committee and executive meetings occur regularly.   
Using participant observation techniques outlined in Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw (1995) 
the researcher took systematic fieldnotes during most public and non-public lake committee, 
technical committee, Council of Lake Committees, and related meetings during 2003 through 
2005.  (As part of his job, the researcher attended Joint Strategic Plan meetings regularly since 
1995 but not did not take fieldnotes prior to the University of Michigan’s Institutional Review 
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Board’s approval of his research design.)  The researcher focused on the meetings’ overall tone, 
personalities, body language, gestures, and other things related to cooperation.  Because part of 
the researcher’s occupation is to attend lake committee and related meetings, he had ready access 
to both open and closed meetings.  The researcher attained permission from the chair of each 
committee to attend non-public meetings for the purposes of this project.  While committee 
members and others were generally aware of his research, there was no indication that the 
researcher’s presence affected the meetings.  Many times during the course of the meetings, the 
researcher was asked to participate normally in his professional capacity.  Fieldnotes were 
written-up as soon as possible after they were taken.  The interviews provided a wealth of 
information about the managers’ opinions about cooperation and participant observation provided 





The Joint Strategic Plan calls for the maintenance of a decision record. As such, a 
significant amount of materials like management plans and objectives, minutes, reports, white 
papers, memos, and other documents were available for analysis.  The documents provided facts 
(e.g., specific actions, dates, etc.) and helped illustrate how managers make decisions.  Most of 




 Interviews, fieldnotes, and documents yielded a considerable amount of data.  To make 
sense of the information and to organize the data into emergent themes, the researcher used 
computer software (“Nvivo”) designed for qualitative research and followed steps to manage 
data, similar to a process presented by Miles and Huberman (1984).  Miles and Huberman 
suggest that data be coded, analyzed, and developed into a conceptual framework.   Data-coding 
was an on-going process whereby the researcher first read the interview transcripts and fieldnotes 
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and engaged in what Miles and Huberman call “pattern coding.”  Pattern coding is where the 
researcher looks for broad themes, contexts, and relationships in the data to gain a broad 
understanding of the information, in its totality.  
The next step was to “open code” the information.  Through open coding, the researcher 
went through the interviews and fieldnotes, line by line, and sorted the data by specific theme, 
idea, and context.  Open coding distinguishes between subtle differences in sentiments and 
themes and, thus, yields a large number of codes.  Figure A-1 is a screen image of the code list in 
Nvivo.  Open codes are shown in lowercase (e.g., “builds relationships-understanding,” 
highlighted) illustrating a few of the many types of themes raised in the data.  Any time a 
participant raised the issue in the context of the code, or any time participant behavior yielded an 
example of the code’s sentiments, those data were sorted under that code’s heading. As figure A-
1 partially illustrates, there was wide range of topics raised during the data collection. 
 After open coding, the broad codes were consolidated through a process Miles and 
Huberman call “cluster coding.”  Cluster coding is a way to take the particular themes identified 
through open coding and consolidate them into more general categories.  Figure A-1 also 
illustrates some of the cluster coding of this research.  In this figure, all codes relating to 
respondents’ comments about the impact of the Joint Strategic Plan were analyzed broadly and 
organized under several categories, shown in all capital letters in figure A-1 (e.g., “AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIPS, PEOPLE”).  Specific comments in the context of accountability, leadership, 
allowing agencies to keep an eye on each other, building relationships, etc. were clustered under 
the more general category called “AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, PEOPLE.”  The open coding 







Figure A-1:  Nvivo screen image illustrating open coding 
(codes shown in lowercase) and cluster coding (categories 
shown in all capital letters). 
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Case study analysis 
 
Case study analysis, used in chapters 3 and 5, was a helpful method in further 
understanding the fishery managers’ level of commitment to the plan and was a useful descriptive 
and explanatory tool to put issues into context, particularly in the absence of the ability to 
manipulate events (Yin 2003).  Besides being a broad, single case study about Great Lakes 
fishery governance under the Joint Strategic Plan, this research also analyzed three specific Great 
Lakes fishery management cases—the implementation of the Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife 
Restoration Act over three iterations, lake trout restoration in Lake Superior, and Lake Erie 
walleye management—to understand whether the managers’ goals for and commitment to 
cooperation were reflected in management action.  Understanding the reasons for cooperation and 
then applying that understanding to cases of Great Lakes fishery management helped improve 




Interview data, participant observation, Joint Strategic Plan documents, and case study 
analysis helped to build an understanding of Great Lakes fishery management through the Joint 
Strategic Plan regime.  This understanding was applied to and helped extend existing literature.  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 each are grounded in separate but related bodies of literature.  Chapter 2 
addresses how and why participants use the plan to cooperate with each other in Great Lakes 
fishery management.  Literature addressing how and why people cooperate in common-pool-
resource-settings was relevant to this chapter.  Chapter 3 addresses how participants use the Joint 
Strategic Plan to delineate federal and non-federal spheres of influence and how they use the plan 
to achieve intergovernmental relations.  Literature discussing Canadian and U.S. federalism, and 
literature about intergovernmental relations—particularly Scheberle’s (2004) model in Federalism 
and Environmental Policy—was important to this chapter.  Chapter 4 addresses the Joint Strategic 
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Plan as an alternative to a binding agreement.  Literature concerning jurisdictional sovereignty, 
agreements, and institutions further explained the participants’ attitudes in this area. 
 
 
Emergent themes and use of data in narrative 
 
 The process of pattern coding, open coding, and cluster coding allowed the researcher to 
gain a both a specific and general understanding of the data.  The cluster coding, for example, 
helped to show the general context under which participants responded to certain questions posed 
during the interviews, and with these general categories in mind, and after a broad review of 
literature, the researcher selected the themes on which to focus in the individual chapters of the 
dissertation.   
Quotations presented in the narrative were selected because they are generally illustrative 
of the types of responses commonly provided and generally are representative of the participants’ 
sentiments.  Miles and Huberman (1984, p. 230) explain how the process of analyzing qualitative 
data is inherently a subjective process: 
Most qualitative researchers work alone in the field.  Each is a one-person research 
machine:  defining the problems, doing the sampling, designing the instruments, 
collecting the information, reducing the information, analyzing it, interpreting it, writing 
it up.  A vertical monopoly.  When we read the reports, they are most often heavy on the 
“what” (the findings, the descriptions) and wafer thin on the “how” (how one got to the 
“what”).  In most cases, we don’t read how, exactly, the researcher got from 500 pages of 
field notes to the main conclusions drawn, and we don’t know how much confidence we 
can place in them.  Researchers are not being obtuse.  It’s just that they have very little 
that is systematic to draw upon. 
 
The systematic process of coding and the comprehensive treatment of data helped the researcher 
focus on the important themes of the Joint Strategic Plan process.  Quotations chosen are those 
that provide evidence or illustration of these themes.   
 
Protocols to improve participation, reliability, and validity 
 
Several reliability and validity issues are relevant to this research design.  Reliability is 
whether a measure produces the same results regardless of who measures the data and when the 
data is measured (Kirk and Miller 1986).  This means the measures should yield replicable 
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results, a major goal of research (King et al. 1994).  For qualitative, interpretive research based on 
participant observation and interviews, gathering reliable data that yields replicable results is 
difficult because categorizations and conclusions are based generally on the researcher’s 
perception.  This reliability issue was mitigated by the fact that interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and coded and re-coded systematically to categorize the information and to uncover 
emergent themes.  Fieldnotes, of course, were not verbatim.  They were a reflection of the 
researcher’s perception of events, and such data are inherently selective and subjective.  To 
increase the chances that the notes accurately reflected the events, the researcher wrote up the 
notes as soon after the meetings as possible (often alone in a hotel room while others were 
enjoying the evening’s social gathering).  The interviews and fieldnotes, thus, are a reasonably 
accurate reflection of sentiments or events. 
Validity is accurate measurement (Kaplan 1964; King et al. 1994); it is, as King et al 
(1994) stress, “measuring what we think we are measuring.”  The key issue with this research is 
whether it is valid to develop theories about cooperation in the Great Lakes based on fishery 
managers’ opinions.  Because this regime is a product of the fishery managers themselves, it is 
only as legitimate as they think it is.  As noted above, the data presented in the narrative—
primarily in the form of quotations from the interviews—were selected based on the extent to 
which the data illustrated major themes that emerged from the research.  While this was a 
subjective process, the participants interviewed were representative of the fishery managers in the 
Great Lakes region and, thus, quotations from the interviews have a heightened chance of 
representing the sentiments of Great Lakes fishery managers than if the participants were not a 
representative sample.  All lake committee members were interviewed; no member as of 2004 
was excluded from the interview pool and no member declined to be interviewed.   
Other participants (for instance technical committee members, past participants, 
academicians, Great Lakes Fishery Commission officials) were also interviewed, but not one-
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hundred-percent of the possible pool.  These individuals were selected by using the criteria 
discussed above (table A-1).  By not choosing those participants at random, a “selection bias” 
was introduced into the research (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Collier 1995; King et al. 1994), 
raising the question of whether the sample represents the opinions of non-lake committee 
members.  The literature suggests the approach taken—not relying on random selection to choose 
interview participants—is  methodologically acceptable (Collier 1995; King et al. 1994; Schuman 
and Kalton 1985) because the individuals were chosen carefully, based on the researchers’ 
knowledge and on expert advice. By choosing interviewees based on their participation level, 
their knowledge of the fishery, or their geographic distribution, individuals were chosen who the 
researcher believed would best address the research questions.  This approach helped avoid the risk of 
losing important interviews because they might not have been part of the random selection. This 
limited, however, the researcher’s ability to compare the sentiments of different types of participant, as 
some types of participant (e.g., former lake committee members) might have been underrepresented. 
Overall, the interviews illustrated a general consensus in responses, helping to gain an 
understanding of both the perceptions of a representative group of participants in Great Lakes 
fishery management and to understand why cooperation persists in this regime.  
The small number of case studies limited the number of instances upon which to apply 
variables such as the existence of the epistemic community, flexibility, adherence to science, and 
other elements related to the fishery management regime.  However, because the Joint Strategic 
Plan is essentially a single case study, there is little variation on the independent variables.  All  
lake committees adhere to similar processes, for example.  What the research loses by not 
applying these variables to a large number of cases (to attempt to expose variation) it gains in 
attaining a deep understanding of the Joint Strategic Plan as a case study of multijurisdictional 
fisheries management.  The shorter case studies chosen for this research—the Fish and Wildlife 
Restoration Act, lake trout restoration, and the walleye dispute—were not chosen randomly or 
designed to test independent variables.  Instead, the cases were chosen because they illustrated 
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well the points drawn from the interviews (in the lake trout and Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act 
cases) and provided an example of a departure from the normal course (in the walleye 
management case).  This method of selecting cases is acceptable because it allows the researcher 
to give particular and explicit consideration to certain regime characteristics (Agrawal 2002). 
This research provides a rich understanding of how and why the Great Lakes fishery 
management regime functions.  The main trade-off for this particular understanding of Great 
Lakes fisheries is external validity (generalizeability).  The research tells much about the Great 
Lakes process, but, with a different set of participants and different circumstances, it is not clear 
the extent to which this research could help others understand management where they are.  
Chapter 6 identifies the conditions under which the Joint Strategic Plan emerged and notes the 
plan’s design principles that allow it to function in the Great Lakes region.  The chapter also 
speculates on the plan’s robustness and fragility and its applicability to other regions.  This 
dissertation, however, did not analyze other regimes in other regions, and, thus, is limited in its 
ability to provide a direct, detailed comparison. 
The use of interviews and participant-observation as a research method presented other 
validity and reliability issues.  As an employee of the commission charged with implementing the 
Joint Strategic Plan, the researcher had tremendous access to the plan’s primary participants.  
Most of the participants knew the researcher (some for many years) and had developed a strong 
relationship with his employer, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission.  This could have introduced 
into the research a “subject bias” (also called “consequential presence” or “reactive effects”); a 
bias that occurs when the participants’ responses are influenced by how they feel they should be 
perceived by the researcher (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Emerson et al. 1995; Robson 1999).  
For example, participants might have felt the need to make the Joint Strategic Plan process sound 
better than it is to compliment the commission’s ability to facilitate the process, to make superiors 
(who have placed a lot of faith in the plan) look competent and cooperative, or to make the 
participants appear absolutely committed to the process.  In such a situation, the participants’ 
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responses would be affected by to whom they were speaking; a different interviewer—one not 
affiliated with the commission—would have solicited different responses purely because of how 
the participant thought he was perceived. 
The researcher’s particular knowledge probably did much to increase validity, as the 
researcher’s deep understanding of the process and his insider status helped him better understand 
exactly what the participants were saying and in what context.  An outside researcher would have 
been less capable of understanding the context and, therefore, more limited in understanding what 
he was hearing.  Concerning the reliability threat—whether the subject bias affected the 
answers—the researcher followed established protocols to assure the participants that their 
responses would be confidential.  Participants were given that assurance in writing, along with an 
assurance that their names would not be connected to the interviews or used in the final analysis.  
Participants were also advised that interview recordings would be stored securely and destroyed 
after the analysis and that they could drop out of the research at any time, though none did.  These 
protocols were designed to solicit honest and open responses and accurate measures, and the 
researcher had no reason to believe that participants were concerned about confidentiality.   
Finally, the researcher attended lake committee meetings and other Joint Strategic Plan 
events for more than a decade and took fieldnotes for this project over a two-year period.  One 
threat to validity, say Miles and Huberman (Miles and Huberman 1984), is generalizing from events 
that are not representative of the particular subject being researched.  The fact that the researcher 
was familiar with the process and had observed it over time lessened the chances that his 
perceptions of interview data or events he observed during only the course of his research were 
anomalous or unrepresentative of the process.  While decisions about which quotations or events 
from which to generalize was subjective, with his long-standing participation in the process, the 
researcher was in an improved position to select evidence that he believed was illustrative of the 




INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 
I. “Demographic” questions 
 
1. You are currently working in [___].  What was your degree in?  How did you get to your 
position?   Where did you go to school?  Would you say your education prepared you for your 
work in the Great Lakes?  What is your current position and how long have you been in it?  To 
whom do you answer in your agency (not a person, but a position)?  How long have you been 
a lake committee member? 
 
2. What other positions have you held in the Great Lakes region—either with your agency or 
otherwise? 
 
II. The Great Lakes fishery regime 
 
The purpose of my research is to understand the process of fishery management on the Great 
Lakes and to gather your thoughts about how the jurisdictions interact.  So, I would like to turn now 
to some questions about the Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries.   
 
3. What do think the impact of the Joint Strategic Plan has been?  Has the Joint Strategic Plan been 
successful?  How would you define success?  What types of issues cannot be addressed by the plan? 
 
4. Broadly speaking, what do you hope to achieve by participating in the Joint Strategic Plan’s 
processes, such as lake committee meetings? 
 
5. Do politicians and senior officials in your agency expect you to cooperate with other 
jurisdictions on the Great Lakes? 
 
6. In what ways, if any, do you approach fishery management on the Great Lakes differently from 
management that takes place entirely within your jurisdiction?   
 
7. Has the plan ever compelled you take action you might not otherwise have taken?  Why did you 
take the action?  What was the management result? (Do management decisions made in other 
jurisdictions ever affect how you do your job?  How?  Ask for case examples for future study.) 
 
8. Do you respect your colleagues from other jurisdictions?  Are other fishery managers at the 
same professional level as you? 
 
III. Fishery manager’s beliefs/concluding questions 
 
9. Do you think an overarching philosophy guides fishery management on the Great Lakes 
today?  (How would you characterize that philosophy  Has it changed over time?)   
 
10. Is the prevailing philosophy consistent with your beliefs about how the fishery should be 
managed?  (If not, how do you handle the conflict between the prevailing philosophy and your 
personal beliefs?) 
 
11. Looking ahead, should the plan stay as it is or be modified?  Or, should there be a different 
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TABLE C-1:  ELEMENTS OF AND MAJOR CHANGES TO THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN 
Significant differences in bold 
 
 1981 (Original version) 1997 
Shared Goal 
Statement 
To secure fish communities, based on foundations of stable self-sustaining stocks, 
supplemented by judicious plantings of hatchery-reared fish, and provide from these 
communities an optimum contribution of fish, fishing opportunities and associated 
benefits to meet needs identified by society for: wholesome food, recreation, 
employment and income, and a healthy human environment."   
To secure fish communities, based on foundations of stable self-sustaining stocks, supplemented by 
judicious plantings of hatchery-reared fish, and provide from these communities an optimum contribution 
of fish, fishing opportunities and associated benefits to meet needs identified by society for: wholesome 
food, recreation, cultural heritage, employment and income, and a healthy human environment."   
Great Lakes 
Fishery Issues 
• Lost fishing opportunities 
• Instability of fish communities (exotic species, over harvest) 
• Inadequate environment quality (land uses, water uses, atmospheric input) 
• Competition and conflict among users (allocation among jurisdictions, commercial 
v sport fishing, native v other users) 
• Access to the resource 
• Lost fishing opportunities.  This version emphasized contaminated sediments and long-range 
transportation of persistent toxic chemicals. 
• Instability of fish communities (exotic species, over harvest)  This version emphasized the increase 
in the rate of exotics. 
• Inadequate environment quality (land uses, water uses, atmospheric input)  This version 
emphasized the establishment of common consumption advisories 
• Competition and conflict among users (allocation among jurisdictions, commercial v sport fishing, 
native v other users) 
• Access to the resource 







• Environmental Management 
• Management of Information 
• Consensus 
• Accountability 
• Ecosystem Management (purpose was to emphasize the need for fishery agencies to work with 
“non-fishery” agencies) 
• Management of Information 
Dispute Resolution 
Procedures 
If consensus cannot be achieved, the GLFC can hold a hearing and arbitrate differences, 
report its finding, and make recommendations for resolution to proper agencies. 
If consensus cannot be achieved, a party may (a)  request the GLFC to arrange/facilitate an information 
exchange forum, (b) seek advice of existing plan committees, (c) ask the commission to arrange third-party 
mediation with any resolution being endorsed through the normal plan procedures, and/or (d) ask the 




• harmony, cooperation, sympathy 
• group solidarity in sentiment and belief 
• general agreement 
• collective opinion 
• the judgment arrived at by most of those concerned 
• "emergent consensus":  results from a crystallization of opinion after all viewpoints 
heard. 
• Consensus has been reached when no party to the negotiation objects to the opinion 
• Signing of a public document helps ensure adherence to the consensus decisions. 



















1. Fish community objectives developed, and a means to measure progress 
2. Lake Committees identify environmental objectives 
3. GLFC create Fish Habitat Advisory Committee 
4. Each agency should identify its plans for achieving the fish community and 
environmental objectives 
5. Each fishery agency should notify others of substantive changes in practice 
6. If a change in practice affects others, it is subject to negotiation through the lake 
committees, until consensus is achieved. 
7. If consensus cannot be achieved, the GLFC can hold a hearing and arbitrate 
differences, report its finding, and make recommendations for resolution to proper 
agencies. 
8. Unresolved environmental issues may be referred by the lake committees to the 
GLFC so that the GLFC can represent the fishery interests before the appropriate 
bodies (e.g., IJC) 
9. Consensus decisions that require action by more than one agency shall be a matter 
of record. 
10. Annual reports of progress toward FCOs shall be made by the lake committees. 
11. Each lake committee will prepare a progress report and make recommendations to 
agencies and the GLFC. 
12. GLFC’s annual report will include a summary of lake committee actions. 
13. The GLFC will coordinate development of data standards, maintain a current 
inventory, facilitate access to data. 
14. Agencies are encouraged to share data with other agencies. 
1. Fish community objectives and a means to measure progress. 
2. Each agency should identify its plans for achieving the fish community objectives 
3. Each fishery agency should notify others of substantive changes in practice 
4. If a change in practice affects others, it is subject to negotiation through the lake committees, until 
consensus is achieved. 
5. If consensus cannot be achieved, a party may (a)  request the GLFC to arrange/facilitate an 
information exchange forum, (b) seek advice of existing plan committees, (c) ask the 
commission to arrange third-party mediation with any resolution being endorsed through the 
normal plan procedures, and/or (d) ask the commission to arrange a process involving a 
mutually acceptable third-party intermediary to make a non-binding recommendation. 
6. Lake Committees identify environmental objectives 
7. Lake committees will work with LaMPs to develop joint proposals to the GLFC or other 
organizations to identify environmental needs relative to fishery needs.  
8. Unresolved environmental issues may be referred by the lake committees to the GLFC so that the 
GLFC can represent the fishery interests before the appropriate bodies (e.g., IJC) 
9. GLFC will maintain a Habitat Advisory Board 
10. Fishery agencies will collectively protect aquatic resources from exotic species 
11. The GLFC will coordinate development of data standards, maintain a current inventory, facilitate 
access to data. 
12. The GLFC and the parties will coordinate development and implementation of models for 
common use 
13. All parties are encouraged to maintain databases on the internet. 
14. Agencies are encouraged to share data with other agencies. 
15. Consensus decisions will be recorded through minutes. 
16. Each agency should make annual reports to the lake committees. 
17. Each lake committee will make an annual report to the GLFC.  Once every 5 years, each lake 
committee will hold a sate of the lake conference and write a report card. 
18. GLFC’s annual report will include a summary of lake committee actions. 
19. All parties must approve changes to the plan or the addition of new members. 
20. CGLFA established to ensure accountability, implementation, provide guidance, ensure timely 
information exchange, etc. 
Signatories 1. Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
2. Illinois Department of Conservation 
3. Indiana Department of Natural Resources 
4. Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
5. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 
6. National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA) 
7. New York DEC 
8. Ohio Department of Natural Resources 
9. Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources 
10. Pennsylvania Fish Commission 
11. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
12. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
1. Chippewa-Ottawa Resource Authority—Signed in 1989 
2. Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
3. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission—Signed in 1989 
4. Illinois Department of Conservation 
5. Indiana Department of Natural Resources 
6. Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
7. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 
8. National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA) 
9. New York DEC 
10. Ohio Department of Natural Resources 
11. Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources 
12. Pennsylvania Fish Commission 
13. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
14. U.S. Geological Survey 
15. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
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TABLE D-1:  SUMMARY OF FISH COMMUNITY OBJECTIVES—ALL GREAT LAKES 
 





1995 1995 2003 1999 
1989 
Reference 
Horns, W. H., C. R. Bronte, T. R. 
Busiahn, M. Ebener, R Eshenroder, 
L., T. Gorenflo, N. Kmiecik, W. 
Mattes, J. W. Peck, M. Petzold, and 
D. R. Schreiner. 2003. Fish 
community objectives for Lake 
Superior, Special Publication 03-01. 
Ann Arbor: Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission. 
DesJardine, R.L., T. Gorenflo, R. N. 
Payne, and J. D. Schrouder. 1995. 
Fish-Community objectives for Lake 
Huron, Special publication 95-1. 
Ann Arbor: Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission 
Eshenroder, R. L., M. E. Holey, T. 
Gorenflo, and R. D. Clark. 1995. 
Fish-community objectives for Lake 
Michigan, Special publication 95-3. 
Ann Arbor: Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission. 
Ryan, P.A., R. Knight, R. 
MacGregor, G. Towns, R. Hoopes, 
and W. Culligan. 2003. Fish-
Community goals and objectives for 
Lake Erie, Special publication 03-02. 
Ann Arbor: Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission. 
Stewart, T. J., R. E. Lange, S. D. 
Orsatti, C. P. Schneider, A. Mathers, 
and M. E. Daniels. 1999. Fish-
Community objectives for Lake 
Ontario, Special publication 99-1. 
Ann Arbor: Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission 
How broad fish 
community objectives 
are reached 
 Literature review and historical 
records. 
 Analysis of quantity and quality 
of habitat. 
 Data from lake committee and 
technical committee members. 
 Consensus-based discussions 
among lake committee and 
technical committee members. 
 Knowledge and experience of 
the members. 
 Data from State-of-the-Lake 
reports. 
Same Same Same Same.  In addition, the Lake 
Ontario Committee held two 
workshops to evaluate the human 
and natural influences on Lake 
Ontario and the committee held a 
series of public meetings to 
gather information related to the 
objectives.  Stakeholder 
preferences were considered as 
the fish community objectives 
were developed. 
Stated purpose(s) of 
the fish community 
objectives 
 Promoting a common 
understanding of how the Lake 
Superior ecosystem functions. 
 Providing a unified direction to 
guide management practices. 
 “To provide an umbrella under 
which management agencies 
are expected to develop more-
specific plans and strategies.” 
 “[T]o provide a framework for 
future decision making.” 
 “[To] help define an unified 
direction and purpose for the 
multitude of management 
activities occurring around the 
lake.” 
 “[These] goals and objectives 
will guide the development of 
strategies and management 
actions within a framework of 
sound ecological concepts and 
basic guiding principles.” 
 “This document will be used to 
guide the delivery of [NY and 
ON’s] mandates for managing 
the fish community and fisheries 
of Lake Ontario.” 
 To serve as “the starting point 
for developing more-specific 
fisheries, habitat, and watershed 
management plans.” 
Major emphasis of 
objectives 
 Natural reproduction of species. 
 Habitat protection. 
 Prevention of new invasive 
species. 
 Top predators 
 Self-sustaining indigenous and 
naturalized species. 
 Restore and maintain the 
biological integrity of the 
resource 
 Sustainable and ecologically 
efficient use of the resource. 
 The open lake. 
 “Top-down” (predator) and 
“bottom-up” (nutrient) forces on 
the fish communities. 
 To balance stakeholder 





 LAKE SUPERIOR LAKE HURON LAKE MICHIGAN LAKE ERIE LAKE ONTARIO 
On cooperation 
amongst the agencies 
 Essential to develop a shared 
understanding of the fishery and 
the overall goals and objectives. 
 Specific management strategies 
to reach the shared objectives, 
are up to each of the 
jurisdictions. 
 Management by consensus is a 
necessary route to achieve the 
goals of the Joint Strategic Plan. 
 Stated objectives further 
commits the individual agencies 
to protecting and restoring the 
lake’s fisheries. 
 The objectives are the umbrella 
under which agencies develop 
their own specific management 
plans. 
Lake committees are responsible 
for implementing a consensus 
approach to fisheries 
management. 
 The objectives were developed 
by the Lake Erie Committee. 
 “All agencies should continue 
the highly successful 
multijurisdictional, cooperative 
approach to fisheries 
management under the [Lake 
Erie Committee].” 
 Standing technical committees 
of the Lake Erie Committee 
should continue to meet the 
science needs of the Lake Erie 
Committee. 
It was important to New York and 
Ontario to together undertake the 
public consultation processes to 
develop the fish community 
objectives. 
Significant species of 
the lake, as noted in 
the objectives 
 Brook trout 
 Deepwater ciscoes 
 Diporeia (a zooplankter) 
 Lake herring 
 Lake trout (“humper” and 
siscowet varieties) 
 Lake whitefish 
 Mysis (a zooplankter) 
 Sculpins 
 Sea lamprey (exotic nuisance) 
 Sturgeon 
 Alewife (naturalized) 
 Bass 
 Burbot 
 Channel catfish 
 Lake Sturgeon 
 Lake trout 
 Northern pike 
 Rainbow smelt (naturalized) 
 Sculpins 
 Sea lamprey (exotic nuisance) 
 Six salmonids (e.g., pacific 
salmon) (naturalizes) 
 Walleye 
 Whitefish (deepwater ciscoes, 
herring, lake whitefish) 
 Alewife (naturalized) 
 Brown trout (naturalized) 
 Burbot 
 Chinook salmon (naturalized) 
 Coho salmon (naturalized) 
 Deepwater ciscoes 
 Deepwater sculpin 
 Diporeia (a zooplankter) 
 Emerald shiner 
 Lake herring 
 Lake trout 
 Lake whitefish 
 Mysis (a zooplankter) 
 Rainbow trout (naturalized) 
 Sturgeon 
 Walleye 
 Yellow perch 
 Cercopagus (an exotic nuisance 
zooplankter) 
 Gizzard shad 
 Lake trout 
 Muskellunge 
 Round goby (exotic nuisance) 
 Sea lamprey (exotic nuisance) 
 Smallmouth bass 




 White perch (naturalized) 
 Whitefish 
 Yellow perch 
 Zebra mussels (exotic nuisance) 
 Alewife (exotic nuisance) 
 American eel 
 Atlantic salmon 
 Burbot 
 Deepwater and slimy sculpins 
 Deepwater ciscoes 
 Emerald and spottail shiners 
 Lake herring 
 Lake sturgeon 
 Lake trout 
 Lake Whitefish 
 Northern pike 
 Rainbow smelt (naturalized) 
 Sea lamprey (exotic nuisance) 
 Walleye 
 Yellow perch 
On ecosystem 
management 
Attained through on-going 
dialogue with environmental 
management agencies. 
 
 Shift from single species to 
entire ecosystems. 
 Key issues:  stability, balance, 
sustainability of the fishery. 
 Public advisory committees 
were “instrumental” in shaping 
objectives. 
 “The Joint [Strategic] Plan 
recognized that the fish 
community in each lake must be 
managed as a whole.” 
 The Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement calls for the 
chemical, physical, and 
biological restoration of the 
Great Lakes.  Linking all three 
supports “ecosystem integrity.” 
 
 “The management of Lake Erie 
fish communities and related 
fish habitat must consider the 
entire lake, including continuous 
rivers, streams, and 
embayments that provide 
important spawning and nursery 
habitat for many fish species 
that inhabit the open waters of 
Lake Erie.” 
 Great Lakes fisheries 
management has been shifting 
from individual fish species to 
the entire fish community. 
 The lake must be managed as 
an ecosystem.  Humans are 
included in the complex 
interrelationships. 
 The Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement is important to 






















 Protect habitat 
 The productivity of the lake as a 
whole is limited, thus, single-
species management is un-
realistic—the entire fishery 
needs to be managed within the 
overall bounds of what the lake 
can support. 
 Naturalized (non-native species) 
are a part of the ecosystem and, 
therefore, will affect fish 
community objectives. 
 Prevent further introductions of 
non-native species. 
 Fish and fisheries are culturally 
important. 
 Unexploited fishes are 
important. 
 Citizens have an interest and a 
role management decisions. 
 Management decisions should 
be supported by science. 
 Management must be 
coordinated among the 
agencies; agencies must share 
information. 
 There is limited ability to 
manage fisheries. 
 Preserve indigenous species 
and promote genetic diversity. 
 Lake must be managed as an 
ecosystem. 
 Preserve and restore habitat. 
 The amount of fish that can be 
harvested is limited and is 
determined by things like 
nutrients, habitat, and ability to 
respond to exploitation. 
 Naturally reproducing fish 
communities based on native 
fish are more predictable and 
sustainable. 
 Non-native species that have 
become naturalized must be 
viewed as part of the fish 
community. 
 Stocking is essential to restore 
fisheries. 
 Rare and endangered species 
should be safeguarded. 
 Species diversity contributes to 
balance and stability. 
 Genetic diversity is desirable. 
 Socioeconomic values are a 
priority in decision-making. 
 Fisheries are culturally 
important. 
 Good management is based on 
science. 
 Recognize the limits on lake 
productivity. 
 Preserve and restore fish 
habitat. 
 Preserve native species. 
 Enhance natural reproduction of 
native and desirable introduced 
fishes. 
 Acknowledge the role of planted 
fish. 
 Recognize naturalized species. 
 Adopt the ‘genetic stock 
concept’. 
 Recognize that fisheries are an 
important cultural heritage. 
 Prevent the unintentional 
introduction of exotic species. 
 Protect and enhance threatened 
and endangered species. 
 Self sustaining stocks provide 
the most predictable, 
sustainable, and cost-effective 
benefits to society. 
 Populations (stocks) of fish are 
the basic unit for conservation; 
fish stocks should be identified, 
monitored, and appropriately 
managed. 
 Priority should be given to 
native species where 
competitive interactions exist. 
 No non-native animals or plants 
will be un-intentionally 
introduced. 
 Habitat should be preserved 
and restored. 
 Rare and endangered species 
should be preserved. 
 Naturalized species should be 
recognized as part of the fish 
community and managed 
appropriately. 
 Species of value to sport and 
commercial fishers should be 
harvested on a sustainable 
basis. 
 Productivity of the lake is limited 
and, thus, managers, when 
making decisions, must 
recognize that harvest will be 
affected by the lake’s capacity. 
 Fish-community objectives must 
reflect the most-current science 
available. 
 Objectives must take 
stakeholder needs and 
preferences into account. 
 Stakeholders contribute vital 
knowledge to fishery managers 
in support of decision-making. 
 Ecosystem management—
including the place of humans—
is the guiding principle. 
 Humans only have a limited 
ability to directly influence the 
ecosystem. 
 Managing fish communities 
requires a long-term 
perspective. 
 Protection and rehabilitation of 
fish communities and habitats is 
essential. 
 There are ecological limits to the 
amount of fish that can be 
harvested. 
 Self-sustaining native and 
naturalized species are most 
desirable. 
 Stocked fish contribute to the 
ecology of the lake and provide 
fishing opportunities. 
 It is important to protect and 
improve native species. 
 Rare and endangered species 
should be protected. 
 Habitat protection and 



























 Habitat:  achieve no net loss; 
identifies habitat needs; 
identifies stresses to habitat, 
including stresses at specific 
sites. 
 Prey species:  achieve self-
sustaining assemblages of prey 
species; promote native prey 
species; limit commercial 
harvest. 
 Lake trout:  achieve diverse, 
self-sustaining populations 
similar to those of the 1940s, 
with lean lake trout being the 
dominant form offshore and 
humpers in eastern waters; 
prevent predation and 
overfishing. 
 Lake whitefish:  maintain self-
sustaining populations in the 
range of abundances of 1990-
1999. 
 Walleye:  Rehabilitate self-
sustaining populations. 
 Sturgeon:  rehabilitate self-
sustaining populations; slow 
excessive sport and commercial 
harvest; protect habitat; dam 
removal. 
 Brook trout:  maintain widely 
distributed populations. 
 Other naturalized species:  
manage so that they are 
compatible with native species. 
 Sea lamprey:  suppress to 
levels that cause insignificant 
mortality. 
 Invasive species:  prevent new 
introductions, prevent the 
spread, control if possible. 
 For specific species, broad 
objectives identified, factors 
affecting achieving objectives 
noted, and impediments listed. 
 Salmon and trout:  sustain a 
harvest of 2.4 million kg 
annually; lake trout should be 
the dominant salmonine. 
 Walleye and yellow perch:  Re-
establish or maintain walleye as 
the dominant cool-water 
predator and sustain a harvest 
of .7 million kg.  Maintain yellow 
perch as the dominant 
nearshore omnivore and sustain 
a harvest of .5 million kg. 
 Northern pike and muskellunge:  
Maintain pike as a prominent 
predator, protect and enhance 
the appeal of muskellunge, and 
sustain a harvest of .1 million kg 
of these species. 
 Channel catfish:  maintain it as 
a prominent predator and 
sustain a harvest of .2 million 
kg. 
 Lake Whitefish and ciscoes:  
Maintain the present diversity of 
these fish, sustain whitefish 
harvest at 3.8 million kg, and 
restore lake herring and 
deepwater ciscoes. 
 Sturgeon:  increase the 
abundance so that it is not listed 
as threatened in U.S. waters; 
rehabilitate populations in 
Canada. 
 Objectives for species diversity, 
genetic diversity, and habitat. 
 Prey species:  maintain a 
diversity of species that 
matches the ability of the lake to 
sustain prey and that satisfies 
predator demand. 
 Sea lamprey:  Reduce 
abundances to allow 
achievement of fish community 
objectives; reduce by 75% by 
2000 and 90% by 2010. 
 Salmon and trout:  sustain a 
harvest of 2.7 to 6.8 million kg, 
of which 20-25% is lake trout.  
Establish self-sustaining lake 
trout populations.  Determine 
what mix of species provides 
the largest sustainable yield. 
 Prey species (planktivores):  
Maintain a diversity of prey 
species at levels that match 
predator demand.  The goal is a 
lakewide prey biomass of .5 to 
.8 billion kg.  Do not manage for 
a single species (e.g., alewife).  
Native prey species are more 
desirable than exotic. 
 Inshore fishery:  Maintain self-
sustaining stocks of yellow 
perch, walleye, smallmouth 
bass, pike, catfish, and panfish.  
The target annual yield for 
yellow perch is .9 to 1.8 million 
kg; for walleye is .1 to .2 million 
kg. 
 Benthivore (open-lake fish):  
Maintain self-sustaining stocks 
of lake whitefish, round 
whitefish, sturgeon, suckers, 
and burbot.  The target yield of 
lake whitefish should be 1.8 to 
2.7 million kg.  Sturgeon can be 
enhanced by improving habitat, 
allowing fish passage past 
barriers, and promulgating 
effective regulations.  
 Sea lamprey:  Suppress sea 
lampreys to levels that allow for 
the achievement of fish 
community objectives. 
 Other:  Protect and sustain a 
diverse community of native 
fishes. 
 Physical and Chemical Habitat:  
Protect and enhance fish 
habitat; pursue the reduction 
and elimination of toxic 
chemicals. 
 A balanced, predominantly cool-
water fish community; walleye 
as the top predator; self-
sustaining species that occupy 
diverse habitats and provide 
valuable fisheries. 
 A predominantly cold-water 
community in the deep waters of 
eastern basin with lake trout and 
burbot as the key predators. 
 Ecosystem conditions:  Nutrient 
conditions that favor cool-water 
organisms. 
 Yield:  Sustainable harvest of 
13.6 to 27.3 million kg of highly 
valued fish. 
 Habitat:  Nearshore habitat that 
can support high quality fishes 
like bass, pike, muskellunge, 
yellow perch, and walleye. 
 River habitat:  Protect and 
restore stream-spawning stocks 
of walleye, white bass, 
sturgeon, and rainbow trout. 
 Western basin:  Sustainable 
harvests of walleye, yellow 
perch, bass, etc. 
 Central basin:  Sustainable 
harvests of walleye, yellow 
perch, bass, rainbow smelt, 
rainbow trout, etc. 
 Eastern basin:  Sustainable 
harvests of walleye, bass, 
yellow perch, whitefish, rainbow 
smelt, lake trout, rainbow trout, 
and other salmonids. 
 Contaminants:  Contaminants at 
levels that cause no detrimental 
harm to fish/humans. 
 Protect rare and endangered 
species. 
 Maintain a diversity of forage 
fish. 
 Food web:  Manage the food 
web structure to optimize 
production; recognize the 
importance of zebra/quagga 
mussels and mayflies. 
 Nearshore:  A diversity of self-
sustaining native fish 
characterized by walleye, yellow 
perch, sturgeon, bass, and 
American eels.  Indicators of 
success:  expansion of walleye 
range, maintenance of walleye 
catch rates, bass catch rate of 
the late 1980s, increased yellow 
perch, increased sturgeon, and 
a return of the American eel. 
 Offshore pelagic:  A diversity of 
salmon and trout, chinook 
salmon as the top predator, 
abundant steelhead trout, 
fishable populations of coho 
salmon and brown trout, higher 
populations of Atlantic salmon 
(with the investigation of self-
sustainability), increased wild 
trout and salmon, and a diverse 
prey community with the alewife 
as an important species.  
Indicators of success:  a healthy 
mix of trout and salmon, salmon 
and trout catch rates 
comparable to the early 1990s, 
high alewife abundances, 
continued increases in prey 
species like shiners and 
sticklebacks. 
 Offshore benthic:  An offshore 
benthic community with lake 
trout as the top predator, a 
growth in the whitefish 
populations, and rehabilitate 
prey species.  Indicators of 
success:  lake trout 
rehabilitation, expanded range 
of whitefish, whitefish catches of 
the early 1990s, increased 
catches of burbot, and 
increased ciscoes and burbot. 
 Ecosystem objectives:  Protect 
biodiversity, maintain ecosystem 

















Major changes in the 
lake/issues of 
importance noted in 
the objectives 
 Fish community reverting to a 
more natural state. 
 Lake trout and lake herring 
recovery. 
 Invasive species have 
permanently altered the system. 
 “Lake Superior is the least 
altered of the Great Lakes.” 
 Fishery recovering thanks to 
sea lamprey control, better 
regulations, stocking, improved 
herring recruitment, pollution 
controls, slower habitat 
destruction, and reforestation. 
 Lake trout, the major species, 
recovered to levels where 
stocking is minimal. 
 Purposefully introduced non-
native species have become 
naturalized. 
 Important species need more 
recovery:  sturgeon, walleye, 
brook trout. 
 Un-intentionally introduced 
species (e.g., sea lamprey) 
have had an impact. 
 Smelt and alewife (non-native 
species) dominate the forage 
base instead of the native 
bloater. 
 Fish community is in transition 
after large-scale changes of the 
1960s (sea lamprey and 
intentional stocking of non-
native species), but is stabilizing 
and recovering. 
 Harvest is falling more in line 
with what the lake can support. 
 Species introductions have had 
an impact. 
 Lake trout are mostly extirpated. 
 Declines in burbot, lake 
whitefish, and larger ciscoes. 
 A severely disrupted fish 
community caused by sea 
lampreys. 
 The combined effects of fishing, 
habitat destruction, and 
introduced species. 
 Abundance of alewife (an 
exotic) may have contributed to 
the extinction of three species of 
deepwater ciscoes and 
suppression of native forage 
fish, and the suppression of 
native predators. 
 Plantings of exotic salmonids in 
the late 1960s provided a put-
grow-take sport-fishery and 
helped control alewives. 
 Significant die-offs of chinook 
salmon occurred in the late 
1980s. 
 Exotic species (e.g., zebra 
mussel, ruffe, round goby) 
continue to invade and change 
the fish community. 
 Many native fish stocks were 
lost. 
 Pollution and toxic chemicals 
are at unacceptable levels. 
 Loss of many important native 
species. 
 Invasion and spread of exotic 
species. 
 Major species significantly 
impaired include lake trout, 
sauger, blue pike, lake herring, 
whitefish, and sturgeon. 
 Excessive nutrient enrichment 
(e.g., too much phosphorus) 
from the 1940s to the 1970s, 
caused by fertilizers, runoff, 
sewage and industry, caused 
eutrophication and increased 
oxygen depletion.  Phosphorus 
reductions have been 
successful, though perhaps to 
the extent of reducing the 
productivity of the lake. 
 The invasion of zebra and 
quagga mussels have caused 
dramatic changes in the Lake 
Erie ecosystem.  
 Mayflies have recovered from 
near-zero levels of the 1970s, 
providing a large source of food 
for fish. 
 Water quality has improved in 
recent decades. 
 The zebra and quagga mussel 
invasions have affected the 
ecosystem. 
 The biomass of prey fish like 
alewife and smelt has been 
reduced by 50%. 
 Salmon and trout stocking were 
reduced to balance predator 
and prey. 
 Habitat loss, water quality 
degradation, and invasive 
species, by the 1960s, 
contributed to the virtual 
elimination of large predators. 
 Fish stocking and sea lamprey 
control have resulted in 
improved abundances and 




 Commercial fishing (poor 
regulations, overfishing) 
 Destruction of habitat, 
particularly from sawmill 
operations—debris, waste, and 
dams—and pollution 
 Invasive species 
 Habitat management 
 Sea lamprey  
 Introduced exotic species 
 Competing demands from the 
public 
 Monitoring and research 
 Stocking 
 Habitat features are often 
beyond human control. 
 Few options exist to alter fish 
communities. 
 Imprecise or invariant affects of 
management actions. 
 Overexploitation 
 Watershed deforestation 
 Exotic species 
 Contaminants 
 Dams 
 Deterioration of tributary 
streams 
 Nutrient enrichment/reversal of 
nutrient enrichment  
 Invasive species.  Alewife 
predation of desirable fish 
larvae and eggs and their 
contribution to fish disease. 
 Habitat loss. 
 Water quality degradation. 
 Nutrients (e.g., phosphorus). 





 LAKE SUPERIOR LAKE HURON LAKE MICHIGAN LAKE ERIE LAKE ONTARIO 
Tools to achieve 
objectives 
 Regulate harvest 
 Stock fish 
 Protect and enhance habitat 
 Suppress non-native species 
 Work with environmental 
agencies 
 Maintain harvest surveys 
 Evaluate fish community health 
in terms range, status, and age 
structures of predators and 
bottom-dwelling fish. 
 Assess community balance and 
stability. 
 Determine the dominance of 
species. 
 Conduct special field surveys. 
 Determine natural reproduction 
of species. 
 Control sea lampreys. 
 Measure fish harvest. 
 Establish future harvest 
expectations. 
 Measure things that relate to 
ecological integrity. 
 Identify habitat impairments. 
 Restore native species or, if 
native species and non-native 
species are incompatible, give 
priority to native species. 
 Take steps to enhance natural 
reproduction. 
 Stock fish to restore fisheries, 
develop spawning populations, 
and provide fishing 
opportunities. 
 Prevent exotic species. 
 Develop recovery plans for 
threatened or endangered 
species. 
 Promote an “harmonic 
community” in Lake Erie to 
achieve balanced, stable, and 
predictable fish communities.  
Harmonic communities are 
groups of fishes that co-evolved 
in a way that makes them 
resistant to change.  This 
suppresses the emergence of 
undesirable fish communities 
(like those dominated by 
invasive species). 
 Maintain the Lake Erie 
committee. 
 Work closely with environmental 
and water quality agencies. 
 Improve coordinated 
assessment capabilities and 
data sharing. 
 Conduct law enforcement. 
 Ensure that fish harvest is 
consistent with restoration 
goals. 
 Trout and salmon abundance 
should be maintained to provide 
quality fishing opportunities 
without putting excessive 
predatory pressures on 
alewives.  Characteristics of the 
trout and salmon fishery will be 
preserved and alewife 
abundance maintained—even 
though this decision may 
impede progress towards 
objectives to rehabilitate native 
species.  (“To deliberately harm 
the highly valued trout and 
salmon fishery would be 
irresponsible given the clear 
preferences of the majority of 
stakeholders.”) 
How these fish 
community objectives 
differ from the others 
 This document emphasizes 
habitat protection and 
restoration more than the 
others, mainly because Lake 
Superior has experienced less 
habitat loss than the other lakes. 
 The fish communities of Lake 
Superior have seen success in 
rehabilitation.  The emphasis is 
often on protecting the gains. 
 These objectives provide very 
specific harvest targets for each 
species. 
 These objectives identify factors 
helping and hindering 
achievement of objectives. 
 These objectives provide a 
more-detailed description of the 
historical makeup of the fish 
community of Lake Michigan 
and ties that to the rationale for 
the desired fish community. 
 These objectives provide very 
specific harvest targets, but 
provides those targets as a 
range. 
 The goals and objectives are 
broader than in other 
documents and harvest targets 
for individual species are not 
provided, as the system is in a 
state of fluctuation.   
 Lake Erie supports an incredibly 
productive sport and 
commercial fishery for walleye 
and yellow perch, and 
objectives are reflective of 
measures necessary to sustain 
those important fisheries. 
 Lake Erie has been affected by 
the disruption of the food web 
caused by invasive species and 
nutrient (phosphorus) 
fluctuations.  These objectives 
focus heavily on those bottom-
up forces. 
 These objectives are unique in 
their particular emphasis on 
stakeholders and their 
preferences. 
 These objectives acknowledge 
the significant differences 
between scientific assessment 
of ecological trends and the 
stakeholder desires.  This posed 
a particular dilemma for the 
agencies in the development of 
these objectives. 
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